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Preface 
This book is the result of “communicative enthusiasm,” to borrow an ex-
pression that Pierre Bourdieu used in a rare statement of professional exu-
berance to characterize the cohesive interaction within his research group. 
Except for two guests – Dennis Büscher-Ulbrich and Timo Müller – all 
contributors to this volume were at some point members of a long-standing 
study group. Its research program has focused on the methodological ques-
tion addressed in the essays collected in the current volume, namely how to 
make use of the concepts of relational sociology, represented by Norbert 
Elias and Pierre Bourdieu, in the field of literary and cultural studies in 
general and in (African) American Studies in particular. The question 
emerged, as so often happens in our field, out of serendipitous reading – 
suggested, in this case, by my husband, Bernhard Buschendorf.  
The “communicative enthusiasm” developed above all during the com-
pact courses my husband and I would over many years jointly devise and 
teach, for instance, on “Key Concepts of Relational Thinking,” “Symbol 
Theories,” “Sociological Theories of Power,” or “Theories of Ideology.” 
Students, doctoral students, and young faculty members from the Depart-
ment of Comparative Literature at Universität Duisburg-Essen and from the 
American Studies Department of Goethe-Universität Frankfurt would meet 
at Haus Bergkranz, a university-owned house located in the picturesque 
Alpine village of Riezlern, Kleinwalsertal. There we would enter into very 
intense and, as it were, never-ending discussions, hardly interrupted even 
when we took a break hiking in the mountains or when in the evening we 
would sit at the bar – “playing one of the most extraordinary games that one 
can play, that of research” (Bourdieu, In Other Words 26). 
In grateful memory of the best of experiences academic life has to offer, 
I would like to thank all the participants of the seminars and reading groups 
who by entering the playfield and engaging in the exciting game of intellec-







Key Concepts of Relational Sociology   




More than one hundred and fifty years after the Emancipation Proclama-
tion, the history of slavery still looms large in the United States. The notion 
of a post-racial society that prospered under the nation’s first black presi-
dent mistook the admittedly significant advancement embodied by a politi-
cal icon for a substantial decline of discrimination against African Ameri-
cans. Quite to the contrary, under the Obama presidency systemic racism 
returned with a vengeance, most obviously in the substantial increase of po-
lice brutality – from targeting black youth with stop-and-frisk practices to 
the notorious cases of the killing of unarmed black men by police officers. 
The idea that a black family in the White House would lead to the color-
blindness of the nation may have been nourished by wishful thinking. To 
hold on to the illusion of colorblindness has become more difficult under 
the Trump presidency, as white supremacist groups increasingly feel en-
couraged to come to the fore. Ultimately, however, the widespread denial 
of a deeply ingrained racism rests on the powerful ideology of individual-
ism that constructs the individual as essentially free and thus fully respon-
sible for his or her fate. What on the one hand forms the core of the staunch 
American belief in upward mobility, known as the American Dream, on the 
other hand leads to the prevalent conviction that poverty, poor education, 
and bad housing must be mainly the responsibility of those who did not try 
hard enough to escape the unfavorable living conditions into which they 
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were born. Thus, black inequality – today manifested most obviously by 
what Loïc Wacquant has defined as the “hyperghetto” (cf. “Deadly Sym-
biosis”) – has frequently been blamed on African American culture rather 
than on structural conditions. In his discussion of the controversy between 
American liberals who commonly lean toward structural factors and con-
servatives who rather focus on aspects of culture, William Julius Wilson 
maintains:  
 
It is an unavoidable fact that Americans tend to deemphasize the structural origins 
and social significance of poverty and welfare. In other words, the popular view is 
that people are poor or on welfare because of their own personal shortcomings. Per-
haps this tendency is rooted in our tradition of “rugged individualism.” (Wilson 43)  
 
It is undoubtedly for this very belief in individualistic explanations that, 
notwithstanding the fact that “the majority of poor people in the United 
States are white, […] the public face of American poverty is Black” (Taylor 
49). As Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor notes, “ideologies do not work when 
they are only imposed from above. The key is widespread acceptance, even 
by the oppressed themselves” (25). Taylor does not address the question 
why the oppressed would accept an ideology that not only enhances dis-
crimination against themselves but also contributes to the reproduction of 
the inequalities of the given social order. Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Eli-
as, the sociologists on whose concepts the authors of this collection draw, 
do pose this question, and both formulate their answers on the basis of rela-
tional theories of power.  
In Bourdieu’s oeuvre it is the concept of “symbolic violence” that – in-
terrelated with the concepts of “habitus,” “field,” and “capital” – serves to 
explain why “the established order, with its relations of domination, its 
rights and prerogatives, privileges and injustices, ultimately perpetuates it-
self so easily, apart from a few historical accidents, and that the most intol-
erable conditions of existence can so often be perceived as acceptable and 
even natural” (Masculine Domination 1). As “a gentle violence, impercep-
tible and invisible even to its victims” (1), it contributes to the misrecogni-
tion of domination and thus to the reproduction of the established order.  
The normalization of unequal power relations is also a concern of Elias. 
In his essay “Towards a Theory of Established-Outsider Relations,” a con-
ceptualization of the field study The Established and the Outsiders he had 
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earlier undertaken together with John L. Scotson, he explicates various 
mechanisms meant to ensure that the uneven balance of power between two 
interdependent groups remains stable so that the group with a higher power 
ratio (called the “established”) manages to preserve its power superiority 
over the group with a lower power ratio (called the “outsiders”). According 
to Elias, an important means of the established to maintain their dominance 
is the application of “mechanics of stigmatisation” (9) that in the long run 
lead to the outsiders’ resignation, their acceptance of their allegedly lesser 
human worth. The effect of what Elias defines as “group disgrace” – com-
plementary to the self-assigned “group charisma” of the established – re-
sembles Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence and its consequences, 
namely naturalization: “Give a group a bad name and it is likely to live up 
to it.” (13) Like Bourdieu, Elias insists, then, on the longevity and rigidity 
of relations of domination. The “emotional barrier” that the established 
erect vis-à-vis outsiders, which defines closer contact with them as a taboo, 
“accounts for the often extreme rigidity in the attitude of established groups 
towards outsider groups – for the perpetuation of this taboo [...] for genera-
tion after generation, even if their social superiority, or, in other words, 
their power surplus diminishes” (8).  
One of the examples Elias gives for the effectiveness of such an emo-
tional barrier is the relation between the established in the United States, 
especially the descendants of slave-masters, and “the formerly enslaved 
group” (8), which causes the continuation of “a very uneven balance of 
power” (6) that notoriously lags behind all efforts on part of the state of 
providing institutional equality by legislation. It is not by accident that Elias 
avoids terms referring to ‘race’ or ethnicity to designate the outsiders of this 
figuration. “By using them,” he claims, “one singles out for attention what 
is peripheral to these relations (for example, differences of skin colour) and 
turns the eye away from what is central (for instance, differences in power 
ratio and the exclusion of a power-inferior group from positions with a 
higher power potential).” (16) Accepting Elias’s understanding of so-called 
“‘race relations’” (16) as established-outsider relations and regarding ‘ra-
cial’ conflicts as “at the core [...] always balance-of-power struggles” (22) 
makes us comprehend that the assessment of the relation of groups with an 
uneven power balance depends on considering the long-term development 
of their social dynamics as well as the longevity of power imbalances. This 
insight will prevent us from overestimating the effect that the social rise of 
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certain segments of the outsiders (such as the black bourgeoisie) or the rise 
of individuals to positions of power has on the situation of the great majori-
ty of outsiders.  
It is not by coincidence, then, that both sociologists would refer to the 
situation of Blacks in the United States in order to exemplify the long-term 
effects of domination. Just as Elias used Harper Lee’s best-selling novel To 
Kill a Mockingbird (1960) – set in segregated Alabama in the 1930s – to 
further develop his theory of established-outsider relations and to discuss 
the difference between the European and the American civilizing processes 
(“Further Aspects of Established-Outsider Relations: The Maycomb Mod-
el”),1 Bourdieu drew on a passage in James Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time 
(1963) to show the traumatic consequences that the exertion of symbolic 
violence has on the black family and how it shapes the habitus of African 
Americans (Pascalian Meditations 170; cf. Kopp in this volume, p. 229). 
What Bourdieu and Elias also have in common, as these examples illus-
trate, and what is of special interest to literary scholars, is that in their so-
ciological analyses they quite frequently make use of literary texts.2 Elias 
claimed that “used critically, novels can help to reconstruct a past society 
and its power structure for us” (The Germans 47). And Bourdieu, in one of 
                                                   
1  In comparison with Elias’s main work, The Civilizing Process, which traces the 
European development toward the formation of unified nation states with firmly 
established monopolies of physical force and the correlating long-term trans-
formation of modes of behavior toward an increasing self-control, his theory of 
established-outsider relations is a much neglected part of his oeuvre. The more 
important it is to understand what Cas Wouters points out in the editorial note to 
his edition of The Established and the Outsiders, i.e., that both theories “com-
plement each other,” the former focusing on “developments in the balance of 
controls” (external and internal), the latter concentrating on “developments in 
power balances” (“Note” xiii, my emphasis). Furthermore, Wouters states that 
from the essay “Towards a Theory” “it is obvious that Elias had the ambition of 
formulating a general theory of power relations” (xiv). On Elias’s sociological 
reading of Harper Lee’s novel, see Franke and Hirschfelder. 
2  For a record of Bourdieu’s writings on writers and literature, see Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 206n167; see Kuzmics for a survey and discussion of Elias’s refer-
ences to fiction. 
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his reflections on the “translation” of the social world into the literary work, 
comments as follows:  
 
The sensitive translation conceals the structure, in the very form in which it presents 
it, and thanks to which it succeeds in producing a belief effect (more than a reality 
effect). And it is probably this which means that the literary work can sometimes say 
more, even about the social realm, than many writings with scientific pretensions 
[…]. But it says it only in a mode such that it does not truly say it. (Rules of Art 32, 
original emphasis)3  
 
From the point of view of the literary scholar, Stefanie Mueller suggests 
that “it is the relevance he grants the acting agent’s perspective from which 
the usefulness of Bourdieu’s theory for literary studies stems” (16). 
While the affinity of Bourdieu and Elias to literary texts is of special in-
terest to the discipline of the sociology of literature, the more important 
question for the current project is what, in turn, must be considered the 
methodological function of concepts of relational sociology for African 
American studies in general and, as is the case in this collection, for the in-
terpretation of (literary) texts by black authors, in particular. As this volume 
focuses on issues of power, the above-mentioned concepts of Bourdieu’s 
and Elias’s theories of power are pivotal to our approach.4 What do they 
have to offer in comparison, for example, with the more widely known and, 
certainly in the discipline of cultural studies, more frequently applied 
                                                   
3  Cf. also “Understanding,” an essay on sociological hermeneutics, wherein 
Bourdieu points out similarities between transcribed interviews and literary 
texts: “By virtue of the exemplification, concretization and symbolization which 
they effect, and which at times give them a dramatic intensity and an emotional 
force close to those of a literary text, the transcribed interviews can have the ef-
fect of a revelation [...]. Like parables of prophetic speech, [...] they render tan-
gible the objective structures which scientific work strives to expose, doing so 
even by way of the most individual characteristics of enunciation.” What Bour-
dieu asserts of transcribed qualitative interviews, literary scholars also claim of 
literary texts: “Being able to touch and move the reader, to reach the emotions, 
without giving in to sensationalism, they can produce the shifts in thinking and 
seeing that are often the precondition for comprehension.” (Weight 623)  
4  See Fowler for a differentiated comparison of the two theories of power. 
16 | CHRISTA BUSCHENDORF 
Foucauldian power theory? As useful as Michel Foucault’s theorizing of 
the disciplinary power exerted by institutions is for an understanding of the 
coercion of the modern subject, he does neglect in his influential Discipline 
and Punish “forms of social constraint much more subtle than those that 
operate through the drilling (dressage) of bodies” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
196). Those concepts of subtle forms of violence direct the attention to the 
necessity of “revealing the wellsprings of power,”5 hidden to the extent that 
they are not recognized by social agents who tend to take the order of 
things for granted and thus, without being aware of it, become complicit in 
their own domination (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 167). Bourdieu’s and 
Elias’s power theories offer concepts that draw our attention to forms of 
domination that – in literature as well as in life – are often overlooked or 
misrecognized and that with our perspective sharpened by the theoretical 
tools of relational sociology we are then capable of discovering and dissect-
ing (cf. Buschendorf and Franke 101).  
However, the most fundamental principle of relational or figurational 
sociology6 is relational thinking itself. In its attempt to transcend the false 
antinomy of objectivism and subjectivism (cf. Bourdieu, Pascalian Medita-
tions 188-89), the relational mode of thought breaks with “all forms of 
methodological monism that purport to assert the ontological priority of 
structure or agent, system or actor, the collective or the individual,” against 
which both Bourdieu and Elias insist on the “primacy of relations” 
                                                   
5  In his eponymous essay, Bourdieu maintains a structural resemblance between 
sociology and comedy: “Sociology has an affinity with comedy, in that it re-
veals the wellsprings of authority. Through disguise [...], parody [...] or carica-
ture, Molière unmasks the hidden machinery that makes possible the production 
of the symbolic effects of imposition and intimidation, the tricks and dodges that 
make up the powerful and important of all ages …” (135; cf. Buschendorf and 
Franke 80) 
6  Elias introduced the term “figuration” as a simple tool that would allow concep-
tualizing “individual” and “society” not as two different or even antagonistic ob-
jects, but relationally. As a term supposed to characterize his theory, Elias pre-
ferred “process sociology” to “figurational sociology” (Mennell 20). For a com-
parison between “fields” (Bourdieu) and “figurations,” see Dépelteau 278-79, 
285-88. 
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(Wacquant, “Social Praxeology” 15).7 Both these “resolute advocate[s] of 
the relational conception of the social” (15) see in ordinary language with 
its structural preference for expressing things rather than relations, states ra-
ther than processes, a major obstacle for the systematic development of re-
lational thinking (cf. 15). Thus, Elias expounds, “we always feel impelled 
to make quite senseless conceptual distinctions, like ‘the individual and so-
ciety,’ which makes it seem that ‘the individual’ and ‘society’ were two 
separate things, like tables and chairs, or pots and pans” (What is Sociolo-
gy? 113). Elias’s study, The Society of Individuals, condenses in its title a 
statement that another radical relational thinker, Karl Marx, expressed in 
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie as follows: “Society does 
not consist of individuals; it expresses the sum of connections and relation-
ships in which individuals find themselves.” (qtd. in Wacquant, “Social 
Praxeology” 16)  
According to Bourdieu, the challenge of the social scientist becomes to 
“hold together, so as to integrate them, both the point of view of the agents 
who are caught up in the object and the point of view on this point of view 
which the work of analysis enables one to reach by relating position-takings 
to the positions from which they are taken” (Pascalian Meditations 189).8 
Consequently, the object of sociology is neither the ‘individual,’ “naively 
crowned as the paramount, rock-bottom reality by all ‘methodological indi-
vidualists’” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 126), nor ‘society,’ but rather the re-
lation between “a socialized subjectivity” that Bourdieu calls “habitus” and 
the social space divided into “fields,” “defined as a network, or a configura-
tion, of objective relations between positions” (97). There is a historical 
                                                   
7  For comparative analyses of the two relational thinkers, see Paulle, van Heerik-
huizen, and Emirbayer; Dépelteau (with further references).  
8  The integration of the “subjectivist” and the “objectivist vision” (Pascalian 
Meditations 188) takes a conscious effort of methodological reflection on the 
part of the sociologist. Thus, Bourdieu demands “epistemic reflexivity” 
(Wacquant, “Social Praxeology” 36-46) and insists on an epistemological break 
or rupture with commonsense perceptions. Elias shares this concern, to which 
attest the numerous methodological reflections throughout his work; on the spe-
cial problem of social scientists who in contrast to natural scientists are simulta-
neously objects and subjects of the investigation, see especially the title essay in 
Involvement and Detachment.  
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dimension in these two interrelated key concepts; both are “realizations of 
historical action” (126, original emphasis). As Bourdieu writes, “[t]he 
habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices – 
more history – in accordance with the schemes generated by history.” 
(Logic 54) Understood as incorporated history and embodied social struc-
ture, habitus can account for the fundamental factor in the lives of African 
Americans: the continuity of the past in the present.  
As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, applied to African 
American literature and culture, the conceptual tools of relational sociology 
heighten our awareness of the power dynamics that have dominated the 
lives of Blacks in the United States for centuries. What Bourdieu finds with 
regard to gender power relations in Virginia Woolf’s novel To the Light-
house, i.e., “an incomparably lucid evocation of the female gaze” (Mascu-
line Domination 69), the contributors to this essay collection reveal in Afri-
can American texts. Black Americans are also disposed to evoke the lucid 
gaze of the oppressed and, like Woolf, they of course do so with the help of 
aesthetic devices, so that the artwork, to repeat Bourdieu’s comment, “says 
it only in a mode such that it does not truly say it.”9  
Thus, in addition to drawing on the concepts of relational sociology, it 
takes the tools of hermeneutics to bring to light what the texts “truly say.” 
This collection’s purpose is twofold. On the one hand, its articles contribute 
to the ongoing debate about relations of domination in the experience of 
Blacks in the United States; on the other hand, the essays are – in part im-
plicit – theoretical explorations of the approach of relational sociology to 
African American studies. While Elias and Bourdieu are among the most 
highly renowned sociologists of the 20th century and while they have 
                                                   
9  The narrative instrument Bourdieu finds particularly efficient in Woolf’s novel 
is indirect free speech with its “‘fade-in, fade-out’ technique” (Masculine Domi-
nation 72, 74); cf. Mueller’s narratological discussion of this type of focaliza-
tion in Morrison’s Paradise (50-53). As I pointed out elsewhere, “the fusion of 
outer with inner reality which is an essential feature of the third-person narrated 
monologue, is the ideal point of view for rendering the interrelation of a charac-
ter’s position in social space and the person’s habitus” (“Narrated Power Rela-
tions” 236). Interestingly, in her contribution to this volume Astrid Franke 
demonstrates that the use of narrated monologue is not limited to fiction, but 
may occur in poetry as well (47 ff.).  
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figured prominently in the sociology of literature, they have so far not in-
spired many scholars to use their conceptual tools of relational sociology in 
literary and cultural studies.10 It is for this reason that the following sum-
maries emphasize the articles’ methodological aspects and, by quoting ex-
tensively especially from Bourdieu’s writings, provide the opportunity to 
become further acquainted not only with the various instruments of rela-
tional-sociological thinking, but also with modifications of their meaning. 
Although many contributors refer to Elias’s established-outsider theory, he 
figures less prominently than Bourdieu. Nevertheless, it is important to un-
derstand that one of the basic principles of the approach is the assumption 
that the two theories are complementary and that in the practice of interpre-
tation their conceptual tools have proven compatible.  
Most articles trace and interpret power dynamics in literary texts by 
such classic black writers as Gwendolyn Brooks, Richard Wright, Ralph 
Ellison, and Toni Morrison, as well as two contemporary authors, Colson 
Whitehead and Percival Everett. Then there is a series of three articles deal-
ing with diverse power struggles under the conditions of neoliberalism: 
from the role of self-commodification in position-takings in the field of rap 
and the fabrication of an idealized type of black homeless man to the 
demonization of a victim of police brutality. The penultimate contribution 
defines the outsider position of Civil Rights activist Bayard Rustin. The 
volume ends with a theoretical and political intervention, a discussion of 
the critique of Bourdieu from the perspective of Jacques Rancière. 
The first article addresses a desideratum of the approach, namely the 
evidence of its applicability beyond the genre of realist fiction. Astrid 
Franke pursues the introductory reflections on method further by voicing 
major challenges the lyrical genre presents to the literary critic who inter-
prets African American poetry on the basis of concepts of relational sociol-
ogy. In Bourdieu’s theory of the literary field, Franke states, poetry marks 
the most autonomous of literary genres; however, African American poets 
used to be highly dependent on a literary market dominated by whites, from 
patrons to publishers. Furthermore, the question arises whether the 
                                                   
10  In the United States, the fragmentary reception of Elias and the ambiguous re-
ception of Bourdieu have certainly hindered any substantial transdisciplinary ef-
forts. For reasons responsible for reservations in the American academy, see 
Wacquant, “Bourdieu in America”; Buschendorf, Franke, and Voelz 3-5. 
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homology between the world of fiction and the world of the author which 
Bourdieu posits in The Field of Cultural Production can be detected in a 
genre known for its scarcity of references to reality. In a similar vein, 
Franke claims, we may ask whether poetry “with its traditionally more lim-
ited scope of the social, may yet contribute to a detailed analysis of it” (35). 
Finally, and more generally, she wonders what influence the author’s posi-
tion-taking in the literary field may have on the acuity of the vision of the 
social laid out in the text, and she asks whether it is possible to keep apart 
what Bourdieu considers interdependent, namely “a sociology of the liter-
ary (field) and a literary (text) sociology”?  
Franke starts out by localizing Gwendolyn Brooks’s position in the field 
of African American poetry. It is characterized by a propensity for the 
reigning style of modernism and simultaneously a marginal position with 
regard to the male writers (represented by Langston Hughes and Richard 
Wright) dominating the field. This position, Franke maintains, correlates 
with Brooks’s highly ironic style which prevents the reader from defining 
the poet’s moral and political stance in the dilemmas exposed in the two se-
lected poems, “The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith” from her first volume of 
poetry, A Street in Bronzeville (1945), and “A Bronzeville Mother Loiters 
in Mississippi. Meanwhile, a Mississippi Mother Burns Bacon” (1960), a 
daring juxtaposition of the mother of Emmett Till and Carolyn Bryant, the 
woman at whom the black teenager had allegedly whistled and whose hus-
band and brother-in-law thereupon lynched him. While both lyrical texts 
have been objects of highly controversial (political) debates, Franke opts 
for going beyond the existing alternative interpretations – on the basis of re-
lational sociology. “The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith,” she claims, “might 
be called a sociological dissection of the habitus of a lower-class black man 
from Chicago in the 1940s” (36). As she shows in her close reading, 
Brooks’s portrait of Satin-Legs Smith offers not only a very detailed depic-
tion of his taste, but also conveys the origin of that taste in the collective 
history of African Americans and his social environment. “Brooks,” Franke 
states, “anticipates a number of central claims Bourdieu formulates in Dis-
tinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (1979): Taste is ‘the 
product of upbringing and education’ (xxiv) and ‘art and cultural consump-
tion are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfill a social 
function of legitimating social differences’ (xxx).” (39) Yet the precision of 
Brooks’s definition of Smith’s taste is juxtaposed with utter indeterminacy 
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in the question of the evaluation of this taste, when the poet introduces a 
counter-voice in the form of an addressed “you,” an audience that repre-
sents a more conservative taste, yet remains ultimately indistinct with re-
gard to race and class. Brooks keeps a distance by ironizing both Smith and 
“you” in a similar way that she seems to stay aloof from both women in her 
poem on Emmett Till’s murder. She has the political courage to offer a very 
detailed and complex “socio-psychological portrait of a white woman” (46) 
the sheer ambiguity of which makes it impossible for the reader to decide to 
what extent Brooks sympathizes with this “victim of a racist patriarchal or-
der” (47). As Franke argues by drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts of sym-
bolic violence and habitus, Brooks confronts us with a carefully document-
ed case of masculine domination, with a protagonist misrecognizing the 
very power structures that lead to the racial physical violence as well as the 
interdependent symbolic gender violence.  
Stephan Kuhl’s reconstruction of Richard Wright’s literary practice, 
which combines Freud’s psychoanalytical concept of “sublimation” with 
Bourdieu’s relational-sociological theory of practice and its core concept of 
“bodily knowledge,” addresses a question raised by both: How is the sexual 
instinct transformed into a social libido? (cf. Bourdieu, Practical Reason 
78-79; 57-58) Kuhl’s focus is on the constituting factors that went into the 
writing of the key scene of Wright’s Native Son, wherein – based on a 
childhood memory recovered by the psychoanalyst Frederic Wertham – 
Bigger Thomas unintentionally kills Mary Dalton. His analysis not only 
unearths information of interest about the author, but, more generally, pro-
poses a theory of creativity. In great detail, Kuhl examines the social and 
psychological conditions responsible for producing what in modification of 
Bourdieu’s concept of split habitus he defines as Wright’s “oppositional 
habitus” (65). The oppositional structure of Wright’s dispositions derives 
from the two contradictory forces shaping his early life. There was the in-
tellectual encouragement he received from his mother, a schoolteacher, and 
there was the experience of poverty and Jim Crow oppression in the 1930s 
South. As Kuhl explains, the former led to Wright’s intellectual disposition 
and the acquisition of incorporated cultural capital, whereas the latter 
severely limited his access to institutional cultural capital and furthermore 
subjected him to the effects of symbolic violence exerted in the name of ra-
cial segregation. Based on Bourdieu’s methodological assumptions in The 
Rules of Art, i.e., that “the practices of writers [...] are the product of the 
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meeting of two histories, the history of the production of the position occu-
pied [in the literary and artistic field] and the history of the production of 
the dispositions of its occupants” (256; cf. 59), Kuhl then examines 
Wright’s position in the literary field of the Harlem Renaissance and finds 
him suspended between the two rival positions represented by the “proletar-
ian intellectualism” of Langston Hughes and the “academic intellectualism” 
of W. E. B. Du Bois (66). Corresponding to his opposition to the major po-
sitions of the literary field, his oppositional habitus was “the structuring 
principle of Wright’s literary practice in 1940 – and thus the structuring 
principle of Native Son,” (68) which Kuhl – by combining relational-
sociological and psychoanalytic arguments – defines as “dispositional sub-
limation” (71). It suggests that Wright’s oppositional habitus allows for the 
integration of both his intellectual and his bodily knowledge into the crea-
tive process and its product. “Wright’s bodily writing,” Kuhl argues, “al-
lows for an equally bodily reading of his text, a reading that, however, has 
as its necessary condition the reader’s own incorporated disposition to un-
dergo the effects of symbolic violence, in particular as they relate to the on-
going histories of racism and capitalism, the two major forces in the struc-
turing of the bodily disposition that Wright inscribed into his text.” (73) 
Nicole Lindenberg’s interpretation of Ralph Ellison’s unfinished novel 
focuses on the prominent theme of father-son-relations and their signifi-
cance for (African) American history. In addition to the work’s edited ver-
sion, published under the title Three Days Before the Shooting… in 2010, 
Lindenberg draws on drafts and notes from the author’s extensive papers in 
the Ellison Archive. On the basis of her selection of published and un-
published material Lindenberg develops her central thesis: In his narrative 
of three generations of fathers and sons, Ellison creates on a psychological 
level a repetition of typical generational conflicts; at the same time he sug-
gests that on a historical level this repetitive pattern reproduces the existing 
social order. With the aid of the tools of relational sociology – focusing on 
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence and his habitus-field theory – 
Lindenberg highlights the interrelation between family history and national 
history. On the level of familial relations, she concentrates on the symbolic 
violence exerted by the father upon the son in the form of charisma. As her 
analysis of numerous father-son encounters shows, they follow what 
Bourdieu defines as an effect of symbolic violence, namely, “the transfigu-
ration of relations of domination and submission into affective relations, the 
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transformation of power into charisma or into the charm suited to evoke af-
fective enchantment,” which, he adds, “can be seen particularly well in re-
lations between generations” (Practical Reason 102; cf. 80). In contrast to 
Bourdieu, who due to his interest in the reproduction of domination empha-
sizes the force of symbolic power rather than the potential of resistance, 
Ellison stresses the struggles of the sons against the strong emotions evoked 
by the fathers’ charisma. But while the sons at first manage to distance 
themselves from the fathers, the latters’ charismatic power proves its long-
lasting impact when the sons, owing to their primary habitus, turn into 
charismatic fathers themselves: “[A]t the very moment when Hickman be-
comes a father himself,” Lindenberg writes, “he experiences a change that 
confuses him the more as it turns him into a father who resembles his own 
father.” (95) Ellison links family history explicitly to national history 
through the father figure of Abraham Lincoln. Confronted with the Lincoln 
memorial in Washington, D.C., the most prominent of the novel’s fathers, 
Reverend Alonzo Zuber Hickman, displays the typical ambiguity of the 
son. The scene reveals an inner conflict with regard to habitus formation, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, a “split habitus.” As the archival material enables 
Lindenberg to show, Ellison conceived of Hickman’s split habitus as a con-
sequence of the confrontation with his own charismatic preacher father. 
The last son in the novel’s sequence of generations seems to break the 
chain by killing his politically powerful, racist father. However, the circular 
structure of the narrative – the published novel starts with the scene of the 
murder followed by the long narration of events that occur “three days be-
fore the shooting” – suggests the presence of the past, that is, the reproduc-
tion of domination. 
In his analysis of Sag Harbor (2009), Marlon Lieber juxtaposes Colson 
Whitehead’s novel with Touré’s 2011 book Who’s Afraid of Post-
Blackness?, in which the writer and TV host propagates “post-Black rugged 
individualism.” As his review of Sag Harbor reveals, Touré reads the novel 
as a document of post-blackness, that is, committed to the notion of the 
black individual’s allegedly limitless choice of identity options. However, 
claiming the freedom of choice and potential success for all Blacks, as 
Touré does, means ignoring social conditioning. In contrast, Lieber argues, 
Whitehead’s work is not a Bildungsroman focusing, like Touré’s own text, 
on the educational process of one individual, but rather “a novel about a 
particular class fraction and their manners” (104). As such it lends itself 
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particularly well to an interpretation drawing on Bourdieu’s relational soci-
ology, “which is essentially a theory of the reproduction of class differ-
ences” (104). In his close readings of representative scenes from Sag Har-
bor, Lieber shows how the African American protagonist, 15-year-old 
Manhattan-raised Benji, struggles during his summer vacation in an upper-
middle-class black Long Island community to come to terms with the class 
positions of the various groups around him (the established of the neighbor-
ing white community, the norm-setting older generation of Blacks, the 
black youth drawn to the cultural practices of the ghetto). For example, as 
much as he would like to join in the complicated handshake routines and 
“the grammatical acrobatics” (111) of black slang perfected by a group of 
friends not socialized in private schools, Benji’s habitus of the black bour-
geoisie prevents him from adapting their ghetto lifestyle. As Lieber claims, 
Whitehead’s novel does not support the post-black notion of the individu-
al’s free choice and responsibility, but rather “is fully committed to the 
(Bourdieusian) idea that individuals possess embodied dispositions that tac-
itly shape the manner in which they perceive the world, think, and act” 
(104). Sag Harbor clearly portrays the distinctions that mark the boundaries 
between different social spaces that promote the reproduction of a class so-
ciety. 
Like Whitehead’s Sag Harbor, the satiric novel I Am Not Sidney Poitier 
(2009) by Percival Everett takes up current debates about ‘race’ in the 
United States by alluding, for example, to the notion of an alleged “post-
racialism” or the so-called “culture of poverty.” More generally, it deals 
with dynamics of racial oppression within the group of the dominated. As 
Johannes Kohrs shows in detail, Everett uses a great range of literary de-
vices that he takes from the great reservoir of black humor – ranging from 
the hyperbolic, such as satire or farce, often overlapping with the absurd, to 
more subtle forms, such as parody or irony. They all function as strategies 
of subversion in that they draw attention to the mechanisms of power rela-
tions. The comic as well as other forms of humor are capable of unmasking 
symbolic violence (cf. Buschendorf and Franke 80-82). Everett’s satire fo-
cuses on the social complexity evoked by symbolic violence to which the 
dark-skinned protagonist, Not Sidney, is exposed during a visit to his girl-
friend’s upper-class, color-conscious family and their posh home. For his 
analysis, Kohrs employs “Bourdieu’s theoretical dyad of symbolic violence 
and habitus [...] as an interpretative prism to zoom in on the social nuances 
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of Not Sidney’s negotiation of his own ‘place’ in the racial order” (131). 
The protagonist’s pre-conscious, bodily reactions to the situation, which 
culminate in contradictory emotions of “uneasy fascination” (135), insecu-
rity, and ambivalence, can be explained, Kohrs contends with Bourdieu, by 
the “effect of symbolic domination [...] exerted not in the pure logic of 
knowing consciousness but in the obscurity of the dispositions of habitus, 
in which are embedded the schemes of perception and appreciation which, 
below the level of the decisions of the conscious mind and the controls of 
the will, are the basis of a relationship of practical knowledge and recogni-
tion that is profoundly obscure to itself” (Pascalian Meditations 170-71; 
132).  
Skin color is also at the core of Toni Morrison’s latest novel, God Help 
the Child (2015). Bride, the protagonist, is a thriving business woman in the 
black beauty industry whose success “is crucially based on her self-
marketing [...] focused on her very dark skin which she highlights by wear-
ing only white clothes” (146). As Stefanie Mueller reminds us in a brief 
survey of the history of the rise of black business men and women and its 
representation in Morrison’s novels, success stories of black female entre-
preneurship have been rare in American history and, accordingly, in the au-
thor’s oeuvre. The question whether the exceptional economic agency 
granted to the protagonist (“the fact that she is doing the selling herself – 
rather than being sold as African slaves were for centuries,” 154) can be 
seen as a sure sign of autonomy and self-identity and thus as a model of 
contemporary black womanhood, Mueller answers by drawing on Bour-
dieu’s interrelated concepts of habitus and field. “Specifically,” she states, 
“this article borrows the idea of agency as emerging from the interrelation-
ship between institutions and habitus, between history objectified and histo-
ry embodied [...]. Bourdieu’s understanding of agency stresses practical 
knowledge, embodiment, and history in a way that accounts for the endless-
ly creative acts and strategies by which agents navigate social fields – at the 
same time that it takes serious the limited horizon of possibilities available 
to any agent at any moment in his or her trajectory.” (147) In her analysis, 
Mueller demonstrates that throughout Morrison’s novels female economic 
agency connected to the black beauty industry is dominated both by white 
beauty ideals and consumer capitalism. As much as Bride may strive for 
self-possession in order to acquire genuine agency, she is bound to fail as 
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she and her partner Booker cannot escape a past that is “inscribed in their 
bodies and that structures the world that is available to them” (159). 
Timo Müller’s contribution on rap music is based on the assumption 
that there is a remarkable structural homology between Bourdieu’s concept 
of “field” and the concrete field of hip hop. By definition, a field is “metho-
dologically inseparable from the field of stances or position-takings (prises 
de position), i.e., the structured system of practices and expressions of 
agents” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 105). In a field defined as a “space of 
conflict and competition” (Wacquant, “Social Praxeology” 17, original em-
phasis), all players engage in struggles for power or authority in order to 
improve their access to the kind of profits that are at stake in the respective 
game, or field. But while commonly such position-takings in the “struggles 
for usurpation and exclusion” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 106) remain pre-
conscious, the field of rap differs from other fields in that position-taking is 
at the very core of the cultural practice of rapping. Thus, Müller argues, 
“Bourdieu’s sociology of fields is particularly useful for a literary-
sociological analysis of rap music [...] because it foregrounds an aspect of 
social interaction that rappers have continually discussed and performed: 
position-taking” (165). Jay Z’s intro to the album In My Lifetime, Vol. 1 
(1997), from which the title of the essay is taken, illustrates how rap lyrics 
thematize position-taking as an essential strategy in the game and, at the 
same time, are themselves position-takings in the field, “drawing on various 
markers of status and legitimacy specific to the field” (166). As Müller 
points out quoting Bourdieu, position-takings “challenge the alternative be-
tween an internal reading of the work and an explanation based on the so-
cial conditions of its production or consumption” (Rules of Art 231; cf. 
169), that is, the concept allows combining the aesthetic with the sociologi-
cal dimension of the songs. In the second part of his essay, Müller sketches 
historical transformations in the field of rap since the mid-1990s – when “a 
new generation of rappers began to redefine the popular perception of rap 
music by incorporating strategies from other fields, especially from pop 
music and the economic field” (176) – and addresses the changes in the 
kind of capital considered indispensable for profitable position-taking in 
three case studies: Kool Moe Dee’s rap battle with Busy Bee Starski 
(1981), Ice-T’s “O.G. Original Gangster” (1991), and Jay Z’s “Empire 
State of Mind” (2009). 
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While Timo Müller analyzes the self-fashioning of successful rappers in 
the field of hip hop, Wibke Schniedermann focuses on the opposite pole of 
the African American social scale, drawing attention to the use of the mad-
genius stereotype in narratives about black homelessness. The stories she 
examines depict a highly-gifted violinist who due to mental illness drops 
out of the renowned Juilliard School of Music, thereby tapping into the 
widely accepted concept of the mad genius that falsely correlates creativity 
with insanity. As Schniedermann argues based on Bourdieu’s critical re-
flections in The Field of Cultural Production, the “insistence on uncondi-
tioned, ‘uncreated’ creativity [...] presupposes a relation of mutual depend-
ence between giftedness and inherent (and thus naturalized) illness. It there-
fore dismisses out of hand any attempt at situating both artist and artwork 
within the context of the conditions that rendered them possible and of the 
structures of which they are the product.” (139; cf. 185) Positioning the 
black homeless man in the field of artistic production, “in which the glorifi-
cation of ‘great individuals’” is particularly common (29), is then a perti-
nent strategy of individualization which allows to regard the homeless-
turned-artist as being separate from society. While the marketing of these 
texts emphasizes that they are based on “true stories,” the mad-genius ste-
reotype suppresses both the bleak reality of the lives of black homeless men 
and any discussion of its systemic foundation. In her survey of the Ameri-
can history of homelessness and its public image, Schniedermann high-
lights the shift from white male to black male homelessness and provides 
the major reasons (ghettoization and criminalization) for the current 
overrepresentation of black men among the U.S. homeless population. In 
the second part of her article, she renders close readings of two versions of 
the mad-genius stereotype, Steve Lopez’s The Soloist (2008), which is 
based on the author’s factual meeting with the homeless African American 
Juilliard dropout Nathaniel Ayers, and the movie adaptation (2009) starring 
Jamie Foxx and Robert Downey Jr. The construction of the protagonist as a 
‘true artist’ idealizes the life of the homeless by suggesting, for example, 
that he has the great privilege of endless free time and thus enjoys an en-
viable freedom. In other words, The Soloist transforms Ayers’s underprivi-
leged status into a source of his happiness. As Schniedermann concludes, 
the “frame of the mad genius elicits sympathy for the individual while at 
the same time facilitating a tacit dismissal of race, class, and social condi-
tionality” (200). 
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With Luvena Kopp’s article “Understanding Ferguson,” we move from 
the individualized and romanticized image of black homelessness to the 
case of a demonized victim of state violence, 18-year-old Michael Brown 
who was killed in Ferguson, Missouri, on August 9, 2014 by police officer 
Darren Wilson. Schniedermann’s and Kopp’s contributions expose the log-
ic of “methodological individualism” (Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations 
155) whose function it is to hide systemic racism and its historical, eco-
nomic, and legal causes. While both articles draw on the seminal article 
“Deadly Symbiosis” by Wacquant, “a rigorous contemporary proponent of 
relational sociology” (207), Kopp also highlights his Punishing the Poor, as 
she interprets Ferguson’s law enforcement and penal system as an example 
of the neoliberal “establishment of a new government of social insecurity” 
(11). She devotes the first part of her analysis to a historical sketch of the 
racialized divisions in St. Louis and its suburb Ferguson, from the racial po-
licing of Jim Crow sundown towns to today’s claims for domination over 
public space, for example, by persecuting jaywalking and generating city 
revenue by extracting (traffic) fines and fees mainly from its poor black 
population. As Kopp argues with Bourdieu, social space is contested as a 
significant site of power struggles: “Because social space is inscribed at 
once in spatial structures and in the mental structures that are partly pro-
duced by the incorporation of these structures, space is one of the sites 
where power is asserted and exercised, and, no doubt in its subtlest form, as 
symbolic violence that goes unperceived as violence.” (Weight 126; cf. 
211) Social divisions that are objectified in physical space are in turn trans-
lated into categories that reproduce the very dividing lines in the percep-
tions of social agents. Kopp demonstrates this interrelation between the ma-
terialist and the symbolic dimensions of domination on the basis of state-
ments by witnesses and an extended analysis of officer Wilson’s grand jury 
testimony. As these testimonies reveal, symbolic violence is exerted by at-
tributing to Blacks as a group of outsiders cultural deviance, for instance, 
with respect to their alleged irresponsibility or the imagined threat emanat-
ing from the demonized black body. This strategy of ‘blaming the victim’ 
has the function of legitimizing state violence, a mechanism that ultimately 
leads to the reproduction and naturalization of racialized power. As Kopp 
summarizes the legal outcome of the case in Bourdieusian terms, “the grand 
jury’s decision not to indict Wilson for the killing of Brown [...] was the 
socio-logical outcome of the lawful ‘encounter between [the subjective 
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structures of] the habitus and [the objective structures of] a field, between 
incorporated history and an objectified history’” (Logic 66, original empha-
sis; cf. 223-24). Thus, “Wilson’s exoneration can be read as an official con-
secration of his (symbolic) power: of his authority, his representation, and, 
ultimately, of the murder itself” (224). 
Nicole Hirschfelder’s article on the symbolic struggles of definition 
concerning Civil Rights activist Bayard Rustin and his legacy draws pri-
marily on Elias’s theory of established-outsider relations. Rustin belonged 
to the inner circle of Martin Luther King, Jr. and was a major organizer of 
the movement, responsible, for example, for the famous March on 
Washington in 1963; and yet, despite his undoubtedly eminent position, he 
was ignored until the 1990s and since then still has been largely neglected 
in historiography. The common explanation for this so-called “silencing” 
is: No wonder, not only was he gay, but a former communist as well, two 
qualities sufficient to ostracize any American, let alone a black man. How-
ever, Hirschfelder argues, the case is more complicated than it may at first 
appear and, in addition, qualifies for the more general question what kind of 
power dynamics lead to a transformation of oppression that ultimately 
guarantees its reproduction. Following Elias’s principle of considering 
long-term developments in relations of interdependent groups, Hirschfelder 
looks at the impact of the constructs of both ‘race’ and ‘class’ on the fabri-
cation of Rustin’s legacy in (African) American collective memory. The 
complexity of his case arises above all from his membership in one of the 
most renowned American religious denominations: He was socialized as a 
Quaker. Hirschfelder argues that the image of Rustin’s political activism is 
forged by changing processes of selection, most importantly, the neglect of 
his Quakerism. Rustin’s upbringing as a black Quaker not only accounts for 
his influence on King’s pacifist stance; more importantly, it makes him a 
member of a highly privileged group of the established among the estab-
lished who “in hindsight were considered the spiritual founding fathers” of 
the nation (248). To be raised as a Quaker means sharing their habitus and 
their we-ideal as well as participating in the cultural and social capital as-
cribed to the Religious Society of Friends. Rustin, then, profited from the 
group charisma of the established which made him less vulnerable to the 
stigmatization that he experienced as a black homosexual. Not surprisingly, 
Rustin became known for his untiring efforts of mediating between the 
groups to which he belonged; however, his attempts to transcend the 
30 | CHRISTA BUSCHENDORF 
boundaries between the respective established and outsiders challenged 
their very we-identity and necessarily met with resistance. As Hirschfelder 
argues, it is Rustin’s Quaker habitus “that makes his development into one 
of the great Civil Rights leaders more plausible than mere contingence” 
(248). On the other hand, it is the same sense of empowerment and privi-
lege derived from participating in the Quaker group charisma that led both 
the established and the various outsider groups to which he belonged to 
suspect him of being a traitor and consequently to distort his legacy.  
The volume concludes with a critical intervention by Dennis Büscher-
Ulbrich who, by presenting Jacques Rancière’s anti-sociological disagree-
ment with Bourdieu’s relational concepts, raises the fundamental “question 
of the relationship between social science and emancipation” (259). 
Rancière’s critique is above all directed against Bourdieu’s concepts of 
“symbolic violence” and “misrecognition,” as they imply that the dominat-
ed cannot perceive their own domination and consequently, according to 
him, are denied political agency. More generally, Rancière criticizes what 
he sees as the hierarchical structure of Bourdieu’s thinking that places the 
sociologist above the excluded, turning the latter into a mere object of in-
vestigation. From the point of view of a theory of politics, then, the power 
theory of relational sociology is ineffective, since it necessarily prevents 
emancipation. In contrast, Rancière holds the fundamental assumption of 
unconditional equality, which ascribes equal powers of speech and thought 
to everybody. As Büscher-Ulbrich points out, Rancière derives the core 
idea of his philosophical project from Kant’s and Schiller’s belief in the 
emancipatory potential of aesthetics. Against Bourdieu’s allegedly deter-
ministic view of the transformative potential of the dominated, a charge he 
shares with many of Bourdieu’s critics, Rancière insists on the possibility 
of emancipatory social transformation by rethinking politics from the per-
spective of the excluded who, in the formulation of Büscher-Ulbrich, are 
said to be capable of “disrupt[ing] not only the power arrangements of the 
social order, but also its perceptual and epistemic underpinnings, the obvi-
ousness and naturalness that attaches to it” (258). With its epistemological-
ly different stance, Rancière’s radical critique of relational sociology pro-
vides a valuable opportunity to reflect upon the fundamentally opposing as-
sumptions of the two theories. It may be the more surprising that Rancière’s 
concept of racism as “a passion from above” is comparable to Wacquant’s 
thesis of the “neoliberal government of social insecurity.” Linked to Kopp’s 
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interpretation of Ferguson as a paradigm of the neoliberal state’s systemic 
racism, the last contribution of this volume leads the debate on power rela-
tions beyond the problem of racial domination, asking “the pressing ques-
tions of what material and symbolic constraints on subjectivity and agency 






Bourdieu, Pierre. “The Contradictions of Inheritance.” The Weight of the 
World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society. 1993. By Bourdieu et 
al., translated by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al., Stanford UP, 1999, 
pp. 507-13. 
—. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 1979. Translat-
ed by Richard Nice, Harvard UP, 1984. 
—. The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature. Edited 
by Randal Johnson, Polity P, 1993. 
—. The Logic of Practice. 1980. Translated by Richard Nice, Stanford UP, 
1990.  
—. Masculine Domination. 1998. Translated by Richard Nice, Stanford UP, 
2001. 
—. Pascalian Meditations. 1997. Translated by Richard Nice, Stanford UP, 
2000. 
—. Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. 1994. Translated by Gisele 
Sapiro, Randal Johnson et al., Stanford UP, 1998. 
—. “Revealing the Wellsprings of Power.” Political Interventions: Social 
Science and Political Action, edited by Frank Poupeau and Thierry 
Discepolo, translated by David Fernbach, Verso, 2008, pp. 133-36. 
—. The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. 1992. 
Translated by Susan Emanuel, Stanford UP, 1996. 
—. “Understanding.” The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Con-
temporary Society. 1993. By Bourdieu et al., translated by Priscilla 
Parkhurst Ferguson et al., Stanford UP, 1999, pp. 607-26. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc J. D. Wacquant. An Invitation to Reflexive Soci-
ology. U of Chicago P, 1992.  
32 | CHRISTA BUSCHENDORF 
Bourdieu, Pierre, et al. The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Con-
temporary Society. 1993. Translated by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et 
al., Stanford UP, 1999.  
Buschendorf, Christa. “Narrated Power Relations: Jesse Hill Ford’s Novel 
The Liberation of Lord Byron Jones.” Civilizing and Decivilizing Pro-
cesses: Figurational Approaches to American Culture, edited by 
Christa Buschendorf, Astrid Franke, and Johannes Voelz, Cambridge 
Scholars, 2011, pp. 227-62. 
Buschendorf, Christa, and Astrid Franke. “The Implied Sociology and Poli-
tics of Literary Texts: Using the Tools of Relational Sociology in 
American Studies.” American Studies Today: New Research Agendas, 
edited by Winfried Fluck et al., Winter, 2014, pp. 75-104. 
Buschendorf, Christa, Astrid Franke, and Johannes Voelz. Introduction. 
Civilizing and Decivilizing Processes: Figurational Approaches to 
American Culture, edited by Christa Buschendorf, Astrid Franke, and 
Johannes Voelz, Cambridge Scholars, 2011, pp. 1-16. 
Dépelteau, François. “Comparing Elias and Bourdieu as Relational Think-
ers.” Norbert Elias and Social Theory, edited by Dépelteau and Tatiana 
Savoia Landini, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 275-95. 
Elias, Norbert. The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic In-
vestigations. 1939. Translated by Edmund Jephcott, Wiley-Blackwell, 
2000. 
—. “Further Aspects of Established-Outsider Relations: The Maycomb 
Model.” 1990. The Established and the Outsiders, by Elias and John L. 
Scotson, vol. 4 of The Collected Works of Norbert Elias, edited by Cas 
Wouters, U College Dublin P, 2008, pp. 209-31. 
—. The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. 1989. Edited by Michael Schroeter, 
translated by Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell, Columbia UP, 1996. 
—. Involvement and Detachment. Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
—. “Towards a Theory of Established-Outsider Relations.” 1965. The Es-
tablished and the Outsiders, by Elias and John L. Scotson, vol. 4 of The 
Collected Works of Norbert Elias, edited by Cas Wouters, U College 
Dublin P, 2008, pp. 1-36. 
—. What is Sociology? 1970. Translated by Stephen Mennell and Grace 
Morrisey, Columbia UP, 1978. 
INTRODUCTION | 33 
Elias, Norbert, and John L. Scotson. The Established and the Outsiders: A 
Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems. 1965. Vol. 4 of The 
Collected Works of Norbert Elias, edited by Cas Wouters, U College 
Dublin P, 2008. 
Fowler, Bridget. “Pierre Bourdieu und Norbert Elias über symbolische und 
physische Gewalt.” Symbolische Gewalt: Herrschaftsanalyse nach 
Pierre Bourdieu, edited by Robert Schmidt und Volker Woltersdorff, 
UVK, 2008, pp. 75-102. 
Franke, Astrid, and Nicole Hirschfelder. “‘Maycomb was itself again’: 
Wandel und Resilienz einer ungerechten Ordnung.” Aufruhr – Kata-
strophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall: Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der 
Kulturwissenschaften, edited by Ewald Frie and Mischa Meier, Mohr 
Siebeck, 2014, pp. 197-228. 
Kuzmics, Helmut. “Literature and Sociology in Elias’s Work.” Norbert 
Elias and Human Interdependencies, edited by Thomas Salumets, 
McGill-Queen’s UP, 2001, pp. 116-36.  
Mennell, Stephen. The American Civilizing Process. Polity, 2007.  
Mueller, Stefanie. The Presence of the Past in the Novels of Toni Morrison. 
Winter, 2013. 
Paulle, Bowen, Bart van Heerikhuizen, and Mustafa Emirbayer. “Elias and 
Bourdieu.” The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays, edited by 
Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner, Anthem, 2011, pp.145-72. 
Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation. 
Haymarket Books, 2016.  
Touré. Who’s Afraid of Post-Blackness? What It Means to Be Black Now? 
Free P, 2011. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. “Bourdieu in America: Notes on the Transatlantic 
Importation of Social Theory.” Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, edited 
by Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma and Moishe Postone, Chicago UP, 
1993, pp. 235-62.  
—. “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh.” Pun-
ishment & Society, vol. 3, no. 1, 2001, pp. 95-133. 
—. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. 
2004. Duke UP, 2009. 
—. “Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s 
Sociology.” An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, by Pierre Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, Chicago UP, 1992, pp. 2-59.  
34 | CHRISTA BUSCHENDORF 
—. “Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu.” 
Sociological Theory vol. 7, no. 1, 1989, pp. 27-63. 
Wilson, Julius William. More Than Just Race: Being Black and Poor in the 
Inner City. Norton, 2009. 
Wouters, Cas. “Note on the Text.” The Established and the Outsiders, by 
Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, vol. 4 of The Collected Works of 
Norbert Elias, edited by Wouters, U College Dublin P, 2008, pp. xi-xx. 
 
 
Satin-Legs Smith and a Mississippi Mother 




To read African American poetry with the help of Pierre Bourdieu is a chal-
lenge in at least three ways: With regard to his field theory, there is a ten-
sion between a genre that, since the end of the 19th century, seems most 
closely positioned toward the pole of autonomous literature on the one 
hand, and an oppressed group whose literature has only slowly emancipated 
itself from the economic dependence of a market dominated by whites, on 
the other. This in itself is a curious situation that warrants further elabora-
tion, but to continue for a moment with the implications suggested by 
Bourdieu’s The Field of Cultural Production, one may also wonder to what 
extent poetry can provide the researcher with enough of a fictional world to 
detect homologies between the world of the author and the world of the 
text. The second task then is to show that poetry, with its traditionally more 
limited scope of the social, may yet contribute to a detailed analysis of it. A 
third challenge is not limited to poetry and concerns a possible connection 
between a sociology of the literary (field) and a literary (text) sociology: If 
the struggles for a position in the literary field shape a literary text so that 
literary criticism can overcome “the opposition between internal analysis 
(text) and external analysis (context)” (Bourdieu, “Passport” 245), how 
does that shape the text’s vision of the social? Will the vision be particular-
ly acute or will there be blind spots depending on the struggles – or are 
these two possible ways to use Bourdieu for literary analysis separate from 
each other? 
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I will not be able to provide full-fledged answers to the third challenge, 
but in the following I want to elaborate on it via an examination of poetry. I 
will develop my sense that while we may find literary insights into the so-
cial that we may ‘see’ more easily with the help of concepts such as sym-
bolic violence, we and the text may also have blind spots that are possibly 
connected with the struggles we, at our time, and the text are engaged in. 
There is always, in one of Bourdieu’s frequently repeated phrase, “vision 
and division” (“The Social Space” 726; “Eine sanfte Gewalt” 227), and the 
reason they come to light through literature is that they are not synchro-
nized when critics look at older texts. To demonstrate this, I have chosen 
two poems by Gwendolyn Brooks that seem well suited to make this argu-
ment because, first, they so clearly present a psycho-sociological analysis 
of an almost Bourdieusian kind. Secondly, both poems, though quite differ-
ent in content and technique, have been read as social critique, directed at 
forms of domination based on race and gender, but they have also been 
accused of catering to white tastes (cf. Bryant 114-15). I would like to ex-
plore the plausibility of these readings and relate them back to the vision 
and division that may be found in them. 
“The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith” from Brooks’s first volume of poet-
ry, A Street in Bronzeville (1945), might be called a sociological dissection 
of the habitus of a lower-class black man from Chicago in the 1940s. Its 
subject matter and modernist form bear the traces of Brooks’s socialization 
in the field of poetry. Like other African American poets at that time, such 
as Robert Hayden or Melvin Tolson, Brooks drew on the poetic experi-
ments associated with Modernism on the one hand and the Harlem Renais-
sance on the other. In her case, James Weldon Johnson advised her to read 
T. S. Eliot (Kent, A Life 26), Langston Hughes encouraged her to turn to 
African American street life as subject matter for poetry (40), and Richard 
Wright established a contact with the publisher Harper & Brothers (62) and 
suggested an important revision of the initial manuscript: Without “Satin-
Legs,” the collection lacked “one real long good [poem]” to pull everything 
together, he felt (63). He also thought the opening poem “the mother” to be 
weak since abortion was not a fit subject for poetry.1 
                                                   
1  In contrast, cf. Harold Bloom, who devotes a large section of his chapter on 
Gwendolyn Brooks to “the mother” (15-16). 
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These names do not simply denote individuals but are important to un-
derstand the relations and dynamics in African American literature in the 
early 1940s: More than is the case for the novel or drama and theater, the 
process of consecration in poetry in the 19th and 20th centuries has often 
happened through single, charismatic figures or small ‘schools’ of poetry. 
Since there is so little money to be made with poems, strong institutional-
ized market mechanisms are missing before the entry of the university into 
the field of poetry. Thus, 19th-century poetry was dominated by figures 
such as Henry W. Longfellow or James Russell Lowell; the beginning of 
the 20th century saw the rise of “heretics” such as T. S. Eliot or Ezra Pound 
who, by the mid-1940s, were well on their way to consecration themselves: 
Eliot received the Nobel Prize in 1948, Pound the Bollingen Prize in 1949. 
Though both poets had made efforts to reach a larger public (through dra-
ma, criticism, and not least Pound’s radio speeches), their poetry was ini-
tially directed against both Romantic personal expression and Victorian 
moral guidance in poetry. Against these popular forms, they advocated a 
detachment created by impersonal voices, impersonations or masks, and by 
irony. 
Hughes and Wright are important for Brooks because of their self-
confident embrace of urban African American subject matter, and perhaps 
also for their difficult relations with political organizations on the left, par-
ticularly the Communist Party. Due to the political developments of the 
1930s and 40s, African Americans found their emancipatory struggles en-
meshed with a number of groups, organizations, and institutions of the left 
in both politics and culture. These did not prescribe a common aesthetic – 
in fact, though there was a widespread belief in the importance of literature 
for racial emancipation (as there was in the Harlem Renaissance), there was 
no dominating doctrine about the relation between the two realms.  
Langston Hughes’s poetry, like T. S. Eliot’s, challenged 19th-century 
sensibilities, but it did so primarily through the inclusion of urban African 
American experiences and vernacular forms, such as the Blues, which in-
spired his poetic experiments. When Hughes wrote “I, too, sing America,” 
he claimed an American heritage that goes back to Walt Whitman. To insist 
on the social responsibility of literature to include those previously exclud-
ed is not a tradition only upheld by racial minorities, but one that can also 
claim a ‘white’ genealogy. For reasons too complex to explain here, the 
American literary field always had a strong bias toward a heteronomy 
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embraced as necessary to a social function of literature. To be recognized 
as an important element of a democratic culture necessitates a certain popu-
larity, and this leads to a greater permeability between popular forms pro-
duced for a mass audience and complex artistic forms produced for a lim-
ited audience: “[T]aste levels and aesthetic forms were never separated as 
categorically as in Europe” (Fluck 53).  
Any poet entering the subfield of poetry in the 1940s would have felt 
the strong current of Modernism becoming the new accepted way to write. 
Its formal elements thus lose their exclusivity and become available for 
projects of a more politically conscious and socially responsive kind, such 
as explorations of the plight of workers or of urban low life. However, 
Hughes as a possible model and Wright as a direct supporter also point to a 
possible problem: Even though Hughes himself is often quite balanced with 
regard to the attention he gives to men and women, Wright’s comment on 
“the mother” points to a predominantly masculine stance in literary explo-
rations of the ghetto where women hardly appear as mothers and are most 
likely to appear as Blues singers or prostitutes. 
The opening lines of “Satin-Legs” at once position the speaker within 
the field as described above. With Latinate words and irony at Smith’s ex-
pense, the speaker establishes a defamiliarizing stance toward both the 
flashy male protagonist and his female lovers in their world of poverty and 
prostitution. The detached voice of a participant observer – someone famil-
iar with the world of her objects of study yet distant enough to observe, an-
alyze, and explain them – then begins to describe the Sunday routine of 
Satin-Legs with particular attention to his tastes in scents, clothes, music, 
movies, food, and finally women: He prefers strong aromatic lotions and 
oils to more subtle scents of flowers, cannot think of gardening as an aes-
thetic or educational occupation, likes colorful, spectacular clothes, has 
never heard classical music and probably cannot understand it, ritually boos 
white lovers in movies, and appreciates both in his food and in his women 
all the explicit signs that they will nourish his physical and sexual hunger. 
His taste is a marker of race, class, and gender; it has been formed by 
Smith’s individual life trajectory (his upbringing in the rural South, his mi-
gration to Chicago, his life in Bronzeville), as well as by the history of his 
ancestors, leading back to slavery. The way this socialization has shaped 
his taste can also be deduced from the poem: The reason why Smith likes 
strong smells and loud colors and why subtleties and understatement are 
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lost on him is that his senses are numbed by his environment. His partial 
blind- and deafness (“he sees and does not see,” “he hears and does not 
hear” 13) is a defense against the thwarted ambitions and betrayed promis-
es, the misery and poverty that have surrounded him all his life. By con-
trast, a taste for “quiet arts” (15) needs education and material comfort over 
a couple of generations. 
Taste then is a social, not an individual fact. It emerges as a set of aes-
thetic preferences at the intersection of social norms and economic and po-
litical interests – with this, Brooks anticipates a number of central claims 
Bourdieu formulates in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of 
Taste (1979/1984): Taste is “the product of upbringing and education” 
(xxiv) and “art and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and 
deliberately or not, to fulfill a social function of legitimating social differ-
ences” (xxx). Smith’s taste arises out of the limits of his socialization (a 
lack of education, poverty) and thus mirrors and marks these limits while 
also being a means of momentarily transcending or perhaps forgetting 
them.  
In the poem, these insights are brought forward in defense of Smith – or 
so it seems, initially. They are made, as the reader suddenly discovers in 
line 12, in an address to a (plural) “you” who advocate a very different 
taste: “You” appear to be so critical of Smith’s use of heavily scented bath 
oils that they are suspected of wanting to deny him these pleasures. Theirs 
is a restrained, unpretentious middle-class taste, as opposed to Smith’s loud 
expressiveness: Contrasts provided in the poem are those between the mar-
ble of sculpture vs. the flesh of his body; between Saint-Saëns, Grieg, 
Tchaikovsky, and Brahms vs. the Blues; between a “straight tradition” (11), 
“the quiet arts of compromise” (15), and “middle grace” (15) on the one 
hand and “baroque, / Rococo” (13) and “affable extremes” (15) on the oth-
er. There are two passages where the criticism of extravagance is given a 
more specific socio-historical context: One is the war-time insistence on re-
straint in consumption as a patriotic service, particularly with regard to the 
zoot suit, extensively described as “wonder-suits in yellow and in wine, / 
Sarcastic green and zebra-striped cobalt” (12); the second is a reflection on 
gardening as part of social reform in a progressivist style when we are en-
tering the minds of “you”: “might his happiest / Alternative (you muse) be, 
after all, / A bit of gentle garden in the best / Of taste and straight tradi-
tion?” (11). Toward the end of the poem, when the description of his taste 
40 | ASTRID FRANKE 
in women and food converges in terms of excess and lack of control, we 
know that aesthetic values are also seen as moral values: The disapproval of 
Smith’s tastes by “you” is also a disapproval of him as a man. 
It is this implied moral condemnation of Smith that is rejected by a de-
fense of his taste. But while the sociological explanations refute any psy-
chologizing charges of innate aesthetic and moral deficiencies, they do not 
establish an idea about the value of that taste – it simply is what it is. In to-
day’s parlance we would probably say: It is part of his identity and thus no 
longer subject to discussions of value. This is by now a widespread as-
sumption in cultural studies, sometimes accredited to Bourdieu.2 What we 
realize through the poem is the fact that aesthetic relativism – all tastes be-
ing equally valuable – stands in an uneasy relation to social reforms tied to 
education in taste: school gardening, free or subsidized concerts, music and 
art lessons in school, etc.: If tastes arising from wealth and those arising 
from poverty are considered equally valuable they do not provide an angle 
to argue for change.3 If, however, some tastes, and by implication some 
forms of art (or food, or music, or clothes), are regarded as better than oth-
ers, this is elitist in its value judgment (because the taste is likely to be that 
of the dominant social formation) but at the same time this assumption can 
be consistently used to argue for an education of taste as part of social re-
form. This is the position “you” hold and that is refuted by the speaker – so 
what is the poem’s stance? That we should at least consider social change is 
made clear in the most explicitly political passage of the poem: 
 
Ah, there is little hope. You might as well— 
Unless you care to set the world a-boil 
And do a lot of equalizing things, 
Remove a little ermine, say, from kings, 
                                                   
2  Cf. During: “Bourdieu has been important to cultural studies [...] because, for 
him, cultural production [...] has particular functions and particular laws which 
[…] demystify the old opposition between ‘high’ and ‘low’ or, to put this more 
accurately, mean that high art has no more inherent value than other forms of 
cultural production.” (89) 
3  Cf. Honneth on Bourdieu in Die Tageszeitung. The problem is the foundation of 
norms, which, Bourdieu would argue, are never “universals” but historical out-
comes of power struggles. 
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Shake hands with paupers and appoint them men, 
For instance—certainly you might as well 
Leave him his lotion, lavender and oil. (11-12) 
 
Whatever the stance on revolution, we understand that the relativist posi-
tion suggested at the end is not borne by a genuine respect for men like 
Smith, nor by the belief that the strong scents of lotions and oils Smith pre-
fers and the flowers “you” prefer are equally valuable. It is rather a cop-out, 
a cheap solution once one realizes that only a redistribution of wealth, pow-
er, and access to education can change the differences in taste and thus the 
hierarchies demarcated by them. Therefore, an exploration of taste, when 
tied to the attempt to change it, is a far more radical endeavor than we all 
(the speaker, “you,” and the reader) may have thought. Aesthetic prefer-
ences are not played out in a world apart from politics and economics but 
tied to them. Whosoever is not prepared for radical change may well 
“[l]eave him” his oil (12). Why not stop then? Since the poem now asks the 
reader explicitly to “proceed” and “inspect” Smith more closely (12), it 
seems more interested in exploring his taste than it is in change. 
There is no critical consensus as to the politics of this poem, and the di-
visions begin, understandably, with the question of who is addressed. The 
majority of critics initially regarded the addressee with the bourgeois taste 
and reformist intentions to be white (cf. Bolden 37; Miller 103-04; Smith 
36; Stanford 164). Recently it has been conceded that these attitudes may 
have been found amongst a black middle and upper class as well. Marsha 
Bryant, for instance, states: “Brooks interrogates both her middle-class 
black readers’ notions of respectability and her liberal white readers’ fasci-
nation with black urban life, resisting their respective tendencies to view 
Smith as either a bad example or a representative figure” (117). On the oth-
er end of the spectrum, Bill Mullen believes the “you” to be the black striv-
ers deeming themselves to be above Smith and “straining to escape its 
[poverty’s] mark” (163). 
Historically, with regard to a real as well as an implied audience, every-
thing is possible. As Brooks’s contemporaries Horace Cayton and St. Clair 
Drake point out in their sociological study Black Metropolis (1945), there 
had been an influx of African American migrants to Chicago in the last 
decades of the 19th century. In the interviews conducted by Drake these 
early migrants claimed, probably casting the past in an all-too-rosy light, 
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that there had been plenty of opportunities for work and almost no racism 
before a second wave of migrants from the South arrived in the so-called 
Great Migration. Throughout the beginning of the 20th century, there were 
tensions within the black population of Chicago between the old arrivals 
and the newcomers: As so often in migrant history, the people who arrived 
earlier felt their achievements of integration threatened by the newcomers 
(cf. Cayton and Drake 174-213). The more established and ‘respectable’ 
black middle and upper class might plausibly constitute the addressee of the 
poet; perhaps the repeated lines “you forget” (11) support the idea that there 
are people who could know the conditions Smith springs from if they 
would only care to remember.  
On the other hand, the repeated “you forget” after the mentioning of 
baroque and rococo is also a general reminder that taste is historical and 
that what they now look down upon was once an acceptable style cherished 
by social elites. This reading does not have to assume an exclusively black 
readership. It is also possible to read Brooks’s poem as imagining a “you” 
consisting of black and white readers united by the belief in a “straight,” 
modest, unpretentious style as both aesthetically and morally superior to 
Smith’s. Likewise, it is not necessary to distinguish between an interest in 
either respectability or voyeurism along racial lines, as Bryant does: The al-
lusions to Progressivist reform and “counsels on control” (15) allow us to 
assign the respectable taste to whites as well. Likewise, as Christopher 
Bigsby points out in a short history of the term “liberal” in the context of 
The Second Black Renaissance, when pertaining to a belief in reform rather 
than more radical change “liberal” may refer equally to Blacks and whites 
(6) – just as the critique of the liberal position as ineffectual was uttered by 
whites (Edmund Wilson) and Blacks (Richard Wright) alike (17-18). The 
lines above might well be read as directed toward whites who need to un-
derstand that human worth and dignity is a right and not a privilege. Or, 
like Richard Wright’s poem “Child of the Dead and Forgotten Gods,” as 
impatient with a liberal position of primarily whites but also Blacks who 
believe that the situation in urban African American ghettoes can be im-
proved by gentle moral and aesthetic education. Or as ridiculing the black 
bourgeois who have reduced race rebellion to “consumer preference” 
(Mullen 164). 
A concomitant divisive issue is the poem’s stance toward black vernac-
ular culture and its representative. There is a tendency to see Smith either as 
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hampered and constrained by circumstances, which are thereby condemned, 
or else as celebrated for his vitality and triumph over circumstances. A cru-
cial instance is a judgment about Smith’s pursuit of love and sex where, 
clearly, taste and morality converge. For R. Baxter Miller, Smith’s date 
with the “ironic ‘lady’” (106) is not celebratory but ironic. He also finds the 
juxtaposition of the Blues with 19th-century composers ironic and believes 
that the poem ultimately does not approve of Smith’s preferences and es-
capism. He sees a discrepancy between Brooks’s humanist values and a 
man who cannot escape his demeaning environment and becomes absurd in 
the end. A more recent example is Bill Mullen’s reading, likewise pointing 
to “an ironic play of elements” at the end of the poem, comprising sex and 
mass-marketed food (the “Woolworth mignonette” 16) in a rewriting of 
Wright’s Bigger Thomas: “Smith is an acclimated and unalienated Bigger 
blindly and ravenously at home among the comestibles.” (166)  
According to Judith Saunders, however, “The Sundays of Satin-Legs 
Smith” is rather a reworking of T. S. Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock” – with Brooks alluding to Eliot’s poem throughout, establishing 
an ironic contrast between “a man of low status and low income who never-
theless manages his life more competently than does his wealthy, high-
status counterpart in Eliot’s poem” (16). Saunders concludes: “The effect of 
allusion in Brooks’s poem, finally, is to compel appreciation of Smith’s un-
subdued vitality. Refusing to succumb to despair or self-pity, even in an 
environment that would excuse such surrender, Smith triumphantly revers-
es nearly every one of Prufrock’s failures.” (17) Though Saunders also 
wants to read the poem as “an unmistakable indictment of the economic 
and social system responsible for Smith’s circumstances” (16), the final as-
sessment of its overall effect approaches current trends in psychology and 
sociology concerned with “resilience” – the power to withstand otherwise 
devastating circumstances. A celebration of someone who triumphs in the 
face of poverty and deprivation is not easy to reconcile with social criti-
cism. Saunders wants to be careful not to read a devaluation of African 
American popular culture into Brooks’s poem. Miller from a humanist 
point of view and Mullen from a Marxist one want to condemn the condi-
tions (including the insufficient artistic choices available) that severely 
limit men like Smith in either their humanity or in their consciousness of 
racial and class identity. 
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These different readings are possible not just because of some general 
ambiguity but because of a logical inconsistency at the core of the poem, 
linked to a particular use of Modernist aesthetics for which Gwendolyn 
Brooks was recognized and praised: her tight control over meter and rhyme, 
latinate words, alliterations, and, tied to it, an all-pervasive irony resulting 
from the discrepancy of complex poetic means and subject matter. Irony is 
important here because it is a rhetorical means of division, of inclusion and 
exclusion: It separates people who can discern what is really meant as op-
posed to those who only understand what is said. In Eliot’s “Prufrock,” dif-
ferent layers of irony appeal to a readership ready to support the avant-
gardist onslaught against the 19th century: These readers acknowledge the 
self-ironic, disillusioned, and dispassionate stance of the aging Prufrock but 
they will not make the mistake of identifying themselves with that voice – 
and the poem, of course, does not ask them to. While irony leading to satire 
is part of social critique with a clear target, the more diffuse irony of 
“Prufrock” is not easy to reconcile with social engagement. In Brooks’s po-
em, it seems at times as though “you” is the target of satire, but since Smith 
is also treated with ironic detachment, neither the target nor the speaking 
position can easily be identified. This is irritating because the poem engag-
es in normative discussions and thus demands a standpoint. 
Two motifs can be examined to illustrate this further: The recurring mo-
tif of hunger and need for food could be read as suggesting that even 
though Smith is able to “go out full” (15) at Joe’s Eats, he is not satisfied 
on a deeper level. There is a diffuse need for scent (“There must be scent, 
somehow there must be some” 11), as well as a general neediness: “People 
are so in need, in need of help. / People want so much that they do not 
know” (12). On his way to breakfast, Smith “swallows sunshine with a se-
cret yelp” (13); in the street there are “men estranged / From music and 
from wonder and from joy / But far familiar with the guiding awe / Of 
foodlessness” (14). What a man can bring to music includes “what he ate / 
For breakfast—and for dinner twenty years / Ago last autumn: all his 
skipped desserts” (14). In the cinema, “it is sin / For his eye to eat of” (15) 
the whiteness of the heroine – announcing the convergence of sexual and 
dietary nourishment at the end. We may conclude from these examples that 
even though Smith is a kind of performance artist himself, his aesthetic 
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hunger is not satisfied – his performance only serves the purpose of gratify-
ing his hunger for food and sex.4 
Another motif occurring throughout the poem which not only describes 
Smith but also seems to judge him is the faux pomp of an anachronistic, 
vaguely medieval kind. It is announced in the opening lines: “Inamoratas, 
with an approbation, / Bestowed his title. Blessed his inclination” (10) and 
continues with words like “royal” and “reign,” the comparison of his closet 
to a “vault / Whose glory is not diamonds, not pearls, / Not silver plate with 
just enough dull shine” (12), and the comparison of his “hysterical ties” 
with “narrow banners for some gathering war” (12). It might be too much 
to compare his layers of clothing with an armor, but when he “Squires his 
lady to dinner”, the woman wearing “Queen Lace stockings,” (15) we are 
back with the discrepant image of aristocrats in the ghetto which ridicules 
both the squire and his lady. Confusingly, the above-quoted temptation to 
do equalizing things is also phrased in terms from that semantic field: “Re-
move a little ermine, say, from kings, / Shake hands with paupers and ap-
point them men” (12). It is confusing because Smith has been described as 
both “king” and “pauper,” with one figurative gesture of the poem being to 
remove his royal pretensions and reveal his nakedness underneath for 
everyone to see. 
Perhaps the great distance that results from the many ironies surround-
ing Smith reflects Brooks’s social distance to him in class and gender. Her 
portraits of black women (as in the poems “the mother,” “hunchback girl: 
she thinks of heaven,” or “a song in the front yard”) carefully interweave 
inside and outside, depicting the life of the mind in a particular environ-
ment. However, Brooks does not shy away from portraying the minds of 
men, too: In A Street in Bronzeville, “Satin-Legs” is balanced by “Negro 
Hero,” a monologue by a soldier who is acutely aware of the hypocrisies 
                                                   
4  Furthermore, the claim that the men in the street are “estranged / From music” 
(14) also devalues the choices on offer in the ghetto, such as the Blues. Here as 
in other places we may suspect that the speaker, though explaining Smith’s 
taste, is secretly in agreement with “you” that Smith’s choices are inappropriate 
and deplorable. Formally, the poem certainly favors “control” which can be de-
tected in tightly composed lines with internal rhymes and alliterations such as: 
“He waits a moment, he designs his reign, / That no performance may be plain 
or vain” (10). 
46 | ASTRID FRANKE 
involved in fighting a war in a segregated army for democracy elsewhere. 
Of all characters in the volume, it is Satin-Legs – the would-be artist and 
designer, the one still hungry for aesthetic experience – who is almost ex-
clusively characterized with regard to his appearance and whose inner life 
is strangely vague and empty: “the pasts of his ancestors lean against / Him. 
Crowd him. Fog out his identity.” (14) He possesses no self-consciousness 
and thus no race- or class-consciousness. Instead, he has been made to think 
that “he walks most powerfully alone, / That everything is—simply what it 
is” (15). He is not consciously affected by the misery of his environment, 
he is neither prefiguring a black aesthetic for the poet, nor is he a possible 
agent of social change – he is no threat to the social order. It is in lieu of his 
blurred vision and fogged mind that the poet can use his performance for a 
display of her skills in portraiture without revealing her own stance. Ironi-
cally, the skillful portrait of a hollow figure becomes a centerpiece to the 
volume while leaving open a central question, namely that of the relation 
between literature and expressive culture on the one hand, and political ac-
tion on the other. 
Brooks received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1946 and the first Pulitz-
er awarded to an African American for her second volume, Annie Allen, in 
1950. Through these prizes, she developed a reputation that allowed for a 
more powerful stance toward literary institutions, such as publishing hous-
es, universities, editors, that were, of course, still predominantly white. This 
may be seen in a poem that goes way beyond the portrayal of poor urban 
Blacks and crosses the color-line to offer a socio-psychological portrait of a 
white woman. Equally daring is its allusion to a spectacular instance of rac-
ism in the South, which, because of its media coverage, shook a national 
public. Brooks’s “A Bronzeville Mother Loiters in Mississippi. Meanwhile, 
a Mississippi Mother Burns Bacon” (1960) juxtaposes and parallelizes 
Mamie Till, mother of Emmett Till, and Carolyn Bryant, the woman Till 
had allegedly whistled at. Emmett was tortured and killed by Bryant’s hus-
band and his half-brother. In 1960, most people reading Brooks could be 
assumed to know about Till and the trial, in which the murderers were ac-
quitted (cf. Metress). Contrary to what one might expect from the title, the 
first poem is actually about Carolyn, followed by only four broken lines 
called “The Last Quatrain of the Ballad of Emmett Till” which attempt to 
capture a psychological state by using the colors black, gray and red to ex-
press the inner turmoil of Mamie Till. While an image of her state of mind 
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is the last thing we are left with, she is not given a voice and thus the poem 
contrasts markedly with the first, much longer one.  
Taken together, these aesthetic choices have irritated critics with regard 
to their moral implications. The discussions about the long poem revolve 
around the question to what extent Brooks sympathizes with Carolyn and 
portrays her as a victim of a racist patriarchal order: Does the poem follow 
a process of gradual awakening, how far does this awakening approach a 
realization of complicity and guilt, and is this enough to be morally and po-
litically satisfying? An example of a harsh judgment is George E. Kent, 
who, in 1981, criticized Brooks for considering “a white woman, who was 
the source of the lynching of an early adolescent Black boy, simply as 
mother” (“Aesthetic Values” 90). A more recent article concludes instead: 
“Brooks’s apparent sympathy for the white woman as the pawn of domi-
neering white men is subverted as she deconstructs the romance within the 
woman’s mind and thereby holds the woman responsible for her complicity 
in the myth, and consequently, in the murder.” (McKibbin 667) 
In this poem, ambiguity results from a technique that often fuses the 
voice of the protagonist, Carolyn, with the voice of the poet in such a way 
that we can never be sure to what extent the insights about the complex 
power relations encompassing race and gender are supposed to belong to 
Carolyn Bryant, or rather only to the poet. What Brooks thus achieves is to 
illuminate the limits of insights into the very structures of oppression we 
are socialized into – to speak with Bourdieu: insights into the ways in 
which habitus prepares people to be susceptible and respond to symbolic 
violence. In particular, the poem dramatizes the simultaneity of a cognitive 
process and bodily practices: While Carolyn’s thoughts discover discrepan-
cies between the events of the lynching and the justifying narratives, she is 
also practicing and enacting consent with her role as a Southern woman 
while doing household work. But we may also see in some passages, once 
we pay attention to the technique being used to render consciousness, a de-
sire on the part of the poet that a crime like the murder of Till would be the 
type of crisis “in which the routine adjustment of subjective and objective 
structures is brutally disrupted” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, Reflexive Sociol-
ogy 131) – which could produce insights into the workings of ideology and 
a more rational way to act. 
The narratological instruments that may help to describe the technique 
used in Brooks’s poem are the same Stefanie Mueller uses in her study of 
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Toni Morrison, namely a combination of the terms provided by Gerard 
Genette and Dorrit Cohn (cf. Mueller 50-53). For simplicity’s sake I will 
only use Cohn’s three major terms here: Among the techniques used to pre-
sent consciousness in fiction she distinguishes between “quoted mono-
logue,” “narrated monologue,” and “psycho-narration” (Cohn 105). While 
the first is the attempt to render an internal voice directly, without media-
tion, the last one presents these thoughts mediated by a narrator, for in-
stance by using mental verbs. Narrated monologue is situated in between 
the two: “Tense and person separate it from quoted monologue […]; the ab-
sence of mental verbs (and the resulting grammatical independence) sepa-
rates it from psycho-narration” (104). Narrated monologue is more oblique 
than quoted monologue, but more direct than psycho-narration. Imitating 
the way a figure may speak to herself “casts that language into the grammar 
a narrator uses in talking about him, thus superimposing two voices that are 
kept distinct in the other two forms” (105). The result may be some ambi-
guity and uncertainty as to who we listen to, and this is precisely the way 
the poem begins: 
 
From the first it had been like a  
Ballad. It had the beat inevitable. It had the blood. 
A wildness cut up, and tied in little bunches, 
Like the four-line stanzas of the ballads she had never quite 
Understood—the ballads they had set her to, in school. 
 
Herself: the milk-white maid, the “maid mild” 
Of the ballad. Pursued 
By the Dark Villain. Rescued by the Fine Prince. (61-62) 
 
It is only with the personal pronoun in the fourth line that we realize we are 
witnesses to the thoughts of a woman. Her socialization into the gender role 
of a white Southern woman with the help of the two major institutions, 
school and literature, as something only insufficiently understood, is cast as 
narrated monologue. We are to assume that she is speaking to herself, say-
ing “It has been … like … the ballads I have never quite understood – the 
ballads they set me to, in school,” and yet through her voice we also hear 
the voice of the poet. In fact, we may never be entirely sure whether 
Carolyn is able to state quite clearly that she is reminded of ballads as “a 
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wildness cut up and tied in little bunches” (61) but has never quite under-
stood them. As Cohn puts it: “By leaving the relationship between words 
and thoughts latent, the narrated monologue casts a peculiarly penumbral 
light on the figural consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbali-
zation in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation.” (103)5  
The ballad or romance is instrumental in having made the speaker white 
and female, captured in the repeated puns “milk-white maid, the ‘maid 
mild’” (62). To be made white and female primarily means to be passive: to 
be set to ballads, to be pursued and rescued by men. It also means to be 
willingly subservient and unaggressive (“maid mild”), as well as pure and 
associated with nourishment (“milk-white”). The reward for corresponding 
to this image is to be desirable as erotic object, and this “was worth any-
thing” (62). The phrase suggests a dim awareness of a price to be paid and 
the later repetition that she must be “worth It” (64) corroborates this. In-
deed, the idealization of the white Southern woman and the attention and 
protection offered to her – seemingly out of adoration – is in fact a veiled 
instrument of masculine domination: Women in general “circulate as sym-
bols fit for striking alliances” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, Reflexive Sociology 
173), their function being part of an exchange system which creates al-
liances between families. Bourdieu formulates this with regard to masculine 
domination and its symbolic exchanges; when race as a second form of 
symbolic domination is added, the alliances go beyond single families. That 
Carolyn never quite understood the ballads is important because a literary 
socialization into female submission is not easy to recognize as such and 
thus not easily opposed. That something is going on is only recognized by 
admitting not to understand – it is the poet, as we see a few lines later, who 
understands that this socialization is turning the schoolgirl into a person 
prone to be subjected to repeated forms of symbolic violence. That Brooks 
here uses the same kind of vaguely medieval imagery for her male protago-
nist as in “Satin-Legs,” i.e., the “Fine Prince,” betrays this woman’s view 
of male practices as curiously anachronistic. 
                                                   
5  For Melhem, it is only later that Brooks renders the mind of the woman: “By the 
third stanza, via style indirect libre, Brooks has clearly stepped into the psyche 
of the white Mississippi mother, who has imagined herself a rescued maiden in a 
romantic tale.” (105) 
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The poem interrupts its forays into the mind of the white woman with 
descriptions of actions and gestures, such as burning and hiding bacon, put-
ting on lipstick because of the need to be pretty and “worth It,” and finally 
being embraced and kissed by her husband who has just slapped one of her 
children. Through dramatic irony we are made to see that her role as mother 
and wife has nothing to do with romance: The Fine Prince is someone to 
serve breakfast to and likely to be angry about the waste of bacon. He is 
prone to violence and may consider his actions as a gift she must subse-
quently prove worthy of. But this does not mean that the romance is re-
vealed or deconstructed as meaningless or that the poem would underline 
the “meaninglessness of the myth as a fantasy in the first place” (McKibbin 
667). What the actions reveal is the power of romance and gender ideology 
over mind and body, revealed in thought and in action. Far from meaning-
less, the myth does not only serve as justification of physical violence (the 
lynching), which is comparatively easy to see through: Even Carolyn rec-
ognizes that falseness during the course of her musings. The myth, ro-
mance, or ballad also allows for and exercises multiple forms of symbolic 
violence the white woman is inevitably subjected to and cannot escape 
from. 
Symbolic violence is a concept that helps to explain how grave in-
stances of physical violence, such as lynching, but also how unequal distri-
butions of power could be normalized. It helps to understand the complicity 
of the oppressed that is necessary to maintain unjust social orders. Its short-
est formulation might be to say that it is “a mis-cognizing based on the un-
conscious adaptation of subjective structures to objective structures” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, Reflexive Anthropologie 203).6 Symbolic vio-
lence relates to the concept of habitus in that the socialization of the body 
and mind also serves the function of a somatization or incorporation of 
domination. Nowhere is this more visible than in the example of masculine 
domination as “the paradigmatic form of symbolic violence” (Reflexive So-
ciology 170). Thus we realize that despite her doubts, Carolyn’s recognition 
of her husband’s power happens through her little gestures as part of the 
                                                   
6  My translation of “… symbolische[n] Gewalt als jener Verkennung, die auf der 
unbewußten Anpassung der subjektiven an die objektiven Strukturen beruht.” A 
more extensive definition from Bourdieu’s Pascalian Meditations and its dis-
cussion can be found in Mueller (39). 
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household routine. Vice versa, it is the household routine as a field for her 
as wife and mother that will reaffirm her habitus so that her doubts will not 
lead to an overall crisis. 
But the poem is also a document testifying to the poet’s hope for an en-
lightening effect of the crime. Here are the lines that follow upon Carolyn’s 
increasing awareness that neither Emmett, nor her husband and his half-
brother easily fit into the roles of villain and prince: Emmett is too young 
and the “Prince” too childish. Finally, we read: 
 
[…] So much had happened, she could not remember now what that foe had done 
Against her, or if anything had been done. 
The one thing in the world that she did know and knew 
With terrifying clarity was that her composition 
Had disintegrated. That, although the pattern prevailed,… 
The breaks were everywhere. That she could think 
Of no thread capable of the necessary 
Sew-work. (63) 
 
The narrated monologue of the long passage imagining Emmett’s surprise 
when facing his murderer leads into psycho-narration creating “the impres-
sion that the narrator is formulating his character’s inarticulate feelings” 
(Cohn 106). Translated into direct speech the lines sound improbable: “I 
did know and knew with terrifying clarity that my composition has disinte-
grated. That I can think of no thread ...” It is not Carolyn but the poet who 
uses a variety of metaphors (“composition,” “pattern,” “sew-work”) for an 
ideological framework that helped the white woman to understand herself 
and which is now questioned. But is the poet reliable? The narrated events 
and thoughts and feelings do not quite support the view of a collapsing ide-
ology: While disturbed by her recognition of her complicity in a murder, 
the white woman has continued to act in agreement with her role. The poem 
actually demonstrates, in spite of the lines above, the limitations of any 
kind of ideological insight – or conversely, the strength of masculine domi-
nation in conjunction with the racial order. While the white woman cannot 
help to realize the discrepancies between romance and the events in Missis-
sippi, she is still, in mind and body, submitting to the symbolic and physi-
cal violence the ballads prepared her for, and thus she is acknowledging its 
‘rightness.’  
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The poem ends with a form of rebellion that is, like the recognition of 
domination, likewise outside conscious control or will: As her husband 
kisses her, “a sickness heaved within her” (67), which she associates with 
the courtroom and Till’s mother. Finally, the disgust turns into hatred and 
we may surmise that the woman no longer feels united with her husband 
through their common whiteness but feels alienated from him because of 
her gender – but this diagnosis is clearly a level above Carolyn’s mind. 
Thus the technique of weaving in and out of a consciousness as in a narrat-
ed monologue allows Brooks to render the mind of her character in such a 
way that we are allowed to enter it, maybe even familiarize ourselves with 
it. If skillfully used, this technique then also allows us to see the limits of 
that consciousness and thus to understand what the character in front of us 
does not understand or is only dimly aware of. Just as the concept of ‘taste’ 
allowed us to appreciate the subtleties of “Satin Legs,” the concept of sym-
bolic violence helps us to understand the contradictory physical and mental 
processes in “Mississippi Mother.” But on top of that I argued in both parts 
of my article that the poems do not only reveal but also conceal; they offer 
new visions but also divisions that might be related to the time and place in 
the literary field, itself embedded in a field of power. In “Satin Legs,” eco-
nomic and social conditions clearly shape the tastes and self-fashioning of a 
young urban black man. The poem defends his everyday aesthetic practices 
but does not attribute any emancipatory power to them. There is a great dis-
tance to the figure whose peers are clearly neither included in an implied 
readership nor in an implied political vision. 
What “Mississippi Mother” registers, primarily through the interference 
of a poetic voice producing three metaphors in a row, is the hope that the 
murder of Emmett Till will lead to a kind of reflexivity that may unmask 
the workings of race and gender to white women. It would be supported by 
the discovery of white mothers of what it means not to be able to protect 
their children from male violence. The hope that this may cut through the 
division of white versus black has a long literary tradition, underlying abo-
litionist work and anti-lynching literature in the sentimental mode. But the 
routines of the kitchen, which are neither sentimental nor romantic, betray 
the weak foundations of these hopes as the technical skills of the poem are 
all employed to underline the stubborn persistence of habitus. 
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Intellectual Disposition and Bodily Knowledge 
Richard Wright’s Literary Practice 
STEPHAN KUHL 
 
And then, while writing, a new and thrilling relationship would 
spring up under the drive of emotion, coalescing and telescop-
ing alien facts into a known and felt truth. That was the deep 
fun of the job: to feel within my body that I was pushing out to 
new areas of feeling, strange landmarks of emotion, tramping 
upon foreign soil, compounding new relationships of percep-
tions, making new and—until that very split second of time!—
unheard-of and unfelt effects with words. It had a buoying and 
tonic impact upon me; my senses would strain and seek for 
more and more of such relationships; my temperature would 
rise as I worked. That is writing as I feel it, a kind of significant 
living. 
RICHARD WRIGHT, “HOW ‘BIGGER’ WAS BORN”  
 
 
In the essay “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born,” Richard Wright explains his crea-
tion of one of the great American intellectual achievements of the 20th cen-
tury, his novel Native Son. In the above quoted passage from the essay, 
however, Wright does not describe his writing of the novel as an intellectu-
al process limited to the sphere of the conceptual, conscious, and rational. 
Rather, he emphasizes the somatic, the emotional and sensual dimension of 
his writing process. Literary creation, for Wright, was a bodily experience 
and his great American novel is at least partly the product of a knowledge 
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that, drawing on a concept of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, may be 
called a “bodily knowledge” (cf. Pascalian Meditations 128-63).  
The assumption that Wright was not consciously aware of all the forces 
that guided his creative process found psychoanalytic confirmation in 
Frederic Wertham’s essay “An Unconscious Determinant in Native Son” 
from 1944.1 In Wertham’s “psychoanalytic study of a literary creation 
based on analytic study of its author” (111), he and Wright aimed to uncov-
er the “unconscious determinant” for the creation of Native Son’s “key 
scene,” meaning the scene wherein “Bigger Thomas unintentionally kills 
Mary Dalton in the presence of her blind mother” (112). With psychoana-
lytic methods, the two did bring to light a memory of Wright’s adolescence 
that was not conscious to him while he was writing the novel, although it 
does bear striking resemblance to the scene of Mary Dalton’s death. 
Wertham describes this memory, which, according to him, unconsciously 
provided the content of the scene: 
 
As an adolescent of fifteen, Wright went to public school and worked mornings and 
evenings for a white family. […] His chief duty was to tend the fireplace. […] The 
fireplace corresponds of course to the furnace in the novel, in which the Dalton girl’s 
body was burned. Further associative material led to the recollection of a special 
scene. In the early morning young Richard would carry scuttles of coal and wood in-
to the house. On one such morning when he was carrying out his usual routine, he 
opened the door and came suddenly upon the lady of the house before she had 
dressed. She reprimanded him severely and told him he should always knock before 
entering. These recollections had great emotional power. They were related to much 
earlier emotional experiences. (113) 
 
Reading the quoted passages from “An Unconscious Determinant in Native 
Son” and “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born,” one is left to wonder about the con-
nection that may exist between the powerful emotions that Wertham here 
describes as being related to this uncovered memory and the emotions that 
Wright claims to have experienced during the writing of his novel.  
                                                   
1  For an account of the relationship between Wright and Wertham, see my essay 
“Guilty Children: Richard Wright’s Savage Holiday and Fredric Wertham’s 
Dark Legend.” Wertham several times changed the spelling of his first name. 
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While Wertham’s essay aims to explain literary creation by means of 
psychoanalytic methods, it does not mention the psychic process of “subli-
mation,” although Sigmund Freud considered this process to be “intimately 
connected” with “artistic talent and capacity” (136). In Leonardo da Vinci 
and a Memory of His Childhood, Freud defines the sexual instinct’s capaci-
ty for sublimation as its “power to replace its immediate aim by other aims 
which may be valued more highly and which are not sexual” (78). In the at-
tempt to explain Leonardo’s “vacillation between art and science” (134) 
and the inhibition that scientific research tended to impose on his artistic 
activity, Freud distinguishes between an “original sublimation” that is relat-
ed to scientific investigation and a “second sublimation” related to artistic 
creation (133). He assumes that Leonardo had initially begun his scientific 
researches “in the service of his art” (76, see also 133), so that these two 
kinds of sublimation are not mutually exclusive. However, Freud sees them 
as arising from different origins. According to him, Leonardo’s scientific 
researches developed from the “infantile sexual researches” (78, original 
emphasis) directed to the question of the origin of children. In Leonardo’s 
case, libido then evaded the nascent sexual repression of early childhood 
“by being sublimated from the very beginning into curiosity and by becom-
ing attached to the powerful instinct for research as a reinforcement” (80). 
Simultaneously, sexual repression was “still taken into account by the in-
stinct, in that it avoid[ed] any concern with sexual themes” (80), so that it 
could be directed to scientific investigations more broadly. While Freud, 
therefore, can derive Leonardo’s later scientific interests from his infantile 
sexual researches, redirected to non-sexual investigations through repres-
sion and reinforced through sublimation, the origin of artistic activity re-
mains much more obscure to him: “We should be most glad to give an ac-
count of the way in which artistic activity derives from the primal instincts 
of the mind if it were not just here that our capacities fail us.” (132) And 
while sublimation made an essential contribution to Leonardo’s artistic and 
scientific achievements, Freud concedes that Leonardo’s “extraordinary ca-
pacity for sublimating the primitive instincts” (136) remains inexplicable to 
psychoanalysis: “Instincts and their transformations are at the limit of what 
is discernible by psycho-analysis. From that point it gives place to biologi-
cal research.” (136) The question of the transformation of the sexual in-
stinct was also raised by Bourdieu, who claims that “[o]ne of the tasks of 
sociology is to determine how the social world constitutes the biological 
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libido, an undifferentiated impulse, as a specific social libido. […] [T]he 
work of socialization of the libido is precisely what transforms impulses in-
to specific interests” (Practical Reason 78-79).  
When Freud’s assumption that artistic creation is intimately connected 
with the psychic process of sublimation is taken into account, then 
Wertham’s psychoanalytic explanation of Wright’s creation of the key 
scene of Native Son can be considered incomplete. In Wright’s creative 
process, the unconscious memory that according to Wertham provided the 
content for this scene and the process of sublimation both played a part. An 
explanation of Wright’s creative process, therefore, must account for the re-
lationship that existed in the writing of the key scene of Native Son between 
his memory and sublimation. This essay will try to offer this explanation 
through a relational-sociological reconstruction of the generative, structur-
ing principle of Native Son’s key scene, a reconstruction that, in the end, 
will try to integrate the psychoanalytic insights that, first, the unconscious 
memory of Wright’s adolescence provided the material for the scene and 
that, second, the process of sublimation is intimately connected with artistic 
production. While the memory that Wertham uncovered is of specific inter-
est to a study of Wright, the concept of sublimation is of interest to the the-
ory of practice more broadly because, like no established concept of this 
theory, it accounts for the socialization of the libido, for its transformation 
from “biological” into “social libido.”2 
                                                   
2  Bourdieu’s own uses of the concept of sublimation exemplify the relationship 
between his theory of practice and psychoanalysis. The concept already makes 
an appearance in Outline of a Theory of Practice, in a passage that precedes a 
critique of psychoanalysis (cf. 92), and it makes fleeting reappearances in most 
of his major publications. Only some of Bourdieu’s uses of the term adhere to a 
psychoanalytic conception of sublimation, which itself underwent slight trans-
formations throughout the development of Freud’s thought. Although Bourdieu 
frequently borrowed psychoanalytic terminology, he never explicated the rela-
tionship between his theory and psychoanalysis, and the closest he came to a 
systematic integration of the concept of sublimation into his theory is a passage 
on “Censorship and the Field of Scientific Sublimation” in Pascalian Medita-
tions (111-14). Partly due to the lack of a systematic rapprochement of the two 
disciplines even the question if Bourdieu’s borrowings from psychoanalysis are 
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WRIGHT’S EARLY SOCIAL TRAJECTORY 
 
In The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, Bourdieu 
translated his theory of practice into the methodology of his “Science of 
Works of Art” (cf. 175-282). In this study he offers a concise rendition of 
the basic assumption of his theory: “[T]he practices of writers and artists, 
starting with their works, are the product of the meeting of two histories, 
the history of the production of the position occupied [in the literary and ar-
tistic field] and the history of the production of the dispositions of its occu-
pants” (256). The dispositions of authors are inscribed into their habitus 
throughout their social trajectory, which Bourdieu defines as “the series of 
positions successively occupied by the same agent or the same group of 
agents in successive spaces” (258, original emphasis). According to 
Bourdieu, the authors central to his study had comparable social trajectories 
since they were what he calls “inheritors” (83). For Bourdieu, it is “money 
(inherited) that guarantees freedom with respect to money” (84), and the 
inheritors were, through the familial relations into which they were born, 
“equally endowed with economic and cultural capital” (86). In contrast to 
the subjects of Bourdieu’s study, it is commonly accepted about Wright that 
he was not an inheritor. In a typical description of his early childhood and 
youth, Keneth Kinnamon lists the many obstacles Wright had to overcome 
in order to pursue a literary career: “the physical hunger and malnutrition” 
that he suffered due to his family’s poverty, his lack of “formal education” 
and the indifference of “his environment […] to creative intellectual activi-
ty,” the fact that his father, “an illiterate Mississippi sharecropper,” had 
“abandoned his wife and two sons in a penniless condition,” and his “racial 
status” as a black man in the Jim Crow South (4). Acknowledging the em-
phasis that Bourdieu places on early experiences in the formation of habi-
tus, Kinnamon’s summary makes it appear inexplicable that Richard, born 
in Mississippi in 1908 as the grandson of four slaves (cf. Fabre 1), became 
Wright, one of the greatest authors of the 20th century. But when it is as-
sumed, again with Bourdieu, that the dispositions of habitus are the result 
of the incorporation of social structures and that they include a sense for the 
limitations inscribed into the structures that they incorporate, so that they 
                                                   
coherent with his theory of practice or introduce inherent contradictions into it 
cannot generally be answered. 
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are incapable of generating practices that lie beyond these limitations, then 
Wright’s acquisition of the dispositions that enabled his literary achieve-
ments must have been inscribed as a potentiality into the social structure 
that structured his habitus. Since Wright was born disinherited, the process 
wherein he acquired these dispositions and the ownership of the cultural 
capital that allowed him to enter the field of cultural production poses the 
greatest problem for analysis. In his autobiography, first published in 1945 
as Black Boy: A Record of Childhood and Youth, but only posthumously 
published in its entirety as Black Boy (American Hunger), Wright rendered 
the structural reasons for his acquisition of a literary disposition either un-
der the veil of symbolism or in textual margins. In order to reconstruct 
Wright’s early social trajectory, therefore, the autobiography’s symbolic 
passages must be unveiled and its margins drawn into the center of the 
analysis. 
In autobiographical and biographical materials on Wright, three mem-
bers of his family, his father Nathan Wright, his mother Ella Wright, and 
his maternal grandmother Margaret Wilson, appear as the most important 
forces in his upbringing; the positions that they occupied in the field of the 
Wright family were the most distinct positions therein. All available ac-
counts describe Nathan Wright as a poor and illiterate day laborer, who 
held odd jobs and worked for most of his life as a sharecropper (cf. Fabre 1-
2, 6-7). He apparently abandoned his wife and their two children, Richard 
and his younger brother Leon Allan, relatively early in Wright’s life, thus 
aggravating their already precarious economic situation. The breakup of 
Wright’s parents, the fact that he stayed with his mother and was left by his 
father, largely removed him from the influence of the latter. While Nathan 
Wright, who had occupied a position of economic and cultural disinheri-
tance in the field of the family, very early recedes into the background of 
the narrative Wright offers in Black Boy (American Hunger), his maternal 
grandmother begins to take a more prominent role therein. The importance 
that she assumed for the maintenance of Ella Wright and her children 
strengthened her position in the field of the family and turned her into a po-
tential role model for her grandson. Wright represents Margaret Wilson and 
her husband, his maternal grandfather Richard Wilson, as illiterate, too (cf. 
Black Boy 83, 133-34). Through their illiteracy and poverty, the positions 
that they held in the field of the family were close to the one that, previous-
ly, his father had occupied, so that they themselves were hardly able to 
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incite an intellectual inclination in Wright. This inclination first appears in 
one of the symbolically laden scenes of his autobiography. Wright writes: 
“To help support the household my grandmother boarded a colored school-
teacher, Ella, a young woman with so remote and dreamy and silent a man-
ner that I was as much afraid of her as I was attracted to her.” (38) Wright 
convinced the schoolteacher to narrate to him what she was reading, “Blue-
beard and His Seven Wives” (38), and then states that “Ella’s whispered 
story of deception and murder had been the first experience in my life that 
had elicited from me a total emotional response” (40). This scene is sym-
bolic because it conceals, under the veil of the representation of a singular 
moment of intellectual awakening, the permanent structural factors in the 
field of Wright’s childhood family that facilitated his acquisition of cultural 
capital and an intellectual disposition.  
In his biography of Wright, Michel Fabre, without giving a source, 
identifies the young schoolteacher who tells the story of Bluebeard to 
Wright as “Eloise Crawford” (18). Wright, however, decided to give her the 
name of his mother, which his autobiography identifies as Ella only long 
after the episode with the schoolteacher (cf. Black Boy 83), and he empha-
sized a further similarity between the two women. Apparently Wright’s ma-
ternal grandparents had, despite their own relative poverty in cultural capi-
tal, secured for their children a relatively high degree of education, and 
Fabre characterizes the relationship between the Wilson and Wright fami-
lies as conflicted due to a discrepancy in their respective social standings: 
“Ella Wilson’s family considered her marriage to an illiterate laborer a step 
down. Despite this disapproval Ella, who was teaching in Cranfield at the 
time, accepted Nathan Wright shortly after their first meeting.” (6) Wright, 
in his autobiography, mentions that several of his uncles and aunts worked 
as teachers, either in religious or country schools (cf. Black Boy 99-100, 
149). But he does not mention what Fabre here points out, namely, that his 
own mother was a schoolteacher, too. While Wright repeatedly mentions 
the menial work that his mother conducted after she had to abandon teach-
ing shortly after his birth (cf. Fabre 14), for example her “cook[ing] in the 
kitchens of white folks” (Black Boy 59), he leaves out of his autobiography 
any explicit reference to her previous scholastic profession. But he renders 
this profession symbolically in the figure of Ella, the young woman who 
boards with his grandmother. Just like this Ella, Ella Wright was a “colored 
schoolteacher.” The young woman in Black Boy (American Hunger) who 
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awakens Wright’s literary interests through a rendition of the story of Blue-
beard is a composite figure that condenses Eloise Crawford and Ella 
Wright, so that she represents, in a veiled form, the influence that his moth-
er’s teachings had on Wright. This symbolic rendition of the fact that Ella 
Wright did socially inherit an intellectual disposition to her son is made ex-
plicit in other passages of Black Boy (American Hunger), which, however, 
marginalize her intellectual influence on him, frequently by rendering it in 
subordinate clauses. For example, after Wright describes how, prior to his 
entry into school, he questioned some local schoolchildren about the “baf-
fling black print” (23) in their books, he writes: “When I had learned to 
recognize certain words, I told my mother that I wanted to learn to read and 
she encouraged me. Soon I was able to pick my way through most of the 
children’s books I ran across.” (23) Later Wright even states about his 
mother: “[S]he taught me to read, told me stories. On Sundays I would read 
the newspapers with my mother guiding me and spelling out the words.” 
(24) These passages indicate that, even before he entered school, Wright 
had learned how to learn from his mother and, after having learned how to 
learn, had learned to read and write from her. Accordingly, Wright’s mea-
ger formal school education was merely of secondary importance for his 
acquisition of an intellectual disposition and cultural capital, because his 
primary education was supplied by a private teacher: his mother. Wright 
was an autodidact insofar as the term signifies that his learning was not 
primarily derived from the school system of the American South; but he 
was an autodidact only insofar as the term does not signify what he himself 
in his autobiography calls his “self-achieved literacy” (352). The “auto” of 
his didacticism signifies that his intellectualism was less derived from his 
relationship to the educational system than from his relationship to his 
mother.  
In contrast to Wright’s marginalization of the intellectual influence that 
his mother exerted on him, Black Boy (American Hunger) strongly empha-
sizes the impediments that his family’s great economic poverty and its 
dominated position in the racial order of the Jim Crow South set to his edu-
cation. These impediments did not merely exist simultaneously to Wright’s 
acquisition of an intellectual disposition, but in opposition to it. Wright re-
peatedly mentions that his family’s economic poverty hindered his educa-
tion, for example because he “began school […] at a later age than was 
usual; my mother had not been able to buy me the necessary clothes to 
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make me presentable” (25). With regard to the year 1920, when he was 
about twelve years old, Wright states: “I had had but one year of unbroken 
study; with the exception of one year at the church school, each time I had 
begun a school term something happened to disrupt it. […] Though I was 
not aware of it, the next four years were to be the only opportunity for for-
mal study in my life.” (117) Wright writes about the year 1924, when he 
was sixteen: “School opened and, though I had not prepared myself, I en-
rolled. The school was far across town and the walking distance alone con-
sumed my breakfast of mush and lard gravy. I attended classes without 
books for a month, then got a job working mornings and evenings for three 
dollars a week.” (156) As these quotes suggest, his family’s poverty hin-
dered Wright’s attendance of school because it prevented the purchase of 
the necessary materials and because it forced him to spend his time wage-
laboring instead of learning and attending school.  
The limitations imposed on Wright by the symbolic order of the segre-
gated South are, in an even more condensed form than in Black Boy (Amer-
ican Hunger), described in “The Ethics of Living Jim Crow: An Autobio-
graphical Sketch.” It is his sense for these limitations which Wright calls 
the “ethics” of Jim Crow, and they are imparted to him through the physical 
violence that he suffers, witnesses, or is threatened with. This violence is 
executed by various white men or even Wright’s mother herself. After a 
fight between his childhood gang and a group of white boys, Wright seeks 
his mother’s understanding and receives a beating:  
 
She grabbed a barrel stave, dragged me home, stripped me naked, and beat me till I 
had a fever of one hundred and two. She would smack my rump with the stave, and, 
while the skin was still smarting, impart to me gems of Jim Crow wisdom. […] I 
was never, never, under any conditions, to fight white folks again. […] She finished 
by telling me that I ought to be thankful to God as long as I lived that they didn’t kill 
me. (226, original emphasis) 
 
In Wright’s representation, the landscape where the fight with the white 
boys had taken place becomes an internalized symbol that reminds him of 
the ethics of Jim Crow and that is connected to the feeling of fear: “Even 
today when I think of white folks, the hard, sharp outlines of white houses 
surrounded by trees, lawns, and hedges are present somewhere in the back-
ground of my mind. Through the years they grew into an overarching 
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symbol of fear.” (226) Among the many limits that this autobiographical 
sketch depicts as protected by the ethics of Jim Crow are those set to 
Wright’s education and those set to relationships between black men and 
white women. Wright reveals the tricks that he had to devise in order to re-
ceive books from a segregated library (cf. 235), and he tells how he was 
reprimanded for looking at a naked “snowy-skinned blonde” (233) prosti-
tute by her white customer: “‘Keep your eyes where they belong, if you 
want to be healthy!’” (233). What Wright himself calls his internalization 
of a “symbol of fear” is captured in Bourdieu’s theory under the concept of 
symbolic violence. For Bourdieu, in symbolic violence “the magical fron-
tier between the dominant and the dominated” is practically accepted by the 
dominated in “the form of bodily emotion (shame, timidity, anxiety, guilt)” 
(Pascalian Meditations 169, original emphasis). But these bodily effects 
are only experienced in a present situation of potential symbolic domination 
when the disposition to undergo them was previously and permanently in-
scribed into the habitus of the symbolically dominated. The present situa-
tion then “reawakens and reactivates” (169) this incorporated disposition, 
including the constraints that it reproduces, in the form of bodily emotions. 
In Bourdieu’s terminology, “The Ethics of Living Jim Crow” shows how 
the disposition to undergo the effects of the symbolic violence that protect-
ed the frontiers drawn by segregation was inculcated in Wright. 
Wright’s habitus, then, was structured by a structural opposition that ex-
isted in the field of his childhood family. In the position of Wright’s moth-
er, who was distinguished from his illiterate father and grandmother 
through her possession of a relatively high degree of cultural capital, intel-
lectualism was inscribed as a potentiality for Wright into the structure of 
this field. Motivated by the recognition that his mother granted for early in-
tellectual successes, he modeled his position in the family according to the 
one that she held therein, so that he acquired an intellectual disposition and 
cultural capital from her. However, Wright’s attempts to realize this dispo-
sition were consistently opposed during his childhood and youth by the so-
cial necessities inscribed into the field of the family through economic pov-
erty and Jim Crow segregation. In contrast to inheritors, who are able to 
convert inherited economic capital into the leisure time necessary for intel-
lectual work, Wright, disinherited, had to use time that he could have in-
vested into leisurely intellectual labor in order to perform the menial sub-
sistence labor through which he contributed to his family’s survival. In 
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addition, he incorporated the limitations that were set to his education by 
Jim Crow segregation in the form of the disposition to undergo the effects 
of symbolic violence. This latter disposition Wright had also largely inher-
ited from his mother, who, out of fear for his physical integrity, served as a 
mediator for the symbolic order of the South. This oppositional structure, 
constituted, on the one hand, by the mother’s relative intellectual distinction 
and, on the other, by the social urgencies imposed on the family through 
poverty and racism, structured Wright’s habitus. Accordingly, Wright had 
an oppositional habitus: He had socially inherited an intellectual disposi-
tion, but the limitations that opposed his acquisition and realization of this 
disposition were also inscribed into his habitus. This opposition, ultimately 
derived from the position of the family in the social space of the American 
South, was the structured structure of Wright’s habitus, which, in turn, was 
the structuring structure of dispositions that contributed to his practices, in-
cluding his literary practice.3 
                                                   
3  In his Sketch for a Self-Analysis Bourdieu states that he himself had a “cleft hab-
itus, inhabited by tensions and contradictions” (original emphasis) that resulted 
from the “very strong discrepancy between high academic consecration and low 
social origin” (100). While Wright, too, may have had a “cleft habitus” as the 
result of the discrepancy between his “low” social origin, wherein his primary 
habitus was formed, and his later “high” literary consecration, the opposition 
that existed in his habitus, described above as an oppositional habitus, differs 
from the contradictions that Bourdieu’s concept of the cleft habitus describes. 
Bourdieu’s concept emphasizes a discrepancy between the field of primary so-
cialization and the field wherein, after this primary socialization, the habitus is 
situated. The opposition that was inscribed into Wright’s habitus, in contrast, 
developed from an opposition that already existed in the field of primary social-
ization, and it was reinforced by rather than derived from an opposition that ex-
isted between the fields that he moved through successively. However, the two 
forms of habitus, cleft habitus and oppositional habitus, do not mutually exclude 
each other and they probably describe two interdependent aspects of one and the 
same phenomenon, namely the phenomenon that the upward social movement 
that both, Wright and Bourdieu, underwent usually entails internal tensions, 
contradictions, insecurities, and anxieties. 
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WRIGHT’S POSITION IN THE LITERARY FIELD  
OF THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE 
 
In 1940 Wright published a joint review of two autobiographies that came 
out in that year, The Big Sea: An Autobiography by Langston Hughes and 
Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept by 
W. E. B. Du Bois. This review allows to hint at the position that Wright, in 
the year of the publication of Native Son, occupied in the literary field. 
Wright writes that the two books “reflect class divisions within the area of 
Negro experience” (“As Richard Wright Sees” 215), meaning a division be-
tween the “educated Negro” and “the masses of workers” (216). While, ac-
cording to Wright, Du Bois “still clings to the hope of a ‘talented tenth’ 
leading and guiding the masses of the Negro people” (215), Hughes “looks 
to the masses of the people for hope and guidance. He feels that they are 
best fitted to protect and extend the basic values of our civilization and he 
has cast his hope with them in their struggles toward enlightenment and or-
ganization.” (215) Hughes and Du Bois represent two opposed established 
positions that were open to authors in the literary field constituted by the 
Harlem Renaissance, a field that both had shaped substantially.4 Du Bois’s 
academic intellectualism included the political assumption that social 
change would emanate from the leadership of a “talented tenth,” that is, the 
intellectual and cultural elite, which would uplift the masses through its 
guidance. In contrast, Hughes’s folkloristic or proletarian intellectualism 
included the political assumption that social change would emanate from 
the masses, who in a revolutionary act would overthrow the elite.  
Since Wright’s entrance into the literary field was tied to the Com-
munist Party and the possibilities for publication that it offered to him, his 
initial position in the field was close to the one that his review ascribes to 
                                                   
4  Describing the Harlem Renaissance as a literary field follows George 
Hutchinson who writes about it in The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White: 
“The movement represented the emergence of a literary sector or field; what be-
comes important is not individual author-by-author succession but the tension 
between a variety of possible (and overlapping) positions.” (436) While 
Hutchinson’s study draws on Bourdieu’s notion of field, it falls short of a rela-
tional account because it neglects its interdependent concept of habitus. 
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Hughes. So in his first poetological publication, “Blueprint for Negro Writ-
ing” from 1937, Wright claims that “there can be no doubt” that “Negro 
workers” possess “consciousness and mobility for economic and political 
action” (38). However, in retrospect Wright writes in Black Boy (American 
Hunger) about the time of the onset of the Great Depression, when he was 
working as an insurance agent in Chicago and first came into contact with 
the organized political left:  
 
As I went from house to house collecting money, I saw black men mounted upon 
soapboxes at street corners, bellowing about bread, rights, and revolution. I liked 
their courage, but I doubted their wisdom. The speakers claimed that Negroes were 
angry, that they were about to rise and join their white fellow workers to make a 
revolution. I was in and out of many Negro homes each day and I knew that the Ne-
groes were lost, ignorant, sick in mind and body. I saw that a vast distance separated 
the agitators from the masses, a distance so vast that the agitators did not know how 
to appeal to the people they sought to lead. (280) 
 
No word here of the “consciousness and mobility for economic and politi-
cal action” among the “Negro workers.” As Wright began to perceive this 
“vast distance” between the Communists’ intellectual conception of the 
masses and the reality of the life of the masses, he began to move away 
from the position he had espoused in his “Blueprint.” Since the distance be-
tween Communist intellectuals and masses was structurally homologous to 
the opposition between intellectualism and social necessity that structured 
his habitus, Wright was predisposed to recognize that the intellectuals’ as-
sumption of the revolutionary potential of the masses was the result of an 
idealist projection, rather than an accurate description of the state of the 
masses. However, Wright’s rejection of his initial position in the literary 
field could not lead him to a position like the one that his review ascribes to 
the distinguished academic Du Bois. As an autodidact intellectual, Wright 
possessed a high degree of incorporated cultural capital and this capital al-
lowed him to enter the intellectual field. But he did not possess the institu-
tional cultural capital, the degrees that are a requirement for access to aca-
demic institutions. Wright, who, as he himself had pointed out, had only re-
ceived four years of uninterrupted formal education, was excluded from the 
central positions in the intellectual field that are situated in its academic 
subfield and reserved for holders of institutional cultural capital, like 
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Du Bois. Wright, moving away from a position similar to Hughes’s and 
structurally excluded from Du Bois’s, took a position of suspense in the lit-
erary field. This position was suspenseful because it was situated between 
the two opposed established positions of the Harlem Renaissance, the folk-
loristic or proletarian intellectualism represented by Hughes and the aca-
demic intellectualism represented by Du Bois, as it rejected them both. The 
meeting of Wright’s oppositional habitus and his position of suspense be-
tween the two sides of an opposition that was running through the literary 
field was the structuring principle of Wright’s literary practice in 1940 – 
and thus the structuring principle of Native Son.  
Wright’s initial position in the literary field had imposed relatively 
strong constraints on the expression of his oppositional dispositions be-
cause the intellectual standpoint of the Communist Party, which it required 
him to reproduce, inhibited the expression of the social urgencies that were 
inscribed into his habitus. In contrast, the position of suspense that he took 
in the field when writing Native Son allowed his oppositional habitual dis-
positions rather free expression because it had a higher degree of corre-
spondence with the structure of his habitus. It was Wright’s move away 
from the position he had taken in his “Blueprint” that allowed him to offer 
in Bigger Thomas his intellectual representation of a member of the masses 
who does not possess the “consciousness and mobility for economic and 
political action” that he had ascribed to “Negro workers” in this essay, but 
rather is “lost, ignorant, sick in mind and body,” as he characterized “Negro 
workers” in his autobiography. While Du Bois’s position would have pre-
cluded the depiction of such a character who is unresponsive to intellectual-
ism and who does not follow an uplifting trajectory, Hughes’s position 
would have precluded the depiction of a character who is not salvaged ei-
ther through his participation in folk culture or by the possession of a revo-
lutionary consciousness. Wright’s intellectual representation of Bigger’s 
sickness in mind and body finds its culmination in the key scene of Native 
Son, a scene generated and structured by the tensions that guided its au-
thor’s literary practice. 
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WRIGHT’S LITERARY PRACTICE 
 
On the basis of Wertham’s “An Unconscious Determinant in Native Son” 
and Freud’s book on Leonardo it was earlier assumed that the process of 
the creation of Native Son’s key scene included two elements: first, the un-
conscious memory of Wright’s adolescence as it provided the content for 
the scene and, second, the process of sublimation as it is intimately con-
nected with artistic creation in general. These two elements correspond to 
the two opposed dispositions incorporated in Wright’s habitus and, there-
fore, to the tension that guided his literary practice during the creation of 
Native Son. Wright had socially inherited an intellectual disposition, but 
throughout his early trajectory the realization of this disposition was im-
peded by the poverty-imposed necessity to perform menial subsistence la-
bor and by the limitations imposed on it by racial segregation, which had 
been inculcated in Wright as the disposition to undergo the bodily effects of 
symbolic violence when overstepping the frontiers drawn by Jim Crow. 
The memory of Wright’s adolescence captures both of these impediments 
to his acquisition and realization of an intellectual disposition. It shows him 
performing the menial subsistence labor that stood in structural opposition 
to his intellectual leisurely labor and it shows him suffering from the effects 
of the symbolic violence that protected the racial order of the South. In the 
uncovered memory Wright involuntarily came upon the undressed white 
lady of the house in which he was employed and, thus, transgressed the 
borderline that protected white female nudity from the black male gaze and 
separated white female sexuality from black male sexuality. This transgres-
sion, for Wright, had great emotional power as it reawakened and reactivat-
ed his disposition to suffer from the bodily effects of symbolic violence 
when challenging the dominant order of Jim Crow. His emotionally power-
ful recollections were, as Wertham claimed, “related to much earlier emo-
tional experiences” because they stood in a causal connection to the many 
situations wherein the disposition to undergo the effects of symbolic vio-
lence was inculcated in Wright through physical violence and its threats. 
The uncovered memory, then, does not only capture one isolated incident. 
Rather, this one incident synecdochically represents the social necessities 
that Wright had incorporated into the structure of his habitus. In particular, 
the memory of Wright’s adolescence that provided the content of Native 
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Son’s key scene represents his structured, structuring disposition to undergo 
the effects of symbolic violence.  
In addition to this disposition, Wright had socially inherited an intellec-
tual disposition and this inheritance involved the process of sublimation, as 
it describes the replacement of the immediate aim of the sexual instinct by 
another aim which is not sexual. In Wright’s relationship to his mother his 
biological libido was socialized and transformed into a specific social inter-
est. This transformation appears in even greater relief when relational soci-
ology makes a concession to orthodox psychoanalysis and allows for the 
hypothesis that Wright’s relationship to his mother entailed an incestuous 
desire on the part of the son. The libido that was related to the incestuous 
desire but could not be discharged sexually, then, found a sublimated outlet 
in the intellectual relationship to the mother, and Wright’s intellectual de-
sire developed a special intensity precisely because it was reinforced by the 
libido that was originally related to the incestuous desire for his teacher. 
Even then what was formative for Wright was not primarily the mother’s 
position in an oedipal triangle but rather her position in social space, in par-
ticular her possession of the relatively high degree of cultural capital that 
allowed her to become a teacher to her son. Irrespective of the hypothetical 
incestuous dimension of their relationship, it was through the mediation of 
his mother’s teachings that Wright’s biological libido was transformed into 
an intellectual interest that ultimately turned into a habitual intellectual dis-
position. The specific form wherein Wright realized his intellectual disposi-
tion finds its origin neither in infantile sexual researches nor in other primal 
instincts of the mind, but rather in his social trajectory. Due to the limita-
tions imposed on his access to institutional cultural capital, Wright was ex-
cluded from the academic or scientific field. Accordingly, he did not have 
the choice to vacillate between science and art, and his scientific interests, 
for example in psychoanalysis, were condemned to exist in the service of 
his literature.5 Wright’s relationship to his mother, which mediated the sub-
limation of his libido into a habitual intellectual disposition, was later re-
produced in his relationship to the literary field. His intellectual disposition 
made use of and was reinforced by biological libido and it found its 
                                                   
5  For an investigation of Wright’s literary adaptations of psychoanalytic theories, 
themes, and tropes, see my dissertation “The Novels of Crude Psychology: 
Richard Wright, Fredric Wertham, and the Twofold Truth of Literary Practice.”  
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realization in his literary practice. Wright’s possession of an intellectual 
disposition, acquired and reinforced through sublimation, is the necessary 
condition for his literary creativity and, therefore, intimately connected 
with his writings in general, including his writing of the key scene of Native 
Son.6 
Wright’s literary practice exemplifies a process that in the following 
will be called dispositional sublimation. In his creation of the key scene of 
Native Son, both of Wright’s two opposed habitual dispositions were simul-
taneously awakened, with the result that his intellectual disposition enabled 
him to sublimate his disposition to undergo the effects of symbolic vio-
lence. The concept of dispositional sublimation describes the process 
wherein the intellectual disposition is combined with the disposition to un-
dergo the effects of symbolic violence, so that, in their simultaneous reali-
zation, the latter disposition itself becomes part of the creative process and 
the bodily emotions related to it, as they contribute to and guide the writing, 
are effectively inscribed into the text. The assumption that while writing 
Native Son Wright’s intellectual disposition entered into an intimate con-
nection with his disposition to undergo the effects of symbolic violence is 
supported by a stylistic homology that exists between the description of his 
creative process in “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born” and his description of his in-
corporation of the ethics of Jim Crow: In “The Ethics of Living Jim Crow,” 
Wright illustrates his mother’s inculcation in him of the disposition to un-
dergo the effects of symbolic violence by claiming that she beat him until 
he “had a fever of one hundred and two”; in the above-quoted passage from 
                                                   
6  Norbert Elias makes the most systematic one of his rare mentions of the concept 
of sublimation in Mozart: The Sociology of a Genius. Before describing Mo-
zart’s “musical education” (103) by his father, himself “a gifted musician of the 
middle rank” and “a man with a pronounced pedagogic tendency” (102), Elias 
writes: “Among the factors which clearly influence the process of sublimation 
are the extent and direction of sublimation in a child’s parents, or in other adults 
with whom the child has close contact in early life. Later, too, models of subli-
mation, such as suitable teachers, can exert a decisive influence through their 
personalities. Furthermore, one often has the impression that a person’s position 
in the chain of generations has a special influence on the likelihood of sublima-
tion; in other words, sublimation is easier for people in the second or third gene-
ration.” (102) 
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“How ‘Bigger’ Was Born,” Wright declares that during his creation of 
Native Son his “temperature would rise.” It may be doubtful whether 
Wright’s mother actually achieved to beat him into a fever and whether he 
actually wrote himself into a fever. But this textual homology suggests that 
the bodily reactions related to Wright’s habitual disposition to undergo the 
effects of symbolic violence were connected to the somatic experience he 
claims to have had during his writing of Native Son. In the process of crea-
tion Wright’s disposition to undergo the effects of symbolic violence was 
activated, but combined with his intellectual disposition. Through disposi-
tional sublimation, the suffering induced by the former disposition and the 
pleasure derived from the creation enabled by the latter disposition were 
combined and, in their combination, both transformed. Thereby they gener-
ated a specific structure of the linguistic sign, inscribing into the key scene 
of Native Son not only Wright’s intellectual but also his bodily knowledge. 
Wright’s intellectual representation of Bigger Thomas’s suffering from 
the bodily effects of symbolic violence inscribed into the key scene of Na-
tive Son the very disposition that, throughout his social trajectory, had op-
posed his acquisition and realization of the intellectual disposition that was 
realized in the very process of his creation of the text. The great emotional 
power related to Wright’s disposition to undergo the bodily effects of sym-
bolic violence finds entrance into the scene through the emotions that 
Bigger Thomas experiences when he fears to be detected in the bedroom of 
Mary Dalton, emotions referred to by signifiers like “excitement and fear,” 
“hysterical terror,” or “[f]renzy” (Native Son 523-25). While realizing his 
intellectual disposition and typing the signifiers that constitute the literary 
language of the scene, Wright’s dormant disposition to undergo the effects 
of symbolic violence was activated, but partly displaced, as it passed from a 
bodily to a textual state. The disposition that was actualized in the uncon-
scious memory of Wright’s adolescence in the form of a bodily emotion 
was disembodied and implemented textually, so that Wright’s bodily dispo-
sition is signified by Bigger Thomas’s emotions. Accordingly, in Wright’s 
literary language, signifiers do not merely refer to signified concepts. Ra-
ther, while they refer to Wright’s conceptual knowledge of the urgencies 
that Bigger Thomas suffers from, they, in addition, begin to refer to his 
bodily knowledge of these urgencies, to his incorporated disposition to suf-
fer from the bodily effects that symbolic violence induces. Wright’s literary 
practice, then, inserted a second signified into the structure of the sign; the 
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signifiers of his literary language refer to his conceptual and to his bodily 
knowledge. As Wright’s bodily knowledge becomes a part of the structure 
of the sign, his bodily emotions are effectively inscribed into the text, so 
that they constitute therein a second layer of signification that is interde-
pendent but not identical with its conceptual dimension. This second layer 
of signification – that is, the bodily meaning inscribed into the text through 
the bodily dimension of Wright’s use of the sign – accounts for the key 
scene’s uncanny capacity to evoke in disposed readers the very same emo-
tions that the main character is experiencing. Wright’s bodily writing al-
lows for an equally bodily reading of his text, a reading that, however, has 
as its necessary condition the reader’s own incorporated disposition to un-
dergo the effects of symbolic violence, in particular as they relate to the on-
going histories of racism and capitalism, the two major forces in the struc-
turing of the bodily disposition that Wright inscribed into his text. Through 
the specific structure of the sign that dispositional sublimation engendered, 
through the reference that it established between the signifiers of his liter-
ary language and their second signified, his bodily knowledge, Wright in-
scribed into the key scene of his great American novel the very sense-
straining tension that guided his literary practice. As this practice was the 
result of the meeting of his oppositional habitus and his suspenseful posi-
tion in the literary field, it seems at any rate as if only a man who had had 
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“You have to leave home to find home” 
Charismatic Violence and Split Habitus in Ralph Ellison’s 




SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE IN THE FORM OF CHARISMA 
 
In his essay “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” (1965), Ralph Ellison asks: “what 
quality of love sustains us in our orphan’s loneliness; and how much is thus 
required of fatherly love to give us strength for all our life thereafter?” 
(Collected Essays 35) With regard to his father’s early death Ellison has the 
feeling that he “only perished, he did not pass away” (36). Moreover, he 
identifies his mother Ida as a passionate bearer of the paternal values and 
norms, which she passes on to her sons and which make Ralph and his 
brother Herbert “confused, sometimes bitter, but most often proud, recipi-
ents of their values and their love....” The mother “cherished his memory 
until she died, apotheosized his vital years” (36, original emphases). While 
“Tell It Like It Is, Baby” addresses the author’s relation to his father Lewis 
Alfred Ellison and even, in a kind of dream-like apparition, fuses the narra-
tion of his loss with the assassination of the ‘historical father,’ Abraham 
Lincoln, Ellison recognized that the essay was not the appropriate genre to 
deal with the theme of father-son relations: 
 
So I confess defeat; it is too complex for me to ‘tell it like it is.’ [...] For a writer 
who depends upon the imagination for his insights and his judgments, perhaps this is 
usually the way. Current events and events from the past, both personal and histori-
cal, ever collide within his interior life—either to be jumbled in the chaos of dream, 
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or brought to ordered significance through the forms and techniques of his art. Fol-
lowing my defeat with the essay, I returned to my novel—which, by the way, has as 
its central incident the assassination of a Senator. (46)1 
  
Ellison then turns back to his novel in progress because, as he writes in his 
1946 essay “Twentieth-Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity,” 
fiction permits to combine social reality and individual experience:  
 
Perhaps the ideal approach to the work of literature would be one allowing for in-
sight into the deepest psychological motives of the writer at the same time that it ex-
amined all external sociological factors operating within a given milieu. For while 
objectively a social reality, the work of art is, in its genesis, a projection of a deeply 
personal process, and any approach that ignores the personal at the expense of the 
social is necessarily incomplete. (84)  
 
Thus, to approach Ellison’s oeuvre with concepts of relational sociology 
seems particularly apt, since Pierre Bourdieu, aiming to overcome the long-
established dichotomy between agent and structure in the social sciences, 
provides important conceptual tools for the disclosure of the interrelation of 
psychological and social factors that are not only involved in the genesis of 
the work of art, as Ellison suggests, but also in the representation of the fic-
tional reality.2 In the case of Ellison’s novel, its social reality juxtaposes 
normativity in the form of laws with an intimidating perfection of authorita-
tive figures on the individual level.  
                                                   
1  In many ways, “Tell It Like It Is, Baby” can be read as a telescoped version of 
Ellison’s unfinished novel, which sometimes resembles a collection of essays, 
whereas the essay shows fictional traits. As Timothy Parrish argues, Ellison – 
regardless of the form in which he was writing – “was always telling a version 
of the same story” (194). 
2  On the interdependency of these two levels, see Bourdieu’s profound analysis of 
Gustave Flaubert’s Sentimental Education, in which he identifies “the genera-
tive formula which is the basis of [the author’s] own novelistic creation” (Rules 
of Art 28-29) and claims that Flaubert’s novel “reconstitutes in an extraordinari-
ly exact manner the structure of the social world in which it was produced and 
even the mental structures which, fashioned by these social structures, form the 
generative principle of the work in which these structures are revealed” (31-32). 
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Even before the publication of Invisible Man in 1952, Ellison began to 
work on his second novel, and when he died in 1994 he left behind several 
thousand pages, of which Ellison’s literary executor, John F. Callahan, and 
Adam Bradley published about one thousand under the title Three Days Be-
fore the Shooting… in 2010. The unfinished novel centers on the story of 
Bliss, an orphan of indeterminate race, who is raised by his foster father, 
Reverend Alonzo Zuber Hickman, in an African American community in 
the Deep South. After decades as a shapeshifter,3 Bliss finally fashions 
himself into a powerful politician, who is assassinated by his own son, 
Severen, on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Undoubtedly, Ellison’s second 
novel is about “fathers and sons” (Bradley 11).4 
One of the most powerful father figures in Three Days is Reverend 
Hickman. He trains his foster son to become a child preacher and at one 
time even makes him reenact Jesus, which is one reason for Bliss’s eloping. 
The chapter “Bliss’s Birth” reveals that Hickman’s father was a preacher as 
well. Hickman also left the religious field (for some time), but in contrast to 
Bliss he turned into a jazzman. As Ellison asserts,  
 
the story goes back into earlier experiences, too, even to some of the childhood ex-
periences of Hickman, who is an elderly man in time present. It’s just a matter of the 
past being active in the present—or of the characters becoming aware of the manner 
in which the past operates on their present lives. Of course this gets into the general 
history, because one of the characters is a senator. He, too, is a trickster. (Collected 
Essays 820) 
  
In each generation of fathers and sons, Ellison seems to suggest, history re-
peats itself. Why is it, Bourdieu asks, “that the established order, with its 
relations of domination […], ultimately perpetuates itself so easily, apart 
from a few historical accidents, and that the most intolerable conditions of 
existence can so often be perceived as acceptable and even natural” (Mas-
culine Domination 1)? Bourdieu’s methodological answer is his concept of 
                                                   
3  See Eric J. Sundquist’s systematic derivation of this term for Bliss/Mr. Movie-
man/Sunraider from Joseph Campbell in his seminal essay. 
4  On the prominence of father-son relationships in Ellison’s unfinished novel, see 
also Callahan and Bradley in the general introduction to Three Days as well as 
the articles by Marc Conner and Lena Hill.  
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“symbolic violence,” a non-physical and therefore “gentle and invisible 
violence” (Pascalian Meditations 169), which is the more powerful as it 
works through emotions:  
 
One of the effects of symbolic violence is the transfiguration of relations of domina-
tion and submission into affective relations, the transformation of power into charis-
ma or into the charm suited to evoke affective enchantment […]. The acknowledg-
ment of debt becomes recognition, a durable feeling toward the author of the gener-
ous act, which can extend to affection or love, as can be seen particularly well in re-
lations between generations. (Practical Reason 102, original emphasis) 
 
In Ellison’s father-son relationships, it is the father who exerts symbolic vi-
olence upon the son in the form of charisma. Although the sons are under 
the spell of this ‘enchantment,’ they struggle to distance themselves from 
their fathers so that we repeatedly see desperate attempts by the sons to 
overcome the overwhelmingly superior father. No son is really successful, 
but rather turns into a charismatic father figure himself, so that the genera-
tional chain results in a form of repetition of history.  
 
 
“THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION”5  
 
Hickman has high expectations for little Bliss whose changing roles within 
the father’s religious project are mirrored in his various names. In one of 
Ellison’s drafts, Hickman summarizes the first stations in Bliss’s life as fol-
lows:  
                                                   
5  In “The Contradictions of Inheritance,” Bourdieu defines the paternal inheri-
tance as “the order of succession,” which is founded on “the tendency to perpet-
uate in one’s very being” the father’s “social position” (507, original emphasis). 
According to Bourdieu, however, “it is frequently necessary to distinguish one-
self from him, to go beyond him and, in a sense, deny him” (507). This, in turn, 
results in a feeling of guilt and “of being torn that comes from experiencing suc-
cess as failure or [even] transgression” (510). Bourdieu writes: “The more you 
succeed (meaning the more you fulfill the paternal will to have you succeed), 
the more you fail, since the closer you come to killing your father, the farther 
you are from him” (510). 
CHARISMATIC VIOLENCE IN RALPH ELLISON’S SECOND UNFINISHED NOVEL | 81 
In Waycross: ‘Blessed Boy.’ [...] ‘The Holy Baby’; in Birmingham, ‘The Little 
Shepard’: Rockymont [sic]; ‘The Leader Child’ Yes, ‘The Lord’s Littlest Lyric’ that 
was Atlanta. ‘The Golden Voiced Lamb’ Tulsa. ‘His Promise Affirmed’ Pueblo; but 
to all the old ones, the close ones, he was Bliss. (Ralph Ellison Archive, Library of 
Congress, ms. box I:119, folder 9, n.p. [hereafter box and folder information only]).  
 
Just as God was willing to sacrifice his son, Hickman is willing to sacrifice 
Bliss for the greater good. Hickman even aims to surpass God himself 
when he tells Bliss: “You’re just a little over six and even Jesus Christ 
didn’t get started until he was twelve” (Three Days 253). In contrast to his 
father’s wishes, Bliss is not willing to sacrifice himself for the congrega-
tion. Instead, he transforms himself from God’s son Jesus into the first hu-
man being Adam.6  
Adam is willing to sin: In his first incarnation, Mr. Movie-man, Bliss 
seduces not only a whole community in the “territory” but also a woman 
named Lavatrice and becomes a father of a son himself. Yet with Adam’s 
first son Cain, the first murder comes into the world; in contrast to the bib-
lical story, Bliss’s son does not commit fratricide but patricide. Unlike 
Hickman who “changes” from jazzman to minister to take over responsibil-
ity for his orphan son, Bliss himself rejects the responsibility of the father 
role. Thus, Severen becomes a fatherless son who has to search for a substi-
tute father. As Bliss had accepted a father substitute in Hickman, Severen 
chooses Love New, the half-Indian, half-black shaman – another charis-
matic father figure. 
And there are even more relations of ‘fathers’ and ‘sons’ in Three Days. 
As in “Tell It Like It Is, Baby,” Ellison relates the father-son story to the 
political field, alluding to Abraham Lincoln as the father of the nation and 
to (African) Americans as his sons. In the presence of the “hero-father,” as 
Ellison calls Lincoln (Collected Essays 46), the inner division of the domi-
nant father figure Hickman is revealed.7 In his speech at the Lincoln Me-
morial, where Hickman leads his congregation members in an attempt to 
prevent the assassination of his son, the Reverend praises Lincoln as “one 
of the few who ever earned the right to be called ‘Father’” (Three Days 
                                                   
6  The subchapters [Adam and Eve] and [Bliss and “snake”] seem to suggest that 
Ellison meant to develop the biblical analogy even further. 
7  For a further discussion of Hickman and Lincoln, see Hill. 
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576). To Hickman, “perfection is reserved to God the Father,” but Lincoln 
comes close to perfection as “the man who did the best he could for us and 
came out the winner” (582). This perfection, which is based on symbolic 
violence in the form of charisma, stands for the normative, standard-setting 
power of the father, which the son has to work through.  
In Three Days Reverend Hickman is presented almost invariably as an 
immaculate father figure – both as the perfect charismatic leader of his 
congregation and as a loving foster father to Bliss. In the very first scene of 
the chapter “Hickman in Washington, D.C.,” he is singled out from the 
congregation by his height, his elegant dress, and his gold watch and thus is 
identifiable as “HNIC,” which “means the ‘Head Negro in charge’; in other 
words, their leader” (505). Hickman stands out through his calm voice and 
his ability to lead the huge group just with “slight nods and gestures” (504). 
Through his charisma, and in his double function as leader and priest, 
Hickman exerts an exceptional amount of power over the congregation. In 
the scene at the Lincoln Memorial, however, Ellison also reveals the part in 
Hickman that once made him leave his religious family and turn into the 
rebellious jazzman. The confrontation with the heroic national father un-
covers an internal combat hidden in the old Reverend. It is first uttered in a 
dispute between Hickman and his best friend Wilhite on whether Lincoln is 
the “man who changed history” or merely “a creature of politics” (582). 
Wilhite focuses on the ‘father part’ of Abraham Lincoln, i.e., on the politi-
cian, the old order. Hickman does not want to accept this image, because it 
shows him a truth about himself that he suppresses. Therefore, he under-
lines the ‘son part’ of the charismatic politician, characterizing Lincoln as 
the man who was brave enough to revolt against the old order. In denying 
the hypocrisy of this image he denies his own. He wants the congregation 
members to see in Lincoln as well as in himself an immaculate leader.  
This controversial double portrait of Lincoln mirrors a conflict in 
Hickman that Ellison exposes through introspection: Approaching the Me-
morial, Hickman remembers “his own mixed emotions and conflict of mind 
which had left him shaken during his first visit to where they were headed 
[and] he had an impulse to draw Wilhite aside and suggest that they find an 
excuse for returning to the hotel” (574). Yet Hickman suppresses this im-
pulse, focuses on the spell of the place, and stresses how “an old, restricted 
part of himself seemed to fall away, giving him a sense of moving from the 
familiar world of the given into the misty sphere of the possible” (575). 
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Thus, in the encounter between the national father and the national son, 
Ellison brings to light Hickman’s son part fighting against the father part in 
him or, in Bourdieu’s terms, Hickman’s split habitus.8  
In Hickman’s case, the split derives from initially having rejected the 
father’s trajectory, or inheritance, which led him from the religious to the 
cultural and eventually back to the religious field. “Such experiences tend 
to produce a habitus divided against itself, […] doomed of a kind of dupli-
cation, to a double perception of self, to successive allegiances and multiple 
identities.” (Bourdieu, “The Contradictions” 511) Later we learn that “in-
creasingly such flashbacks were accompanied by interior dialogues in 
which a voice from his life as irreverent young bluesman mocked his pre-
sent role of spiritual leader and reminded him of his lingering worldliness. 
Marked by a conflict between his past and his present, it was an ongoing 
dialogue in which the younger self badgered and teased while his older self 
stubbornly asserted its spiritual authority” (Three Days 715). The narrated 
monologue, occurring when Hickman is faced with the idealized father fig-
ure Lincoln, elucidates his internal combat between the normative, stand-
ard-setting father and the rebellious son.9  
                                                   
8  Hickman reveals a habitus clivé, a split habitus, as Bourdieu defines it in retro-
spect of his own development. What Bourdieu describes in Sketch for a Self-
Analysis, however, is the split habitus of the ‘climber.’ The tension Bourdieu 
experiences before his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France indicates that 
he is not able to hold his authority and that his former habitus adheres to him 
(108). For a famous example of split habitus in African American history, see 
Buschendorf’s analysis of Frederick Douglass’s transition from slave to famous 
orator. 
9  See also Bradley’s discussion of Hickman’s “duality.” Quoting Ellison’s state-
ment about Hickman as being of “‘two minds’—one doubtful, the other hopeful; 
one blues-toned, the other sanctified,” Bradley argues: “Unifying voice while 
complicating perspective, Ellison has made Hickman [in the computer files] a 
richer and deeper character than in the typescripts, albeit at the cost of his an-
tiphonal relationship with Bliss/Sunraider. Through Hickman, Ellison explores 
the contrasts and the connections in a bifurcated voice” (50, my emphasis). 
Bradley then gives an example of what he calls Hickman’s “doubling of vision” 
referencing a “tradition in African-American expression balancing the faith of 
the spirituals with the tragicomic sensibility of jazz and the blues” (50-51). This 
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In contrast to the dominating father-leader image of Hickman in Three 
Days the Ellison Papers contain scenes about his childhood experiences and 
his relationship to his own preacher father; most importantly, they comprise 
numerous versions of a scene called “Hickman Reminiscing” including a 
passage marked with the subtitle “[clock and church],” in which Hickman 
remembers a fateful Sunday in his father’s church, describing in detail the 
charismatic father preaching from the pulpit and his own feelings and 
thoughts while listening to the sermon that eventually result in an epipha-
ny.10 These drafts open up a new image of Hickman as revolting son as well 
as charismatic preacher father. Both the drafts of “Hickman Reminiscing” 
and the two following notes reveal that Ellison aimed at a pattern of repeti-
tion: “Hickman’s fall and Bliss’s fall, each others doubles” and “1 runaway 
jazz / 2 runaway – politics / taken (send) away – murder” (ms. box I:138, 
folder 5).  
A close reading of “Hickman Reminiscing” and especially “[clock and 
church]” uncovers the moment in Hickman’s childhood when he hears the 
second inner voice for the first time and when through introspection he cap-
tures the starting point of the “ongoing dialogue in which the [son] bad-
gered and teased while [the father] stubbornly asserted [his] spiritual au-
thority” (Three Days 715). These drafts, then, not only illuminate the 
genesis of both Hickman’s and Bliss’s primary and split habitus, they also 
reveal how Ellison, by emphasizing father-son relationships, writes history 
against history-book history.  
                                                   
evokes The Souls of Black Folk, notably the chapter “Of the Faith of the Fa-
thers,” in which Du Bois defines the preacher as “the most unique personality 
developed by the Negro on American Soil. A leader, a politician, an orator, a 
‘boss,’ an intriguer, an idealist” (116) and highlights “two great and hardly rec-
oncilable streams of thought and ethical strivings [in two “types” or “groups of 
Negroes”]; the danger of the one lies in anarchy, that of the other in hypocrisy” 
(123). 
10  Besides “[clock and church],” the three folders entitled “Hickman Reminiscing” 
(ms. box I:123, folders 5-7) contain “[Music dance hall],” “[Adam and Eve],” 
and “[Bliss and the “Snake”].” Some of these titles have different spellings in 
some versions; they are listed with “Jack Johnson” and “Other” on a folder page 
in ms. box I:123, folder 6. 
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“HICKMAN REMINISCING” 
 
“Hickman Reminiscing” displays yet another overwhelmingly superior, 
charismatic, and powerful father figure who represents the old order, i.e., 
the normative order in the shape of religious doxa with its elements of the 
censorious, punitive father representing God(’s will) and the concept of sin 
and punishment. In Alonzo Hickman, we find yet another anxious son, who 
finally revolts in the form of escape. The drafts present a pivotal moment in 
Hickman’s childhood, which captures in an experience of epiphany his de-
cision of turning away from his family. Here we have the origin of Ellison’s 
fictional chain of fathers and sons outlined in his note which marks 
Hickman as “1 runaway—jazz.”  
The drafts of “[clock and church]” are dominated by introspection as a 
means to illuminate how Alonzo Zuber Hickman felt as the son of a char-
ismatic preacher father, how the father’s behavior affected the little boy – 
including his bodily reactions that reveal the origin of what Hickman de-
scribes as “family traits and instincts inherited from the past” (ms. box 
I:123, folder 5). In other words, the notes disclose aspects of Hickman’s so-
cialization and thus his primary habitus, which, according to relational so-
ciology, is  
 
the set of dispositions one acquires in early childhood, slowly and imperceptibly, 
through familial osmosis and familiar immersion; it is fashioned by tacit and diffuse 
“pedagogical labor with no precedent”; it constitutes our baseline social personality 
as well as “the basis for the ulterior constitution of any other habitus.” (Wacquant 7; 
cf. Bourdieu and Passeron 42-46) 
 
And as Erica Edwards maintains in her study on black leadership, charisma 
is “a kind of habitus” (201).  
The notes make us aware of the interrelation, the parallel between father 
and son. The analogy between Hickman and his father clarifies our under-
standing of Hickman’s own father role and thus in turn allows us to gain 
insight into Bliss’s son role as well as the process of his transformation. 
Furthermore, the notes draw attention to Hickman’s renunciation of his fa-
ther as the representative of the old order and the religious field. That, in 
turn, illustrates the image of the son in revolt (which will be repeated by 
Bliss and again by Severen) and enables us to see more clearly the manner 
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of his revolt and his trajectory: Both sons move into the cultural field, 
Hickman turns into a jazzman, Bliss into Mr. Movie-man, appropriating the 
religious charismatic habitus to the position of an entertainer. In the draft 
“[in the music hall]” Hickman states explicitly how he transposed the pat-
tern he adapted from his father in the church into the music hall, while Bliss 
does so twice, first as Mr. Movie-man and later as senator in the political 
field. The parallel underlines the structure of repetition in Ellison’s novel 
which, in turn, highlights the repetition in (African) American history and, 
more generally, in the relation of fathers and sons. 
 
 
[CLOCK AND CHURCH] 
 
In one of the drafts of “Hickman Reminiscing,” the Reverend denotes his 
childhood memory of his father’s “voice-flung sermon” (ms. box I:123, 
folder 6). All the variants of “[clock and church]” focus on Hickman’s fa-
ther as the center of the ceremony and the master of collection. Hickman’s 
reflections uncover the father’s ability to lead and control the whole con-
gregation solely with his body language. He depicts the father preacher be-
fore the start of the sermon as standing in front, staring at the congregation 
which turns quiet and finally silent.  
With the beginning of the sermon Hickman chronicles the preacher’s 
transformation from “his beloved father” to “a figure of mysterious grace.” 
Alonzo hears his “preacher father’s voice-flung sermon” and sees “the pat-
tern unfolding.” In one of the drafts, Ellison renders a detailed description 
of what the boy perceives: “it was nothing more or less than the connection 
between the creeping movement of the church house clock’s hands and ro-
man numerals, the sunlight filtering through the red, blue, green and gold of 
a stained glass window, and the pattern” (my emphasis). Hickman reflects 
on the synesthetic quality of his past experience, which leads him to grasp-
ing the essence of time itself: “Once as a child being forced to sit quietly in 
church when I wanted to be outside playing, didn’t I catch time off guard, 
and wasn’t it made up of the details of familiar scenes and acts/actions and 
of smells and sounds that fused briefly in my mind before flying apart.”11  
                                                   
11  The various versions of “[Adam and Eve]” contain further elaborations of 
Hickman’s (respectively Ellison’s) musings about time.  
CHARISMATIC VIOLENCE IN RALPH ELLISON’S SECOND UNFINISHED NOVEL | 87 
Alonzo watches the church clock as if in a sort of game, a race between 
his father’s voice and the moving pendulum signifying his wish that the 
sermon would soon be over. “When the clock and his father’s voice had 
come together,” Hickman recalls, “the service had approached its end,” 
which meant redemption for the members and “freedom,” more precisely, 
“heathen freedom” for him. The boy distances himself more and more from 
the congregation, which remains fully under the spell of his father and is 
represented by his mother who reprimands Alonzo again and again to sit 
still and listen to his father’s sermon. Although he soon begins to see 
through the game and, thus, the “familiar scenes and acts/actions and […] 
smell and sounds [are] flying apart,” he nevertheless is still afraid of his 
father and ascribes superhuman powers to him: He is convinced that his fa-
ther knows about the game and will punish him for staging the race be-
tween pendulum and voice. A feeling of guilt overtakes him since he be-
lieves “that now everybody has to suffer the punishment for it.”  
What is in operation here is what Bourdieu calls doxa, in this case, the 
internalized concept of sin. Hickman is afraid of his vision and describes 
his father as “frightening.” That his childhood self is scared is most clearly 
exposed by his interior monologue, which brings to light his inner division 
and its genesis; the two voices in him are dramatized in a dialogue for the 
first time in Ellison’s drafts – and they are fighting:  
 
Pulpit Why do they call it that?
To scair you, man. To make you feel if you don’t listen you’ll git pulled into the pit, 
thass why...  
No, you’re wrong and you better watch out now because what you doing is a sin...  
And yet in spite of a sudden feeling of dread he couldn’t stop listening for the game. 
(ms. box I:123, folder 5) 
 
One part of him is obedient and adapts to the rules, which is stressed by the 
feelings evoked in the boy when he sees his mother crying; it makes him 
afraid “even when he had not sinned.” The other part of him starts to see 
through the rules of the game, which is reflected in the appearance of 
Hickman’s second voice. With this insight his perception of his father starts 
to change, but as he is still afraid he succumbs again to the doxa of the reli-
gious field, which he has internalized during socialization. The beloved fa-
ther scares him by turning into “the figure on the rostrum [who] caused 
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judgement day.” Yet, Hickman’s second inner voice becomes more and 
more dominant – as, for example, in the following draft: 
 
And then it happened. Beneath the roar around him he (=little Hickman) heard a 
(low) teasing voice (saying). No man, no. This always happens after they took up the 
collection. You just ain’t paid attention to it before, thass all. But you just watch: 
when this part is over him and the clock will be caught up with each other and then 
we can go home and eat and look at the funnies…You just listen and watch that 
clock.  
 
In dialogue with his double, Alonzo’s emotions intensify, with the result 
that he is distancing himself from his father, the reference to whom is now 
marked by depersonalization: “the voice from the pulpit.” As Alonzo re-
moves himself emotionally first from the other congregation members and 
then from his family, Ellison emphasizes his growing inner conflict by cre-
ating an analogy to his inner conversation on the physical level. First, the 
boy himself tries to find a way to sneak out of the church by pretending that 
he needs to run to the restroom. Then, during the father’s sermon on sin, 
Alonzo observes “a tall, light-skinned man” actually rising and leaving the 
church, evoking the preacher’s wrath: “As his father watched the man leav-
ing he seemed to be growing taller. And as his body surged and panted with 
emotion it seemed to swell and fill out the robe and his voice became trum-
pet-like and threatening” (ms. box I:123, folder 7). 
In any case, the boy waits with growing impatience for the sermon to 
end. In the process of gaining distance from the charisma of the father and 
the doxa of the religious ritual he is able to perceive the final part of the 
sermon already through ‘new eyes,’ which allows him to see the pattern 





The conflict with the embodied concept of sin and the related fear makes 
the little boy feel as if “he were being swept away like a leaf in a whirl-
pool” (ms. box I:123, folder 5). Hickman is indeed swept away – from eve-
rything his life had stood for so far. And interestingly, with the ‘death of his 
old life’ he has a dream-like vision based on imagery of the Old Testament: 
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[H]e was being pelted by a rush of images he’d learned from the banners in sunday 
[sic] school. The Hebrew children were dashing toward the blood red sea with Phar-
oah’s [sic] coldiers [sic] lashing their horses like cowboys as they tried to head them 
off, and the bloody bodies of babies killed by King Herod’s cutthroat bad men 
bobbed past like water-soaked dolls with sightless, staring eyes. 
 
It is remarkable that this vision ends with a reference to the Book of Daniel: 
“And Shadrach, Mesrach, Abenego and Daniel were looking out at him 
from within a blazing furnace which spun and bobbed in the rush of wa-
ter….” The prophet Daniel and his three companions represent unshakable 
faith as they refuse to worship Nebuchadnezzar’s image of gold. In the very 
moment of Hickman’s apostasy, they look at him reproachfully, frightening 
the little boy, who starts screaming and thinks he is about to faint. But de-
spite his fear, he is able to free himself from the symbolic violence of the 
biblical image. Hickman abandons this vision and turns away – not only 
from his biological father but also from God, the father, from everything 
that has dominated his life so far and in which he has believed. Simultane-
ously, he seems to have gained an outsider’s perspective on the scene, when 
he watches with great distance the screaming and chanting church members 
– including his mother.  
Hickman’s initial split from his family and his (first) congregation is ef-
fectively symbolized by the flying bird illuminated by a blue tilted beam of 
sunlight that he perceives in connection to the one o’clock stroke (cf. ms. 
box I:123, folder 6). The one o’clock strike is an ominous sign. It stands for 
time in general, and time, as Ellison writes in the draft, “came into the 
world after the fall” and is generally a “name for regret” (ms. box I:123, 
folder 5). Accordingly, the clock indicates that it is past twelve, i.e., it is 
always already too late. The flying bird signifies another rebellious son 
(Icarus) who tries to surpass the father. His subsequent fall is foreshadowed 
by color symbolism, the beam of sunlight tilted in blue. This conglomera-
tion of metaphors, combined with the vision from the Book of Daniel fore-
shadows the end, which is told in the beginning: Sunraider’s fall by the 
hand of his own son. Yet, it also fuses the stories of the sons into one story 
of sons.  
In another draft, Ellison emphasizes the connection between the son’s 
process of apostasy and the doxa-inflicted vision even more. He describes 
the charismatic father literally as “magician” of words who is able to 
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“pull[…]” the boy, who is “trying to stop the feeling,” “like a fish on a 
line,” while the mother appears to be “hypnotized” (ms. box I:123, folder 
7). As soon as the son sees the above-mentioned “tear roll[ing] down her 
cheak [sic] […] an invisible hand had reached out and was dragging him 
down inside a raging whirlpool of flashing scenes.” This time, the “fright-
ening image […] of [t]he Hebrew children” is paired with a more dramati-
cally staged fall by a figure illustrating the dangerous state of blindness: 
 
And as the [father’s] voice thundered and rapsed [sic] he [=Hickman] saw a blind 
man appear, tettering [sic] high on the edge of a cliff. And just as something which 
glowed like a lump of coal tore from the blind man’s chest and zoomed into the jet 
black sky he saw the man plunging headlong into space, forever falling. The poor 
blind man had strayed from the narrow path and seeing him fall made his mouth fly 
open to scream. But now, looking out through the iron-barred door of a big blazing 
furnace which tossed and spun past him in solemn retrograde were Meshrach, 
Shadrach, Abenego and Daniel, and he stared in amazement at the four saved souls 
who were so holy that they could sit cool and collected in fire so fierce that it burned 
in rushing water.  
 
Ellison’s drafts of “Hickman Reminiscing” uncover a form of split habitus 
translated into biblical and mythical images, which reveal the unconscious 
and internalized doxa of the religious field at work in the little boy. 
 
 
“THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST” 
 
In the novel, Ellison produces an analogy to Hickman’s apostasy by creat-
ing a scene that associates Bliss’s apostasy with the same vision of the blaz-
ing furnace. In Bliss’s case, the allusion to the Book of Daniel occurs after 
the night in Sister Georgia’s house, where the boy “misbehaved” (350), 
namely, when he lifted Sister Georgia’s nightgown. This suggests that 
“Bliss’s fall” is connected to his first sexual exploration. In accordance with 
the biblical story and in contrast to Hickman, Bliss envisions only Daniel’s 
three companions when in his dream “Sister Georgia was there in the 
kitchen and was leading him over to the red-hot stove and asking him about 
Meshack, Shadrach, and old bigheaded Abernathy” (351). The dream of 
guilt is triggered by Bliss’s innocent musings about the kitchen stove: 
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When sitting there in the morning, waiting for his father, he sees a kind of 
synopsis of his old life; he thinks about seasons and food prepared on the 
hot stove and imagines finally: “That big pot on the back there will be puff-
ing like a steam engine Meshack, Shadrach, and Abednego, and I like 
black-eyed peas […]” (350). 
In the subsequent scene, Ellison uses the eye metaphor to illustrate the 
distance between father and son. Hickman’s face is literally behind ban-
dages, and even his eye (“Thy merciful all-seeing eye”), that he shortly be-
fore had asked God to “keep us focused in [...] until we reach the living 
end” (349), is closed. In this scene, Hickman admits that he prayed the 
wrong prayer and left Bliss out (cf. 350). The night before, which Hickman 
spent in jail and Bliss in Sister Georgia’s house, they were not only physi-
cally separated for the first time but had also lost the religious-based bond 
between father and son. That night sowed Bliss’s seed of doubt12: His first 
step to transform himself into Adam was the moment he lifted Sister 
Georgia’s nightgown. As a result, Bliss is no longer willing to reenact Jesus. 
Hickman lost control of Bliss just as his own father had lost control of his 
son in the church scene. Hickman announces that he will help Bliss to 
preach the following week and whispers that he will take him to the mov-
ies, but the connection between son and father is broken: “He [Bliss] 
looked but suddenly the eye was gone—as though someone had turned 
down the wick on a lamp” (356).  
What Hickman sees as a child in his father’s church, according to the 
draft, is “the scene in which Christ, loaded down with his cross and wearing 
a crown of thorns, was being driven up the hill by soldiers carrying shields 
[...]” (ms. box I:123, folder 6). From “his dual perspective” of himself as 
“reminiscing” adult and experiencing child, Hickman “could see the awe 
reflected in the eyes of his child self before the mystery of a life beyond 
death and dying which was depicted in the glass; the timeless agony in an-
cient dress, the array of figures and forces, political and spiritual, the end-
less climb.” He would like to protect Alonzo from perceiving suffering at 
such a young age. He thinks, “listen to the words and leave this until you 
are older.” The hypocrisy of the father is that Hickman will not save Bliss, 
                                                   
12  At the celebration of Juneteenth, when Bliss, again, reenacts Jesus, a red-haired 
woman appears and claims him as her son, which is closely connected to the 
boy’s realization of his own whiteness. 
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even though he shows the desire to save his own child self. Instead of pro-
tecting Bliss from the “awe” that he sees “in the eyes of his child self” he 
charges him with the burden of his and the congregation members’ high 
hopes and even makes Bliss reenact Christ the incarnation of suffering. 
The repetition of the father’s mistake is summarized in the following 
notes (ms. box I:138, folder 5) that start with the different ideas Hickman’s 
parents have of their son’s future occupation:  
 
Hickman’s father wants him to be a preacher,  
his mother taught him a little piano [...]
 
Highlighted on this page, encircled, Ellison drafts the novel’s basic struc-
ture of the three generations of father-son relations:
 
1 runaway jazz
2 runaway – politics
taken (send) away – murder 
 
Further down Hickman reflects on the parallels between his own reaction to 
his father’s plans and Bliss’s response to himself. The father-son conflicts 
depicted in Ellison’s notes suggest the ambivalent feelings Bourdieu attrib-
utes to the “contradictions of succession,” especially “when the father oc-
cupies a dominated position, whether economically, socially […], or sym-
bolically (as a member of a stigmatized group)”:  
 
He cannot want his son to identify with his own position and its dispositions, and yet 
all his behavior works continuously to produce that identification, in particular the 
body language that contributes so powerfully to fashioning the whole manner of be-
ing, that is, the habitus. […] The product of such a contradictory injunction is 
doomed to be ambivalent about himself and to feel guilty […]. Guilty of betrayal if 
he succeeds, he is guilty of disappointing if he fails. (“The Contradictions” 510)
 
Here is the passage from Ellison’s draft: 
 
Well, I reaped twofold the seeds I sowed.
What I rejected of my father the boy rejected of me
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He wanted me to become a preacher and the boy
rejected (the same from me) my desire for him from me. I ran away from home and  
the boy ran away from me. (ms. box I:138, folder 5)
 
In the following variation, especially with the phrase “broke his heart” jux-
taposed to “the shadow of his wish” Ellison expresses the ambivalence of 
the son more explicitly:
 
Well, I reaped twofold the seeds I sowed.
What I rejected of my father came back to me.
He wanted me to become a minister but I ran away and broke his heart by becoming 
a jazz musician. Then after he was long
dead and gone I became both, minister and father out of heartbreak
and I asked of the boy what my father had asked of
me he ran away and now I’m here. Freedom
I ran but the shadow of his wish ran with me. I’d learned
and forgot that13 
 
In another draft of “Hickman Reminiscing,” the protagonist recalls an event 
from his childhood in which he shot his slingshot at the blue glass insula-
tors of the telephone poles. Hickman underlines his relief that he never 
succeeded, “because now he could recall the color with pleasure that was 
unspoiled by memory of a boy’s thoughtless action” (ms. box I:123, folder 
5). The color blue triggers Hickman’s memories.  
In Three Days, in the chapter “[FALL],” Hickman draws on this analo-
gy when in a hotel lobby in Washington, D.C. he interprets a tapestry, 
which (unknown to him) represents Pieter Brueghel’s Landscape with the 
Fall of Icarus. In this scene, the color of the water of the sea reminds 
                                                   
13  Cf. a slightly different version of this note (ms. box I:123, folder 7), in which, 
for example, Ellison substitutes “I’d learned and forgot that” with “Even the 
spirit of his preaching had entered my unknowing flesh and claimed me long be-
fore I surrendered and answered its calling….” and adds: “Who says that play is 
simply play, or idleness mere suspension of action when both can be disci-
plines? The clock-game was a child’s diversion but through it I sensed that emo-
tion given form brought communion. And later I came to recognize how the pat-
tern of communion was there unfolding even in a low-life public dance.” 
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Hickman again of the glass insulators and he remembers that “[s]uch 
domed, translucent shapes had often served as targets for his slingshot, and 
though strictly forbidden by both the law and his father, he had found them 
so irresistible that years later, when coming upon young Bliss trying his 
hand at the game, he couldn’t help but grin at his own hypocrisy while put-
ting a belt at the little boy’s bottom” (Three Days 597). This quote not only 
links the drafts of “Hickman Reminiscing” and “[clock and church]” to a 
scene among the computer files, “[FALL],” which establishes an explicit 
connection between Sunraider’s fall and Icarus’s fall, but associates “the 
law,” namely, the normative order, with the father who prohibits what the 
son is particularly tempted to do. The blue glass insulators are irresistible; 
consequently, the son revolts by overriding the prohibition.  
As a father punishing his foster son for something he himself did as a 
boy, Hickman quickly changes back into a minister and is no longer jazz-
man. His admission of his own hypocrisy is reminiscent of Ellison’s 
memory about the common hypocrisy among respectable professionals and 
the greater sincerity of jazzmen who for this reason were more attractive 
role models for him, and his fatherless companion:  
 
Looking back, one might say that the jazzmen, some of whom we idolized, were in 
their own way better examples for youth to follow than were most judges and minis-
ters, legislators and governors [...]. For as we viewed these pillars of society from 
the confines of our segregated community we almost always saw crooks, clowns or 
hypocrites. Even the best were revealed by their attitudes toward us as lacking the 
respectable qualities to which they pretended and for which they were accepted out-
side by others, while despite the outlaw nature of their art, the jazzmen were less 
torn and damaged by the moral compromises and insincerities which have so sick-
ened the life of our country. (Collected Essays 52)  
 
As jazzman and revolting son, Hickman asks Bliss’s mother when she 
comes to him for help: “Do you think a man like me is even interested in 
the idea of trying to be Christlike? Hell, my papa was a preacher while I’m 
a horn-blowing gambler. Do you think that after being the son of a black 
preacher in this swamp of a country I’d let you put me in the position of 
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trying to act like Christ?” (Three Days 467-68).14 Yet, at the very moment 
when Hickman becomes a father himself, he experiences a change that con-
fuses him the more as it turns him into a father who resembles his own fa-
ther. 
In his philosophical musings about time in “Hickman Reminiscing,” 
Ellison establishes the principle of repetition which is realized in the se-
quence of generations. History is embodied in the seemingly endless chain 
of fathers begetting sons who then turn into fathers again. However, the 
novel’s last son, Bliss’s son Severen, does not turn into a father but instead 
kills his father: History stops. By letting Three Days begin with the assassi-
nation Ellison halts the family story to tell the story about history. It is in-
teresting to note that the sons of the reference stories, Icarus and Jesus, also 
never become fathers, as they are sacrificed by their fathers for their own 
purposes. And it is only when Bliss rejects the Jesus identity, that he can 
turn into a father himself. As Ellison reminds us, “time came into the world 
after the fall” (ms. box I:123, folder 5). According to the bible, the history 
of humankind starts, then, with disobedience toward God-the-father causing 
the fall, and it continues with murder in the next generation. In the Icarus 
myth, the son also disobeys the father and like Adam and Eve he is pun-
ished by a fall. In contrast to the reference myths, in Ellison’s narrative the 
last son, Severen, is able to break the spell of charismatic violence by kill-
ing the father and, as his name suggests, thereby also cutting the genera-
tional chain. However, the novel’s circular structure indicates that 
Severen’s murder will not vanquish once and for all the power of fathers.15 
                                                   
14  When Bliss’s mother comes into the house of Hickman’s family and asks him to 
help her deliver the baby, Hickman is sitting there ready for revenge, because 
due to the woman’s false accusation his brother and mother died shortly before. 
15  On repetition and variation in life and history, cf. the following statement El-
lison made in an interview with John Hersey (“A Completion of Personality”): 
“[Y]ou just write for your own time, while trying to write in terms of the density 
of experience, knowing perfectly well that life repeats itself. Even in this rapidly 
changing United States it repeats itself. The mystery is that while repeating itself 
it always manages slightly to change its mask” (Collected Essays 810). 
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“THE END IS IN THE BEGINNING” 
 
Ellison’s notes and drafts disclose that he repeatedly changed the sequence 
of his narrative and even experimented with the function assigned to pro-
tagonists. For example, he considered the possibility of having McIntyre, 
the white reporter who witnesses the shooting of Sunraider in chapter one, 
travel to Oklahoma to talk to Love New or Hickman.16 Yet as the fragment 
“Hickman in Georgia & Oklahoma” documents, Ellison came to the con-
clusion that it should be Hickman who “meets Love New, a half-black, 
half-Cherokee medicine man who weaves a mysterious fable […] of fathers 
of sons” (247). Confronted with Love New’s outsider perspective about 
past events and his pivotal fable, Hickman begins to “see [his] mistake” 
(844). In response to Love New’s repeated question about his identity, 
Hickman at first points to his past as a jazzman, and then states, “I’m a fa-
ther” (851). Only Love New’s persistence forces Hickman ultimately to 
admit that he is “a grown old man who’s as confused in his own way as that 
lost boy of Janey’s” (851), confessing that he, too, is a son who suffers “the 
orphan’s loneliness.”  
Love New not only makes Hickman aware of his position in the chain 
of individual father-son relationships, but with the Native American fable 
about the Chief’s son that reveals the “great inner division [among the State 
folks]” (810) he emphasizes the interrelation between individual and na-
tional level, again using the parallel to Abraham Lincoln. Moreover, on the 
narrative level, the fable, which Love New had once told Severen when he 
returned to the territory to learn more about his father and which he repeats 
in his conversation with Hickman, strengthens the interdependence of the 
fates of Hickman, Bliss, and Severen. The Chief’s son – so the fable goes – 
was seized by a bear and brought back to the tribe by a white man who in-
sisted to take the boy with him to educate him. When the son returns after 
eighteen instead of the promised five years, the village experiences a joyful 
spring. After a short while, however, the son shows first signs of a change 
that the elders initially construe as a consequence of his overstepping a ta-
boo. As his behavior changes more and more drastically, he is brought to a 
                                                   
16  Cf. one of the eight excerpts Ellison published during his lifetime, “A Song of 
Innocence” (1970), in which McIntyre talks to Cliofus about Severen’s return to 
Oklahoma (Three Days 1073 ff.). 
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powerful medicine man in the mountains who tries to cure him. Upon his 
return, it soon becomes clear that he has turned even wilder, and the tribe 
finally decides that he has to die. In the fable, the father shoots his son up 
on the hill. Up on a hill is also where in Ellison’s novel the son ultimately 
shoots his father, thereby revealing the influence of yet another charismatic 
father figure, Love New, who confesses to Hickman: “So I told the boy 
what I knew, and even though I went at it at an angle, like when you use a 
parable to say something that you’d rather not run the risk of saying straight 
out. So he got something from what I said, and when he finds his man we’ll 
both know the rest” (768). 
The tribal story contradicts the common historiography of the United 
States: The white man does not truly save the Native American from wild 
nature (the bear) here, nor does he bring ‘civilization’ to the ‘barbarous’ 
tribes; on the contrary, it is the socialization among whites that turns the 
Native into a beast who even unlearns to honor the taboos of the tribe, and 
as he comes to endanger the community, the tribe must kill him as it would 
kill a wild animal. Consequently, as Love New points out, there is no truth 
in written history, and the “bloody pyramid of bodies” (814) underneath 
everything – such as Lincoln’s – haunt each new generation.17 Severen ar-
gues that he “wasn’t even born” when all of that happened, but Love New 
explains that nevertheless, “its mark is upon you. And just like it haints the 
spirits of those who did the murder and those who refused to do the right 
thing after it was done it haints their children and their children’s children” 
(815). Love New’s Native American fable teaches not only Severen but al-
so Hickman about “the manner in which the past operates on their present 
lives” (Collected Essays 820). However, Love New’s history lesson is not 
limited to the abstract principle of the relevance of past falls and murders in 
the present. Rather, it also discloses the two concrete major falsehoods of 
American historiography: the claim of having civilized the Indians (as 
juxtaposed to their expulsion and extinction) and the allegation of the sepa-
ration of the races (as juxtaposed to their actual mixture). Love New 
                                                   
17  Cf. Ellison’s remark on Lincoln in “Tell It Like It Is, Baby”: “the hero-father 
murdered (for Lincoln is a kind of father of twentieth-century America), his life 
evilly sacrificed and the fruits of his neglected labors withering some ninety 
years in the fields; the state fallen into corruption, and the citizens into moral 
anarchy, with no hero come to set things right” (Collected Essays 46). 
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acknowledges the blending of Native Americans, African Americans and 
whites by referring to his tribal name, “the black One” and the name he 
chose for himself, “Part White One,” adding that he and Hickman both 
“share the blood of a slaver” (829). 
In one of his notes, Ellison suggests that the issue of race is at the core 
of the murder: “Bliss is killed not because he abandoned Severen’s mother 
nor because of his activities in [the] Senate but because he betrayed his past 
and thus provided Severen the deepest intellectual motive for murder. He is 
murdered by way of proving that Severen was full of that acceptance of 






In the introduction to Ellison’s “Oklabook,” the editors state that 
“[p]articularly with Love New, a story leads to another story, circles within 
circles, relevant to the novel’s theme of fathers and sons […]” (496). While 
it emphasizes the circular structure of the novel, the Native American fable 
also extends the cultural horizon of father-son relations by adding a Native 
American version to the ancient and Christian stories. Moreover, Love 
New’s fable highlights the novel’s historical dimension. It reverses Ameri-
can history as written by white historians who exert the symbolic power of 
definition. Severen’s patricide is a reaction to one of the basic fabrications 
of American historiography. Enlightened by a Native American, he rejects 
and ultimately extinguishes his father who owed his success to the denial of 
his African American heritage and the subsequent internalization of the 
hypocritical national anxiety of racial mixing. By starting the novel with 
such a crucial break of the generational chain and ending it with its expla-
nation Ellison argues not only for a fundamental rewriting of American his-
tory but also for a radical change in American politics.  
Ellison’s notes and drafts provide important clues to the understanding 
of the novel. First, they contain explicit reflections on the novel’s structure 
and the protagonists’ relations to each other that confirm the narrative’s de-
sign of the generational conflicts and their repetitions. Second, Hickman’s 
childhood memories offer valuable insights into the bodily effectiveness of 
charismatic power, as they vividly demonstrate his fierce emotional struggles. 
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Finally, the scenes from Hickman’s childhood provide an extension of the 
generational chain to include a particularly important link: Hickman’s 
struggling against the influence of his dominant, charismatic father estab-
lishes a significant parallel between his and Bliss’s early upbringings, 
thereby reinforcing the central idea of the repetition of father-son relations 
that ultimately guarantees the perpetuation of existing power structures. 
Having successfully overcome the symbolic violence of his father, 
Hickman, the revolting son, later recovers his primary habitus and turns 
into a charismatic preacher father himself. Bliss, having escaped Hickman’s 
dominating charisma and the doxa of the religious field, also later exerts 
power himself as a charismatic politician father figure. The sons’ “primary 
conditioning,” dominated by their fathers, reproduces a habitus that repre-
sents the history of which it is the product: “It ensures the active presence 
of past experiences […]” (Bourdieu, Logic 54). As race-baiting Senator 
Sunraider Bliss becomes a representative of the dominant political order 
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(Post-Black) Bildungsroman or Novel  
of (Black Bourgeois) Manners? 





As in all of Colson Whitehead’s novels, the use of pop-cultural references 
in Sag Harbor is telling. Consider the following passage: 15-year-old Benji 
Cooper and his friends are listening to Afrika Bambaataa and Soulsonic 
Force’s 1982 song “Planet Rock.” His friend Marcus calls it “a classic 
joint,” which prompts Benji to provide the information that the hip hop pio-
neers sampled a song by the German electronic music band Kraftwerk. 
However, Benji is not using these words; what he says is, “You know they 
bit that off Kraftwerk.” Biting – as adult Ben, who narrates the novel, 
points out – was considered “a major crime” in 1985 when the novel is set. 
Thus Marcus angrily replies, “Afrika Bambaataa didn’t steal anything. This 
is their song.” (61) Today – with the assistance of the website WhoSampled.com 
that meticulously records the samples used by hip hop artists – it is easy to 
determine that Benji is right, for “Planet Rock,” that “polycultural pastiche” 
(Chang 172), does use a Kraftwerk sample. Marcus however remains scan-
dalized and accuses Benji of betraying black culture: “I forgot you like that 
white music, you fuckin’ Siouxsie and the Banshees-listenin’ motherfuck-
er.” (62) Ironically it is Marcus who gets hip hop wrong, for adult Ben em-
phasizes that it has always been a syncretistic art form drawing on hetero-
geneous sources. “Funk, free jazz, disco, cartoons, German synthesizer mu-
sic—it didn’t matter where it came from, the art was converting it to new 
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use.” (61) In other words, it is necessary to know “that white music” to ex-
perience the full range of hip hop’s creativity. 
While not all literary critics might be familiar with the practice of sam-
pling, they will certainly know about ‘intertextuality’ and ‘heteroglossia’ – 
related concepts that similarly posit that texts are characterized by the pres-
ence of earlier texts or a plurality of voices. In fact, we can read the passage 
just quoted from as a metafictional commentary on Whitehead’s own liter-
ary ambitions (cf. Schur 248); he has pointed out that the range of influ-
ences on his work include both ‘high-brow’ literature and popular culture, 
both white and black authors (cf. Sherman). The exchange between Benji 
and Marcus suggests that Whitehead is aware that some of his readers 
might go so far as to accuse him of betraying his ‘race’ (see, for example, 
Fain 120). If Whitehead is analogizing his position in the literary field with 
that of Benji among his friends, we will have to conclude that he feels mis-
understood because of others’ facile juxtaposition of ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
culture as homogeneous and distinct entities.  
This is remarkably similar to what writer and TV host Touré diagnosed 
in his 2011 book Who’s Afraid of Post-Blackness? in which he chastises 
“self-appointed identity cops” (7), who believe that “there is a correct or le-
gitimate way of doing blackness,” and demands “for every Black-American 
to have the freedom to be Black however he or she chooses” in order to de-
stroy “the bankrupt, fraudulent concept of ‘authentic’ Blackness” (11). 
Touré also favorably reviewed Sag Harbor and praised its “unapologetic” 
reshaping of the “iconography of blackness” (“Visible Young Man”). He 
lauded Whitehead’s semi-autobiographical tale of a summer spent in an up-
per-middle-class black Long Island community for its refusal to give in to 
normative demands about how Blacks should act. In Touré’s words, “Post-
Blackness sees blackness not as a dogmatic code […] but as an open-source 
document, a trope with infinite uses.” No longer “stamped inauthentic and 
bullied into an inferiority complex,” modern Blacks such as those repre-
sented by Whitehead are free to “do blackness their way.” Touré ends the 
review with a call for “more post-black stories,” such as Whitehead’s about 
“black boys with beach houses.”  
Since 2009 – and also with reference to novelists such as Paul Beatty, 
Percival Everett, Mat Johnson, and others that seem to fit the bill – there 
has been continued scholarly interest in the phenomenon of ‘post-
blackness’ (cf. Paul Taylor; Baker and Simmons; Schmidt). However, far 
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from all authors approve of the concept. As I have shown elsewhere (cf. 
Lieber), Touré’s account is indeed deeply problematic, because it tacitly 
universalizes the experiences of (upper-)middle-class Blacks through its 
focus on “choice” (Who’s Afraid 68) and “identity options” that are alleg-
edly “limitless” (12), as well as its commitment to individual “Black suc-
cess” (11). While Touré acknowledges that success in the corporate world 
can be a function of knowing how to behave in a ‘proper’ manner, he treats 
this knowledge as a purely intellectual operation as if it was a choice that 
each and every black person was able to make irrespective of his or her 
class position. Thus, he reproduces clichés about the ‘American Dream,’ 
claiming that Barack Obama’s election provided proof “that believing in 
yourself and in the country can lead to towering rewards […]. And for 
those who opt to hate America and refuse to play the game and reject it be-
fore it rejects you, there are no rewards.” (200) In an autobiographical 
chapter we find out where Touré learned to “play the game,” namely in a 
Boston private school whose alumni include Robert Kennedy and T. S. 
Eliot (77). He additionally spent time in a “culturally black and ghetto ten-
nis club,” and it was the combination of “preppy school” and “ghetto club” 
that taught him to do “rapid cultural 180s” (88), in other words, to success-
fully move in both ‘white’ and ‘black’ surroundings. 
But Touré seems to have forgotten his privileged class position, arguing 
that success was a consequence of “[t]he way you walk—the grammar, ar-
ticulation, and diction you choose to employ” (184, my emphasis). His em-
phasis on deliberately choosing how to act and speak reveals that he cannot 
grasp that social agents “have not chosen the principle of their choice,” i.e., 
what Pierre Bourdieu calls “habitus” (Pascalian Meditations 149). Habitus 
is acquired in childhood and primarily a product of a social agent’s position 
in a society’s class structure. Speech – or the capacity to produce “an infi-
nite number of sentences really appropriate to an infinite number of situa-
tions” (Logic 32) – is an important part of a habitus, and what Touré cannot 
see is that “access to legitimate language is quite unequal, and the theoreti-
cal competence liberally granted to all by linguists is in reality monopolized 
by some” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 146). Thus, the skill Touré calls “Black 
multi-linguality” (Who’s Afraid 11, original emphasis) is also a result of 
having acquired sufficient cultural capital to be able to speak the language 
appropriate in various social situations. When Touré envisions “Black suc-
cess” in “the game” – which is nothing but the labor market (cf. Lieber 
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277-78) – he similarly ignores that to succeed social agents must first pos-
sess a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, Logic 66). Touré’s paean to “post-
Black rugged individualism” (Who’s Afraid 8) knows only history- and thus 
habitus-less individuals and remains blind to structural constraints that limit 
the number of choices actually available to them. Lack of success can thus 
only appear to be the result of false choices, and this commitment to indi-
vidual responsibility amounts to a central tenet of neoliberal ideology (cf. 
Wacquant 307). 
So what about Sag Harbor then? If it really was a ‘post-black’ novel, 
would this not imply that it proposes a vision of a neoliberal society, a vi-
sion of individuals who are not constrained in their actions by an embodied 
class habitus? Walter Benn Michaels thinks so, writing that it is a hallmark 
of the “neoliberal novel” to substitute “cultural difference for […] class dif-
ference” (184). Quoting Touré’s words of praise for Sag Harbor he polemi-
cally asks “if the crucial thing about rich black people is that they offer new 
ways of performing race rather than the old ways of embodying class” 
(185). While I am sympathetic to Michaels’s critique of neoliberal culture, I 
do not think that his brief remarks do Sag Harbor justice. The novel, I 
claim, is fully committed to the (Bourdieusian) idea that individuals possess 
embodied dispositions that tacitly shape the manner in which they perceive 
the world, think, and act. Through the novel’s focus on Benji we can recon-
struct the influence of his habitus – and this habitus is that of a member of 
the (black) bourgeoisie. Unlike Touré he struggles with making “cultural 
180s” and proves inept when it comes to “performing race” – and this is 
precisely because he has “embod[ied] class,” to use Michaels’s phrase once 
more. Ultimately, the difference between the two texts, Sag Harbor and 
Who’s Afraid of Post-Blackness?, is also expressed formally; for, many 
critics’ claims notwithstanding (cf. Maus 99, Fain 132), I argue that 
Whitehead’s novel is not a Bildungsroman. Rather than focusing on one 
(black) individual’s process of maturation – which is what Touré does – 
Whitehead has created a novel about a particular class fraction and their 
manners, and it is Bourdieu’s relational sociology – which is essentially a 
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ENOUGH OF THAT “IF-ONE-OF-US-GETS-IN CRAP,” 
OR, DELINKING FATE 
 
“Black success” in Touré means having “a shot at becoming the CEO or a 
vice president of the company” or at least “a powerful entrepreneur” 
(Who’s Afraid 184). By definition this is limited to the few – for there can 
hardly be many CEOs. And as long as their income drastically exceeds that 
of regular workers – on average, top CEOs make a staggering 300 times 
more (cf. Mishel and Davis) – it is hard to understand how this could count 
as meaningful progress for a majority of American Blacks – unless one ac-
cepts the logic of “linked fate” (Warren, What Was 138) according to which 
“the welfare of the race” (139) depends on the success of individual 
Blacks.1 Kenneth Warren holds that the same structure of thought has his-
torically underpinned African American literature, arguing that “the idea 
that sustains the possibility of an African American literature is a belief that 
the welfare of the race as a whole depends on the success of black writers 
and those who are depicted in their texts.” (139) While he acknowledges 
that this made sense in the era of Jim Crow segregation (cf. Warren, “On” 
742), he believes that it no longer does. If black authors continue to follow 
this model, it is because they “need to distinguish the personal odysseys 
they undertake to reach personal success from similar endeavors by their 
white class peers” (What Was 139). For Sag Harbor to have the kind of 
significance that Touré imagines it possesses it would need to represent 
Benji’s experience as having some sort of positive effect on “the welfare of 
the race.” 
Like Touré and Whitehead himself (cf. Maus 2), Benji and his brother 
attend a private school, where Benji is “the only black kid in the room” (7). 
Some people, notably white upper-middle-class liberals, see a benefit in the 
presence of a black student at this school, and adult Ben is able to explicate 
                                                   
1  Political scientist Adolph Reed has powerfully criticized the idea of a “black 
community” as “a racial population that is organically integrated and that oper-
ates as a collective subject in pursuit of unitary interests” (134). He thus inad-
vertently produced an avant la lettre rebuttal of Touré, pointing out that one 
consequence of the denial of “intraracial stratification” is to reduce differences 
between blacks to “idiosyncratic attitudes and personal styles” which obscures 
“structured social relations” (135). 
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their motivations: The father of one of his classmates, a Mr. Finkelstein, is 
glad to see Benji around because for him and his wife (both Civil Rights 
lawyers), 
 
[s]ending their daughter to a fancy private school was a betrayal of core values, pay-
ing tuition when you were supposed to support local public schools being in traitor-
ous equivalence with eating grapes [harvested by non-unionized workers] […]. / The 
fact that Mr. Finkelstein’s daughter had a bona-fide black friend mitigated the situa-
tion a bit. Hey, wasn’t that why they’d marched on Washington in the first place? (8) 
 
Benji’s presence makes it possible for white liberals to ignore the fact that 
they actively participate in the reproduction of an unjust education system 
in which success is a function of parental wealth: It produces the appear-
ance that the system is essentially fair since it does not discriminate on ra-
cial grounds. 
But it is not just white liberals who can appreciate individual black suc-
cess; the parents of Benji and his friends – Blacks who would have experi-
enced the U.S. before the end of legalized segregation – are committed to 
the idea of “linked fate.” On Labor Day the Sag Harbor community is lis-
tening to what Ben calls “the black national anthem,” i.e., the song “Ain’t 
No Stoppin’ Us Now” by R&B duo McFadden and Whitehead (259). The 
narrator appropriates two lines from the song’s first verse: “There’ve been 
so many things that held us down—check. But now it looks like things are 
finally coming around—check” (259-60), and reflects on the song’s signifi-
cance: “Whether the association was civil rights triumph, busting through 
glass ceilings in corporate towers, or merely the silly joy of gliding around 
a roller rink […], the song addressed the generations.” (260) Thereby col-
lective achievements (Civil Rights legislation) are conflated with individual 
ones (success in corporate America). In the minds of the Sag Harbor bour-
geoisie, the progress made by some Blacks – like themselves – is thus rep-
resented as signifying progress for all. 
But this, we learn in the course of the novel, is the belief of the older 
generation. By way of focalizing through 15-year-old Benji’s perspective, 
Sag Harbor suggests that his post-Civil Rights generation is in the process 
of delinking its fate from that of “the race as a whole.” In the novel “linked 
fate” is expressed in the form of the phrase, “If they got in, it was like all of 
us getting in.” (196) Only Benji does not refer to the corporate world but to 
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Bayside, a local music venue. Sag Harbor provides an allegory for the un-
sustainability of “linked fate” by way of detailing the plans made by Benji 
and his friends Bobby and NP to attend a concert. When only Benji and NP 
end up getting in this no longer figures as a collective triumph, but rather 
triggers the “resentment” (216) of those left outside. Similarly, once inside, 
Benji no longer feels solidarity with his friends who were turned down at 
the door but instead feels a new sense of comradeship with the other danc-
ers at Bayside, among whom are “older white people” (218). At this point 
he has already given up on the idea that individual success in making it past 
the bouncer “was like all of us getting in” because NP and Bobby, in their 
attempts to secure places on the guest list, made it clear that they did not 
care about him. Benji concludes, “Now that the day [of the concert] had ar-
rived, I wasn’t going in for that if-one-of-us-gets-in crap. I was pissed at the 
thought of them inside and me standing outside the club like a fucking 
jerk.” (212-13) By assuming what Benji – who is used to not “getting in” – 
elsewhere calls his “outsider’s perspective” (80), the novel shows that that 
notion of “linked fate” is only attractive for those already on the inside. 
The black upper middle class then is shown to be a class fraction whose 
members compete for desirable positions. But the novel also addresses its 
relation to the black proletariat, for the flipside of the “if-one-of-us-gets-in” 
rhetoric is expressed by Benji as follows: “When they failed [to get into 
Bayside], we accepted our portion of shame.” (196) Again there is a struc-
tural homology to “linked fate” ideology. For if the success of individual 
Blacks reflects positively on “the race as a whole,” individual failure serves 
as a source of collective “shame” – this “pars pro toto distortion” (Elias 5) 
cuts both ways. Thus the inhabitants of Sag Harbor sharply distinguish 
themselves from what they euphemistically call “those of our race who 
possessed a certain temperament and circumstance”; or, phrased more ex-
plicitly: “There were no street niggers in Sag Harbor.” (31) In fact, both 
statements are made by the narrator, which serves to show that Benji has 
incorporated the principles of the Sag Harbor “classification system” (204), 
i.e., the principles of its habitus and “schemes of perception, thought and 
action” (Bourdieu, Logic 54). The language he uses is that of his father, 
who displays a dismissive attitude toward what he also calls “corner nig-
gers” (162). The use of the ‘n-word’ in itself does not necessarily express 
class hostility, for the Sag Harbor adults also use it “in its familiar comrade-
ly sense” (31). When it is used to denigrate lower-class Blacks, it is always 
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brought up in connection with spatial referents such as “corner” or “street” 
(cf. Maus 106). Those places serve as a shorthand for “a vast, abstract plane 
of black pathology” (87) in the eyes of Benji’s father. That Benji tacitly ap-
plies the same principles of vision and division becomes clear when he sees 
his friend Nick wearing a big gold chain and imagines hearing his father 
exclaim: “Where does he think he comes from, the Street?” (87) As a child 
of the black bourgeoisie, it is not surprising that Benji has acquired its habi-
tus and the attendant “classification system.” 
By way of introducing Benji’s father and his ideas about black “pathol-
ogy” the novel makes explicit the class condescension hidden under the 
surface in Touré. As Norbert Elias explains in “Towards a Theory of Estab-
lished-Outsider Relations,” the self-image of “established” groups – such as 
the Sag Harbor bourgeoisie – is “modelled […] on the minority of its ‘best’ 
members,” whereas their perception of “outsider” groups – such as the 
black proletariat – is based on “the ‘bad’ characteristics of that group’s 
‘worst’ section” (5). In Sag Harbor the former is embodied by the commu-
nity’s “founding fathers” and “their ideas of how proper black people 
should act” (221), whereas Benji’s father can see the latter – i.e., stereotyp-
ical representations of the black proletariat that were popular in the 1980s 
such as “Welfare Moms” (180) – on the news daily. At the same time the 
inhabitants of Sag Harbor are outsiders vis-à-vis the white elite that lives in 
the adjoining Long Island communities – and whose riches fuel Benji’s 
wildest dreams (cf. 37, 113).2 Consequently, they must fear to be judged by 
the same standards as the black proletariat by whites. Benji’s father and 
everyone else committed to the Sag Harbor “classification system” tacitly 
understand that “systems of classification constitute a stake in the struggles 
that oppose individuals and groups” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 14, original 
emphasis), which is why they so desperately try to distinguish themselves 
                                                   
2  John Clegg writes: “Two important and somewhat contrary facts must be kept in 
mind when discussing this new black elite. Firstly, they constitute an elite only 
relative to the extreme and concentrated poverty of the black inner city. They 
tend to do significantly worse than their white neighbors, especially with respect 
to wealth, and like all black people they experience racism. Secondly, and de-
spite this, they are in a relative sense more of an elite than the white equivalent, 
since black wealth in America is far more concentrated than white, and the in-
come gap between top and bottom far greater.” (cf. Taylor 2016: 7) 
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from the black proletariat (all the while believing that their own success 
constitutes progress for “the race as a whole”) or from those of their own 
who “fell in with the wrong crowd” (256), such as Benji’s uncle Nelson. 
In short, Benji’s father, the head of what his son terms a “Cosby fami-
ly” (160), represents the same class resentment as comedian Bill Cosby 
himself, who (in)famously went on a rant about the black proletariat in a 
2004 speech, in which he blamed what he called the “lower economic peo-
ple” among American Blacks (qtd. in Dyson xi) for their allegedly “self-
destructive behavior” in typical neoliberal fashion (xiii). Mr. Cooper is sim-
ilarly committed to individual responsibility, claiming that the black poor 
“need to get off their asses” (180). While we have seen that 15-year-old 
Benji often unwittingly applies the same “classification system” as his fa-
ther, the fact that the novel is narrated by adult Ben introduces a certain dis-
tance to the class condescension. After performing a sort of class ventrilo-
quism by saying that “There were no street niggers in Sag Harbor,” the nar-
rator adds “No, no, no” (31). The threefold repetition of the word suggests 
that Benji has repeatedly heard his father underscore that all kinds of be-
havior associated with “the Street” are contradicting the norms of respecta-
bility laid down by the “founding fathers”; but it also suggests that he – just 
like his friends – is tired of hearing this. While the manners of black bour-
geois life have been inculcated in their minds for all their lives, this young-
er generation finds much that is desirable in “the Street.” 
 
 
THEORIZING THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, OR,  
BENJI AS GRAMMARIAN 
 
The question remains whether their upper-middle-class habitus does not 
create an unsurpassable distance between their own lives and those of the 
black proletariat, however attractive they may find “the Street.” Benji sums 
up the teenagers’ predicament as follows: 
 
According to the world, we were the definition of paradox: black boys with beach 
houses […]. / It could mess with your head sometimes, if you were the susceptible 
sort. And if it messed with your head, got under your brown skin, there were some 
typical and well-known remedies. You could embrace the beach part—revel in the 
luxury, the perception of status, wallow without care in what it meant to be born in 
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America with money […]. You could embrace the black part—take some idea you 
had about what real blackness was, and make theater of it, your 24-7 one-man show. 
Folks of this type could pick Bootstrapping Striver or Proud Pillar, but the most 
popular brands were Militant or Street, Militant being the opposite of bourgie capitu-
lation to The Man, and Street being the antidote to Upper Middle Class emascula-
tion. Street, ghetto. Act hard, act out, act in a way that would come to be called 
gangsterish […], knowing there was someone to post bail if one of your grubby 
schemes fell apart. (57-58) 
 
While this passage implies choice, it also makes clear that the ability to 
choose is a result of certain material preconditions – in short, of being born 
“with money.” At the same time, the designation of possible choices as 
“popular brands” suggests that they are certainly not expressions of “real 
blackness” but rather the commodified expressions of 1980s urban culture. 
The teenagers attempt to buy into this lifestyle through sneakers and gold 
chains popularized by rap artists. But as a matter of fact we have already 
seen how the idea of hip hop’s “real blackness” has been deconstructed by 
way of Benji’s insistence on Afrika Bambaataa’s use of a Kraftwerk sam-
ple. 
It is adult Ben who can verbalize this more precisely when he relates 
that his 15-year-old self “didn’t understand […] why Marcus was hassling” 
him (61) because he thought “that it was okay to like both Afrika Bam-
baataa and Kraftwerk” (62) – which brings us back to the issue of ‘post-
blackness’. Yet far from Touré’s “unapologetic” commitment to ‘post-
blackness,’ Benji seems less self-assured. While he points out that “you 
could embrace the contradiction,” for instance by saying, “what you call 
paradox [of being “black boys with beach houses”], I call myself,” he con-
tinues that this worked only “[i]n theory,” for “[t]hose inclined to this reme-
dy didn’t have many obvious models” (58, original emphasis).3 If “em-
brac[ing] the contradiction” is what ‘post-blackness’ requires, this does not 
come easy for Benji. And this is again a matter of habitus because unlike 
Touré, who learned to do “rapid cultural 180s” by spending time in a pre-
dominantly white private school and a “black and ghetto tennis club,” Benji 
is unable to connect with the “black and ghetto” lifestyle that his friends 
                                                   
3  The black “nerd,” a possible role model for Benji, only became a popular figure 
in 1986 with the release of Spike Lee’s She’s Gotta Have It (cf. George 135). 
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engage in (or try to, at any rate) due to what he calls his “strong dork con-
stitution” (43). In other words, we again encounter the issue of an individu-
al’s “practical sense” or the embodied dispositions that make up a habitus. 
Bourdieu employs this concept to mediate between structure and prac-
tice. In a classic formulation he defines habitus as “systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations” (Logic 53). These dispositions are them-
selves structured by the objective conditions under which they were ac-
quired, and here “[e]arly experiences have particular weight” (60). But the 
habitus also acts as a “structuring structure,” insofar as all subsequent 
“thoughts, perceptions and actions,” in a word, all forms of “practice” (55), 
are structured by the habitus’ “schemes.” The latter enable social agents “to 
adapt endlessly to partially modified contexts” (Pascalian Meditations 
139), that is, they serve as the basis for the practical rationality of their 
practices in new situations – but only within “limits” (138) since the range 
of possible practices always remains constrained by the conditions under 
which the habitus was acquired. In short, individuals incorporate the objec-
tive structures of the social world that they experience early in their lives, 
and these structures are embodied as subjective dispositions that guide – 
though not mechanically determine – all their later practices. While this 
suggests that they will be able to act ‘properly’ in situations that resemble 
those in which they acquired their habitus without having to consciously 
adhere to explicit rules (cf. 143), it also suggests that this will not be easily 
possible under changed conditions: Due to what Bourdieu calls “hysteresis” 
(Outline 83), the habitus is slow to adapt to a radically changed context. 
There individuals might feel embarrassed due to their lack of access to the 
means of producing the correct practice – and this is often expressed in “the 
form of bodily emotions” such as “shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety, 
guilt” (Masculine Domination 38, original emphasis). 
Benji the “dork” thus falters when it comes to his encounters with 
“black slang and other sundry soulful artifacts [he]’d missed out on in [his] 
‘predominantly white’ private school” (29). This refers primarily to com-
plex handshake routines and the “grammatical acrobatics” (41) of the ritual-
ized strategies of insult that his friends – some of whom do not attend pri-
vate schools – introduce to Sag Harbor. Benji cannot transcend his “outsid-
er’s perspective” which only allows him to provide detached descriptions of 
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their actions without being able to acquire a “practical mastery” (Outline 
19) of the logic of their practice. In other words, the habitus shaped by a 
“predominantly white” Manhattan environment and the manners of the old-
er black generation hostile to ‘street’ culture makes it hard, almost impossi-
ble, for him to do “rapid cultural 180s” à la Touré. 
Consider the description of a handshake routine performed by Benji’s 
friends Marcus and Bobby: “Slam, grip, flutter, snap. Or was it slam, flut-
ter, grip, snap? I was all thumbs when it came to shakes.” Benji, who only 
perceives “a blur of choreography” reasons: “I had all summer to get it 
right, unless someone went back to the city and returned with some new 
variation that spread like a virus, and which my strong dork constitution 
produced countless antibodies against.” In short, Benji admits that his ef-
forts to learn the new handshakes remain mere “fumbles” (43). Because 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is not determinist it does not exclude the 
possibility of adapting to new practices; but we see here that this requires 
an extended period of time (“all summer”) and remains imperfect (“fum-
bles”). Benji imagines the handshakes to be “[d]evised in the underground 
soul laboratories of Harlem, pounded out in the blacker-than-thou sweat-
shops of the South Bronx” (43), but this should not be misunderstood as 
suggesting that they express “real blackness.” For elsewhere we read that 
whatever Benji thinks about Queens and Brooklyn – boroughs that are 
structurally homologous to Harlem and the Bronx vis-à-vis Manhattan – is 
distorted by the “standard projections of the repressed” (239); “repressed” 
because he feels excluded from ‘black’ culture. That is, the content of his 
projection (say, “blacker-than-thou sweatshops”) is no more adequate to re-
ality than the content of his fantasies about the “affluence” (113) that exists 
in the white neighborhoods surrounding Sag Harbor.4 In both cases spatial 
difference mystifies class difference. And this class difference is expressed 
in class habitus, if only negatively, because Benji fails to master the hand-
shakes – which produces the sensation of “sham[e]” (43; cf. Bourdieu, 
Masculine Domination 38). 
                                                   
4  Benji’s exclusion from both black ‘urban’ culture and from white elites is fur-
ther analogized when he imagines the latter as “secret-handshake groups” (110) 
as well. 
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When it comes to the “grammatical acrobatics” of the insults Benji’s 
“outsider’s perspective” on the logic of practice stands out even more clear-
ly. He explains (41): 
 
The trend this summer, insult-wise, was toward grammatical acrobatics, the unlikely 
collage. One smashed a colorful and evocative noun or proper noun into a pejora-












Benji points out that the addition of a “‘You fuckin’,’ as in ‘You fuckin’ 
Cha-Ka from Land of the Lost-lookin’ motherfucker,’” could serve “as a 
rhetorical pause, allowing the speaker a few extra seconds to pluck some 
splendid modifier out of the invective ether” (41-42). And he finishes thus: 
 
True masters of the style sometimes attached the nonsensical ‘with your monkey 
ass’ as a kicker, to convey sincerity and depth of feeling. Hence, ‘You fuckin’ Kunta 
Kinte-lookin’ motherfucker … with your monkey ass.’ You may have noticed that 
the -in’ verbs were generally visual. The heart of the critique concerned what you 
were putting out into the world, the vibes you gave off. Which is what made them so 
devastating when executed well—this ordnance detonated in that area between you 
and the mirror, between you and what you thought everyone else was seeing. (42) 
 
Despite the ironic tone of this passage – which comes with giving vernacu-
lar language a quasi-academic treatment – the attention to detail suggests 
that Benji is intimately familiar with this practice. But in fact these observa-
tions are entirely a product of a “theoretical view of practice” that Bourdieu 
distinguishes from a “practical relation to practice” (Logic 81). For 
throughout the whole novel Benji not once utters a phrase of this sort. In 
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Bourdieu’s terms, adult Ben can produce an account of the theoretical logic 
of the insult in the manner of a “grammarian,” but teenage Benji cannot 
produce actual insults in practice as an “orator” would (31). The former 
speaks from the standpoint of “an ‘impartial spectator’ who seeks to under-
stand for the sake of understanding” and possesses “mastery of the code”; 
the latter possesses “mastery of [its] appropriate usages” (32). “Orators” are 
thus the “[t]rue masters of the style” – but Benji is not one of them because 
he lacks the appropriate “practical mastery.” 
In The Logic of Practice Bourdieu discusses the need to complete two 
“epistemological break[s]” (26) in order to transcend the false opposition 
between “subjectivism” and “objectivism” (25). The first is a “methodical 
break with primary experience” (14) and the commonsense perceptions of 
social agents. By having adult Ben narrate the novel Whitehead introduces 
a potential first break, the break with the “primary experience” of teenage 
Benji. While sometimes this break fails to materialize, insofar as the novel 
remains focalized through the eyes of Benji, often adult Ben acts as narra-
tor-focalizer – as in the passage quoted above. Whitehead himself states as 
much: 
 
I knew that it had to be an adult looking back on his childhood because I would get 
bored out of my skull if I had to have a fifteen-year-old’s voice for three hundred 
pages. […] My narrators generally have a certain kind of critical faculty. They’re 
analyzing what the characters are doing in larger social structures. So I wanted to 
have an adult voice looking back upon teenage years with that kind of critical dis-
tance. You know, being able to break down their cursing grammar. (qtd. in 
Chamberlin)  
 
This “critical distance” equals Bourdieu’s first “break.” But the second one 
is missing. This would entail a critical distance to his own position which 
could enable Ben “to objectify the objectifying distance and the social con-
ditions that make it possible” (Logic 14). Not having performed this second 
“break” he cannot reflect on the fact that he can “break down” his friends’ 
“cursing grammar” but remains unable to employ it in practice himself. In 
other words, he does not grasp why he can assume the “objectifying dis-
tance” of the “grammarian” but lacks the practical understanding of the 
“orator.” 
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In fact, according to Bourdieu, the “scientific break is inseparable from 
a social break” (5). It is significant that Ben resorts to producing a diagram 
of the logic of the insult. The diagram form represents the objectivist 
“break with primary experience” as practiced in Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist 
anthropology. Bourdieu points out that it produces a “synchronization ef-
fect” (10) that is alien to the actual logic of the practices the diagram pur-
portedly represents. This is because practice by definition occurs in time 
and because social agents, rather than mechanically following a “rule” sug-
gested by a diagram, engage in a “strategy” that allows for symbolic profits 
to be reaped based on the use of time (Outline 9, original emphases). Ben is 
tacitly aware that the diagram cannot represent the full truth of the insult, 
for otherwise he could not speak of insults that are “executed well” – for 
this implies that it does not suffice to produce some combination of “modi-
fier,” “-in’ verb,” and “object.” And he explicitly evokes the role of time by 
pointing out that “You fuckin’” can provide a “rhetorical pause” that makes 
it possible to come up with a better insult, as it is the “interval” that allows 
for “strategy” in the first place (Bourdieu, Logic 106). But he cannot ex-
plain his own ineptitude, and this is precisely because he fails to objectify 
his class position that keeps him at a distance from the “grammatical acro-
batics” of black vernacular. For his class privilege means that he is relative-
ly “free from necessity” (Pascalian Meditations 17) which allows him to 
assume the “detached, distant disposition” of the observer who treats the 
world as “an object of contemplation, a representation, a spectacle” (51) 
that can in turn be represented by means of a diagram. But while Benji/Ben 
as an individual struggles with understanding how his class position shapes 
his actions and thought, the novel itself insists on the fact that social agents’ 
way of acting in the social world is not a matter of ‘choice’ alone (or of 
‘performance’), but is decisively determined by the (‘embodied’) durable 
dispositions of (class) habitus.  
 
 
BILDUNG VS. MANNERS 
 
What kind of novel is Sag Harbor then? As indicated above it is somewhat 
common to classify it as a Bildungsroman; Whitehead himself has used the 
related term “coming of age novel” to describe his fourth work of fiction. 
As I have argued above, I do not believe that those are accurate 
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designations. And indeed in the same interview Whitehead himself quali-
fies this statement by saying that he was “avoiding certain expectations of 
plot and a certain kind of narrative satisfaction” in order to produce his 
“own kind of version” of a coming of age novel (qtd. in Shukla). Accord-
ingly a closer look at the novel’s minimal plot reveals that there is neither a 
process of Bildung nor a coming of age in any meaningful sense. Quite the 
opposite. Benji starts the summer by planning to establish a “New Me,” 
basking in the “early-summer dream of reinvention” that should result in a 
“refurbished self” (23). But on the second-to-last page of the novel, just be-
fore returning to Manhattan, he must conclude that “[i]t didn’t work out the 
way I had envisioned.” Though no doubt “some stuff happened,” this is not 
exactly the stuff a successful Bildungsroman is made of. In fact, the desired 
“reinvention” is deferred: Benji resolves to sketch a “new plan” (272), now 
“sure” that “it is going to be a great year.” However, the novel’s two very 
last sentences – “Isn’t it funny? The way the mind works?” (273) – imply 
that the near future will not go according to Benji’s “new plan” either. Sag 
Harbor thus raises but ultimately frustrates the expectation that we are 
reading a Bildungsroman. 
For this we should rather turn to Touré’s Who’s Afraid of Post-
Blackness?, which is not strictly speaking a novel, but includes an autobio-
graphical chapter that details precisely the process of maturation that we 
expect from a Bildungsroman. As Michaels argues, the meaning of this nar-
rative form in the current (neoliberal) socio-political climate is to empha-
size “that there are only individuals,” which is why the question of 
“whether memoirs really count as literature” (183) is secondary; what 
counts is the trajectory of an individual overcoming obstacles. And this is 
the very lesson of Touré’s “post-Black rugged individualism.” Reading his 
book we can reconstruct his struggle to free himself from oppressive defini-
tions of “Blackness” and deal with the everyday racism he encounters as a 
journalist. In short, we see him triumph over those, both black and white, 
who want to constrict the free expression of his “post-Black” individuality. 
The logic of this type of narrative is essentially “optimistic” because, while 
it acknowledges “lingering racism” as a problem that continues to exist, it 
at the same time proposes that this can be overcome through the right 
choices and individual determination (Michaels 179). As Franco Moretti 
has demonstrated in his classic account of the Bildungsroman, “‘in the 
middle’ anything can happen – each individual can ‘make it’ or ‘be broken,’” 
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which is why this genre needs both “hope” and “disillusion” (248n5). The 
latter is provided by Touré in the chapter immediately preceding his auto-
biographical sketch in which he discusses the “fall” of black comedian 
Dave Chappelle, who was “scared […] to death” by the “freedom of the 
post-Black era” in Touré’s telling (Who’s Afraid 74). The “hope” of course 
is provided by his own example.5 
Sag Harbor remains a Bildungsroman deferred. Instead of following 
Benji as he truly ‘comes of age,’ we watch him stay in place. He does not 
undergo what the narrator calls a “[c]ommon rite of passage” among the 
Sag Harbor youth, namely getting out. This option is represented by Benji’s 
older sister Elena who no longer comes to Sag Harbor because she has had 
“[e]nough of this bourgie shit” (234, original emphasis), and she even ex-
horts her brother: “[D]o me a favor, Benji, and get out when you can” 
(237). This process of getting out in a both literal (no longer spending 
summers in Sag Harbor) and figurative sense (breaking with the manners of 
the black “bourgie” class) is precisely what would be the stuff of a Bil-
dungsroman – but this is not what Sag Harbor is about. Instead it is a novel 
about a particular space, again both in a literal (a physical location) and a 
figurative sense (a position in social space). In fact, Whitehead’s spatial 
commitment goes so far that he produced a map of Sag Harbor included in 
the original edition of the novel and a further annotated map for the Wall 
Street Journal (cf. Mechling). Furthermore, it is a novel whose temporality 
is not linear, but circular. When summer ends Benji thinks, “[w]e plotted 
and planned and next year came around and we were in the same place” 
(259), and observes younger children that will be the “replacements” (261) 
of his circle. What is important here is not Benji’s individual trajectory, but 
the fact that there is a physical and social space that can and will be 
                                                   
5  Interestingly the very same logic pervades Ta-Nehisi Coates’s celebrated Be-
tween the World and Me (2015), a book that at first glance looks diametrically 
opposed to Touré’s. However, for all of Coates’s pessimism, we find the same 
dualism: the “disillusion” is represented by the police murder of his friend 
Prince Jones, but the “hope” is provided by Coates’s own career. As in Touré 
the relevance of class is denied, and we end up with a story of individual (‘post-
black’) achievement. While in Touré class disappears behind acts of individual 
choice, in Coates it is the “social equalizer” of the “black body” (Kuhl) that 
serves this purpose (cf. also Clegg).  
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occupied again. In other words, the logic of Sag Harbor is one of reproduc-
tion not of change. 
This is why it makes more sense to treat Sag Harbor as a novel of man-
ners and start looking for its predecessors among works by authors such as 
Edith Wharton or Bret Easton Ellis rather than (exclusively) in the tradition 
of the (black) Bildungsroman or autobiography (as Fain does, see 127-36).6 
In a classic account Lionel Trilling described “manners” as belonging to 
 
that part of a culture which is made up of half-uttered or unuttered or unutterable ex-
pressions of value. They are hinted at by small actions, sometimes by the arts of 
dress or decoration, sometimes by tone, gesture, emphasis, or rhythm, sometimes by 
the words that are used with a special frequency or a special meaning. They are the 
things that for good or bad draw the people of a culture together and that separate 
them from the people of another culture. (206-07) 
 
By “people of a culture” we are of course to understand members of a so-
cial class. As my reading of Sag Harbor has shown, the novel is committed 
to showing the myriad ways by which members of classes distinguish 
themselves from others – willingly or unwillingly, explicitly or implicitly. 
And no theorist was better suited to grasp these processes than Bourdieu 
with his keen sense for the way “[s]ocial subjects, classified by their classi-
fications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make […], in 
which their position in the objective classifications is expressed or be-
trayed” (Distinction 6). The sense of difference goes so far that 15-year-old 
Benji imagines the super-rich whites who live in the neighborhoods nearby 
as belonging to a different species, as “reptilian creatures” wearing “hu-
man-flesh costumes” (113) or “[p]terodactyls” (37). Their lives – and man-
ners – seem so radically different from what he knows that he cannot imag-
ine their essential sameness any longer; and this recalls, say, Undine 
Spragg’s perception of Peter Van Degen as possessing a “grotesque saurian 
head” in Wharton (285) or Patrick Bateman’s literal turning of a homeless 
                                                   
6  To be sure, Wharton’s New Yorkers (and Ellis’s rich kids, too, if for other rea-
sons) would disapprove of the ‘manners’ of Benji and his friends. But it is worth 
remembering that, “as economic structures change, so manners change.” The es-
sential fact is that, whatever form they assume, manners express class differ-
ences; their “foundation” is “economic” (Godden 12). 
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man’s face, with whom he claims he has nothing “in common,” into a gro-
tesque pulp (Ellis 131). In all these cases, behind the façade of manners, the 
“structural antagonism” of class society lurks as a monstrosity (Michaels 
181). Unlike Touré’s account of ‘post-blackness’ then Whitehead’s Sag 
Harbor remains aware of the monstrous nature of class society and the log-
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“You People Almost Had Me Hating You 
Because of the Color of Your Skin” 
Symbolic Violence and Black In-Group Racism in  
Percival Everett’s I Am Not Sidney Poitier 
JOHANNES KOHRS 
 
imagine!...words were coming…a voice she 
did not recognize…at first…so long since it 
had sounded…then finally had to ad-
mit…could be none other…than her own.  
SAMUEL BECKETT / NOT I 
 
 
What does it mean to be not Sidney Poitier? More precisely: What does it 
mean to be black, male but not Sidney Poitier? Or, more precisely and con-
fusingly: What does it mean to be black, male but not Sidney Poitier and 
have, as prime social identifier, a name that proclaims this very differential 
status? These questions lie at the core of I Am Not Sidney Poitier (hence-
forth: Not Sidney). The 2009 satiric novel by African American author 
Percival Everett portrays the absurdly funny, crisis-ridden coming of age of 
the wealthy black orphan Not Sidney Poitier. The novel’s eponymous nar-
rator struggles for (self-)recognition in an episodic rite of passage through 
the starkly satirized cultural scene of the 1980s and 90s U.S.  
Due to his peculiar name the Sidney Poitier look-alike Not Sidney sets 
off a sequence of ragingly racist episodes, all of which parody various film-
ic Sidney Poitier scenarios. In one of these, Everett changes the interracial 
conflict negotiated in the Poitier movie Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? 
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(dir. Stanley Kramer, 1967; henceforth: Guess) into an intraracial confron-
tation. Here, as a victim of in-group racism in the social domain of a black 
upper class family, Not Sidney is marginalized not by way of overt, physi-
cally transacted racial oppression but on the basis of what Pierre Bourdieu 
has termed symbolic violence.1 By juxtaposing the icon of benign black 
masculinity, Sidney Poitier, with his elusive character Not Sidney Poitier, 
Everett insinuates a race-based analogy between the Civil Rights conflicts 
at the peak of Poitier’s career and the multiculturalist entertainment indus-
try in the era satirized in Not Sidney. Implicitly, the novel thus hints at the 
“post-racial” euphoria at the time of its publication, which is at odds with 




“YOU MAKIN’ FUN OF ME, BOY? – NATURE BEAT ME TO 
THAT”: TOWARD A DEHABITUALIZED READING OF RACE 
 
Following the journey of a young black man through the geographical 
(Southern rural and East Coast urban) as well as social spaces (lower to up-
per class) of U.S. society, Not Sidney ironicizes the idea(l) of a colorblind 
society that crystallized in the controversial concept of “post-race.”2 Having 
first emerged in the 1990s as the utopian promise of social progress brought 
about with the turn of the Millennium, the notion gained further traction 
when – one year before the publication of I Am Not Sidney Poitier – Barack 
Obama took the highest office in the nation and seemed to prove an unpar-
alleled upward social mobility of minorities.  
Not Sidney grows up as an outsider in a poor black neighborhood of 
Los Angeles. The origin of his name is as dubious as his genealogy (his fa-
                                                   
1  It is precisely the import of Bourdieu’s approach, on which this article is based, 
to consider every act of racial oppression as violent in a physical, i.e., body-
centered way. Although this seems to be stating the obvious, the impact of fists 
and words can have the same psycho-corporeal “reality” for the racialized vic-
tim. 
2  I draw on “post-race” not as an accurate description of sociopolitical realities, 
but as the epitome of a simplistic socio-historical teleology from civic equality 
to colorblindness. 
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ther remains unknown). According to his mother, it has “nothing to do with 
the actor at all.” As she claims, it is “simply a name she had created, with 
no consideration of the outside world” (7). Raised by his self-made, “eccen-
tric” (130), and politically radical mother, he is taught to read a lot and 
think critically, and not surprisingly he “turn[s] out to be extremely well 
educated” himself (30). However, she passes away when Not Sidney is 
eleven years old, bequeathing to him a vast amount of money from her for-
tunate investment in the TV company TBS, owned by the fictionalized Ted 
Turner. In appreciation of Ms. Poitier’s loyalty to his firm the media mogul 
takes Not Sidney to live with him and his wife, the fictionalized Jane Fonda, 
in Atlanta, Georgia. In this private, well-situated milieu, Not Sidney’s 
wealth grants him access to the privilege of whiteness, namely disregard for 
(his own) skin color. Educated by an almost exclusively non-white staff (an 
Indian American accountant, an African American social activist home 
teacher and a Korean American martial arts instructor) Not Sidney is raised 
to be entirely unaware of the racial divide outside his gilded cage. The fre-
quent beatings he receives from kids in the formative years of his adoles-
cence (they are confused by and frustrated with his name) instill in him an 
ironic indifference toward the social world in general and race-related 
stimuli in particular.  
Embarking on what he deems a “valuable learning experience, a rite of 
passage” (168), Not Sidney resolves to find his mother’s headstone in Los 
Angeles in order to solve the mystery of his origin. He drops out of high 
school after a scandalous incident of forced fellatio inflicted on him by his 
white history teacher Ms. Hancock, gets arrested for “driving while black” 
in rural Georgia and is locked away in the “Peckerwood County Correc-
tional Prison Farm,” from which he escapes and buys his way into the his-
torically all-black Morehouse College. There, he is marginalized as being 
“not black enough” by the elitist fraternity of the “Big Brothers” and as be-
ing “too black” by his girlfriend’s extremely class-conscious light-black 
parents during the aforementioned episode in Washington DC, modeled on 
the Stanley Kramer movie. He has his accountant buy the TV channel NET 
(“Negro-Entertainment-Television,” obviously a satirical nod at BET), thus 
highlighting the novel’s parallelization of the “post-racial” era and the rise 
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of the commercialization of blackness in the 1980s.3 He enrolls in a philos-
ophy course on “Nonsense,” taught by the fictionalized author of the novel 
himself, Percival Everett, only to drop out of college, too. Ironically, Not 
Sidney increasingly resembles the original actor, undergoing a quasi-surreal 
bodily transformation. His chaotic quest culminates in his solving the mys-
terious murder of his very own doppelganger and, passing for the ‘real’ 
Sidney Poitier, accepting the Academy Award for Most Dignified Figure in 
American Culture as the man who “sets the standard” (234). 
Everett’s satire presents an episodic experiment on a black millionaire: 
Not Sidney is the test object in a speculative test-scenario for which money 
serves as the key variable. He passes through the crucial institutions of so-
cietally regulated socialization: high school, college – and prison. Signifi-
cantly, he returns with similar results every time. He is policed and brutal-
ized, harassed and exoticized, in short: misrecognized. This punitive impe-
tus emblematizes Everett’s ironic riffing on the principle of blaming the 
victim and the “culture of poverty” debates. Not Sidney thus can be con-
ceived of as a privileged victim who, due to his very name, is forced to un-
settle the racial order. This paradox of involuntary subversiveness marks 
the core of the novel’s absurd humor, which, as I will discuss below, pro-
ductively complicates the social scope of the satire.4 Thus, his name is 
                                                   
3  BET was founded in 1980, at the beginning of the decade that saw the rise of 
one of the wealthiest and most widely influential African American figures in 
the U.S. entertainment industry: Oprah Winfrey. 
4  Not Sidney experiments with a humor-based configuration of incongruity and 
nonsensicality that aligns it with the Absurd, as the paratextual reference to 
Samuel Beckett’s 1973 one-act play Not I is meant to show. Like Everett’s pro-
tagonist, Beckett’s acting unit, the mouth of a woman who soliloquizes her life-
story of subjugation reduced to the corporeal function of her speech organ, is in-
serted into a linguistically predetermined power system, against which she re-
volts by refraining from using the pronoun “I.” Everett’s absurdist alignment 
with Beckett hinges on the problematization of the performative link between 
language and subjectivity as well as of art as a simplistically politicized practice. 
Aiming, above all, at debunking the misappropriation of language as a means of 
establishing meaning as naturally dominant, the Absurd can be conceived of as 
relating to symbolic violence in approaching racism not as a linear-hierarchical 
but rather as an inherently ambiguous, relational process of social domination.  
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interpreted by his white and black opponents as an act of sassiness, or mak-
ing fun of them, for it induces an infinite interrogation loop, undermining 
any ascriptive attempt at identification: “‘What’s your name?’, a kid would 
ask. ‘Not Sidney’, I would answer. ‘Okay, then what is it?’” (13). This 
cyclic misrecognition is the defining principle of Not Sidney’s being persis-
tently marginalized as the black Other; it epitomizes the novel’s complica-
tion of the essentialist view of race that results in stereotypically fixing 
human difference.5  
The re-contextualization of the seemingly outdated Sidney Poitier sce-
narios challenges the reader to make sense of the racial madness erupting 
around Not Sidney. Though he is persistently punished for being unaware 
of race he actually fares moderately O.K. This discrepancy, which fosters 
the satiric humor in the first place, as well as the incongruity between Not 
Sidney and Sidney Poitier make the novel a particularly productive exam-
ple of what Glenda R. Carpio has called “incongruity humor.” Carpio de-
fines this so far understudied type of African American humor as the “play-
ing of ‘what if’ games […] that momentarily reconfigure habits of mind 
and language,” which has the function to challenge social normativity (6). 
Seemingly incongruent with the original Sidney Poitier, Not Sidney, as 
E. Lâle Demitürk asserts, “signifies a counter-discourse to whites’ stereo-
types of blacks, deemed as deviant in normative spaces. He is denied a sub-
jective performance of black masculinity because he is always shadowed by 
the Poitier image imposed on him” (89). Provoking his opponents (and thus 
the reader) to constantly question his subjectivity in favor of Sidney 
Poitier’s spectacular preeminence, Not Sidney evokes their (and the read-
er’s) commonsensical, i.e., habitualized conceptions of (stereotypical) 
blackness. By way of its comparative scenario (Civil Rights – multicultur-
alism – “post-racial” paradigm) Not Sidney critically comments on the insti-
tutionalization of these stereotypes. Yet, it does not exhaust its satirical 
potential with that. Rather, zooming in on Poitier as a cross-cultural icon, 
the novel presents a language-centered thought experiment that challenges 
                                                   
5  I am drawing on Mustafa Emirbayer’s and Matthew Desmond’s definition of 
race as “a symbolic category based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed 
according to specific social and historical contexts, a category that is misrecog-
nized as natural” (51). By the “fixing” quality of stereotypes I mean, essentially, 
the fixing of human difference in readily accessible categories. 
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us to question our conceptual safe spots on both sides of the symbolic di-
vide of race. More specifically, it also brings us to reflect on the receptive 
preconditions for critically negotiating the social and the literary sphere. 
This particular aspect ties in with Everett’s critique of reductive concep-
tions of literary writing in general and writing labeled as “African Ameri-
can” in particular.  
As a (self-declared) successor of black authors such as Ralph Ellison 
and Chester Himes, who ventures into various generic and thematic terrains 
– in the novelistic vein of Samuel Butler, Mark Twain, Samuel Beckett, and 
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. (to mention but a few) – the Los Angeles-based novel-
ist, poet, critic, painter, and USC professor Percival Everett makes a simple 
but important distinction: He does not stand for but in the tradition of Afri-
can American literature and literary theory. He frequently stresses the prob-
lematic categorization of his (satiric) writing as “experimental,” Instead he 
claims: “[E]very novel is experimental. There’s no such thing as an experi-
mental novel” (“Teaching Voice” 54). If anything, his writing can be con-
sidered experimental precisely because it is based on the productive inter-
play of story and the (often self-reflective) ways of its telling, which makes 
for its multi-conceptuality in the first place. Not Sidney thus can be con-
ceived of as exemplary for Everett’s experimental engagement with the 
possibilities of literature, specifically with respect to his critical negotiation 
of race and its sociocultural realities.6  
Investigating Poitier as a signifier that has been culturally institutional-
ized as a shortcut to non-threatening, white mainstream-compatible black 
masculinity, Everett’s impetus is based on what Anthony Stewart has iden-
tified in Everett’s public political problematization of his birth state North 
                                                   
6  Like most of Everett’s satires, Not Sidney’s conceptual configuration is based on 
the generic contrafactum of the Bildungsroman and the picaresque novel: a para-
doxical protagonist, i.e., an inherently problematic figure of identification, and a 
(pseudo-)picaresque plot, i.e., an episodic, non-linear, simplified adventure sto-
ry. These form the basic narrative framework of an often sign-theoretical, lan-
guage-philosophical, and overall self-reflective project that, essentially, aims at 
dehabitualizing the reductive use of language as a shortcut to meaning, be it on 
the level of individual literary texts, literary history, or wider cultural discourses. 
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Carolina’s racist legacy, namely paralipsis (189).7 Echoing the rhetorical 
tactic of misdirection, the novel revives the racial legacy of Sidney Poitier 
by his counter-character Not Sidney. Poitier, the racial representative of a 
seemingly bygone era, signifies a development that reaches its (first) peak 
in Not Sidney’s time: the commercialization of blackness in the multicul-
turalist entertainment era. Generally, Everett’s paraliptic project ironically 
appropriates various concerns and conventions of African American culture 
and literature.8 Obviously, Not Sidney draws on the black tropes of naming 
and genealogical dislocation. What is more, Not Sidney complicates the 
vernacular paradigm of tricksterism famously synthesized by Henry Louis 
Gates, Jr. in Signifying Monkey. Far from being a trickster who plays with 
language to compete in micro-social power games, Everett’s protagonist is 
an involuntary subversive, who only reluctantly plays along with the events 
rather than deliberately shape their outcome. That the reader is encouraged 
to make sense of Not Sidney’s humorously harmless punishment can be 
read as another deliberate deviation from the melodramatic mode dominat-
ing the canonical genre of the (neo-)slave narrative, with which Not Sid-
ney’s narrative shares the quest for freedom from racial oppression in the 
self-authenticating form of autobiography. What, finally, makes Everett’s 
intermedial re-negotiation so unconventional and complex is that Not 
Sidney is not just not Sidney Poitier. Rather, both figures share a consistent 
inconsistency, as it were.  
Having come “to personify the Black Man on screen” (Leab 223) dur-
ing the post-WWII re-negotiation of the representational politics in U.S. 
popular culture, Sidney Poitier not only embodied a decisive diversification 
of on-screen images of blackness but changed the role of the black male in 
                                                   
7  Thus, Everett’s investigation of Sidney Poitier echoes his engagement with the 
Republican, pro-segregationist South Carolinian senator Strom Thurmond in A 
History of the African-American People (proposed) by Strom Thurmond as told 
to Percival Everett and James Kincaid (2004). Everett’s scathing satire forces us 
to complicate the commonsensical conception of Thurmond as the very model 
of a racist white supremacist much like he provokes us to reconsider the seem-
ing iconic consistency of Poitier as the stereotypical good black man. 
8  Not Sidney’s name, one could even argue, echoes the race-related disprivileging 
of job seekers whose names, because they are (stereo-)typically associated with 
African-Americans, trigger their rejection in written applications. 
130 | JOHANNES KOHRS 
the U.S. cultural consciousness by way of a vast array of groundbreaking 
“firsts.” For the very first time a black male artist received a tremendous 
popularity among a mass white audience, star-like fees, and, in 1964, the 
Academy Award in a leading role (for Lilies of the Field). Poitier achieved 
this at a time when films first “began cautiously to broach the subject of 
‘race’ as problem,” as Stuart Hall recalls (240). On the one hand, his on-
screen characters combined all the characteristics of cultivation that catered 
to the white liberal fantasy of the good black male citizen worthy of inte-
gration into mainstream society, thus countering the cultural fear of the ag-
gressive, sexually predatory black male. As Hall points out, Sidney Poitier 
was “almost sexless” (241) in his absolutely non-threatening allure. On the 
other hand, the image of the acting Poitier was, as James Baldwin stressed, 
sexually codified, as he was a “sex symbol […], though no one dares admit 
that” (58). Retracing the “Poitier effect” in her same-titled study, Sharon 
Willis identifies “unmanageable” tensions and ironies such as the sexual 
subtext as the crucial constituents of Poitier’s spectacular “extraordinari-
ness” (23). Whereas “in his comforting returns” he “remains the same from 
role to role, just as his characters remain unchanged despite the dramas that 
develop around them” (40), the movies seem to have not been able to con-
tain him “despite their accommodationist rhetoric” (23). It is this consistent 
inconsistency, i.e., the stability of his role and the contradictions implicit in 
his cultural appeal that Everett self-declaredly interrogates.9  
Not Sidney looks “for the world like Mr. Sidney Poitier” (3). He is 
characterized by other characters as “tall and dark like him” (37), and, sig-
nificantly, as “extremely handsome” (121) by women. The latter fact makes 
for several grotesque, sexually charged episodes of quasi-forced fellatio. 
What all of these encounters have in common is that Not Sidney remains 
passive, ironically echoing Sidney Poitier’s sexlessness on screen. Being 
“extremely well educated” (30), Not Sidney’s use of language shows his 
wit – oftentimes hilariously so, while he struggles to stay out of all the 
trouble that his name incites. Not Sidney’s Poitier-esque appearance and 
linguistic proficiency contrast with his clumsy behavior (as opposed to 
                                                   
9  “I was interested in the icon of the palatable black man in the ‘60s or ‘70s,” Ev-
erett stated in an interview with Drew Toal, stressing that Poitier was interesting 
to him precisely because he was such a “complicated” persona, “politically out-
spoken in public, and eminently ‘safe’ onscreen” (“The Tipping Poitier” 163).  
SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE IN PERCIVAL EVERETT’S I AM NOT SIDNEY POITIER | 131 
Poitier’s spectacular bodily presence and ‘timing’ onscreen) as a stoic of 
sorts. His inculcated ironic indifference is severely troubled in the Guess 
episode where, interestingly, space and Not Sidney’s practical involvement 
in it are key, as opposed to the novel’s overarching disintegration of plot 
and the backgrounding of setting, as well as the (stereo-)typification of 
characters (including Not Sidney). For a sociologically informed literary 
analysis Bourdieu’s theoretical dyad of symbolic violence and habitus can 
serve as an interpretative prism to zoom in on the social nuances of Not 
Sidney’s negotiation of his own ‘place’ in the racial order. Whereas Everett 
creates Not Sidney not as a conventional character but as a figurative test-
device, Bourdieu’s body-oriented, relational approach to human sociality 
allows us to focus on the author’s characterological re-complexification of 
Not Sidney. Reemphasizing the social dynamics of the latter’s involvement 
in his racial environment, Everett’s central aim is to keep the reader ponder-
ing the potential import of Poitier on present-day racial realities, to keep us 
engaged in his challenging language-centered thought-experiment whose 
complexity is based on its productive, humor-centered balancing of imagi-
native absurdity and social credibility. 
 
 
THIS BIZARRE GAME OF COLOR:  
SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE IN BLACK IN-GROUP RACISM 
 
Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? is special within Sidney Poitier’s array of 
cinematic works, for it stages a white-black miscegenation scenario in the 
year of the Supreme Court’s Loving v. Virginia decision that legally sanc-
tioned interracial marriages. The renowned black doctor John Wade 
Prentice Jr. (Sidney Poitier) and Joanna (Katharine Houghton), the 23-year-
old daughter of the white, liberal, upper class Draytons, want to get mar-
ried. Upon meeting their son-in-law-to-be Matt and Christina Drayton 
(Spencer Tracy, Katharine Hepburn) are challenged to live up to their ideals 
of tolerance and integration on which they raised their daughter. Translat-
ing the antagonism of white and black in Sidney Poitier’s era to light-black 
and black in Not Sidney’s fictional world, the Guess episode problematizes 
the latter’s internal struggle to cope with his being marginalized as the 
dark-black Other by his class-conscious, light-black opponents. The 
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episode culminates with an instance of black in-group racism in the social 
sphere of what E. Franklin Frazier termed the “black bourgeoisie.”  
Symbolic violence, Bourdieu contends, is “every power which manages 
to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the 
power relations which are the basis of its force” (Bourdieu and Passeron 4). 
With an entire academic career of sociological scholarship and critical 
thinking devoted to the attempt of understanding why “the established or-
der, with its relations of domination, its rights and prerogatives, privileges 
and injustices, ultimately perpetuates itself so easily” (Masculine Domina-
tion 1), symbolic violence, as the power which epitomizes the social mech-
anisms of this perpetuation, has often been pointed out as Bourdieu’s key 
concept. It is valuable for a critical engagement with the social processes 
inherent in racial oppression and stereotyping, for it extends W. E. B. Du 
Bois’s epoch-making notions of the “color-line” and the “double-con-
sciousness.” Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory we can conceive of the symbol-
ic divide between black and white (and its ideological and individual, psy-
cho-sociological institutionalization) as fundamentally formative for the es-
tablishment of the social order of U.S. society, precisely because it allows 
us to move beyond several problematic dichotomies. These comprise con-
sciousness and unconscious, consent and coercion, but also those of the 
individual and the institutional, the dominated (i.e., those who are allegedly 
exclusively affected by racial oppression) and the dominant (i.e., those who 
effect that oppression). Reconsidering all of these as interrelating rather 
than self-contained spheres of human sociality we are able, with Bourdieu, 
to arrive at the fundamental insight of the body as the primordial site of 
social action and interaction: 
 
The effect of symbolic domination (sexual, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, etc.) is exert-
ed not in the pure logic of knowing consciousness but in the obscurity of the disposi-
tions of habitus, in which are embedded the schemes of perception and appreciation 
which, below the level of the decisions of the conscious mind and the controls of the 
will, are the basis of a relationship of practical knowledge and recognition that is 
profoundly obscure to itself. (Pascalian Meditations 170-71)  
 
Not Sidney reacts to the unspoken discrimination by his girlfriend’s par-
ents, who dismiss him as potential son-in-law because of the dark shade of 
his skin color, and to the spatial structure of their decadent mansion in a 
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bodily-rooted way: He is urged to constantly, quasi-consciously reflect on 
the material composition of the house’s interior space, unconsciously asso-
ciating it with the particular sphere of the social order in which, as he rec-
ognizes, he illegitimately roams.  
The ways in which Not Sidney recognizes his being out of place, of not 
belonging in the social sphere of the Larkins’ home in Washington, D.C. at-
tests to his habitus, his inculcated schemes of perception and recognition of 
the social order. His reaction resonates with what Du Bois once stated when 
reflecting on the wider historical reverberations of racial oppression in the 
U.S.: “we were not facing simply the rational, conscious determination of 
white folk to oppress us; we were facing age-long complexes sunk now 
largely to unconscious habit and irrational urge” (296). In the Guess epi-
sode, which marks the peak of the narrative’s episodic progression from 
overt, physically transacted forms to ambiguous and subliminal manifesta-
tions of racial violence,10 Not Sidney struggles severely to maintain his 
ironic indifference. Becoming “sadly, irritatingly, horrifyingly observant of 
skin color and especially my own” (138) he proves to have cultivated a 
habitus of an oppressed of the oppressed. The episode thus forms a climac-
tic micro-section in the novel’s episodic experiment, subsuming two vari-
ants of symbolic violence. The first consists in Not Sidney’s reaction to his 
socio-spatial environment, the second in his interaction with the patriarch 
of the family, Ward Larkin.  
Ironically, very much like John Wade Prentice, Not Sidney meets his 
girlfriend’s parents to find himself at first challenged and then acknowl-
edged as the perfect son-in-law-to-be. He has been invited by his girlfriend 
Maggie to meet her parents and bringing their relationship to the next level 
                                                   
10  The episodic progression broadly follows the chronology of the movies’ produc-
tion – beginning with The Defiant Ones (1957), the movie that consolidated 
Poitier’s image as the benign black male – and culminates in returning to Poi-
tier’s Oscar decorated Lilies of the Field (1963) at the end of the novel. This se-
quentialization correlates with the overall progression of Not Sidney’s encoun-
ters from overt, physically transacted racial violence to subliminal, ambiguous 
forms of oppression. This progression, significantly, applies to the main narra-
tive of Not Sidney’s autobiographical account, i.e., his active involvement in his 
social environment. His dreams, as meta-reflective elements, are excluded from 
it. 
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on the pretext of celebrating Thanksgiving together. Although having been 
informed that Maggie’s “family is slightly class-conscious […] Hell they’re 
snobs” (119), Not Sidney accepts the invitation because of what Bourdieu 
has termed illusio, the belief in the purposefulness of one’s engagement in 
the everyday social competition of societal life. Not Sidney believes in liv-
ing what he deems the American way of life, in the validity of the multicul-
tural promise of emancipation qua cultural contribution,11 hoping to find his 
own place in society.12 He believes in the reasonableness of having a proper 
education, of getting the real “college experience” by joining a fraternity 
and living in student dorms rather than affording a much more luxurious 
abode (94).13 Above all, he wants to celebrate Thanksgiving and participate 
in the American ritual of celebratory communion – despite his mother’s 
disapproval of this event as “one big glorious lie to put a good face on con-
tinental theft” (153), as Not Sidney imagines her argue in retrospect. How-
ever, Maggie has really brought Not Sidney to antagonize her overbearing 
parents Ruby and Ward in her attempt at post-adolescent rebellion. She 
plans to use the darkly complected Not Sidney as a “wedge” (141) between 
herself and her lightly complected, race-obsessed parents. As if in an ab-
surd adaptation of a passing melodrama in the vein of Charles Chesnutt, the 
Larkins predicate their pride of belonging to an elite racial caste of almost 
white but still distinctly (light-)black conservative progressivists by way of 
a twisted notion of social Darwinism. This notion manifests in Ward’s pas-
sion for the idea of hunting as “a demonstration of man’s primacy in the 
order of nature” (133) and his fable for stuffed animal heads. The Larkins’ 
                                                   
11  This notion, obviously, is complicated by his implicit cooptation by the enter-
tainment industry as the owner of the TV channel NET and the protégé of the 
media mogul Ted Turner.  
12  Part of the novel’s successful negotiation of imaginative absurdity and social 
credibility rests on the frequent commenting of the narrating I on the narrated I’s 
naiveté, which is inherent in Not Sidney’s status as autodiegetic narrator.  
13  Not Sidney has an ambivalent perspective on his own extraordinary socio-
economic status and its influence on his enterprise. He buys a used Toyota for 
his journey but spends 325,000 Dollars to buy his way into college. In the end, 
he resolves to help a group of Pentecostal sisters to build their new church as a 
“newfound and fairly ironic way to spend my ridiculously easy-to-come-by 
money” (185). 
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overall repudiation of pro-black social support as allegedly undermining 
their self-achieved exceptionality is revealed when he asserts, “I’m nothing 
but an American. I’m no needy minority,” thus expressing his pride of hav-
ing worked his way up from “dirt poor Alabama to Yale” (137) to being 
one of D.C.’s top lawyers. Maggie’s mother heads a conservative think tank 
with the intention of getting rid of “the welfare system because it keeps 
black people down,” stopping “gay rights because it endangers the family 
structure and keeps black people down,” and abolishing “affirmative action 
because it teaches special preference and that keeps black people down” 
(128), as Maggie explains to Not Sidney. Thus, the Larkins display a stark-
ly caricatured variation of what Frazier identified as the black bourgeoisie’s 
pathological inculcation of white oppression: “the repressed hostilities of 
middle-class Negroes to whites are […] directed […] inward toward them-
selves. This results in self-hatred, which may appear from their behavior to 
be directed towards the Negro masses but which in reality is directed 
against themselves.” (186) According to Frazier’s controversial account, 
the black bourgeoisie “suffered spiritually not only because they were af-
fected by ideas concerning the Negro’s inferiority, but perhaps even more 
because they had adopted the white man’s values and patterns of behavior 
[… thus developing] an intense inferiority complex” (124).  
It is the Larkins’ outward display of their high socio-economic status, 
for Frazier a “symptom” of the black bourgeoisie’s whiteness-related infe-
riority complex, to which Not Sidney initially responds with an uneasy fas-
cination with the ornate décor of the rooms and the splendor of colors at 
display in them, the color red in particular. He stresses the “heavy red 
drapes” (126) and the resultant darkness in the anteroom, as well as his dif-
ficulty “to take a step without staring down at” the carpet and “the expanse 
of red [that] was, if not disorienting, unsettling” (127). The omnipresence 
of the color red – or as Not Sidney calls it, “crimson” (127) – can be read as 
a proleptic leitmotif, hinting at the Larkins’ obsession with skin color, i.e., 
the (alleged) exceptionality inherent in their light-blackness. In fact, they 
appear to conceive of themselves as members of a genetically privileged 
light-black “bloodline,” as one of the dinner guest’s, the Reverend 
Golightly, reveals in his mealtime prayer: “Thank you for our fine homes 
and our nice clothes and for money. Thank you for our lineage, our good 
blood, and our distance from the thickening center [of non-light-black 
blacks]” (159). Not Sidney deals, unconsciously, with the implicit 
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contrastive conflict between his own dark-black skin color and the predom-
inantly dark colors of his surroundings, its absorption in the dark, dimly lit 
rooms, as a problem of orientation. The dark red, crimson-colored carpet 
makes him feel as if it was pulling the rug out from under his feet, compel-
ling him to constantly “watch his step.” His social debasement thus trans-
lates into an association of spatio-symbolic dislocation. In his guest room – 
which is stuffed with stuffed animals that represent Maggie’s mother’s 
making up for the lack of the most important unaffordable luxury of her 
poor childhood; this ironically correlates with Ward’s stuffed “real” ani-
mals14 – Not Sidney sits “on the bed and [feels] suddenly like [he] ought 
not” (128). Troubled by the kitschy regalia he notices small bells, which 
make him recall the forced fellatio incident with his white history teacher 
Ms. Hancock, who was especially fond of this decoration item. He quickly 
gets up from the shiny golden bedspread, leaving it “smooth as if it had 
never been touched” (128). He associates the former, unsettlingly weird 
pseudo-sex scene with his present situation in the kitsch-crammed, golden 
bed, a sort of symbolic site of his (bodily) liaison with Maggie, of which 
her parents, as he grows more and more aware, strongly disapprove. 
Whereas he had felt as if being absorbed in the crimson-colored darkness of 
the downstairs, the golden spread seems to highlight his dark skin color and 
thus (proleptically) reflect (his recognition of his) black masculinity as 
compromising the racial purity of the Larkins. 
“[I]t is through this material inclusion—often unnoticed or repressed,” 
Bourdieu argues, “and what follows from it, the incorporation of social 
structures in the form of dispositional structures” that a person acquires “a 
practical knowledge and control of the encompassing space” (Pascalian 
Meditations 30). In the case of Not Sidney, this incorporation of social 
structures, which shapes his peculiar feeling of displacement, seems to have 
been stalled in the entrepreneurship-centered domain of the Turner home, 
where his pecuniary means granted his however exceptional membership of 
this micro-community. Not Sidney’s entry into the upper-class society of 
the Larkins marks his first encounter with a race-centered socio-economic 
                                                   
14  These absurdly kitschy, because literal tokens of their social self-idealization 
ironically echo the Draytons’ extensive display of modern works of art in Guess 
Who’s Coming to Dinner as an alleged sign of their cultural sophistication and 
open-mindedness.  
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elitism that is not solely based on money but on ancestry and heritage, both 
of which he lacks. This further fosters his unconscious recognition of (skin) 
color as the exclusive constituent of the Larkins’ light-black racial identity 
– which he associates with the spatio-symbolic structuration of their private 
domain – or in fact, with racial identity as such. Significantly, Not Sidney’s 
only quasi-conscious strategy of making sense of his encounter with the 
Larkins is to imagine Ward and Ruby as Ward and June Cleaver of the mid-
century TV sitcom Leave it to Beaver (137). The fact that he refers to this 
comedic-didactic show about a white American suburban family further 
hints at Not Sidney’s (un-)conscious recognition of the Larkins’ naturally 
legitimate, whiteness-centered dominance.  
Upon meeting him in person Maggie’s parents are disappointed by the 
young black man accompanying their daughter and, unsurprisingly, are stu-
pefied by his name, which, as Ward later suspects, is “some kind of ghetto 
nonsense, no doubt” (131). Ruby, who is first to meet Not Sidney, takes an 
uneasy interest in his skin color and tells her husband that it is “just so 
dark” (131). Just like Bigger Thomas, Richard Wright’s epochal black out-
cast, Not Sidney accidentally overhears their conversation, which corrobo-
rates his recognition of displacement: “It hadn’t occurred to me, but now it 
did that the Larkins were all very light in complexion. It hadn’t dawned on 
me that I should have noticed or cared.” (131) Thus already fully aware that 
Maggie’s parents disapprove of him because of his dark complexion, Not 
Sidney then meets the patriarch of the family, Ward Larkin, and imagines 
to hear him concluding his casual welcome small talk with “boy,” the ver-
bal epitome of black emasculation. That Not Sidney hears this derogatory 
appellation without it actually having been uttered hints at his habitus, that 
“practical sense for what is to be done in a given situation—what is called 
in sport a ‘feel’ for the game, that is, the art of anticipating the future of the 
game, which is inscribed in the present state of play” (Bourdieu, Practical 
Reason 25). Not Sidney, despite his seemingly race-neutral socialization in 
the Turner domain, anticipates his own ostracization when imagining hear-
ing racial slurs. “Boy” not only echoes his experiences in the South, where 
white, ragingly racist policemen and prison guards frequently made use of 
this appellation while brutalizing him. It seems to have been implemented 
in his habitus during his childhood in a poor neighborhood of Los Angeles, 
about which the reader knows next to nothing. This lacuna in his protago-
nist’s social profile further ties in with Everett’s provoking the reader to 
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ponder the implications of Not Sidney’s social background in his stereo-
type-activating and -complicating experiment.  
Increasingly taking offense with the Larkins’ racist elitism, Not Sidney, 
significantly, confides not in Maggie but in Violet, the family’s black serv-
ant.15 Having been raised by Ted Turner’s staff, Not Sidney considers Vio-
let an ally in the hierarchical color confrontation since they both “are pretty 
much the same color” (155). Violet rejects his proposition, stating that she 
is “milk chocolate and [he’s] dark cocoa, dark as Satan” (155) and stress-
ing: “Listen, boy, Mister and Missus have worked too hard [… to] have a 
black boy like you come around Miss Maggie” (154). Whereas on the con-
scious level Not Sidney is able to pinpoint Violet’s absurd, Stockholm syn-
drome-like mindset (“This is not the antebellum south and you’re not a 
house slave” 155), his confiding in her in the first place illustrates his un-
conscious acknowledgement of skin color as a defining factor in the racial 
order of the Larkin’s private domain. Evidently, the logic that undergirds 
what Not Sidney describes as the “bizarre game” of pigmentation16 (156) is 
that whiteness is the racial default, whose social dominance manifests in its 
very power to obscure its dominance and thus is naturalized as the seeming-
ly self-evident standard, in relation to which all other races are marked. Not 
Sidney is essentialized as the counterpart to the Larkins’ class-conscious 
elitism that hinges on their paradoxical pride in their light-blackness and 
their allegedly superior status as almost-white, i.e., almost sufficiently 
American.  
When the Larkins find out about their guest’s enormous wealth and his 
status as a media mogul, Ward and Ruby reconsider their antipathy toward 
Not Sidney and try to beguile him, hoping to succeed in integrating him in-
to their social ranks as Maggie’s future husband. However, Not Sidney, 
who has once again overheard them, undermines their plotting. He debunks 
the pillar of their racial pride – their anti-affirmative action stance – by 
turning the tables on them at the final climactic Thanksgiving dinner scene: 
                                                   
15  Not Sidney is inclined to call her a “servant,” whereas he describes her as the 
family’s “housekeeper” in Maggie’s company because he feels the former de-
scription to be “more correct but less appropriate” (127).  
16  That most of the characters bear color-related names further attests to the pro-
ductive interplay of the starkly (stereo-)typified conflict-scenario and the social 
complexity of Not Sidney’s struggle. 
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“You people almost had me hating you because of your skin, but I’ve 
caught myself. […] I don’t hate you because you’re light.” (162). 
 
 
“A MAN THAT SETS THE STANDARD”:  
SIDNEY POITIER REVIS(IT)ED  
 
Everett’s satirical impetus hinges on what Terry Rey phrases thus: “only 
where there is distinction can there be domination” (55). The Thanksgiving 
Dinner episode is but one example of how Not Sidney investigates institu-
tionalized structures of meaning along the lines of race, gender, and class to 
challenge those consensual conceptions that are accepted by the dominant 
and the dominated alike. The intermedial adaptation of Guess Who’s Com-
ing to Dinner? is remarkable for its negotiation of black in-group racism as 
an ambiguous, double-bound form of social debasement, during which Not 
Sidney’s own racial formation is reflected in his habitus of an oppressed of 
the oppressed. That his birthday coincides with the premiere of the movie 
in 196717 further attests to the import of this episode for Everett’s re-
contextualization of Sidney Poitier for his particular version of a dehabitu-
alized reading of race.  
Along with his other two movies of 1967, In the Heat of the Night (dir. 
Norman Jewison) and To Sir, with Love (dir. James Clavell), Guess made 
Poitier finally and fundamentally famous, establishing him as the benign 
black male in the U.S. cultural imaginary. Not Sidney’s fictional life thus 
begins in the exact year when Sidney Poitier, the star-like figure of black 
masculinity, is born, as it were. Everett’s novel ties in with what the movie 
never shows: the interracial confrontation of the family dinner. It retraces 
the reverberations of the happy ending’s conciliatory silence by forming a 
provocative epilogue to the film’s eponymous ellipsis.18 This ellipsis allows 
                                                   
17  Recapitulating the peculiar circumstances of his own conception, i.e., his moth-
er’s “hysterical pregnancy” lasting 24 months and the “urban legend” around it, 
Everett’s protagonist states that he “was two [years old] in 1970” (4). Had he 
been born after nine months his birthday would have been in 1967.  
18  The movie concludes shortly after Matt’s monologue, fading out the subsequent 
conversations of the guests at the dinner table while playing the soundtrack song 
“The Glory of Love” (by Billy Hill, sung by Jacqueline Fontaine).  
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for an unchallenged notion of social progress that manifests in Matt 
Drayton’s idealization of white-sanctioned integration and white-monitored 
political debate as answers to racism’s threat to the civic cohesion and mor-
al integrity of a de-segregated U.S. society still deeply divided by race. 
As Keith M. Harris concludes in his study Boys, Boyz, Bois, “Poitier’s 
masculinity […] hinges upon the tropological transformations of racialized 
masculinity (the black man) into a figure of honor, dignity, and sacrifice: 
Black masculinity and the battle for recognition and respect is a trial, a re-
demptive struggle to find and overcome the shortcomings of whiteness” 
(68). Poitier’s characters thus achieved an ethical authority that surpassed 
the dominant “Tom-dom” (62) in early American cinema by often being 
paired with white partners. In Guess, this partner is Matt, who, as the white, 
liberal newspaper editor and patriarch of the upper-class Draytons of San 
Francisco, stands in as proxy for the nation’s collective catharsis in a phase 
of profound social crisis. His sanctioning of the young white-black couple 
Joanna and John – who, as he idealistically argues, “happen to fall in love 
and happen to have a pigmentation problem” – marks the climactic resolu-
tion of his internal ethical conflict around which the plot coheres. In this re-
gard, John Wade Prentice Jr.’s very name seems to symbolize the movie’s 
idealization of a sociocultural pilot project, a white-monitored interracial 
test-run exemplified by John and Joanna’s marriage. Thus, John Wade 
Prentice is the “apprentice,” as it were, the to-be-examined beneficiary of a 
socially emancipated, ethically upright white-centered U.S. society.  
The predication of racial integration on interracial love epitomized by 
Matt Drayton’s cathartic monologue is, obviously, problematic, as it is con-
ceptualized at the expense of several simplifications.19 The most significant 
one is John’s status as an acclaimed doctor, which, despite his foreground-
ed cultivation, is what actually makes him a suitable candidate for the up-
per-class Draytons.20 The “threat” of Poitier’s black male sexuality, Harris 
                                                   
19  These simplifications resulted in the film taking “a well deserved critical beat-
ing,” as Daniel J. Leab points out (230). Following the peak of his career in 
1967 Sidney Poitier’s image as race negotiator became increasingly unpopular 
with both white and black audiences, as Leab furthermore stresses.  
20  Speaking with Bourdieu, John owns a lot of cultural capital (consolidated in his 
doctoral degree from Harvard, for one) that is derived from his participation in 
the competition over professional legitimacy in the prestigious profession of 
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stresses, “is contained in class, effeminacy, and morality in the image of 
Poitier as sexual passivity” (69). The racial redemption of whiteness is thus 
exclusively allocated to the alleged supra-bodily realm of the intellectual, 
for which class (and the Draytons’ position in the upper section of it) serves 
as metaphor. What is more, the anticipated societal opposition to John and 
Joanna’s interracial union is only tangentially associated with several white 
characters, namely one friend of Christina’s. Rather, this antagonism is as-
cribed to the family’s black servant Tillie and John’s black father, a retired 
mailman, and his petty bourgeois amor fati: He has self-declaredly bent 
over backwards to allow for his son to have a better life. Joanna’s trans-
gression of the social taboo of white-black miscegenation, in turn, is cam-
ouflaged by her feminine-codified naiveté and good-heartedness. Also, why 
should so distinguished and attractive a black man as John Wade Prentice 
Jr. actually come up with the idea of marrying such a strikingly shallow 
white damsel such as Joanna, after all? Whereas the movie suggests that 
love, or mutual recognition, is able to transcend the borders of race, said 
episode in Everett’s novel, as I sought to show above, renegotiates all of 
these three issues: socio-economic mobility (rooted in Wade’s status as 
high-achieving doctor), black in-group racism (rooted in Wade’s father’s 
amor fati), and colorblind or “post-racial” love (rooted in Joanna’s naiveté). 
Thus, Not Sidney’s Guess episode ironically literalizes this very notion of 
symbolic transcendence not only by transposing the interracial conflict into 
an intraracial conflict, thus bridging the symbolic intraracial border. It also 
relocates the overtly articulated and (tele-)visually observable confronta-
tion into the realm of the symbolic, i.e., into the subtextual script of Not 
Sidney’s encounter with the Larkins. 
That the satiric novel Erasure appears in Not Sidney – when the charac-
ter Ted Turner mentions to the fictionalized Percival Everett that he liked 
the novel in the novel (“My Pafology / Fuck”) better than Erasure itself 
(226) – makes for a good laugh, given that the continuation of conventional 
debates on race and black identity by critics made for a peculiar receptive 
irony of this satire that actually satirizes (an unsuccessful) satire (on race). 
Yet, it also stresses how deep Everett’s engagement with the possibilities of 
aesthetic representation runs. Not Sidney, as I tried to illustrate above, aims 
                                                   
medical science. This capital, because of the medical field’s interrelation with 
the supra-field of power, is especially easily transferrable into economic capital.  
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first and foremost at challenging the critical preconditions of reflecting so-
ciocultural realities (in literature). His negotiation of black in-group racism 
complicates the notion that today, in the putative ‘post-racial’ moment, 
racism manifests in significantly different, i.e., increasingly ambiguous (in-
traracial) and subliminal (non-physical) ways, than it did in the 1960s. Yet, 
it also problematizes the notion of the very opposite being true. Everett’s 
paraliptic preoccupation with Sidney Poitier, probably the most (mis-) 
recognized cross-cultural figure of race relations in the post-war U.S., ques-
tions the safe spots on both sides of the symbolic divide in U.S. society.  
What makes (Not) Sidney Poitier such a productive focal point for an 
inquiry into race and its present-day realities? Given the novel’s date of 
publication and its thematic core of social mobility, it is hard not to think of 
Barack Obama, whose political appeal, one could argue, stems from his 
sharing several characteristics with Poitier, such as his striking rhetorical 
talent and (televisual) bodily presence. The re-contextualization of Sidney 
Poitier qua Not Sidney Poitier is narrativized as a fictional experiment: 
What if Sidney Poitier still is the prevalent safe spot of black subjectivity? 
And, taking this question at face value, what does it mean to be a black 
male and not Sidney Poitier, after all? It means that in a culture which 
commercially exploits individual artists and socially pathologizes entire 
urban communities categorizing black subjectivity along the lines of “Not-/ 





Baldwin, James. “Sidney Poitier.” Look, 23 July 1968, pp. 50-58. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Masculine Domination. 1998. Translated by Richard 
Nice, Stanford UP, 2001.  
—. Pascalian Meditations. 1997. Translated by Richard Nice, Stanford UP, 
2000. 
—. Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. 1994. Translated by Gisele 
Sapiro, Randal Johnson et al., Stanford UP, 1998. 
Bourdieu. Pierre, and Jean-Claude Passeron. Reproduction in Education, 
Society and Culture. 1970. Translated by Richard Nice, Sage, 1977. 
Carpio, Glenda R. Laughing Fit to Kill: Black Humor in the Fictions of 
Slavery. Oxford UP, 2008. 
SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE IN PERCIVAL EVERETT’S I AM NOT SIDNEY POITIER | 143 
Demitürk, E. Lâle. “Rescripted Performances of Blackness as ‘Parodies of 
Whiteness’: Discursive Frames of Recognition in Percival Everett’s I 
Am Not Sidney Poitier.” The Contemporary African American Novel: 
Multiple Cities, Multiple Subjectivities, and Discursive Practices of 
Whiteness in Everyday Urban Encounters, edited by Demitürk, 
Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2014, pp. 85-109. 
Du Bois, W. E. B. Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a 
Race Concept. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1940. 
Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Matthew Desmond. The Racial Order. U of 
Chicago P, 2015. 
Everett, Percival. I Am Not Sidney Poitier. Graywolf P, 2009. 
—. “Teaching Voice and Creating Meaning.” Interview with Forrest An-
derson, 2004. Conversations with Percival Everett, edited by Joe 
Weixlmann, UP of Mississippi, 2013, pp. 51-56. 
—. “The Tipping Poitier.” Interview with Drew Toal, 2009. Conversations 
with Percival Everett, edited by Joe Weixlmann, UP of Mississippi, 
2013, pp. 163-64. 
Frazier, E. Franklin. Black Bourgeoisie: The Rise of a New Middle Class in 
the United States. 1957. Collier Books, 1962. 
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-
American Literary Criticism. Oxford UP, 1988.  
Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? Directed by Stanley Kramer, performanc-
es by Sidney Poitier, Spencer Tracy, and Katharine Hepburn, Columbia 
Pictures, 1967. 
Hall, Stuart. “The Spectacle of the ‘Other.’” 1997. Representation: Cultural 
Representations and Signifying Practices, edited by Hall, Sage, 2013, 
pp. 215-71. 
Harris, Keith M. Boys, Boyz, Bois: An Ethics of Black Masculinity in Film 
and Popular Media. Routledge, 2006. 
Leab, Daniel. From Sambo to Superspade: The Black Experience in Motion 
Pictures. Houghton Mifflin, 1975. 
Rey, Terry. Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy. 
Equinox, 2007. 
Stewart, Anthony. “About Percival Everett.” Ploughshares, vol. 40, no. 2-
3, 2014, pp. 188-93. 
Willis, Sharon. The Poitier Effect. U of Minnesota P, 2015. 

 
Black Women’s Business 
Female Entrepreneurship and Economic Agency in  




Toni Morrison’s latest novel, God Help the Child (2015), features her pro-
fessionally most successful protagonist to date: Lula Ann Bridewell, known 
as Bride, an executive who manages her own line of products at a Los 
Angeles based cosmetics company. In prior novels, female characters pre-
dominantly participated in informal economies. In Home (2012), for exam-
ple, which is set in the 1950s, the female protagonist works as an untrained 
nurse in a private practice. In Love (2003), the women of the male owner’s 
family effectively run the hotel business that he neglects in favor of devot-
ing himself to his mistress and his grief. In Paradise (1997), none of the 
women who live at the convent had a job prior to their arrival, with some of 
them housewives, others simply scraping by. As a result of these informal 
economic structures, the women’s source of income and thus their (finan-
cial) security and autonomy is often precarious or at least dependent on 
men. 
To some degree, this prevalence of female characters without a profes-
sional career or a stable source of income independent of men is a conse-
quence of the historical setting of most of Morrison’s novels. Several take 
place, in part or even fully, during the time of slavery – such as Song of 
Solomon (1977), Beloved (1987) and A Mercy (2008) – when the opportuni-
ties for exercising economic agency were limited at best (for both sexes). 
Even more importantly, her novels present and explore precisely the kind of 
work black women have done that historically has received little 
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recognition, such as child rearing, keeping the family together, organizing 
the community.1 Yet even in the stories that are set in the 20th century and 
that portray women in professional positions or as financially secure – such 
as Love, Home and parts of Sula (1973) and Song of Solomon – Morrison is 
much more interested in the corrupting influence of wealth as such, whether 
inherited, won, or enjoyed through relationships with men. This is also the 
case in Tar Baby (1981) whose protagonist is a successful fashion model 
and, as reviewers have noted, a potential predecessor of Bride.2 In light of 
these tendencies and themes in Morrison’s novels, Bride’s success in God 
Help the Child warrants a closer look, in particular when considering that it 
is premised on the beauty industry and on the fact that Bride is strategically 
“capitaliz[ing] on her dark skin” (Child 143). 
While she is portrayed as having a knack for inventing and marketing 
cosmetic products, such as eye shadows, lipsticks, etc., Bride’s success at 
Sylvia Inc. is crucially based on her self-marketing, without which her 
cosmetics line would not have received any attention and which is focused 
on her very dark skin which she highlights by wearing only white clothes. 
This form of self-marketing connects her success to her childhood trauma, 
her mother Sweetness’s rejection. Herself light-skinned, Sweetness was in-
capable of accepting the fact of her daughter’s skin and raised her in a cold 
and punitive environment, in which her affection became a coveted prize 
for Bride. The irony of her material success and recognition being based on 
the very color of skin that her mother regarded as an impediment to success 
and even as a liability is explicit in the narrative and a special source of sat-
isfaction for Bride: “I sold my elegant blackness to all those childhood 
ghosts and now they pay me for it” (57). Yet, does Bride’s ability to turn 
herself into a commodity and sell herself for a price of her own asking 
mean that she possesses economic agency? Does Bride offer a model of 
black female entrepreneurship and success? 
To investigate these questions, this article draws on Morrison’s previ-
ous novels as well as on recent scholarship about the connection between 
the rise of professional black beauty salons and the emergence of female 
                                                   
1  For a study of the representation of African American women’s work in which 
“work” explicitly refers to this aspect see, for example, Courtney Thorsson’s 
Women’s Work (2013), which also discusses Morrison’s Paradise. 
2  See, for example, Hermione Hoby’s review in The Guardian. 
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black leadership in business and politics in the early 20th century. The con-
cept of economic agency employed here, however, is not based on the kind 
of rational actor model that modern economics tends to apply when inquir-
ing into economic behavior, but on a recognition of the historical genesis of 
individual as well as collective agency. Specifically, this article borrows the 
idea of agency as emerging from the interrelationship between institutions 
and habitus, between history objectified and history embodied, as proposed 
by Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s understanding of agency stresses practical 
knowledge, embodiment, and history in a way that accounts for the endless-
ly creative acts and strategies by which agents navigate social fields – at the 
same time that it takes serious the limited horizon of possibilities available 
to any agent at any moment in his or her trajectory.  
 
 
MADAM WALKER AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION  
OF BEAUTY 
 
For early 20th-century African American leaders like W. E. B. Du Bois and 
Booker T. Washington, the rise and success of black businessmen was a 
key element of the advancement of black people and the security of their 
Civil Rights. Accordingly, in 1900, Washington established the National 
Negro Business League (NNBL), while Du Bois had helped to organize a 
conference on the theme of black business the previous year. As Tiffany M. 
Gill notes in her recent study of the relationship between Civil Rights activ-
ism and female entrepreneurship in the beauty industry, the initial debates 
over black business posited “entrepreneurship primarily as a masculine 
ideal” and discussed women’s potential to contribute only in terms of their 
“roles […] as consumers and nurturers of the next generation of young 
male entrepreneurs” (12).3 Simultaneously, however, with the support of 
                                                   
3  See pp. 7 ff. in Gill’s Beauty Shop Politics (2010) for an overview of black fe-
male business activities in colonial and antebellum times, as well as for a de-
tailed presentation of gendered business roles in the African American commu-
nity at the turn of the century. Also see the chapter “Antebellum Free Black 
Women Enterprises” in Juliet Walker’s The History of Black Business in Ameri-
ca (1998). 
148 | STEFANIE MUELLER 
the National Association of Colored Women’s Clubs (NACWC),4 black 
women’s business clubs began to spread throughout the country. Their aim 
was to improve black women’s financial security while also promoting 
middle-class ideals of feminine respectability and domestic responsibility. 
As Gill puts it, this two-pronged approach left the business clubs “[c]aught 
between a desire to prove black women’s ability to succeed in the business 
world and the desire to assert their femininity, something they had been de-
nied throughout their history” (17). 
It was through the example and influence of businesswomen like 
Madam C. J. Walker and Annie Malone that female entrepreneurship 
gained respectability in the black community and was recognized as a form 
of social and political activism during the first two decades of the 20th cen-
tury. Yet the beauty industry had been and remained at the center of con-
troversies over the dominant beauty ideals for black women, even as 
Walker and Malone took over. Before they introduced their products and 
business models, the beauty industry had been dominated by white busi-
nessmen whose companies advertised skin bleaching creams and hair 
straightener to ameliorate what was presented as inferior physical attributes 
in black women.5 Annie Malone pioneered a hair product that was ostensi-
bly not designed to straighten hair but to improve its condition by treating 
scalp diseases, though it did “temporarily alter black women’s hair by 
stretching and adding shine to it” (Gill 20). Moreover, Malone established a 
system in which her agents would carry her products into black women’s 
homes as they went from door to door and offered free scalp treatments. 
One of her saleswomen opened her own business in 1906 and soon rose to 
even greater prominence than Malone under the name of Madam C. J. 
Walker. As Tiffany Gill explains, Malone and Walker “created what they 
called ‘hair systems,’ which included hair-product manufacturing, distribu-
tion, and sales throughout the United States and the African diaspora as 
well as salons and eventually beauty colleges and training programs” (22). 
                                                   
4  The NACWC was established in 1896 as the National Association of Colored 
Women (NACW). 
5  Gill points out that it was Anthony Overton, a black businessman, who first 
moved toward a different beauty ideal for black women when he established the 
Overton Hygienic Company in 1898, which sold “High Brown Face Powder” 
and employed only Blacks (19).  
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But it was only when Madam Walker decided to attend the NNBL annual 
convention in 1912 and boldly claimed a place at the podium that the Afri-
can American male leadership took note of the women’s potential for the 
political struggle. In 1915, as Gill recounts, “the NNBL chose the ‘Beauty 
Parlor Business’ as the theme of the sixteenth annual convention” (24). 
The rise of the black beauty industry was inextricably connected to the 
emergence of modern black womanhood in the urban centers of the North. 
On the one hand, it provided women avenues to entrepreneurship and thus 
to financial stability, on the other, it gave them access to a modern urban 
lifestyle. Fueled by the Great Migration, this transformation turned black 
women into consumers and entrepreneurs. An important aspect of this 
transformation was that Walker and Malone initiated and supported a pro-
cess of professionalization of the beauty trade. They helped to bring the 
work of beauticians closer to the status of nurses and teachers, which had 
been the only other professions open to black women before. Yet there was 
an important difference: The training and education was both more afford-
able and less time-intensive than teaching and nursing, and therefore avail-
able to a broader stratum of women. This professionalization of the beauty 
industry was reflected in the fact that the women who had trained at one of 
Madam Walker’s beauty colleges were not called hairdressers, but “beauty 
culturists” (Gill 49),6 and they were not only trained to provide a service to 
their customers but also taught to assume leadership: “Beauty college cur-
ricula instilled in their students the strategic importance of using their posi-
tion to influence their communities” (47).  
Gill’s study Beauty Shop Politics shows that during the following 
decades beauty parlors assumed a significant role in the Civil Rights strug-
gle, as they “provid[ed] one of the most important opportunities for black 
women to assert leadership in their communities and in the larger political 
arena” (2). By the beginning of the 1960s, beauty salons offered black 
                                                   
6  In Masculine Domination, Bourdieu explains that this step in the professionali-
zation of a trade also signifies upon a gendered symbolic order: “[T]he same 
task may be noble and difficult, when performed by men, or insignificant and 
imperceptible, easy and futile, when performed by women. As is seen in the dif-
ference between the chef and the cook, the couturier and the seamstress, a reput-
edly female task only has to be taken over by a man and performed outside the 
private sphere in order for it to be thereby ennobled and transfigured” (60). 
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women not only financial security, but a “unique institutional space they 
controlled” and “access […] to black women within their communities,” 
which allowed them to take an active role in the Civil Rights struggle and 
contribute to the movement’s political infrastructure (99). Of course, by 
that time, Gill notes, “the practice of straightening or pressing one’s hair 
[…] had become so deeply entrenched in black women’s lives that there 
was little discussion over its meaning” (105). This would change by the end 




MORRISON AND THE BUSINESS OF BEAUTY 
 
In one of the most famous photographs of Toni Morrison, she walks side by 
side with Angela Davis. It is the spring of 1974 and both women, evidently 
deep in conversation, sport impressive Afros. It is hard to overestimate the 
political significance of this hairdo during the 1970s,7 just as it is hard to 
overestimate the significance of the hair-motif in Morrison’s work.8 Physi-
cal beauty, in general, is a central topic in her novels, starting with her first, 
The Bluest Eye (1970), whose protagonist, a young girl named Pecola, 
wishes for the blue eyes that mainstream culture celebrates as the standard 
ideal of beauty because she believes that it will make her more lovable. As 
countless scholars have since demonstrated,9 Morrison’s novels present a 
powerful indictment of a black beauty ideal defined by white standards, on 
the objectification of the female body and the reduction of black women to 
passive consumers. By contrast, novels like Song of Solomon and Tar Baby 
suggest an alternative definition of black beauty based on a rejection of 
                                                   
7  For research on this topic, see, for example, Ayanna Byrd and Lori Tharps, Hair 
Story (2001); Maxine Leeds Craig, Ain’t I a Beauty Queen (2002); Susannah 
Walker, “Black Is Profitable” (2007). 
8  In particular in Song of Solomon (1973), in which Hagar becomes convinced 
that her lover, Milkman, has left her for a woman with straight copper-colored 
hair. When Milkman finally returns and finds that Hagar has killed herself, her 
mother hands him a box of her hair as a reminder of his responsibility for her 
death. See, e.g., Ashe. 
9  See, for example, Tait; Kuenz; Miner. 
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both the position of consumer and the position of the object to be (visually) 
consumed. As Malin LaVon Walther has argued, in Morrison’s novels 
women’s beauty is based on their usefulness (as opposed to idleness), on 
the fundamental reality of their bodies as grounded in a racial experience, 
and on their refusal to operate within a “specular system,” in which the fe-
male body is a body represented and hence an object of consumption (775). 
Morrison’s critique of an ideal of beauty defined by white standards of 
femininity also underwrites her representation of the era in which the beau-
ty parlors of Madam Walker and Annie Malone had their heyday. Jazz tells 
the story of a couple that once moved to New York City from the South, 
Joe and Violet, and of the girl, Dorcas, with whom Joe falls in love and 
whom he shoots after their breakup. Famous for its narrative voice, the 
novel recreates the cityscape of Harlem in the 1920s and underscores both 
the opportunities and the many dangers in store for its black citizens. Sig-
nificantly, both Joe and Violet earn money by selling beauty: Joe is an 
agent for beauty products, while Violet works as a hairdresser in people’s 
homes. Her informal work is contrasted with the “legally licensed beauti-
cians” (5) who can charge more than her and who work at salons while 
“Violet carries her tools and her trade […] into the overheated apartments 
of women who wake in the afternoon, pour gin in their tea and don’t care 
what she has done” (13). After Joe has killed his lover and after Violet has 
attempted to cut up the corpse’s face during the funeral wake, the money 
from Violet’s hairdressing keeps the couple afloat.  
Black women in Jazz participate in formal and informal economies. 
They earn money by cleaning offices (40-41) or by watching children “for 
mothers who worked out of the house” (55), and some, like the Dumfrey 
sisters, have “nice paper-handling jobs: one took tickets at the Lafayette; 
the other worked in the counting house” (19). But what is significant about 
the portrait of women’s work in the novel is the pleasure that women of 
Violet’s generation take in a job well done. In a scene in the apartment of 
Alice Manfred, a seamstress and Dorcas’s aunt, “a woman of fifty and in-
dependent means” (54), the fact that women like Alice and Violet are never 
idle is addressed: 
 
Alice ironed and Violet watched. […] 
The iron hissed at the damp fabric. Violet leaned her cheek on her palm. “You iron 
like my grandmother. Yoke last.” 
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“That’s the test of a first-class ironing.” 
“Some do it yoke first.” 
“And have to do it over. I hate a lazy ironing.” 
“Where you learn to sew like that?” 
“They kept us children busy. Idle hands, you know.” 
“We picked cotton, chopped wood, plowed. I never knew what it was to fold my 
hands. This here is as close as I ever been to watching my hands do nothing.” (112) 
 
The narrative also emphasizes the social aspect of Violet’s hairdressing 
which takes place in the private space of homes, whether her own or her 
customers’: “Violet is sudsing the thin gray hair, murmuring ‘Ha mercy’ at 
appropriate breaks in the old lady’s stream of confidences” (16). Their 
work is presented as more than the source of an income independent of 
their husbands or the business of another. 
Violet’s and Alice’s work is characterized as useful in a social and prac-
tical sense: It contributes to the welfare of their families and their commu-
nities and as such is a source of agency for the women. The difference to 
the women of Dorcas’s generation becomes apparent in the different uses 
of time because a visit to the beauty parlor requires leisure time.  
 
The beauticians have it beat when it comes to that: you get to lie back instead of lean 
forward; you don’t have to press a towel in your eyes to keep the soapy water out 
because at a proper beauty parlor it drains down the back of your head into the sink. 
So, sometimes, even if the legal beautician is not as adept as Violet, a regular cus-
tomer will sneak to a shop just for the pleasure of a comfy shampoo. (18) 
 
To enjoy the pleasures available at a beauty parlor,10 women need to pay 
with money and time. Such practice requires a habitus different from Alice 
and Violet’s because their pleasure derives precisely not from being idle. 
                                                   
10  This pleasure is qualitatively different from the intimacy of hair washing, as de-
scribed before, with Violet. The intimacy created by washing somebody’s hair 
and body is a central element in Love, for example during a scene in which 
Junior helps Heed to wash and dye her hair. Gill repeatedly underscores the im-
portance of this intimacy in the beauty salons, as well as what she calls a politics 
of dignity (121). 
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By contrast, Joe’s young lover, Dorcas, is a regular customer at a beauty 
parlor. 
In Jazz, the problem with female entrepreneurship as a source of eco-
nomic agency is that its emergence goes hand in hand with the development 
of a black (female) consumer identity. Idleness, shallowness, and a posses-
sive way of thinking are manifestations of this identity that also defines 
Dorcas’s choice of a new lover: “Other women want him—badly—and he 
has been selective. What they want and the prize it is his to give is his 
savvy self” (188). This “savvy self” is a performance and a commodity that 
ultimately rests on a split between real and ideal, a split that obstructs an 
experience of the self as authentic and whole. This split becomes apparent 
to Dorcas’s friend, Felice, as she recalls a game that she used to play with 
Dorcas:  
 
Dorcas and I used to make up love scenes and describe them to each other. […] 
Something about it bothered me, though. Not the loving stuff, but the picture I had 
of myself when I did it. Nothing like me. I saw myself as somebody I’d seen in a 
picture show or a magazine. Then it would work. If I pictured myself the way I am it 
seemed wrong. (208-9) 
 
Echoing Violet, Felice describes this sense as “having another you inside 
that isn’t anything like you” (209). But the beauty industry as criticized in 
Morrison’s novels, together with white mainstream culture (movies and 
magazines), depends for profits on customers that specifically desire such 




PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND THE COMMODIFICATION 
OF THE SELF 
 
To some extent, Bride in God Help the Child embodies this logic of the 
consumer identity taken to its extreme. In the chapters in which she narrates 
her story the commodification of her self is presented as an achievement in 
power and control: “I sold my elegant blackness to all those childhood 
ghosts and now they pay me for it” (57). The backdrop of her statement is 
the novel’s serious pun on the market for this commodity, as when her 
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personality coach tells her that “[b]lack sells. It’s the hottest commodity in 
the civilized world” (36). But the question that Bride’s success raises is 
whether the fact that she is doing the selling herself – rather than being sold 
as African slaves were for centuries in the so-called civilized world – is 
enough to prove that she is now in a position of autonomy and power as 
well as of self-identity; or whether her economic agency is ultimately still 
directed by the very “childhood ghosts” she had set out to defeat.  
As did previous novels, God Help the Child suggests that ownership of 
the self is a prerequisite for agency. Yet this ownership is not a Lockean 
form of ownership, conceived to explain and legitimate a commercial ex-
change, such as of one’s labor for money. Whereas Florence in A Mercy 
must learn that giving up oneself entirely to those we love is a form of en-
slavement that deprives her of her agency and selfhood, Bride’s lesson in 
self-enslavement is part of a critique of the American capitalist system with 
its roots in black slavery. In particular, it is a critique of the beauty industry 
as capitalizing on the commercialization of female bodies at the same time 
that it is selling the illusion of agency and self-ownership by equating them 
with the body’s market value. In other words, in the corporate world of God 
Help the Child ownership of the self, self-possession, and autonomy are 
strongly encouraged yet they are always already premised on the cash value 
of this self and thus only gained in order to be sold. 
At first, the fact that Lula Ann Bridewell is making a career out of her 
particularly dark skin seems to defy her mother’s rejection – which is por-
trayed as a result of the racist system she herself grew up in and as an at-
tempt to prepare her daughter for the social stigma attached to skin that is, 
in Sweetness’s words, “[m]idnight black, Sudanese black” (4). But black 
skin is still a liability, as Bride herself admits when she recounts how she 
started with “a job working stock,” not where customers could see her (36). 
She needs to invent herself as a commodity, beginning with her name or ra-
ther, her brand: “Lula Ann Bridewell is no longer available and she was 
never a woman. Lula Ann was a sixteen-year-old-me who dropped that 
dumb countryfied name as soon as I left high school” (11). It’s “Bride” she 
is selling to her customers through her product line: “YOU, GIRL: Cosmet-
ics for Your Personal Millennium. It’s for girls and women of all complex-
ions from ebony to lemonade to milk. And it’s mine, all mine—the idea, the 
brand, the campaign” (10). “YOU, GIRL,” which resonates so strongly 
with Felice’s description of that other “you inside that isn’t anything like 
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you,” originates with her personality coach, Jeri, who “call[s] himself a ‘to-
tal person’ designer” and is responsible for her “makeover” (33). It is Jeri 
who adds the necessary final ingredient or perhaps “packag[ing]” for her 
product (Wyatt 33):  
 
“You should always wear white, Bride. Only white and all white all the time.” […] 
“Not only because of your name,” he told me, “but because of what it does to your 
licorice skin,” he said. “And black is the new black. Know what I mean? Wait. 
You’re more Hershey’s syrup than licorice. Makes people think of whipped cream 
and chocolate soufflé every time they see you.” (33) 
 
Always clothed in white garments, the blackness of Bride’s skin becomes 
relational: It depends on the presence of whiteness to show it off, to frame 
it, maybe even to contain it. This dependence finds an echo in her name, 
“Bride.” Not just because, as Jeri suggests, a bride wears white, but because 
a bride is a bride in relation to a groom. She is a woman who is soon to be 
married or has just married. In this regard, her dress and her name also 
stage her as the quintessential object of exchange in a patriarchal society.11 
This dependence is even constitutional for Bride’s relationship with 
Booker who, when remembering the beginning of their relationship, calls 
her a “midnight Galatea always and already alive” (132). But Galatea is the 
creation of the artist Pygmalion, a feminine ideal come alive, and even 
though Booker may not be Pygmalion in this comparison, it suggests that 
she is created for consumption by a male gaze. In addition, Galatea’s name 
means She who is milk-white, a meaning that is now framed by Booker’s 
addition of “midnight,” as if to invert the relationship between the framing 
white garments and Bride’s black skin. The success of Bride’s beauty, 
while it appears to affirm the beauty of black womanhood, remains depen-
dent on a structure of perception that is essentially white and male. 
                                                   
11  While women are no longer goods of exchange in a marriage market based on 
the symbolic order of kinship structures, Bourdieu does emphasize the role that 
women still play as guardians or perhaps even managers of the symbolic capital 
of the family; see Masculine Domination 98-100. Bride’s chosen name is also 
significant, of course, with respect to the fact that her body seems to lose the 
signs of womanhood, thereby rendering her even more virginal (and immature) 
than the name suggests.  
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The novel is straightforward in its rejection of the beauty industry as a 
field in which female economic agency can grow and become meaningful. 
Sylvia, Inc., Bride tells us, “used to be Sylph Corsets for Discriminating 
Women back in the forties, but changed its name and ownership to Sylvia 
Apparel, then to Sylvia, Inc., before going flat-out hip with six cool cosmet-
ics lines, one of which is mine” (10). Making money of the practice of con-
straining women’s bodies, the cosmetics corporation is a twin of the correc-
tional facility in which Sofia, Bride’s former teacher, is incarcerated.  
 
Decagon Women’s Correctional Center, right outside Norristown, owned by a pri-
vate company, is worshipped by the locals for the work it provides […] most of all 
[for] construction laborers […] [who were] adding wing after wing to house the in-
creasing flood of violent, sinful women committing bloody female crimes. Lucky for 
the state, crime does pay. (13) 
 
Both corporations are making money with the management of women’s 
bodies, and it is significant in this respect that Sofia rejects not only Bride’s 
offer of a plane ticket but also of cosmetics for a makeover. The fact that 
Sofia is white also underscores that the novel’s critique of a culture based 
on the marketability of the self is universal. It constrains “girls and women 
of all complexions from ebony to lemonade to milk.” 
As critics have noted, the novel’s portrayal of the beauty industry and 
its protagonist’s self-commodification is reminiscent of Morrison’s 1981 
novel Tar Baby, which tells the story of Son and Jadine, as well as of the 
wealthy white employers of Jadine’s aunt. Jadine is a Sorbonne-educated 
fashion model, orphaned at age twelve and presently at the height of her 
commercial success, whereas Son is a mysterious stranger, a drifter who 
tries to resist and break with what he perceives as the trappings of white 
capitalist culture. While scholars have suggested many possible incarna-
tions of the tar baby in the novel, often focusing on Jadine, John Lutz, in a 
recent interpretation, argues that the tar baby represents not so much a sin-
gle character as “the destructive, self-negating social desires inspired by the 
system of commodity fetishism” (57). In Lutz’s reading, Jadine and Son 
move in a world peopled by “brand names,” while people are turned into 
objects, a double movement that he brings into dialogue with “Marx’s 
memorable phrase” that “‘relations between people’ have been transformed 
into ‘relations between things’” (57). In this sense, the scene in which 
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Jadine makes love to her new and expensive sealskin coat – a gift from a 
suitor – epitomizes  
 
the substitution of material objects for human relationships by foregrounding the 
hidden brutality that informs the system of commodity production and exchange. 
Described as “the hides of ninety baby seals stitched together so nicely you could 
not tell what part had sheltered their cute little hearts and which had cushioned their 
skulls” […], the coat serves as a concrete manifestation of the exploitative character 
of commodity production. (Lutz 59) 
 
In Tar Baby, exploitation and domination are continually shown to under-
write the capitalist system as such, which means that identity, liberty, and 
community are impossible for the characters as long as they stay within this 
system.  
This is ultimately also the problem of Bride’s career in God Help the 
Child. Trading in beauty, the industry in which she succeeds is deeply en-
twined with a history of female oppression that distorts the self. While 
Bride does not fetishize the expensive objects with which she surrounds 
herself – consider the fate of the increasingly shabby Jaguar – her cosmetics 
line “YOU, GIRL” does bear a resemblance to the function of the sealskin 
coat, in particular when it is anthropomorphized, as in the following pas-
sage, in which Bride worries what her injured face might do to her brand if 
she were seen in public: “And what if the local newspaper gets the story 
along with my photograph? Embarrassment would be nothing next to the 
jokes directed at YOU, GIRL. From YOU, GIRL to BOO, GIRL” (22). The 
brand has become an extension of herself, locking Bride in a narcissistic 
loop in which her self and her brand serve to recognize and affirm each 
other.  
The beauty industry is thus anathema to what is essential in Morrison’s 
novels when it comes to selfhood and subjectivity: a relational understand-
ing of the self, in which characters grow by caring for others. They do not 
grow through a love that is infatuation, as Bride reveals when she muses 
that Booker’s love made her feel “curried, safe, owned” (56).12 This is the 
kind of infatuation that leads Florence to attack her lover with a hammer af-
ter he has told her, “Own yourself, woman” (A Mercy 139). But they grow 
                                                   
12  Compare also her description of her feeling “safe, colonized somehow” (78). 
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through caring for someone who is their own separate self, such as the girl 
Rain, whom Bride literally protects with “[her] own self” from the shots of 
a shotgun, and such as Queen, for whom Booker and Bride care jointly 
(105). By the time, Bride has taken her place at Booker’s side to care for 
his aunt, she can tell him, “I don’t know about my job and don’t care. I’ll 
get another one” (168).  
 
 
RADICAL SELF-RELIANCE AND THE HORIZON  
OF POSSIBILITIES 
 
For Bourdieu, agency is the result of the interrelationship between two his-
tories: one individual and embodied, one collective and institutional. These 
histories dialectically define a horizon of possibilities, a wide range of pos-
sible actions, choices, behaviors which, while limited by this horizon, are 
nonetheless greatly variable. As I have shown elsewhere, Morrison’s novels 
explore these two levels in which the past is present in the present: how the 
past seeks to perpetuate itself into the future and how this process becomes 
obstructed, interrupted, or redirected.13 Moments of crisis are moments in 
which the categories of perception, action, and appreciation on the basis of 
which agents inhabit the social world no longer apply. Such moments offer 
a potentially liberating discordance in which novelty can emerge and 
change occur and which can thereby widen the horizon.14 In Tar Baby, 
Jadine returns to her familiar environment in Paris, rejecting the possibility 
of changing. But Son is given a radical opportunity: Left on a small island 
in the Caribbean, he joins a mythical community of blind men and presum-
ably abandons his life in American society.  
                                                   
13  See Stefanie Mueller, The Presence of the Past in the Novels of Toni Morrison 
(2013). 
14  Bourdieu explains this discordance in terms of a “gap”: “[H]abitus helps to de-
termine what transforms it. If it is accepted that the principle of the transfor-
mation of habitus lies in the gap, experienced as a positive or negative surprise, 
between expectation and experience, one must suppose that the extent of this 
gap and the significance attributed to it depend on habitus: one person’s disap-
pointment may be another’s unexpected satisfaction, with the corresponding ef-
fects of reinforcement or inhibition” (Pascalian Meditations 149). 
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In God Help the Child, Bride tells Booker that she is pregnant, after 
which he takes her hand and they both drive away in her Jaguar. Even 
without the subsequent and final chapter in which Bride’s mother Sweet-
ness comments on her daughter’s pregnancy by saying, “Good luck and 
God help the child” (178), this ending does not bode well. For one thing, 
the sentimental set-up and the road-movie ending that has the couple driv-
ing into a “future” that they believe they are free to “imagine” is reminis-
cent of the high-gloss love stories that had earlier been shown to distort 
Bride’s perception of the world and herself in it, as in the following passage 
in which she tries to console herself after Booker has left her (175). 
 
Well, anyway, it was nothing like those doublepage spreads in fashion magazines, 
you know, couples standing half naked in surf, looking so fierce and downright 
mean, their sexuality like lightning and the sky going dark to show off the shine of 
their skin. I love those ads. […] Why I kept comparing us to magazine spreads and 
music I can’t say, but it tickled me to settle on “I Wanna Dance with Somebody.” 
(9)  
 
While they may have exorcised the child-ghosts that haunted them, Bride 
and Booker are not free of a history that is inscribed in their bodies and that 
structures the world that is available to them. The “future” that they “imag-
ine” is less an open road that they follow in Bride’s “dusty gray car,” “lean-
ing back on the headrests to let their spines sink into the seats’ soft hide of 
cattle” (175), than it is a horizon of possibilities rooted in the very past they 
are driving away from. While Tar Baby’s Son may perform a radical break 
with the world as he knew it, he did join a community by doing so. Yet 
communal bonds are conspicuously absent from God Help this Child. 
All characters in the novel appear isolated, whether it is Bride’s mother, 
Sweetness, who only receives letters and money from her daughter, or 
Booker’s aunt Queen, who has several children but has lost touch with 
them. Even the impromptu family that Evelyn, Steve, and Rain have 
formed is merely “a fake family” (104), and Brooklyn, Bride’s colleague at 
Sylvia, Inc., is not “a true friend,” but an ambitious competitor who uses 
her influence over Bride to her advantage (29). Morrison’s emphasis on the 
isolation of the characters is the more significant, as in her previous novels 
social bonds are presented as nurturing, often enabling characters to con-
nect with the past healingly. In this light, the drive that concludes Bride’s 
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narrative and presents her and Booker united yet alone with each other, is 
too Hollywood-esque, too glossy, to be real. In their celebration of one an-
other, Bride and Booker also evoke a form of radical self-reliance that has 
become a fashionable staple of the neoliberal-capitalist regime in the 21st 
century.15 It is here that the novel’s criticism of contemporary entrepreneur-
ial agency is most pronounced. 
The novel criticizes a model of female entrepreneurship that follows the 
ideal of liberal individualism, in which ownership of the self is a value be-
cause it is the prerequisite for entering the capitalist system of exchange. 
That Morrison’s depiction of the contemporary beauty industry is spot on in 
this respect becomes apparent when we look at fashion model and enter-
tainer Tyra Banks. As if reviving the “hair systems” with which Madam 
Walker and Annie Malone had once contributed to the emergence of a new 
black woman, Banks recently launched her own cosmetics company.16 
TYRA Beauty uses a multi-level marketing system in which women re-
ceive bonuses not just for selling products at their homes but also for re-
cruiting new “Beautytainers.”17 The company’s mission statement explains 
(see the section “Business” on their website): 
 
My goal is to help you be the CEO of your life! YOU can start your own business by 
selling TYRA Beauty products. I am galvanizing a community of entrepreneurs 
called “Beautytainers” who will sell products by throwing fierce parties at their 
                                                   
15  I am borrowing this term from the mission statement of the Burning Man Festi-
val (see Harvey), which has arguably emerged as the annual celebration of ne-
oliberal lifestyle.  
16  Ralina Joseph analyzes Banks as “performing a post-racial, post-feminist ideolo-
gy,” explaining that she “has made a career out of presenting herself, on the one 
hand, as a ‘post-identity’ everywoman who embodies a universal appeal because 
of her positioning as a liberal, democratic, colorblind subject, and on the other 
hand as an African-American supermodel who embodies niche desirability be-
cause of her positioning as a racially specific, black female subject” (238). 
17  The company was launched in 2015 and its business model is similar to long-
established predecessors such as Mary Kay. Banks has been criticized for what 
some see as the company’s exploitative practices (see Marthe) while she has al-
so been invited to teach a “personal-brands course” at Stanford University (see 
Bazzaz). 
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homes and online. We’ll provide cool, customized ways to help our Beautytainers 
use their social media networks to promote their business, and they’ll be able to cre-
ate a personalized TYRA Beauty website with cutting edge technology. Plus, my 
TYRA Beauty team and I will train our Beautytainers in the art of fusing beauty and 
entertainment and rackin’ up them Bank$igns! 
I’m a business, man. And you can be, too! 
 
From the capitalized brand name to the commercialized domestic space and 
the idea of a life turned into a company, the mission statement eerily evokes 
Bride’s YOU, GIRL. It is this ideal of radical self-reliance in which every 
woman is the CEO of her own life, responsible for herself alone and con-
necting with others only to exchange commodities, that the novel rejects as 
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“What’s the Position You Hold?” 




Rap music has met with increasing scholarly interest since the appearance 
of the first full-length studies in the mid-1990s (Rose; Potter). While early 
scholarship focused on the social conditions from which rap music emerged 
and the political debates it incited, recent studies have increasingly ad-
dressed its literary qualities as well (Bradley; Caplan 103-32; Pate). In the 
following I will explore an approach from relational sociology that draws 
on both of these areas and helps elucidate the interconnections between 
them. Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of fields is particularly useful for a liter-
ary-sociological analysis of rap music, I argue, because it foregrounds an 
aspect of social interaction that rappers have continually discussed and per-
formed: position-taking.  
The importance of defining, claiming, and occupying one’s position in 
the field of hip hop is a central concern in many rap songs, and the frequen-
cy with which positions are defined by referring to other actors in the field 
confirms a basic assumption of Bourdieu’s relational model. The begin-
nings of rap music were shaped by an explicitly relational activity, the rap 
battle, in which two rappers competed for superiority, often by addressing 
and comparing themselves to each other. The social milieu out of which rap 
music emerged was dominated by street gangs, which additionally under-
scored the importance of position-taking: Claiming or denying one’s mem-
bership in a gang could be a question of life and death. When rap music be-
came a national phenomenon in the 1980s, these relational principles were 
extended accordingly. Rappers now defined their position with reference to 
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larger spatial entities such as their hometown or, as the East Coast-West 
Coast feud intensified, an entire part of the country. At the same time, the 
emergence of message rap saw rap music defining itself against mainstream 
society, a tendency strengthened by hardcore rap a few years later. In the 
mid-1990s, rap music entered yet another phase as the most successful rap-
pers made themselves into icons by developing personae that combined 
strategies from earlier phases and staked their iconic status on obsessive 
self-positioning. 
The title of this essay is taken from the intro of In My Lifetime, Vol. 1 
(1997), an aptly titled album by Jay Z, one of these iconic rappers. Entitled 
“A Million and One Questions/Rhyme No More,” the intro celebrates Jay 
Z’s achievements by contrasting them with the incredulous questions he 
was facing at the beginning of his career:1 
 
A lot of speculation 
On the monies I’ve made, honeys I’ve slayed 
How is he for real? Is that nigga really paid? 
Hustlers I’ve met or dealt with direct 
Is it true he slay the beef and slept with a tech? 
What’s the position you hold? Can you really match 
A triple platinum artist buck by buck by only a single goin’ gold? 
 
Not only does the passage illustrate the importance of defining one’s “posi-
tion” and the unusually explicit discussion of position-takings in the field of 
hip hop. It is also a position-taking itself, drawing on various markers of 
status and legitimacy specific to the field (money, womanizing, street life, 
guns, successful albums) that Jay Z claims by implication. The relationality 
of such position-takings is emphasized by the communicative situation 
evoked in the passage, which implies that some other actors in the field al-
ready admired Jay Z while others questioned his status, and by the explicit 
comparison Jay Z draws with an ostensibly more successful peer at the end. 
The comparison indicates that positions are defined by combinations of sta-
tus markers (or in Bourdieu’s terms, types of capital) that are themselves 
open to negotiation: Jay Z in effect suggests that he can match an economically 
                                                   
1  Quotations from songs by Jay Z and Ice-T are taken from the records listed in 
the bibliography. Transcriptions are available at rap.genius.com. 
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more successful rapper because of the artistic superiority of his work. This 
essay argues that Bourdieu’s theory can help us understand both the role of 
relational position-takings in rap music and the transformations the field 
underwent as a result of changes in the valorization of different kinds of 
capital. The first section of the essay discusses this proposition from a theo-
retical perspective; the second section traces the position-takings and his-
torical transformations in the field of hip hop by examining three repre-
sentative rap texts: Kool Moe Dee’s rap battle with Busy Bee Starski 
(1981), Ice-T’s “O.G. Original Gangster” (1991), and Jay Z’s “Empire 
State of Mind” (2009).  
 
 
BOURDIEU’S FIELD THEORY AND RAP MUSIC 
 
The concept of position-taking emerges out of Bourdieu’s field theory, 
which he began to develop early in his career and differentiated in a series 
of case studies. A field, Bourdieu says, is “a network, or a configuration, of 
objective relations between positions” defined “by their present and poten-
tial situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power 
(or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that 
are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other posi-
tions” (Wacquant 39). All actors in the field are engaged in a struggle for 
power, that is, for a position that gives them control over the distribution of 
these profits (Rules of Art 232). As Bourdieu’s definition suggests, his un-
derstanding of capital is not limited to the economic sense of the term. He 
distinguishes three main types of capital – economic, cultural, and social – 
but points out that every field ultimately defines its own kind of capital 
(“The (Three) Forms”). The one kind of capital operative in all fields is 
symbolic capital, which Bourdieu variously equates with “recognition,” 
“prestige,” and “honour” (Language 106; Logic 118). In highly institution-
alized fields such as politics or religion, most positions exist independently 
of the actors who occupy or aspire to them. In less institutionalized fields 
such as the literary, by contrast, actors often define their own position, and 
even preexisting positions (such as that of poet laureate) depend on the oc-
cupant for much of their authority. The arrival of an influential young writ-
er or a new school changes the configuration of the literary field, so that 
personal and temporal factors acquire considerable importance in 
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sociological analysis (Rules of Art 127-28, passim). As a result, Bourdieu’s 
study of the literary field, The Rules of Art, contains not only his most thor-
ough discussion of the concept of position but adjusts to the fluidity of that 
field by introducing the more dynamic concept of position-taking. 
Since in the modern world actors are seldom born into positions, they 
need to make their aspirations to a position known by means of direct or in-
direct discursive signals. It is these signals that Bourdieu calls position-
takings. In sociological terms, position-takings have a subjective and an ob-
jective component: They result from the individual actor’s personal disposi-
tions but also from the structure of positions in the field. While they are not 
determined by either of these components, sociological analysis of disposi-
tions and positions can elucidate the motivations behind position-takings 
(Rules of Art 234-35, 264-67). Bourdieu uses the term both for singular, 
empirically traceable acts like criticizing another actor in the field and for 
larger projects like developing a new school or movement (92-93). With 
regard to literary texts, he argues that both the content and the form of the 
text function as position-takings in the literary field. Some position-takings 
are explicit, for example in autobiographical or metafictional texts, but 
most are implicit in that the author’s “aesthetic choices” signal his position 
relative to the various groups, schools, and movements that structure the 
field at the time of publication (231-34). While Bourdieu offers few exam-
ples for such implicit, “aesthetic” position-takings, he points out that a wide 
range of formal aspects can fulfill this function, including “genres, styles, 
forms, manners” (233; cf. Dubois, “Pierre Bourdieu” 100; Müller 45-52; 
Speller 64). 
Position-takings are only one element in Bourdieu’s detailed sociologi-
cal analysis of the literary field, which raises the question of whether they 
can be analyzed without reconstructing field structures and actors’ disposi-
tions in detail. In The Rules of Art, Bourdieu himself begins with a close 
reading of a literary text and later points out that his model allows for both 
deductive and inductive approaches. A “stylistic strategy,” he says, may 
“furnish the starting point of a search for its author’s trajectory” (234), and 
one might add the analogous point that the structure of the field can be elu-
cidated by tracing stylistic choices through a number of works. The induc-
tive approach has the additional advantage of avoiding the reductive 
tendencies of Bourdieu’s model. With regard to rap music, his limitation of 
structural power differentials to issues of class is particularly problematic as 
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it risks occluding the racial issues so momentous in an African American 
context. Similarly, Bourdieu’s tacit assumption that his field theory can ex-
plain any society in its entirety has resulted in problems of national or cul-
tural bias when applied to global or non-Western social formations.2 
The inductive analysis of position-takings is also supported by a phe-
nomenon specific to rap music: the ubiquity of explicit position-takings. 
Whereas literary texts usually “veil” their negotiation of the field and of the 
world in general, as Bourdieu and his followers have stressed (Rules of Art 
33; cf. Dubois, “Flaubert” 83-84; Rabaté 29-31), rappers have made their 
messages and their position toward one another clear from the beginning. 
The rapper’s sociological interests, in the sense of both socio-political con-
cerns and of aspirations in the field, are the central topic of many songs. In 
historical perspective, moreover, the alliances, goals, and even institutions 
of rap music emerged from negotiations often conducted in the music itself. 
To a considerable extent, then, the field of rap music does not only moti-
vate position-takings but is constituted by them.  
In analyzing these songs as position-takings, we can account for both 
their sociological and their literary dimension without reducing one to the 
other. Bourdieu himself argues that position-takings “challenge the alterna-
tive between an internal reading of the work and an explanation based on 
the social conditions of its production or consumption” since they fore-
ground the interplay of these aspects (Rules of Art 231). With regard to rap 
music, the concept of position-taking helps bridge the division between so-
cial and poetic approaches noted at the outset of this essay. The analyses 
that follow will address the function of position-takings both in the field of 
hip hop and within the aesthetic configuration of the individual songs. 
While a thorough sociological analysis of the field of hip hop is beyond 
the scope of the essay, a brief survey of relevant structural features will 
help demonstrate the applicability of Bourdieu’s concepts and provide 
background information relevant for the case studies.3 The field of hip hop 
emerged in New York City around 1980, when the art forms that make up 
hip hop were a few years old and began to institutionalize within structures 
provided by producers, record labels, and art galleries, but also by street 
                                                   
2  For discussions of these problems, see Figueroa; Gurr; for a Eurocentrically bi-
ased application, see Casanova. 
3  The survey draws on Chang; Forman; and George. 
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gangs. The oppositional self-definition of these gangs made hip hop an un-
usually bounded and structured artistic field. The principle of gang territo-
ries was extended first to the boroughs of New York, then to the nation as a 
whole, as the well-publicized East Coast-West Coast feud attests.  
The foregrounding of capital is another characteristic feature of the field 
of hip hop. Actors seek and demand “respect” from their peers, a term that 
could be added to the list of Bourdieu’s synonyms for symbolic capital. A 
closer look shows that respect is usually gained by foregrounding other 
kinds of capital. This distinguishes the field of hip hop from other artistic 
fields, which, as Bourdieu has shown, try to obfuscate the importance of 
capital in general and valorize cultural capital over other kinds. Economic 
capital is demonstrated by status symbols such as cars, diamonds, and 
champagne. Cultural capital is awarded for artistic skills (in rap music, 
primarily the originality of rhymes, metaphors, and insults) but also, again 
unusually for an artistic field, for quantitative factors such as sales figures 
and the size of concert audiences. Social capital is generated by associa-
tions with successful artists, producers, and music executives on the one 
hand and by loyalty to one’s neighborhood and gang or clique on the other. 
Hip hop here differs from other artistic fields in that it awards social capital 
for purely material relations such as those with the music business. From 
the mid-1990s onward, rappers like Puff Daddy, Jay Z, and Kanye West 
began to create personae that demonstrated their possession of all three 
types of capital. 
While Bourdieu’s concepts have proven useful in analyzing various 
fields,4 they are particularly suited to the field of hip hop, with which they 
share several core metaphors. For example, Bourdieu describes fields as 
“social games” (jeux sociaux) that have their own rules, require the “play-
ers” to believe in “the game and the value of its stakes” (enjeux), and main-
tain themselves by the “continual reproduction” of this belief (Rules of Art 
248, 228, 227). In the field of hip hop, the word “game” has become syn-
onymous with rap music and the rap business, implying the same underly-
ing mechanisms. Another example is the metaphor of “struggle,” which for 
Bourdieu captures the dynamic that defines and sustains a field. The 
                                                   
4  Bourdieu himself published analyses of the academic (Homo Academicus), edu-
cational (State Nobility), and fashion fields (Sociology 132-38). For other appli-
cations, see Benson and Neveu; Hilgers and Mangez. 
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“history of the field is the history of the struggle for a monopoly of the im-
position of legitimate categories of perception and appreciation,” Bourdieu 
writes, and “it is in the very struggle that the history of the field is made” 
(157). He returns to struggle and related metaphors such as “symbolic vio-
lence” throughout his case studies of specific fields (Language 164). Posi-
tion-takings are weapons in this struggle, which they reinforce because 
most position-takings function “negatively, in relation to others,” and thus 
“often remain almost empty, reduced to a stance of defiance, rejection, rup-
ture” (Rules of Art 240). The field of hip hop, too, emerged out of struggles 
over authority: first in the ritualized form of rap battles in which artistic su-
periority was at stake, then in the larger-scale “beefs” and “feuds” that es-
tablished the structure of the field. The frequency with which these terms, 
and indeed the word “struggle” itself, appear in rap songs attests to the con-
tinuing awareness and negotiation of struggle as a core dynamic in the field 
of hip hop.5 It also confirms the finding, cited above, that the field of hip 




CASE STUDIES: FROM RAP BATTLE TO RAP PERSONA 
 
Rap music emerged in the predominantly African American areas of New 
York City in the 1970s, when local DJs began to extend the popular instru-
mental passages of funk and disco songs and to speak (“rap”) over these 
passages. As rapping increased in popularity, “masters of ceremony” (em-
cees) began to specialize in this occupation, animating the crowd with 
rhymed stories and party calls. The frequent personal references and com-
parisons with other rappers in these early pieces indicate the importance of 
position-takings for the definition of the new field. These position-takings 
found their most condensed form in rap battles, where two rappers compet-
ed in generating noise from the crowd. The dynamic of the emerging field, 
and the usefulness of Bourdieu’s vocabulary for analyzing this dynamic, is 
perhaps most evident in the legendary battle between Busy Bee Starski and 
Kool Moe Dee at the Harlem World Christmas celebration in 1981. The 
                                                   
5  The online database rap.genius.com features dozens of songs with these titles 
and hundreds in which the words appear in the lyrics. 
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contestants positioned themselves at opposite poles of the emerging field. 
Busy Bee was one of the most successful party rappers at the time, whereas 
Kool Moe Dee questioned the artistic value of party rap and emphasized 
verbal skills and innovation instead (Nguyen). In Bourdieu’s terms, the 
contest pitched a member of the orthodoxy who fulfilled existing require-
ments for recognition against a heretic who sought to redefine these re-
quirements. 
Both contestants voice their aspirations to the “number one” position, as 
Busy Bee puts it, but Kool Moe Dee turns his reply into a comprehensive 
critique of party rapping in general and Busy Bee’s work in particular.6 He 
accuses Busy Bee of stealing rhymes from other rappers and goes on to 
portray party rapping as “counterfeit,” repetitive, and childish (“ba-ditty-
ba”). The negative dimension of this position-taking is evident in the fre-
quent personal attacks on Busy Bee, but also in the comments Kool Moe 
Dee makes about the structure of the emerging field: 
 
You’re not number one, you’re not even the best 
And you can’t win no real emcee contest 
Celebrity clubs and bullshit like those 
Those the kind of shows everybody knows 
Celebrity clubs, those are the kind you can win 
They’re all set up before he comes in 
But in a battle like this, you’d know you’d lose 
Between me and you, who do you think they’ll choose? 
 
The opposition between “real” and “fake” was one of the basic structural 
features of the field of hip hop from the beginning. It manifests in Kool 
Moe Dee’s distinction between “real emcees” and celebrity emcees who 
win rap battles not because of their superior skills but because of outside 
support. The positive dimension of his position-taking is beginning to take 
shape in this passage: Kool Moe Dee wants the field of hip hop to emanci-
pate itself from such outside influences and award cultural capital for artis-
tic skills, not popularity. This would make the field homologous to other ar-
tistic fields such as the literary, which, as Bourdieu shows, established itself 
                                                   
6  Quotations from the rap battle are taken from the recording available in Nguyen 
and the partial transcript available at rap.genius.com. 
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in this very act of separation (Rules of Art 47-112). It would also require 
field-specific rules by which skills can be measured and cultural capital dis-
tributed. One of the reasons for the success of Kool Moe Dee’s intervention 
was, arguably, that it was not only a demand for but also a practical demon-
stration of such rules. The second part of his performance opens with Kool 
Moe Dee’s announcement that he will now “say those rhymes that I in-
vent,” which recalls his claim about Busy Bee’s stealing rhymes while at 
the same time drawing attention to the originality of his own rapping. He 
underscores this self-reflexive dimension by extending each of the follow-
ing rhymes over several lines: 
 
And for your pleasure, a rhyme you’ll treasure 
Please don’t try ’cause you can’t measure 
The length of time can’t touch the rhyme 
Hip hop don’t stop, ’cause you know I’m 
An MC supreme and I’m one-of-a-kind 
And if you search real hard, I’m sure you’ll find 
 
The repetition of rhymes here functions as a positive position-taking in that 
it showcases Kool Moe Dee’s artistic skills, but also as a negative position-
taking in that its inventive repetitions contrast with Busy Bee’s dull ones, as 
summarized in the alliterative lines “Party after party, the same old shit / 
Record after record, rhyme after rhyme.” Several other passages in the song 
function in this manner, for example Kool Moe Dee’s inventive puns on his 
opponent’s name: “Busy wanna-bee / Cause you know he wanna be another 
Kool Moe Dee.” The formal complexity of the language underscores the 
explicit position-takings formulated on the level of content. The Busy Bee 
vs. Kool Moe Dee battle is widely regarded as formative of the field 
(Nguyen). In sociological terms this is because it replaced the old ortho-
doxy of party rap with new rules for the distribution of cultural capital. Au-
thority was now conferred for verbal skills rather than crowd response, so 
that the field of rap emancipated itself from popular music and instituted 
rules similar to those of other artistic fields. 
Party rap remained a popular strand of rap music but no longer com-
manded the recognition it did at the beginning. On the contrary, it became a 
foil against which succeeding movements defined themselves. The most in-
fluential of these movements – the one that had the greatest impact on the 
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structure of the field – was arguably hardcore rap, which combined verbal 
skills with an aggressive style and an insistence on street credibility (De 
Genova; George 53-60; Quinn). The breadth of positions in hardcore rap is 
indicated by two of its most successful representatives: Run-D.M.C. were 
celebrated for their rhyming skills while N.W.A. brought the “gangsta” 
lifestyle to nationwide attention in simple, authentic language. In sociologi-
cal terms, hardcore rap changed the field of hip hop by establishing the im-
portance of economic and especially social capital alongside the cultural 
capital awarded for skills and success. Many successful hardcore songs, es-
pecially of the gangsta variety, were centrally concerned with defining and 
claiming these types of capital. One of the best known gangsta rap songs, 
Ice-T’s “O.G. Original Gangster” (1991), demonstrates both the valoriza-
tion of social capital and its combination with the other types. 
The song is of particular interest in our context because it opens with an 
explicit position-taking and goes on to undergird that position-taking on the 
levels of form and content. Ice-T recalls his origins in party rap and his 
eventual realization that instead of imitating other rappers he needed to 
draw from his own experience: 
 
So I sat back, thought up a new track, 
Didn’t fantasize, kicked the pure facts.  
Motherfuckers got scared cause they was unpre- 
Pared. Who would tell it how it really was, who dared? 
A motherfucker from the West Coast, L. A.  
South Central fool, where the Crips and the Bloods play 
When I wrote about parties it didn’t fit 
“6 in the Mornin’”—that was the real shit. 
 
The position-taking has a positive and a negative dimension, but both refer 
back to the authentic personality of the artist: Ice-T distances himself from 
his own earlier party songs and defines his new style by autobiographical 
reference to the “pure facts” about life in his gang-ridden hometown. The 
self-referentiality of the song is also evident in the heavy use of first-person 
pronouns (“When I wrote about parties someone always died / When I tried 
to writ happy yo I knew I lied cause / I lived a life of crime”) and the re-
peated linking of the eponymous “Original Gangster” with Ice-T’s name. It 
points to the central role of social capital in the song and its position-taking. 
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Social capital is conferred for street credibility, a concept that was defined 
in large part by hardcore rap and encompasses distinctions drawn on the ba-
sis of race, class, and geography. “I rap for brothers just like myself,” Ice-T 
announces, and reinforces the distinction by addressing the listener as a 
“fool” unacquainted with life in lower-class black neighborhoods: “I’m 
from South Central, fool, where everything goes / Snatch you out your car 
so fast you’ll get whiplash.” The notorious South Central neighborhood is 
not merely mentioned as a posture but depicted as a conditioning social en-
vironment characterized by violence and a lack of education. 
These claims to social capital are intertwined with claims to economic 
and cultural capital. Economic capital still plays a subordinate role in “O.G. 
Original Gangster.” Just as the party rappers had occasionally referred to 
cars and other indicators of wealth, Ice-T mentions his “quest for extreme 
wealth” but clearly valorizes the other kinds of capital more highly. His 
claims to cultural capital are based on artistic skills, which indicates that the 
redefinition of the field inspired by Kool Moe Dee’s battle rap had been 
successful in the long term. When Ice-T describes his rap as “Hardcore top-
ics over hardcore drum beats,” he positions himself in the new movement 
of hardcore rap and at the same time in the tradition of Kool Moe Dee’s 
artistry. The line evokes an approach similar to the formalist aesthetic the 
literary field had instituted in the process of its self-definition: form and 
content enter into an organic, mutually supportive relationship.  
Ice-T demonstrates his artistic skills by using internal and triple rhymes 
(game to me / fame to me / claim to be), and especially by paralleling 
gangsta life and rap music throughout the song. This is not only an aestheti-
cally valuable conceit but it allows him to marshal his social capital (gang-
sta life) in support of his aspirations to cultural capital (rap skills). While 
other rappers pose as invincible action heroes, Ice-T recognizes the empti-
ness of their posture and turns to the more valuable pursuit of rapping in-
stead: “I ain’t no super hero, I ain’t no Marvel comic / But when it comes to 
game I’m atomic / At droppin’ it straight, point blank and twisted.” The 
concluding reference establishes a metaphoric link between rap songs and 
guns that is sustained throughout the song (“I blast the mic with my style”; 
“my wit’s as quick as a hair trigger”), echoing Amiri Baraka’s influential 
poem “Black Art” (1966) which calls for “poems that kill. / Assassin po-
ems, poems that shoot / guns” (116). The strategy of drawing on social cap-
ital and inventive language in pursuit of cultural capital can be found 
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throughout Ice-T’s work, starting with the title of his 1987 debut album, 
Rhyme Pays. Given the positive reviews his albums received within the 
field of hip hop, the strategy was fairly successful, and Ice-T is now re-
membered as one of the defining rappers of the period (Metcalf and 
Turner). 
From the mid-1990s onward, a new generation of rappers began to re-
define the popular perception of rap music by incorporating strategies from 
other fields, especially from pop music and the economic field. These rap-
pers made themselves into carefully constructed personae, or “icons.” By 
individualizing their appeal, they stabilized their authority in the field of hip 
hop and at the same time reached audiences beyond the field. They differed 
from previous rappers, one might argue in Bourdieu’s terminology, in that 
they elevated economic capital to the same importance as the other types 
and laid claim to all three. The fusion of social, cultural, and economic cap-
ital into a rap persona is succinctly illustrated by Jay Z’s “Empire State of 
Mind” (2009), arguably the most successful song by the most successful 
rapper of this generation.  
The title of the song indicates that geography continues to be an im-
portant source of social capital but now acquires an additional dimension. 
While the song stresses Jay Z’s origins in Bedford-Stuyvesant, a notorious 
black neighborhood in Brooklyn, it presents these origins not as a determin-
ing or conditioning factor but as the starting point of a success story. This 
trajectory is established at the very beginning of the song, where Jay Z in-
troduces himself in terms of the geographical coordinates of his success: 
“Yeah I’m out that Brooklyn, now I’m down in Tribeca / Right next to De 
Niro, but I’ll be hood forever.” These lines signal a change in the rules of 
the field, a change that Jay Z instituted along with other rap “icons” such as 
Puff Daddy and Kanye West. Social capital is now awarded not only for 
street credibility (“hood”) but also for economic success and upper-class 
markers such as living next to movie stars. New York, nicknamed the Em-
pire State, thus functions both as a geographical indicator and as a meto-
nym for a personal quality that enables economic success: the “Empire 
State of Mind.” 
The various sets of images Jay Z uses to outline his success story indi-
cate the continuing importance of relational position-takings, which acquire 
an additional dimension in that they serve not only to situate the rapper in 
the field but to define and solidify his persona. The geographical references, 
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for example, are intertwined with references to Jay Z’s business ventures, 
from his early drug dealing to his current status as co-owner of a basketball 
team. The parallel between these career trajectories serves to reinforce the 
success story but also, in sociological terms, the fusion of social and eco-
nomic capital in his rap persona. Moreover, the linear geography of the 
success story (Bedford-Stuyvesant to Tribeca) is embedded in a set of hori-
zontal references to the various black neighborhoods in New York City 
(like Harlem or the Bronx), which underscores Jay Z’s claim that his perso-
na is representative of New York and vice versa.  
The same strategy can be detected behind the frequent references to 
other celebrities who became personae. On the one hand, Jay Z parallels his 
success story with that of better-known mainstream celebrities (Robert De 
Niro, Frank Sinatra, Bob Marley); on the other hand, he lays claim to field-
specific social capital by referencing classic New York rappers (Afrika 
Bambaataa, Special Ed, The Notorious B.I.G.). The association with The 
Notorious B.I.G., or Biggie, is developed into a complex position-taking in 
the course of the song. It positions Jay Z as an East Coast rapper in the East 
Coast-West Coast opposition Biggie came to embody, and as a Brooklyn 
rapper in the New York scene. On the temporal scale, Jay Z is laying claim 
to Biggie’s legacy as one of the greatest rappers of all time but also an early 
rap persona and thus one of the few rappers to attain celebrity status beyond 
the field of hip hop. On yet another level, Jay Z combines this temporal 
succession with the coordinates of his personal success story when he par-
allels his precursor figures with New York landmarks: 
 
[…] rest in peace Bob Marley 
Statue of Liberty, long live the World Trade 
Long live the King, yo; I’m from the Empire State 
 
The succession from Bob Marley to Biggie (“the King”) to Jay Z extends 
the temporal position-taking further back in time, toward an earlier black 
icon whose Jamaican origins point to the role of Caribbean immigrants in 
the emergence of rap music; the link between Marley and the Statue of 
Liberty emphasizes this connection. The next pairing, of Biggie and the 
World Trade Center, is indicated by the repetition of “Long live …,” an 
ambiguous phrase that expresses veneration but in this context also rele-
gates its subjects to the past. The phrase alludes to the unbroken succession 
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of monarchs in the Middle Ages (“the King is dead, long live the King”), 
thus underscoring Jay Z’s claim to the social capital held by his precursors 
(cf. Kantorowicz). The allusion to the title of his own song right afterward 
reinforces this claim. In the context of this passage, the reference is now 
unmistakably to the Empire State Building, itself an iconic site that has sur-
vived where the World Trade Center has not and that combines aesthetic 
appeal with business success. 
The complexity of the “Empire State” trope amounts to a claim for cul-
tural capital alongside the other types. It prominently demonstrates the ver-
bal skills manifest throughout the song in such formal devices as slant 
rhymes (Dominicanos / that McDonalds; melting pot / selling rocks / hip 
hop) and double-layered wordplay (drug-dealing is discussed in terms of 
food and of basketball), but especially in the linguistic and formal density 
of the final section: 
 
Lights is blinding, girls need blinders 
So they can step out of bounds quick, the side lines is 
Lined with casualties who sip the life casually 
Then gradually become worse; don’t bite the apple, Eve 
Caught up in the in-crowd, now you’re in-style 
And in the winter gets cold en vogue with your skin out 
The city of sin is a pity on a whim 
Good girls gone bad, the city’s filled with ’em 
Mommy took a bus trip and now she got her bust out 
Everybody ride her, just like a bus route 
“Hail Mary” to the city, you’re a virgin 
And Jesus can’t save you, life starts when the church ends 
 
The main skill required of rappers, rhyming, is demonstrated not only by 
the frequency of rhymes in this passage but also by their variety and inven-
tiveness. The section features slant rhymes, triple rhymes, internal rhymes, 
parallelisms, assonances, and alliterations, to a degree that several examples 
could be cited for each of these devices. Since each line is interwoven with 
the neighboring lines, often by several links, the section has a tight structure 
even by the standards of formal poetry. The formal connections often rein-
force semantic affinities or contrasts: the blinding lights necessitate blin-
ders, the casual attitude of the newcomers makes them casualties, and so 
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forth. The section is additionally structured by extended metaphors for life 
in the big city, especially football, religion, and fashion. The second line 
describes the challenges of the city in terms of an athletic competition 
played on a field. Various references suggest American football, a rough, 
relentless game where players “step out of bounds,” stand on the “side-
lines,” can easily become “casualties,” and in desperate situations throw 
“Hail Mary” passes. These references frame the passage, as does the reli-
gious imagery introduced in the fourth line (“don’t bite the apple, Eve”), 
taken up in the “city of sin” phrase, and developed more fully in the con-
cluding lines of the passage. The central metaphor in terms of its location in 
the passage, and also of its significance for the song as a whole, is that of 
fashion. While it only extends over two lines (“now you’re in-style / And in 
the winter gets cold en vogue with your skin out”), it exemplifies the com-
pact wordplay of the passage and thus the rapper’s verbal skills. As Jay Z 
himself has pointed out, the lines do not merely describe the exposure of 
fashionable girls to the hardships of the city but also contain a string of ref-
erences to fashion magazines: InStyle, Vogue, and the notoriously icy editor 
of the latter, Anna Wintour (Decoded 129). 
The fashion metaphor also recalls the importance of economic capital 
for the sort of rap persona Jay Z is developing and presenting in the song. 
References to status symbols pervade the song: living “next to De Niro,” 
driving an “off-white Lexus,” living “on Billboard,” “sipping mai tais,” 
holding courtside seats at professional basketball games. Many of these sta-
tus symbols are brands that combine all three types of capital in that they 
indicate economic success, social recognition, and cultural authority in the 
field of hip hop. These brands stand in metonymical relation to the rap per-
sona of Jay Z, which also combines the three types of capital and depends 
on global marketing and instant recognizability. When Jay Z brags that he 
“made the Yankee hat more famous than a Yankee can,” he summarizes the 
aspirations underlying his creation of a rap persona. His iconic status not 
only equals but surpasses that of the New York Yankees, the most success-
ful baseball club of all time, in that his iconicity ranges beyond its field of 
origin. This achievement can only be measured against that of the Yankees, 
however, and the obsessively comparative self-descriptions of many “per-
sona” rappers indicate that relational position-taking has lost none of its 
importance since the early days of hip hop.  
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This essay has provided only a broad outline of the interplay of social 
structures and artistic strategies in rap music. A more detailed study would 
inevitably complicate the configurations and trajectories identified so far, 
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“Decolorized for Popular Appeal” 






If George Dawes Green had published his mystery novel The Caveman’s 
Valentine within the past decade and not in 1995, one might be tempted to 
accuse him of rather crude plagiarism. Its main character is a homeless 
African American man in his fifties who suffers from paranoid schizophre-
nia. He turns out to be an incredibly talented pianist who used to study at a 
world-renowned conservatory, Juilliard’s music division, and we learn that 
prior to the beginning of the story his illness first made it impossible for 
him to graduate and ultimately rendered him unfit for what is usually con-
sidered a regular life altogether. For the entire diegetic time, he lives in a 
cave in New York City’s Inwood Park and refuses all attempts to ‘reinte-
grate’ him into society. 
More than ten years after the publication of Green’s novel, LA Times 
columnist Steve Lopez met a homeless African American man in down-
town Los Angeles. Nathaniel Ayers is 54 years old at the time, plays the 
violin and turns out to be a highly-gifted Juilliard dropout who has been di-
agnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Ayers’s illness has prevented him 
from graduating, and when Lopez first meets him, he insists on sleeping 
outside and playing music in a noisy tunnel. Lopez repeatedly wrote about 
Ayers in his column and also contacted his family, who assured him of their 
efforts to convince Nathaniel to return to sleeping indoors and recommence 
his medication. Lopez published a much-noticed book, The Soloist, about 
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his friendship with Ayers in 2008. A movie adaptation came out the follow-
ing year, starring Jamie Foxx and Robert Downey Jr. 
Musical geniuses, it seems safe to assume even without solid data on 
the topic, make up only a fraction of the American inner-city homeless 
population. Black Juilliard alumni (or dropouts) are also not exactly abun-
dant; African American students currently make up between 3 percent and 
4.2 percent of the school’s student body, which makes Blacks the second-
smallest ethnic group among Juilliard students after Native Alaskan and/or 
Native Hawaiian.1 And while mental illness has been a significant factor for 
many Americans in becoming homeless and not finding their way back into 
regular housing,2 psychotic disorders and their borderline symptoms are in 
many cases compounded not just by lack of access to medical treatment, 
but also by increased substance abuse, self-medication, and addiction.3  
The conspicuous parallels between Green’s fictional and Lopez’s factu-
al character suggest that the two books draw on some sort of ‘type’ or cul-
tural staple, namely the mad-genius stereotype. In what follows, I will dis-
cuss the use of the mad-genius trope in allegedly “true” stories about black 
homelessness from different media in the context of Pierre Bourdieu’s cri-
tique of the notion of the “uncreated creator” on which the myth of genius 
is built (cf. Cultural Production 139). The “substantialist mode of thought,” 
as Bourdieu writes with reference to Ernst Cassirer, dominates the field of 
cultural and artistic production more blatantly than most other areas of so-
cial and cultural reality (Sociology 29). Its tendency “to foreground the 
                                                   
1  According to colleges.niche.com and collegefactual.com, respectively. These 
numbers refer to the entire student body of all Juilliard divisions, including the 
music school. 
2  In The Insanity Offense: How America’s Failure to Treat the Seriously Mentally 
Ill Endangers Its Citizens, E. Fuller Torrey refers to a number of studies report-
ing that one-third of homeless men and two-thirds of homeless women suffer 
from severe psychiatric disorders. He also quotes a study of chronic, long-term 
homelessness conducted in Miami which found that “every one of them was 
mentally ill” (123-24). 
3  According to the National Coalition for the Homeless, roughly half of all men-
tally ill urban homeless in the U.S. suffer from substance abuse and addiction, 
many of them self-medicating with street drugs. African Americans are even 
more over-represented in this group than other minorities (“Mental Illness”). 
‘TRUE’ STORIES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HOMELESSNESS | 185 
individual […] at the expense of the structural relations […] between social 
positions” is reflected in this field’s doxic belief in “unique creators” that 
are “irreducible to any condition or conditioning” (29). This insistence on 
unconditioned, “uncreated” creativity informs the mad-genius stereotype in 
particular because it presupposes a relation of mutual dependence between 
giftedness and inherent (and thus naturalized) illness. It therefore dismisses 
out of hand any attempt at situating both artist and artwork within the con-
text of the conditions that rendered them possible and of the structures of 
which they are the product. 
While the texts analyzed here are in one way or another self-proclaimed 
“true stories” of African American homeless persons,4 I use Green’s work 
of fiction as a point of departure not just for the above described parallels. 
In addition to these similarities between Green’s and Lopez’s books, the 
novel includes one scene that anticipates my essential argument here and 
boils it down to one ideologically charged motto: Romulus Ledbetter, the 
mystery novel’s protagonist and homeless would-be detective has a televi-
sion set in his cave. The device does not work in the technical sense, of 
course, since the cave has no electricity. Romulus’s schizophrenic mind, 
however, fabricates hallucinatory television programs that sometimes re-
veal parts of the character’s pre-diegetic past. On one of these TV nights, 
Romulus believes to be watching a film starring Steve McQueen and Ali 
MacGraw, a reference to The Getaway, Sam Peckinpah’s 1972 road-movie 
gangster drama.5 The film’s plot, however, rendered through the filter of 
Romulus’s perspective, bears no resemblance to The Getaway but tells the 
story of a young music student at Juilliard, who drops out of school because 
                                                   
4  To be more precise: All homeless characters in these texts are male, as is the 
case for the vast majority of fictional representations of homelessness. To find 
accounts of the experiences of homeless women with psychotic disorders, one 
could turn to Tanya Marie Luhrmann’s ethnographic studies, e.g., “Down and 
Out in Chicago” (2010). 
5  The chapter featuring this made-up film provides information about Romulus’s 
early years at Juilliard and about his marriage. McQueen’s and MacGraw’s dis-
astrous real-life marriage, their characters’ turbulent and often dysfunctional 
marriage in The Getaway, and also their public personae as the epitomes of re-
bellious masculinity and tragic feminine beauty provide insight into Romulus’s 
self-image and his analysis of his own biography. 
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his girlfriend is pregnant. Despite its two white leading actors, it is suggest-
ed that the film’s male hero is “in fact supposed to be a young black man,” 
that “his great-grandfather had been a slave,” and that the composer is 
“treated like family” in Harlem (Caveman’s Valentine 43). His social and 
physical downfall from promising musical talent to homeless madman be-
ing unappealing enough, the poor black musician from the Bronx is repre-
sented in Romulus’s imagined movie by one of Hollywood’s most iconical-
ly masculine white stars. A caption flashing on the screen definitively 
drives home the reason for this choice of cast, informing the viewer – or, 
rather, the reader – that “this movie ha[s] been DECOLORIZED FOR 
POPULAR APPEAL” (43).  
This slogan pointedly summarizes the effect of framing the narratives 
discussed here as “true stories” of individual pathologies. I will argue that 
what these depictions achieve by foregrounding the giftedness and mental 
illness of their characters serves the purpose of fading out the racist and 
classist challenges these characters face in their lived realities. The narra-
tive frame of the mad genius provides a well-known type of tragic hero that 
allows these stories to superficially make black homelessness more visible 
while avoiding a discussion of systemic conditions. 
In order to be palatable for a mass audience, African American home-
less characters must be framed in a particular – and particularly narrow – 
way. It’s not a story about that kind of homeless guy, these texts suggest. 
Instead, they offer an easier to swallow tidbit of truth in the form of alter-
natingly pitiable (for their mental illness or bad luck) and admirable (for 
their genius and/or their resilience) individuals. Yet, these stories nonethe-
less claim to offer a piece of truth since they all are being marketed as 
either ‘inspired by a true story’ or as the direct or adapted results of journal-
istic production. While apparently zooming in on an especially devastating 
aspect of America’s rapidly growing issues of mass poverty and social, po-
litical, and cultural neglect of the poor – particularly if they are people of 
color (cf. APA; Gradín; Institute for Research on Poverty) – these texts 
provide their audiences with an alternative perspective of black homeless-
ness in which criminalization, racial profiling, and the reach of the prison 
system are relegated to the margins. The audience’s attention is instead 
drawn to the extraordinary yet conceptually familiar individual whose gift-
edness and social invalidity are mutually dependent and hence form a 
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HOMELESS, GIFTED, AND BLACK 
 
Cultural articulations of homelessness since the late 19th century have, for 
the most part, represented unhoused characters as white and male. When 
public discussions about the socio-economic plight of the extremely poor 
began to identify the unstable housing situation of a growing number of 
Americans as an issue of national importance during the 1870s, African 
Americans were already “a significant presence” within the homeless popu-
lation (Hopper and Milburn 124). Yet, as Kenneth Kusmer has shown, the 
public image of a typical homeless person remained that of a white male 
until the 1960s, rendering homeless Blacks even less visible than white 
street dwellers. Nowadays, however, no group is as overrepresented among 
the homeless in the U.S. as African Americans. It is estimated that forty 
percent of the entire homeless population in the U.S. and more than fifty-
six percent of those who experience long-term and chronic homelessness 
are black (cf. NCH, “How Many People”; SAMHSA).  
A number of historical, political, and legal factors play into this imbal-
ance. In Slavery by Another Name, Douglas Blackmon unravels the exten-
sive perpetuation of the structures that shaped slave-based economies in the 
South well into the 20th century and that contributed greatly to processes of 
ghettoization and the precarious housing situation of an disproportional 
number of African Americans, as well as to the systematic criminalization 
of poor Blacks moving freely in public spaces. Thus, the postbellum va-
grancy laws in former slave states were designed specifically to target Afri-
can Americans and sentence them to what essentially amounted to slave la-
bor (cf. Blackmon). Today’s staggering incarceration rate among African 
Americans is in part a direct result of this deliberate criminalization. The 
U.S. prison system, including the laws and legal practices facilitating it, in 
turn fuels the increase of homelessness rates by releasing inmates into a life 
in which they are often legally barred from employment or housing.6 “The 
                                                   
6  Ava DuVernay’s documentary film 13th (2016) takes on the interconnections be-
tween the U.S. criminal justice system and racial inequality. Featuring scholars 
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racial dimension of mass incarceration is its most striking feature,” as 
Michelle Alexander notes in her groundbreaking study of 2010, The New 
Jim Cow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (6). A similar 
claim could be made for homelessness.  
While literature and film seldom feature homeless protagonists, un-
housed African American characters are particularly rare given the demo-
graphic reality, which renders the similarities in those few representations 
all the more salient. Looking at cultural articulations of black homeless per-
sons of the past two decades, both fictional and allegedly factual, one can-
not but notice a tendency toward narratives that center on giftedness and 
special talents. One example of great popular success is Gabriele Muccino’s 
overachiever drama The Pursuit of Happyness (2006), which claims to be 
“inspired by a true story” about its protagonist, Chris Gardner (Will 
Smith).7 The film follows the improbable career of a single father who goes 
from lining up outside San Francisco’s homeless shelters while taking care 
of his infant son to becoming a successful stock broker. The hyperbolic 
emphasis on an extraordinary individual’s personal success story certainly 
comes as no surprise in a high-profile Hollywood production, but Muccino’s 
film deserves to be mentioned in the context of how American popular cul-
ture represents black homelessness due to its strong reliance on its main 
character’s unusual capabilities.  
The Pursuit of Happyness only brings up in passing the interrelations of 
mental health and destitution: as a foil against which the protagonist’s resil-
ience can shine even brighter. A secondary character (played by Kevin 
West) personifies the stereotype of a mentally confused hippie roaming the 
streets of San Francisco. He mistakes Gardner’s bone-density scanner for a 
“time machine” with which he wishes to travel back to the 1960s. First in-
troduced in a scene that shows Gardner waiting for and then riding a bus, 
the homeless man’s constant jabber about the “time machine” provides a 
                                                   
like Michelle Alexander, Angela Davis, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., the film was 
widely released on the online streaming platform Netflix, which makes it avail-
able to subscribers worldwide, perhaps an indicator that this topic is beginning 
to receive more popular attention. 
7  With a box-office result of over $26 million during its opening week, The Pur-
suit of Happyness compares to The Departed or The Devil Wears Prada, which 
also came to theaters in 2006. 
‘TRUE’ STORIES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HOMELESSNESS | 189 
basis for the protagonist’s aversion against public transportation. The 
homeless hippie returns later in the film when he is in possession of the lost 
bone-density scanner that Gardner has to wrestle from him in another scene 
of public humiliation. The clownish role amounts to little more than a paro-
dy of Bay Area hippie culture. Like other homeless characters in the film – 
e.g., the man who picks a fight with Gardner while they wait in line at a 
homeless shelter – the character has little to no impact on the story itself but 
merely showcases what a nuisance homeless people are for Gardner and 
how admirably he shoulders the mental, emotional, and physical burden of 
his situation. Chris Gardner could have gone mad, this tells us, but he 
didn’t. Instead, he puts his extraordinary intelligence to good use – demon-
strations of which culminate in his solving the Rubik’s Cube puzzle and 
thereby securing an interview for an internship – and becomes a stock bro-
ker, i.e., a representative of the profession widely blamed for laying the 
foundation for and then accelerating the most recent housing market crisis 
and financial meltdown8 that led to over four million home foreclosures in 
the U.S. between 2008 and 2011 alone (cf. Bennett). 
Certain forms of fusing individualization with pathologization, in the 
way that The Caveman’s Valentine and The Soloist do, loom large in narra-
tives of black homelessness. Most recently, Ted “Golden Voice” Williams 
leapt to fame in 2011, at age 53, after a video interview with the then home-
less man was published by the Columbus Dispatch and later on YouTube. 
His unusual vocal skill has dominated Williams’s self-presentation as well 
as the narratives that various media have based on his persona. The other 
two aspects of Williams’s biography that define his public image are his 
drug and alcohol addiction and his homelessness. A voice-over artist by 
training, Williams struggled with addiction, lost his house, and was home-
less for over 15 years. The media reported extensively on his return to mid-
dle-class living standards, his job opportunities, the emotional reunion with 
                                                   
8  Economist Josh Bivens, among others, speaks out against the notion that the fi-
nancial meltdown of 2008 was an unpredictable and inevitable event within a 
complex system: “The economy that […] turned a housing bubble into an eco-
nomic catastrophe was […] designed, specifically, to guarantee that the power-
ful reaped a larger share of the rewards of overall economic growth” (9). See al-
so Calomiris and Haber; Stiglitz. 
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his mother, his relapse and subsequent rehabilitation program, and his wed-
ding in 2014.  
While the character of Nathaniel Ayers in The Soloist suffers from a 
psychotic disease that fits snugly into the framework of madness and the 
mad-genius trope, Ted Williams’s struggle with addiction does not lend it-
self so well to the ambiguous fascination with ingenious madness but leans 
more toward the abject end of the illness spectrum. A BBC report of 2011 – 
apparently unaware of the real-life basis for the film – goes as far as explic-
itly comparing the internet sensation Ted Williams to the movie adaptation 
of The Soloist, claiming that Williams’s story was “a remarkable case of 
life imitating art” and asking if, based on the parallels between the “golden 
voice” media coverage and the movie, Williams’s fame was “too good to 
be true.” This slightly hypocritical attempt at criticizing the media’s ten-
dency to overemphasize personal tragedy and success for the sake of a 
heartwarming story – the BBC is cashing in on the sensationalism, too, af-
ter all – addresses by proxy (through an internet commentator’s video foot-
age) how a discussion about the increase in poverty and homelessness is 
notably absent from most of the media coverage on Ted Williams, but then 
does not engage in or initiate such a discussion. Williams’s mental health 
issues are subsumed under his “checkered past,” accompanied by Roger 
Miller’s sentimental hobo song “King of the Road.” The reality for the 
thousands of mentally ill homeless in the U.S., however, bears little resem-




MENTAL HEALTH AND HOMELESSNESS 
 
Homelessness and mental illness are in many cases mutually dependent. 
Being homeless poses a severe mental health risk, and mental illness in turn 
increases the risk of becoming homeless. This correlation does not merely 
stem from the social, economic, physical, and psychological strains of liv-
ing on the street or the many challenges that accompany mental illness and 
make it difficult to secure one’s income and housing. Political and legal 
changes are decisive factors, particularly in the U.S. with its political de-
velopments of the last decades that relieved the federal and state govern-
ments of many responsibilities with regard to mental health care. The 
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systematic deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients since the 1960s has 
contributed considerably to what E. Fuller Torrey calls “the rise of mass 
homelessness” (The Insanity Offense 124). Under the Community Mental 
Health Act of 1963, public psychiatric hospitals were closed and funding 
moved instead to community mental health centers. With the introduction 
of Medicaid and Medicare many states passed legislations modelled after 
California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which regulates involuntary civil 
commitment to mental health institutions and involuntary assistance or 
medication. These policies make it extremely difficult to institutionalize or 
medicate even severely psychotic persons against their will.9  
Deinstitutionalization works in two stages: First, patients are discharged 
from public institutions, most of which are then closed down afterwards. As 
Torrey writes, “[t]he former affects people who are already mentally ill. 
The latter affects those who become ill after the policy has gone into effect 
and for the indefinite future because hospital beds have been permanently 
eliminated” (Out of the Shadows 8). By the 1980s, after the Reagan admin-
istration had repealed Carter’s Mental Health Systems Act (thus defunding 
many of the already underfinanced community mental health centers), the 
“overtly psychotic” homeless who could not or did not want to find ade-
quate care were “politicized, provoking major debates regarding their num-
bers, their origin, and the relative responsibility of local, state, and federal 
governments for their care.” “By the turn of this century,” thus Torrey, “the 
homeless were no longer causes célèbres, having quietly blended into urban 
landscapes like abandoned cars or rundown buildings” (The Insanity Of-
fense 124).10 
                                                   
9  To illustrate the at times absurd consequences of these legislations, Torrey re-
counts the case of a mentally ill homeless man in Augusta, Maine, whose cho-
sen abode resembles that of Green’s protagonist in The Caveman’s Valentine: 
“Randy Reed, a forty-three-year-old man, dug out a cave-like home for himself 
on the banks of the Kennebec River. Mental health outreach workers and police 
were aware of Reed and offered him help, but he refused […] Reed continued 
enlarging his home to the point that it eventually undermined a city parking lot, 
causing it to sag. Reed was then deemed eligible for psychiatric commitment 
because of the danger posed to the parking lot, not to Reed himself.” (126-27) 
10  The results officially intended by these policies failed to materialize in most re-
gards, as Daniel Yohanna points out: “Three forces drove the movement of peo-
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Homelessness and mental illness are interrelated; homelessness and 
prison also have a strong correlation; and to come full circle, mental illness 
ties in with incarceration as well. 45 percent of federal prison inmates and 
64 percent of local jail inmates have been reported to suffer from mental 
health problems (cf. James and Glaze). “America’s jails and prisons have 
become our new mental hospitals,” a 2010 study states based on the fact 
that in some states there are “almost ten times more mentally ill persons in 
jails and prisons than in hospitals” (Torrey et al. 1). This conglomerate of 
factors – homelessness, incarceration, and mental health issues – affects 
people of color at a much higher rate than any other group in U.S. society. 
“People of color [...] are more likely to suffer disparities in mental health 
treatment in general,” as Lorna Collier reports, which also makes them 
“more likely to be ushered into the criminal justice system.” The texts dis-
cussed here, however, focus on just a fragment of one of those interrela-
tions, namely homelessness and mental illness, and neglect the interconnec-
tions of racial bias, poverty, incarceration, and mental health altogether.  
 
 
                                                   
ple with severe mental illness from hospitals into the community: the belief that 
mental hospitals were cruel and inhumane; the hope that new antipsychotic med-
ications offered a cure; and the desire to save money” (886-87). None of these 
three points proved entirely true or attainable. While the institutionalized treat-
ment of mentally ill patients has a long and in many cases well-deserved reputa-
tion for cruelty, discharging patients from hospitals without providing the legal 
requirements or infrastructure to ensure the care they need turned out to be just 
as inhumane in the long run. The development of the first widely effective anti-
psychotic drugs, above all chlorpromazine in the 1950s, fueled expectations that 
psychotic patients would be enabled to return to a ‘regular’ life. Since a strong 
belief that one is not sick, however, is a common symptom of many psychotic 
disorders, patients stopped taking their medication after being discharged. As for 
saving money, the decision to pull funding from public mental health care suf-
fered from the same short-sightedness as most other policies defunding institu-
tions that provide care and assistance to those citizens most in need of it. It looks 
good in a government’s annual budget, but the actual expenses for cities and 
counties – if and when somebody takes the time to estimate such costs – are 
staggering (cf. Mangano and Blasi; Culhane).  
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THE MAD GENIUS 
 
The narratives spun around Chris Gardner in The Pursuit of Happyness and 
the YouTube phenomenon Ted Williams derive much of their momentum 
from continuously dramatizing their protagonists’ outstanding talents, a 
strategy that Green’s novel The Caveman’s Valentine and Lopez’s book 
The Soloist carry to an extreme by making use of the mad-genius trope for 
the depiction of their main characters. Certain mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia have long been believed to coincide with creativity, artistic 
talent, and unusual cognitive abilities. The mad genius, as Judith Schlesinger 
puts it, “has been a cherished cultural icon for centuries, a romantic and 
compelling concept” (62). Schlesinger’s analysis dismantles the mis-
conception behind the mythconception of the mad genius stereotype, the 
unfounded belief that creativity and what is perceived as genius have any 
scientifically proven correlation to psychopathology and madness. She 
hints at the cases made about famous artists like Mozart, Beethoven, van 
Gogh, or Kafka, and canonical literary figures fitting into the Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde theme. “Who needs science when we have such compelling poet-
ry to make the case?” she asks (63). 
The figure of the mad genius has not lost its allure for today’s storytell-
ers. “Hollywood can’t get enough of it,” Arne Dietrich points out in a po-
lemical article on medical research’s readiness to assume a connection be-
tween mental illness and creativity: “The narrative of the troubled genius 
just strikes all the right chords for coverage in the tweet-sized attention 
span of modern news reporting.” (1) Although it makes for a compelling 
narrative, the mad genius nonetheless belongs to the realm of long-
established myths about superhuman intelligence and artistic talent, as 
Dietrich makes clear. “The simple truth of the matter is that the VAST ma-
jority of creative people are not mentally ill and, more importantly, the 
VAST majority of those suffering from psychopathology are not geniuses.” 
(2)
While medical researchers like Schlesinger and Dietrich refer to clinical 
psychology’s tendency to draw ill-informed and then widely popularized 
links between mental illness and creativity, the question with regard to cul-
tural images of black homelessness is one of representational politics and 
the effects this well-established – if scientifically unsound – stereotype has 
on character development and the ways in which these “true stories” are 
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told. When relying on the mad-genius trope and its less flamboyant neigh-
bor, the highly gifted individual who is faced with personal tragedy, media 
representations of homeless Blacks tap into a popular myth of extreme in-
dividualization whose very logic separates the individual from society. The 
same condition that makes the mad genius unfit for society – their mental 
illness – is believed to produce inexplicable yet socially and culturally valu-
able outcomes, namely artistic work. Social exclusion is not simply a re-
grettable side-effect of genius; in the logic of this stereotype, it is necessary 
for peak performances.
Representational strategies that personalize social and systemic issues 
have been widely criticized in Reality TV formats, a genre with a pro-
grammatic claim to telling ‘true stories’ (cf. Aho; Andrejevic and Colby; 
Escoffery). Employing the mad genius frame is in itself such a strategy of 
individualization. Merely by depicting characters as artists or creative tal-
ents locates them within the field of artistic production and, according to 
Bourdieu’s analysis of this field, detaches them from their social condition-
ing: “There are in fact very few other areas,” he observes in The Field of 
Cultural Production, “in which the glorification of ‘great individuals’ [...] 
is more common or more uncontroversial” (29). Due to their relative posi-
tion within social reality, artistic production and creative work are singular-
ly suited to promote a consecration of creative individuals that, even while 
acknowledging socio-cultural and socio-political environments, obliterates 
most of the interdependencies between the personal and the context of 
which it is the product. Naturalization of the assumed bodily source of ge-
nius – illness – is but one side of this process of de-socializing, de-
politicizing glorification. The production of “a particular form of belief” on 
which the artistic field depends – and within it the myth of the mad genius 
as a specific kind of tragic artist – forms the other. “The work of art is an 
object which exists as such only by virtue of the (collective) belief which 
knows and acknowledges it as a work of art,” writes Bourdieu (35). The 
same is true for the artist whose name consecrates the work qua the collec-
tive belief in that name. Producing this belief requires practices that “can 
only work by pretending not to be doing what they are doing,” which is 
building and participating in an economic structure that “can function […] 
only by virtue of a constant, collective repression of narrowly ‘economic’ 
interest” (74). 
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In this ostensibly anti-economic, disinterested universe, the figure of the 
‘true artist’ incorporates the assumed opposition in which the artistic field 
constructs itself in opposition to fields of power. The ‘pure’ artist defies 
economic interest, state institutions, bourgeois standards, and politics. What 
could be a purer artist, then, than one whose very body does not even allow 
for the option of participation in mainstream society? By representing black 
homeless characters through the mad-genius frame, texts like The Soloist 
pretend to be doing what they are not doing: They appear to depict the ra-
cial dimension of poverty and homelessness while actually eclipsing the 
systemic scope of their characters’ racialized identities. For the remainder 
of this essay, I will engage in a closer reading of the specific techniques 
used in the book and the film The Soloist. 
 
 
THE DISCONNECTED SOLOIST 
 
The first time Lopez and Ayers meet, the homeless musician is playing his 
violin at the foot of the Beethoven statue in Pershing Square in downtown 
Los Angeles. Lopez describes the scene as an “odd picture of grubby re-
finement,” expressing the discrepancy between contradicting elements un-
expectedly forming a coherent image: a homeless man, visibly poor and 
“troubled,” as Lopez puts it, skillfully playing an old violin with only two 
strings and seeming “oblivious to everyone around him” (The Soloist 13). 
Ayers’s clownish attire and the decorated shopping-cart in which he holds 
his possessions add to the air of absurdity in this scene that constantly tip-
toes the line between the merely odd and a parodic portrait of the protago-
nists’ first encounter.  
Within the artistic field, intentional parody “presupposes and confirms 
emancipation” in that this form of parody means to overcome “the domi-
nant mode of thought and expression” (Bourdieu, Cultural Production 31). 
The borderline-parodic effect of a visibly psychotic homeless African 
American playing a damaged violin, however, does not constitute an act of 
emancipation in The Soloist – not so much because Ayers does not intend 
an emancipatory parody, but because the narrator Lopez, who creates and 
constructs the character Ayers for the reader, does not allow it. In what I 
read as an act of false modesty, Lopez claims not to know much about clas-
sical music while at the same time making what seems intended to sound 
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like a valid judgment of Ayers’s skills. He discerns from hearing Ayers 
play on a two-stringed violin that he must have had “some serious training” 
(13); it sounds “brilliant” to him, who is “no musician” but has “a good ear 
for pitch” (23). Lopez remains wedded to a conventional (bourgeois) per-
spective on classical European music that focuses on the cultural and sym-
bolic capital of canonical works, expressed also in his namedropping of 
composers, and aims at harnessing its profits for the benefit of the under-
privileged homeless man – and also for Lopez’s own creative work, namely 
his newspaper column.  
The character Nathaniel Ayers is, of course, a product of the author/ 
narrator Lopez’s creative imagination. Lopez creates Ayers not just as an 
artist, but at the same time as a work of art, an object: He is introduced, first 
and foremost, as ‘material’ for a story; in fact, Ayers is the story. “I’m fig-
uring this vagrant violinist is a column,” Lopez realizes (8); and a few 
pages later, when it proves difficult to get a hold of Ayers, he states: “Now 
I’m worried that I’ve lost the column” (16). Journalistic writing occupies a 
rather low position within the field of cultural production. Therefore, the 
journalist jumps at the opportunity to increase his story’s (in other words, 
Ayers’s) value by way of the quasi-magical effect of name recognition. As 
soon as Ayers mentions his Juilliard education, and no sooner than that, 
Lopez begins to do the “legwork” necessary for a “good column” (20). The 
journalist is ready to drop the idea when a first enquiry at the renowned 
conservatory does not confirm Ayers as an alumnus. When the school calls 
back with the information that Ayers did in fact attend Juilliard but failed to 
graduate, it ‘upgrades’ Ayers to the status of a particularly unique object. 
Bourdieu describes this mysterious ‘alchemy’ using the example of “the 
magic of the designer’s label” which, “stuck on any object, […] can multi-
ply its value in an extraordinary way” (Sociology 102). With the Juilliard 
label attached to his persona, Lopez’s character Ayers takes on the extraor-
dinary cultural capital that comes with the famous name and that is even in-
creased by his destitute living conditions because of the improbability of 
the two labels – ‘homeless’ and ‘Juilliard’ – coinciding. “This is indeed a 
magical, alchemical act,” as Bourdieu puts it, “since the social nature and 
value of the object are changed without any change in its physical or its 
chemical […] nature” (102). After Lopez receives the phone call from 
Juilliard, Ayers is still the same person, nothing about him has changed, ex-
cept for his now being a product of the Juilliard school. Not the crazy, 
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homeless black man is of value to Lopez’s writing, and even the obviously 
talented homeless black musician has barely any scarcity value; it is the la-
bel of Juilliard – an institution that stands for elite education in high-brow, 
classical European music – that grants Ayers a position of uniqueness. In 
Bourdieu’s words, “what makes the value of the work is not the rarity […] 
of the product but the rarity of the producer […], that is, the collective be-
lief in the value of the producer and his product” (102). 
The Soloist sidesteps the issue of the conditionality of Ayers’s class af-
filiation and racialized identity by way of the mad-genius trope that shields 
the character from his surroundings and also keeps the audience from en-
gaging in a discourse about the race- and class-related aspects of African 
American homelessness. It must be mentioned here that the film adaptation 
uses a more ambivalent strategy than the book. While it increases the indi-
vidualization that disconnects Ayers from his environment and foregrounds 
Lopez’s character, the movie also includes scenes that seem to criticize the 
effects of this individualization in a form of meta-critique of the media. 
On the one hand, the film presents Ayers as a de-racialized, assumedly 
non-political character. What the book rather soberly mentions as a histori-
cal landmark coinciding with Ayers’s biography turns into a character-
defining scene on the screen: In a sequence that summarizes Nathaniel’s 
socialization, he is shown in the basement of his Cleveland home, feverish-
ly practicing the cello while Civil Rights protests take place on the street 
right outside his small window. Only the flickering lights of a burning car 
catch his attention. After briefly glancing through the window with an ex-
pressionless face, he returns to his cello practice. His schizophrenic mind 
provides an opportunity for the story to detach Ayers from socializing as 
well as politicizing influences. 
On the other hand, the film includes a scene in voice-over narration in 
which Lopez is composing his first column about Ayers while we also see a 
woman reading the published column. The scene begins with a full-screen 
image of a television broadcasting news footage from New Orleans in the 
days after Hurricane Katrina, which hit the gulf coast just before Lopez 
published his first piece about Ayers. The newspaper reader is sitting in 
front of her television, but instead of watching the news where predomi-
nantly black people persevere on rooftops and in overcrowded buildings, 
holding up signs that ask for help, she is immersed in the column and so 
touched by Ayers’s fate that she donates her old cello to him. The 
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personalized story about one singled-out individual elicits generosity while 
thousands of hurricane survivors, cooped up in stadiums and ignored by the 
federal and state governments, are not even granted a look. A discussion in 
the LA Times newsroom also addresses the lack of response to an investiga-
tive article revealing large-scale corruption, in contrast to Lopez’s piece 
about his own accident which generated tens of emails from concerned 
readers. 
By limiting to an ultimately personal level even those passages of the 
book that deal with social institutions, political agendas, and the responsi-
bility of the media with regard to the way the public deals with issues of 
poverty and racism, Lopez’s The Soloist divests itself of the opportunity to 
place such issues in their larger socio-political context. “Is he happy?” the 
narrator Lopez asks himself in reference to Ayers. “Clearly music makes 
him happy, and how many musicians in the world have as much time to 
play as he does, entirely free of expectation? For him, it isn’t work” (163). 
Interpreting lack as freedom here, Lopez paints Ayers’s life as endless free 
time where the absence of conventional expectations, rather than being the 
result of marginalization, provides constant opportunity to indulge in one’s 
favorite pastime.  
The passage suggests that Ayers does not conceive of music as “work” 
simply because he enjoys it so much, and not, as would be much more to 
the point in many respects, because he does not get paid for playing. The 
line between being free of constraints and being denied access to opportuni-
ty gets even blurrier as the passage continues: “Sure, he [Ayers] gets down 
on himself occasionally, frustrated by his limitations. But he doesn’t have 
to worry about training for an audition, like he did when he was younger, 
and he doesn’t need to make a living at it. For Nathaniel, music is freedom” 
(163). Again, and more pronouncedly at this point, Lopez interprets as a 
privilege what is in fact an expression of Ayers’s exclusion from the oppor-
tunities of those who have access to the labor market (limited as these op-
portunities may be for a growing number of artists and many other workers 
in the United States). Ayers is unable to make a living and he could not 
prepare for an audition if he wanted to because he has no access to that pro-
fessional part of a musician’s life anymore. And yet The Soloist suggests 
that his being underprivileged is the source of Ayers’s happiness.  
This strategy works all the better because Lopez stages himself as a 
hard-working everyman and his work life as a burden. His complaints about 
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the nuisances of a regular life in mainstream society sometimes sneak in 
through the back door when he pretends to talk about Ayers: “Nathaniel is 
100 percent off the books. No Social Security card, no driver’s license, no 
address, no living will, no job, no lawn to mow, no phone calls to return, no 
retirement to plan for and no rules except his own” (164). What begins as a 
mere list of items separating Ayers from regular citizens soon turns into a 
cliché of middle-class tedium and then culminates in what sounds like the 
tagline of a Wild West drama featuring a lone hero of last-man-standing 
caliber. But domestic chores, social etiquette, or retirement plans are not in-
evitable consequences of secure housing and mental health; plenty of peo-
ple enjoy the roofs over their heads without ever mowing a lawn or re-
sponding to certain phone calls. What Lopez conceives of as Ayers’s “free-
dom” is the kind of liberation the illusio of the artistic field ascribes to the 
‘true’ and ‘pure’ artist. “The position of ‘pure’ writer or artist,” writes 
Bourdieu, is assumed to be “an institution of freedom, constructed against 
the ‘bourgeoisie’ […] and against institutions – in particular against the 
state bureaucracies, academies, salons, etc.” (Cultural Production 63). 
Ayers has no bourgeois reputation to protect, no federal or state institutions 
to deal with, and no academic aspirations to train for. Without his musical 
talent, he would merely be a social failure. As a Juilliard-certified and med-
ically diagnosed mad genius, however, he meets the requirements for ‘pure 
artist.’ 
The particular focus not just on individual experience as detached from 
the systemic, historic, and habitual forces of which it is the product, but on 
an individual’s unusual mental capacities and shortcomings has a double ef-
fect. For one thing, it allows for the fading out of the physical experience of 
homelessness by ascribing its bodily aspects to pre-existing mental pathol-
ogies (and moral disciplining, or lack thereof), thus further marginalizing 
the socially exposed and culturally divested black body, along with the po-
litical-cultural history incorporated in these bodies. For another, these nar-
ratives neatly fall in line with the specifically U.S. American welfare ideol-
ogy, which aims at charity rather than welfare, “not solidarity but compas-
sion” in Loïc Wacquant’s words (42). Displaying and eliciting moral sym-
pathy for an exceptional individual gives a forum to the cathartic proclama-
tions and outbursts of compassion so ingrained in the liberal American 
habitus, while the texts edit out the relational entanglements of African 
American poverty. 
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In 1969, Nina Simone released the single “To be Young, Gifted and 
Black” (lyrics by Weldon Irvine), later to be included on her live album 
Black Gold (1970). The song honors playwright Lorraine Hansberry, author 
of the famous play of the same title, and became an important protest hymn 
in the Civil Rights movement. It celebrates the abilities of the new genera-
tion of black youths all over the world, demands they be acknowledged, 
and encourages Blacks to claim recognition and equal opportunities. “There 
are billion boys and girls / That are young, gifted and black, / And that’s a 
fact!” one stanza ends. The giftedness this song wants to convince its lis-
teners of, however, is not the kind attributed to black homeless men in the 
early years of the 21st century. Simone’s song – arguably the most widely 
distributed cultural reference that links being black to being talented – pro-
motes a change in how the public conceives of African Americans, and 
even more so in the collective self-image of people of color in the U.S. It 
targets the demeaning identity politics of the Jim Crow era and claims 
agency for a disempowered social group.11 The homeless and gifted black 
characters of the early 2000s, by contrast, are divested of much of their in-
dividual agency as well as their African American identity precisely 
through a foregrounding of their special talents. The frame of the mad ge-
nius elicits sympathy for the individual while at the same time facilitating a 
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Suburban Marginality and Racialized Penality in the  
Age of Neoliberalism 
LUVENA KOPP 
 
This is the message that has spread 
through streets and tenements and prisons, 
through the narcotics wards, and past the 
filth and sadism of mental hospitals to a 
people from whom everything has been 
taken away, including, most crucially, their 
sense of their own worth. People cannot 
live without this sense; they will do any-
thing whatever to regain it. This is why the 
most dangerous creation of any society is 
that man who has nothing to lose. You do 
not need ten such men—one will do. 
JAMES BALDWIN, “DOWN AT THE CROSS” 
 
 
On August 9, 2014, 18-year-old Michael Brown and his friend, Dorian 
Johnson, were walking on the roadway on Canfield Drive in the southeast-
ern part of Ferguson, Missouri.1 As they walked, the young men 
                                                   
1  This is a revised version of a German article titled “Der Fall Michael Brown: 
(Symbolische) Polizeigewalt und kollektive Fantasie.” Von Selma bis Ferguson: 
Rasse und Rassismus in den USA, edited by Michael Butter, Astrid Franke, and 
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encountered Darren Wilson, a white police officer in an SUV, who de-
manded that they use the sidewalk. Approximately two minutes after this 
encounter, Michael Brown was dead, killed by the police officer with at 
least six shots. 
After the killing, Brown’s corpse was not immediately removed from 
the scene but left “bleeding […] in the hot summer sun for four hours, 
much of that time uncovered, as the residents of [his neighborhood of] 
Canfield looked upon his splayed-out corpse in horror” (Devereaux). The 
blatant brutality of Brown’s spectacular murder and the attempts of 
Ferguson officials to deflect responsibility for the killing that “devastated a 
family with high hopes for their college-bound son” (Devereaux) sent a 
shockwave through the town, which erupted into weeks of intense protests. 
When a jury decided not to indict Wilson for the killing, protests intensified 
further and the black rage thus kindled catalyzed a transnational activist 
movement which, most prominently under the slogan Black Lives Matter, 
continues to assert human rights for black people in the face of anti-black 
state violence (cf. Harris).2 
In the aftermath of the shooting – and owing to the public protests and 
their international media coverage – the United States Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) issued a report on the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) and 
the city’s municipal court. The report exposed a systemic pattern of abusive 
and largely unconstitutional law enforcement practices that were “shaped 
by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs” (U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Ferguson Report 2). Ferguson’s focus on revenue genera-
tion was further structured by racial bias. As the DOJ explained, the city’s 
officials perceived “some residents, especially those who live[d] in 
Ferguson’s predominantly African-American neighborhoods, less as con-
stituents to be protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue” 
(4). Weaving together material and symbolic modes of division, Ferguson’s 
                                                   
Horst Tonn, Transcript, 2016, pp. 261-86. I would like to thank Derek C. Maus 
for reading and commenting on the manuscript.  
2  My use of the term black rage draws on Cornel West’s description of Malcolm 
X as a “prophet of black rage.” According to West, this rage is shaped, among 
other things, by a “great love for black people,” a “profound commitment to af-
firm black humanity at any cost,” and a “tremendous courage to accent the hy-
pocrisy of American society” (136).  
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approach to law enforcement emblematizes “the law-and-order upsurge that 
has swept most postindustrial countries around the close of the century” 
and which “constitutes a reaction to, a diversion from, and a denegation of, 
the generalization of the social and mental insecurity produced by the dif-
fusion of desocialized wage labor against the backdrop of increased in-
equality,” as Loïc Wacquant, a rigorous contemporary proponent of rela-
tional sociology, argues in Punishing the Poor (xv, original emphasis). 
Ferguson’s penal system thus instantiates the interrelation of the materialist 
and symbolic dimensions of the social, which are traditionally kept apart in 
critical thought.3 For, as Wacquant further argues,  
 
penal institutions and policies can and do shoulder both tasks at once: they simulta-
neously act to enforce hierarchy and control contentious categories, at one level, and 
to communicate norms and shape collective representations and subjectivities, at an-
other. The prison symbolizes material divisions and materializes relations of sym-
bolic power […]. (Punishing the Poor xvi) 
 
Exploring the symbolization of material divisions and materialization of 
symbolic power that characterize law enforcement in Ferguson, this article 
places the killing of Brown within the larger nexus of what Wacquant de-
fines as the neoliberal “government of social insecurity” (11). Contrary to 
common critique of the idea of a post-racial America, this government of 
social insecurity is indeed post-racial to the effect that “the absence of rac-
ism in the law mean[s] that African Americans [can]not claim racial harm,” 
as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor notes in From #BlackLivesMatter to Black 
Liberation (52-53). Post-race then, indicates not post-racism but the state’s 
consistent withdrawal from the legacy of the Civil Rights revolution. Inter-
twining structures of race making (cf. Wacquant, “Deadly Symbiosis” 
passim) and structures of class making, penal practices in Ferguson, as 
                                                   
3  Emphasizing this link between the materialist and symbolic spheres of the social 
is truly in line with relational sociology which “demands […] a rupture with na-
ive conceptions derived from philosophical anthropology that dominate our per-
ceptions in everyday life, most importantly the binary opposition of society and 
individual, structure and agent, or, more generally, the long-established dichot-
omy of objectivist and subjectivist modes of knowledge,” as Christa Buschen-
dorf explains in a review of Punishing the Poor (305).  
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elsewhere in the U.S., are indicative of the state’s larger task of protecting 
the established order or, put differently, of reinforcing its resilience in the 
face of social disturbances caused by heightened economic deregulation, 
fiscal austerity, reduced social spending, expansive social precarity, popula-
tion shifts, and growing social discontent (cf. Franke and Hirschfelder). 
Thus, I contend that the case of Ferguson “ties together [issues of] inequali-
ty and identity, fuses [issues of] domination and signification, and welds 




THEORETICAL APPROACH: NEOLIBERAL PENALITY 
AND THE SYMBOLIC POWER OF ‘RACE’ 
 
Wacquant’s work on urban marginality, ethnoracial domination, and the 
penal system offers powerful analytic tools and methodologies that allow 
researchers of social inequality to grasp more clearly the progressive inter-
weaving of social policy and penal policy within the larger context of a 
neoliberal state that ‘punishes its poor’ (cf. Buschendorf et al. 303, 306). 
Wacquant argues that the post-Civil Rights era was marked by a shift in 
U.S. state policies that “tipped the balance of the US bureaucratic field 
from its protective to its punitive pole” (Punishing the Poor 43, original 
emphasis). A particularly drastic feature of this shift is the rise of the penal 
state, which has come to replace the country’s relatively tenuous welfare 
state. This penal state, Wacquant insists, “responds, not to rising criminal 
insecurity, but to the wave of social insecurity that has flooded the lower 
tier of the class structure owing to the fragmentation of wage labor and the 
destabilization of ethnoracial or ethnonational hierarchies” (287, original 
emphasis). Consequently, the targets of America’s penal system are, firstly, 
poor and, secondly, black (cf. Wacquant, “Class” 78-79).  
In his seminal article “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison 
Meet and Mesh,” Wacquant traces the longue durée of racialized domina-
tion in the U.S. from slavery to the present. He identifies four “peculiar in-
stitutions” – slavery, the Jim Crow system, the urban ghetto, and the hyper-
ghetto – that have successively performed “the task of defining, confining, 
and controlling African Americans in the United States” (98-99, original 
emphasis). Postindustrial restructurings starting in the late 1960s – includ-
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ing the shift from manual to service-based labor and the relocation of pro-
duction plants from the city centers of the Northeast and Midwest to south-
ern anti-union states and low-wage foreign countries – led to the disintegra-
tion of the urban ghetto, rendering its (semi-)skilled black residents effec-
tively redundant within America’s national economy. Unable to sell their 
labor, and thus devoid of economic – and ultimately human – worth, these 
deproletarianized African Americans from the inner cities have been caged 
in the symbiotic interlocking of the remains of the ghetto, defined as hyper-
ghetto, and the prison system. In other words, as the ghetto loses its ability 
to enforce the color line through “economic extraction and social ostraciza-
tion of a population deemed congenitally inferior, defiled and defiling” 
(“Class” 81), a function uniting all before-mentioned institutions, “it is up 
to the fourth ‘peculiar institution’ born of the adjoining of the hyperghetto 
with the carceral system to remould the social meaning and significance of 
‘race’ in accordance with the dictates of the deregulated economy and the 
post-Keynesian state” (“Deadly Symbiosis” 117).4  
                                                   
4  The nexus of the various structures of ethnoracial marginality is the result, first, 
of the epistemic propensity to highlight structural coherences and, second, of the 
tendential systematicity of social practices and struggles. I must insist on this 
lest it is believed that Wacquant is attempting to propagate some kind of con-
spiracy theory. Rather than stemming from an intentionalist or even determinist 
unity, then, the interconnectedness of the structures outlined above must be con-
ceived as the product of a practical unity shaped by regularity as much as by di-
gression and driven less by monolithic behavior than by (collective and individ-
ual) interest, social competition, and researchers’ analytical practice. “It should 
be clear,” Wacquant explains, “that the high degree of internal coherence and 
external congruence displayed by the radiography of the nascent government of 
social insecurity after the collapse of the Fordist-Keynesian order drawn here is 
partly a function of the analytic lens deployed. It should not mislead the reader 
to think that the penalization of poverty is a deliberate ‘plan’ pursued by malev-
olent and omnipotent rulers—as in the conspiratorial vision framing the activist 
myth of the ‘prison-industrial complex.’ Nor does it imply that some systemic 
need (of capitalism, racism, or panopticism) mysteriously mandates the runaway 
activation and glorification of the penal sector of the bureaucratic field. The lat-
ter are not preordained necessities but the results of struggles involving myriad 
agents and institutions seeking to reshape this or that wing and prerogative of 
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Wacquant defies essentialist notions of ‘race’ by embedding this con-
cept within a framework of social practices, more precisely relations of 
power. ‘Race,’ then, is produced in various acts of race making; it “consists 
of a set of politically negotiated meanings, a symbolic structure of power 
that must be activated to be efficacious” (“The Puzzle” 12, original empha-
sis). To characterize ‘race’ as a structure of symbolic power is to highlight 
its capacity to legitimize, or rather naturalize, the established social order. 
In this sense, ‘race’ 
 
becomes an operative principle of social vision and division [which] resides in the 
full gamut of forms assumed by social action: in categories, taxonomies, and theo-
ries, but also in the objective distributions of positions and powers that make up in-
stitutions and, last but not least, in human bodies shaped and inhabited by the differ-
entiations it stipulates. (Wacquant, “For an Analytic” 227-28) 
 
Today, the penal system constitutes America’s primary institution of sym-
bolic production. It is, as Wacquant puts it, the country’s “main machine 
for ‘race making’” (“Deadly Symbiosis” 117). A particularly far-reaching 
effect of this rise of the penal state has been the renewed popularization of 
the phantasmatic association of blackness and deviance (cf. 117), which al-
lows state officials to deprive African Americans of basic constitutional 
rights, above all, their right to vote.  
Wacquant’s sociology of ethnoracial domination invites us to explore 
anti-black state violence not in isolation, but within the larger processes of 
the crafting of the neoliberal state and, relatedly, the political aim of neu-
tralizing an ever-growing dispossessed and dishonored “surplus popula-
tion” (105, original emphasis; see also “Crafting”). Correspondingly, the 
killing of Brown should not be viewed merely as additional evidence of the 
racism of individual police officers or departments; rather, it must be un-
derstood as the realization of the – political and economic – necessities of a 
postindustrial society wherein (poor) black lives have indeed ceased to mat-
ter.  
 
                                                   
the state in accordance with their material and symbolic interests” (Punishing 
the Poor xx).  
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OBJECTIVE DOMINATION: FERGUSON’S MATERIAL 
DIVISION IN SOCIAL/PHYSICAL SPACE 
 
This section outlines Ferguson’s objective conditions of racialized power. 
One cannot fully understand these conditions, which shaped Brown’s fatal 
encounter with Wilson, unless they are observed in the larger context of 
struggles over physical space and its various forms of capital: Wilson’s at-
tempt to charge Brown and Johnson with the ‘crime’ of jaywalking is es-
sentially a variation of this struggle and an example of the established 
group’s claim to Ferguson’s public space.5 For Pierre Bourdieu, spatial 
struggles are intimately linked to struggles over power and, thus, a main 
site of symbolic violence: 
 
Because social space is inscribed at once in spatial structures and in the mental 
structures that are partly produced by the incorporation of these structures, space is 
one of the sites where power is asserted and exercised, and, no doubt in its subtlest 
form, as symbolic violence that goes unperceived as violence. (Bourdieu et al. 126) 
 
                                                   
5  My use of the terms “established group” and “outsider group” is based on Norb-
ert Elias’s theory of established-outsider figurations. In the introduction to his 
seminal study The Established and the Outsiders, co-authored with his student 
John L. Scotson, Elias argues that it is not so much ethnicity than social inequal-
ity that generates the perceived human superiority of the established group vis-à-
vis the perceived human inferiority of the outsider group (cf. 1). “‘[R]ace rela-
tions,’” he contends, “are simply established-outsiders-relations of a particular 
type” (15). Similarly, we may argue that Ferguson’s established-outsider rela-
tion is shaped, but not restricted by ‘race.’ After all, the FPD did include a small 
number of Blacks; and there is no reason why a black police officer should not 
have seized this opportunity for revenue generation. Thus, even though ‘white-
ness’ is a vital component of the established representation of Ferguson’s domi-
nant group, “the salient aspect of their relationship [with the outsiders] is that 
they are bonded together in a manner which endows one of them with very 
much greater power resources than the other and enables that group to exclude 
members of the other group from access to the centre of these resources and 
from closer contact with its own members, thus relegating them to the position 
of outsiders” (16). 
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The struggle over physical space, then, corresponds to the struggle over 
“social space” and is therefore inseparable from the “political construction 
of space” which, shaped by government and economic interests, practically 
translates into “the construction of homogenous groups on a spatial basis” 
(129, original emphasis).  
Whereas Wacquant’s studies tend to focus on the urban cores as the 
main site of socio-spatial marginality, the social struggles in Ferguson indi-
cate a gradual shift of socio-spatial marginalization from the cities to the 
suburbs. According to Richard Rothstein, segregation in 21st-century 
America replicates the European model: Affluent whites settle in gentrified 
neighborhoods in the city centers while the poor, particularly Blacks and 
Latinos/as, are continually pushed to inner-ring suburbs (cf. 2-4, 31). Today 
almost forty percent of America’s poor live in suburbs such as Ferguson 
(Dreier and Swanstorm). 
Ferguson, a city with approximately 21,000 inhabitants, is one of 90 
municipalities in St. Louis County, Missouri. 25 percent of the city’s popu-
lation live below the poverty line (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Ferguson Report 
11), which is one and a half times the rate of poverty in America as a whole 
(Casselman). While Ferguson’s total population has remained more or less 
consistent, its racialized demographics have changed rapidly over the past 
four decades (cf. Ferguson Report 11). In 1970, Blacks accounted for less 
than 1 percent of the city’s population with whites comprising nearly all of 
the remaining 99 percent; by 2010, these proportions had changed to the 
point that Blacks and whites represented 67 and 29 of Ferguson’s popula-
tion, respectively (cf. Rothstein 3; U.S. Census Bureau 2). Space does not 
permit an extended discussion of the manifold reasons for this remarkable 
change in Ferguson’s racial composition, but it will suffice to highlight a 
few significant points. 
In his report “The Making of Ferguson” (2014) Rothstein conducts a 
detailed analysis of racialized division in the St. Louis metropolis, from the 
segregationist policies of President Woodrow Wilson in the early 20th cen-
tury until the present. Rothstein shifts the analytical focus from a “methodo-
logical individualism” (Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations 155), i.e., the em-
phasis on personal racism as the main cause for segregation, to an inquiry 
into the systemic structures and policies that indicate “the explicit intents of 
federal, state, and local governments to create racially segregated metropo-
lises” (1). As he further explains,  
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[m]any of these explicitly segregationist governmental actions ended in the late 20th 
century but continue to determine today’s racial segregation patterns. In St. Louis 
these governmental policies included zoning rules that classified white neighbor-
hoods as residential and black neighborhoods as commercial or industrial; segregat-
ed public housing projects that replaced integrated low-income areas; federal subsi-
dies for suburban development conditioned on African American exclusion; federal 
and local requirements for, and enforcement of, property deeds and neighborhood 
agreements that prohibited resale of white-owned property to, or occupancy by, 
African Americans; tax favoritism for private institutions that practiced segregation; 
municipal boundary lines designed to separate black neighborhoods from white ones 
and to deny necessary services to the former; real estate, insurance, and banking 
regulators who tolerated and sometimes required racial segregation; and urban re-
newal plans whose purpose was to shift black populations from central cities like St. 
Louis to inner-ring suburbs like Ferguson. (2) 
 
Rothstein applies one of the main hypotheses of relational thought, the in-
terpenetration of objective configurations and subjective modes of thought 
and perception, in defining the extent to which segregationist policies struc-
tured whites’ prejudiced efforts to distance themselves from Blacks in St. 
Louis as a whole: 
 
Whites observed the black ghetto and concluded that slum conditions were charac-
teristic of black families, not a result of housing discrimination. This conclusion 
reinforced whites’ resistance to racial integration, lest black residents bring slum 
conditions to white communities. Thus, to the extent we attribute segregation of the 
contemporary St. Louis metropolitan area to white flight, government policy bears 
some responsibility for creating conditions that supported the racial stereotypes fuel-
ing such flight. (20) 
 
Another important aspect of Rothstein’s report for the Economic Policy In-
stitute is that it moves away from what Elias has criticized as “process-
reduction” (Zustandsreduktion) by defining segregation as a set of dynamic 
processes that, over the course of historical changes, prevail in the form of 
“transhistorical invariants” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 78, original empha-
sis). “The following pages,” he writes at the outset of his study,  
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tell the story of how St. Louis became such a segregated metropolis, where racial 
boundaries continually change but communities’ racial homogeneity persists. 
Neighborhoods that appear to be integrated are almost always those in transition, ei-
ther from mostly white to mostly black (like Ferguson), or from mostly black to in-
creasingly white (like St. Louis’s gentrifying neighborhoods). Such population shifts 
in St. Louis and other metropolitan areas maintain segregation patterns established 
by public policy a century ago. (3-4) 
 
Ferguson used to be what James Loewen has called a sundown town. To 
wit, until the mid-1960s, Blacks and other racialized minorities were forced 
to leave town after sunset (cf. Rothstein 3, 32n2; U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fer-
guson Report 118). Warning signs that read “Nigger, Don’t Let The Sun Go 
Down On You In …” or “Nigger, Read This Sign and Run” frequently 
marked the boundaries of such towns (qtd. in Loewen 3, 69).6 In Ferguson, 
this practice of racialized exclusion was discontinued in 1968, among other 
things because of organized protests in the neighboring predominantly 
black town of Kinloch following the assassination of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. in April of that year (cf. Rothstein 32n2).7 In 1975 a federal court further 
mandated that Ferguson “and other white towns […] integrate their schools 
into a common district with Kinloch” (Rothstein 3). All of this concurred 
with the elimination of public housing in the city of St. Louis to generate a 
steady migration of Blacks to formerly white suburban towns. Once the 
first African Americans broke the color line in these suburbs, ‘for sale’ 
signs began to pop up on the lawns of their neighbors (cf. Rothstein 4).  
                                                   
6  Like lynching, this exclusion of Blacks after sunset must be viewed as a racializ-
ing form of violence. As such, it is established firmly in the collective memory 
of African Americans. In his famous “Message to the Grassroots,” Malcolm X 
earns much applause and laughter from the almost exclusively black audience 
when he signifies on sundown towns in his critique of the March on Washing-
ton. Arguing that the March was essentially hijacked by the Kennedy Adminis-
tration, X contends: “They controlled it so tight, they told those Negroes what 
time to hit town […]; and then told them to get out of town by sundown. And 
every one of those [Uncle] Toms was out of town by sundown” (16-17).  
7  Moreover, as Loewen demonstrates in his study of sundown towns, opposition 
to housing discrimination increased with the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968 which banned discrimination in housing (395-96). 
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The gradual ‘blackening’ of Ferguson did not counter the persistent ra-
cialized division in the city’s physical space. According to a study by 
Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences (S4), a research initiative at Brown 
University, only 26 percent of the city’s Blacks lived in majority-white 
areas in 2010 (“Ferguson City”). This lack of integration is further evinced 
by the unequal distribution of power resources, i.e., capital. While the black 
newcomers were gradually becoming the majority, the city’s resources of 
power remained firmly in the hands of the old-established whites: At the 
time of Brown’s death in 2014, Ferguson’s mayor was white, the all-white 
school board had recently suspended its first black superintendent under 
unclear circumstances, the city council included only one black member, 
and the city’s municipal judge, court clerk, prosecuting attorney, and assis-
tant court clerks were also all white. Ferguson’s white police chief presided 
over a department of fifty white and three black police officers, which gave 
the city’s white establishment full control over the local monopoly of vio-
lence.8 Defining the power imbalance between Ferguson’s established and 
outsiders in a way that highlights the link between distribution of capital 
and social distance, Marc Lamont Hill notes: “[T]he social distance be-
tween those in positions of authority—particularly the police, but others as 
well—and those who actually lived in Ferguson was [...] vast” (21). 
Social distance in Ferguson, as elsewhere, is inseparable from the un-
equal distribution of economic capital, which helps to structure the racial 
division in Ferguson’s physical space. The city is more or less split between 
a “middle-class suburbia” (Casselman) in the Northwest and a “suburban 
ghetto” (Dreier and Swanstorm) in the Southeast. Ferguson’s southeastern 
                                                   
8  Cf. “Institutional Racism”; Levintova et al.; Smith; U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fergu-
son Report 13. When the DOJ conducted its investigation in September 2014, 
the Ferguson Police Department held four black police officers (12). By outlin-
ing this racialized imbalance in Ferguson’s distribution of (power) capital, I do 
not mean to suggest that the killing of Brown would not have occurred had there 
been a higher number of African Americans in positions of power. As the 2015 
death of Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland, illustrates, cities run by a black 
political elite are not exempt from problems of structural violence against 
Blacks (cf. Taylor 75-80). For a discussion of the way in which diversification – 
particularly of police departments – and black exceptionalism are used to further 
the neoliberal project, see Taylor 75-152. 
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tip, comprising the apartment complexes of “Canfield Green, where Brown 
lived and died,” is basically truncated from the rest of the city by West 
Florissant Avenue, “a bleak stretch of payday loan stores, nail salons and 
half-vacant strip malls”; the median household income of this census tract 
is below $27,000, “making it the eighth-poorest census tract in the state” 
(Casselman). It is roughly a mile from Brown’s neighborhood to the head-
quarters of Emerson Electric, a multinational corporation with a history of 
union suppression (cf. Berger). The company that once “provided the types 
of housing and employment opportunities that drew Black people to the 
city” has meanwhile moved all of its production plants to foreign countries; 
and, “as much of the town lives in suburbanized poverty, Emerson’s CEO, 
David Farr, guides the company while pulling an annual compensation 
worth as much as twenty-five million dollars” (Hill 8).  
Because of the withdrawal of industrial facilities and the hesitance of 
officials to raise taxes on the wealthy and on corporations (cf. Taylor 126), 
Ferguson is one of many municipalities across the U.S. that generates reve-
nue out of fines and fees issued on the basis of aggressive police and court 
practices.9 In a city wherein Blacks account for 80 percent of the poor (cf. 
Casselman), police officers used ordinary activities, so-called “[n]uisance 
crimes” or “quality of life” violations (Taylor 123), as pretexts to impose 
citations predominantly on black citizens, frequently issuing multiple tick-
ets during a single stop.10 Once caught in the dragnet of law enforcement 
(cf. Wacquant, Punishing the Poor 2), citizens were sent on a “legal odys-
sey” by Ferguson’s municipal court “from which it [could] be difficult, if 
not impossible, for ordinary people to emerge with their finances intact” 
(Taylor 127-28). Individuals who were too poor to pay their fees even faced 
jail time, a punishment of poverty that is utterly unconstitutional (cf. 127). 
                                                   
9  The digital version of the Ferguson Report, which can be accessed on the DOJ’s 
website, makes explicit reference to the city’s police department as “a collection 
agency for its municipal court” (55). According to Taylor, this aggressive police 
and court practice constituted “the town’s second leading source of revenue” 
(155). 
10  In an interview with The New Yorker, Darren Wilson cited the example of a fel-
low police officer who had issued sixteen tickets during one stop. When asked 
how many tickets he issued, Wilson replied “that he ‘usually’ never wrote more 
than three” (Halpern). 
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According to the DOJ, African Americans accounted not only for 95 
percent of jaywalking charges in Ferguson but also “for 85% of vehicle 
stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests made by officers”; furthermore, 
black drivers were “more than twice as likely as white drivers to be 
searched during vehicle stops” despite being “found in possession of con-
traband 26% less often than white drivers” (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Ferguson 
Report 7). The police’s monopoly of physical violence certainly undergird-
ed this enormous power imbalance between Blacks and whites in Ferguson. 
As the DOJ found,  
 
FPD records suggest a tendency to use unnecessary force against vulnerable groups 
such as people with mental health conditions or cognitive disabilities, and juvenile 
students. Furthermore, […] Ferguson’s pattern of using excessive force dispropor-
tionately harms African-American members of the community. The overwhelming 
majority of force—almost 90%—is used against African Americans. (Ferguson Re-
port 47-48) 
 
Thus, the DOJ also exposed a process of criminalizing mental illness, 
which Taylor sees as a byproduct of fiscal austerity designed to exempt 
“the state [from] any obligation to address poverty” (123). Municipal gov-
ernments impose massive cuts in social services, such as mental healthcare, 
and then empower police officers “to ‘clean up’ the consequences.” 
“[J]ails,” Taylor continues, “have become the predominant destination for 
those who commit crimes of mental health. This is because of the dearth of 
mental healthcare, including treatment facilities that would be more appro-
priate destinations” (123). 
The racialized power in Ferguson, then, exemplified by the death of 
Michael Brown, is shaped not merely by anti-black animus, but by the vio-
lence of a state that intertwines its traditional exclusion of Blacks with “the 
neoliberal era of free-market reform, the rollback of social spending, and 
cuts in taxes for corporations and the wealthy” (Taylor 6). In this way, 
Ferguson ties together its past, present, and future, wedding its historical 
anti-blackness with the present demands of economic discipline in anticipa-
tion of the larger scheme to promote “the advance of neoliberalism” 
(Wacquant, Punishing the Poor xviii).  
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SUBJECTIVE SIGNIFICATION: SYMBOLIC DOMINATION 
ON THE BASIS OF ‘RACE’ 
 
According to Bourdieu, “[t]he great social oppositions objectified in physi-
cal space […] tend to be reproduced in thought and in language as opposi-
tions constitutive of a principle of vision and division, as categories of per-
ception and evaluation or of mental structures” (Bourdieu et al. 125). This 
section examines the reproduction of Ferguson’s objective divisions in the 
“categories of perception and evaluation” of agents. To highlight the inter-
relation between these two dimensions of the social – on the one hand, the 
objective social relations and divisions and, on the other hand, the subjec-
tive modes of perception and thought that infuse the former with meaning – 
allows us to grasp more clearly the invisible mechanisms through which ra-
cialized power in Ferguson becomes naturalized. 
In its report, the DOJ found that Ferguson officials drew on black ste-
reotypes to explain the racial disparity in their penal practices:  
 
Several Ferguson officials told us during our investigation that it is a lack of “per-
sonal responsibility” among African-American members of the Ferguson communi-
ty that causes African Americans to experience disproportionate harm under 
Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement. (115)  
 
Based on Bourdieu’s assumption of the reproduction of social oppositions 
in perception and thought, I argue that this subjective position of Ferguson 
officials is firmly rooted in their objective position in the city’s social 
space. Insisting on African Americans’ presumed irresponsibility, they ar-
ticulate a feeling of human superiority (expressed as black inferiority) that 
indicates the embodied presence of the city’s racialized power structure. 
The officials’ view corresponds to an officialized and thus established view 
which, denying the police’s participation in an oppressive system, reinforc-
es a discourse of ‘blaming the victim.’  
According to Elias, this form of self-exculpation is usually achieved 
through “collective fantasies” on the part of the established group which 
“reflects and, at the same time, justifies the aversion—the prejudice—its 
members feel towards those of the outsider group” (19). According to such 
establishment fantasies, the outsiders are marked by an objective sign – for 
example, a different skin color – that signifies their supposed natural 
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inferiority. This mark at once reifies the act of stigmatization and absolves 
the established group from it. Elias notes: “[I]t is not we, such a fantasy im-
plies, who have put a stigma on these people, but the powers that made the 
world—they have put the sign on these people to mark them off as inferior 
or bad people” (20, original emphasis). Thus, Elias’s concept of collective 
fantasies highlights a mechanism in the legitimization of power that charac-
terizes the practice of race making.  
Race making is not readily evident in the language of Ferguson’s estab-
lished group, which emphasizes the alleged inferior culture, rather than the 
‘race,’ of the city’s black outsiders. In an interview with Jake Halpern, 
Darren Wilson echoes the established notion of black anomy when, charac-
terizing the children of a black woman, he explains that “[t]hey’re so 
wrapped up in a different culture.” Halpern, suspecting “racial code lan-
guage,” asks Wilson to specify, whereupon the latter responds: “[I mean] 
pre-gang culture, where you are just running in the streets—not worried 
about working in the morning, just worried about your immediate gratifica-
tion,” concluding that this “is the same younger culture that is everywhere 
in the inner cities.” Wilson employs a culturalist language to reinforce the 
racist establishment fantasy of ‘super predators’ (cf. Dilulio), thus illustrat-
ing that, in the age of ostensible colorblindness, the notion of culture is 
used as a “classifying category” that is “never far from race” (Butter, 
Franke, and Tonn 9, my translation). By pointing to an allegedly devious 
‘black culture,’ Ferguson’s officials engage in a phantasmatic production of 
‘race’ to the effect that this act of production itself is denied. 
A variation of this established fantasy of black anomy – which evokes 
the pro-slavery discourse according to which slaves were “unfit for free-
dom” – can be found in the FPD’s public representation of Brown. Almost 
a week after the shooting, the Ferguson police finally gave in to public pro-
tests and decided to disclose Wilson’s identity. Yet, the officer’s identity 
was revealed only after the FPD publicized a surveillance video that 
showed Brown stealing a pack of cigarillos in a local neighborhood store. 
On August 15, 2014, a press conference was held during which Police 
Chief Thomas Jackson admitted that Wilson’s decision to stop Brown and 
Johnson was not connected to the theft (cf. Lee and Richinick). The fact 
that the “strong-arm robbery,” as the police defined it, finds no mention in 
Wilson’s call for backup (cf. “Case: Grand Jury” 256) tends to support this 
claim. However, during the grand jury hearing that took place a month 
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before the press conference, Wilson claimed to have recognized Brown as 
the suspect in the larceny (209). Similarly, the March 2015 DOJ report of 
the shooting indicates that “Wilson was aware of the theft and had a de-
scription of the suspects as he encountered Brown” (“Justice Department” 
6).  
Regardless of whether Wilson’s approach was linked to the theft, “the 
real work of the tape had already been done” (Taylor 22). Paralleled by the 
mainstream media’s depiction of Ferguson protesters as vandals and loot-
ers, this symbolic work of public demonization drew on the collective es-
tablishment fantasy of black anomy and, more specifically, on the notion of 
the “underclass.” Characterized by Wacquant as a “scholarly myth” (“De-
civilizing” passim), the concept of the underclass allows state officials not 
only to talk race in colorblind or coded language (e.g., ‘gang banger,’ 
‘thug,’ or ‘welfare queen’) but also to continuously amplify the penal state 
in the name of ‘law and order,’ that is, on the basis of a rationale that con-
structs the effects of systemic dispossession – such as stealing – as the 
product of an alleged “culture of poverty” (161).11 
                                                   
11  In his documentary Stranger Fruit, released in March 2017, director Jason Pol-
lock reveals a previously unreleased surveillance video from the neighborhood 
store that supposedly proves that, as Pollock himself puts it, “Mike did not rob 
the store” (“Stranger Fruit Trailer”). The silent video shows Brown entering the 
store at approximately 1:13 am, eleven hours before the alleged robbery and his 
subsequent death (1:09-1:11). The teenager takes two bottles of soda from a 
beverage cooler, walks to the counter, and asks for two big boxes of cigarillos. 
A different camera angle shows three clerks behind the counter. One clerk bags 
the items while Brown pulls a small package out of his pocket and throws it on 
the counter. The second clerk takes the package and, after sniffing it, passes it 
on to his colleagues who also sniff it. There is a brief verbal exchange between 
the clerks and Brown before the latter picks up the bag with the items and begins 
to leave. Seconds later, Brown turns around, goes back, and leaves the bag on 
the counter. He then exits the store. Pollock claims that Brown bartered the ciga-
rillos in exchange for marijuana. The video released by the FPD captures not a 
robbery, he further contends, but Brown retrieving the items he had put on lay-
away the evening before. Jay Kanzler, the attorney for the neighborhood store, 
disputes this narrative, arguing that Pollock’s film, which led to further protests 
and disturbances in front of the store, was heavily “misedited” (FOX 10 Phoenix). 
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In a passage of “Deadly Symbiosis” that highlights the demonizing of 
young black males, Wacquant writes: 
 
In the era of racially targetted [sic] ‘law-and-order’ policies and their socio-logical 
pendant, racially skewed mass imprisonment, the reigning public image of the crimi-
nal is not just that of ‘a monstruum—a being whose features are inherently different 
from ours’ […] but that of a black monster, as young African-American men from 
the ‘inner city’ have come to personify the explosive mix of moral degeneracy and 
mayhem. (118, original emphasis) 
 
Aiming to construct his killing of Brown as an act of self-defense, Wilson 
draws on precisely this public image in his grand jury testimony. The of-
ficer describes his physical altercation with Brown as follows: “[W]hen I 
grabbed him, the only way I can describe it is I felt like a five-year-old 
holding onto Hulk Hogan” (“Case: State” 212). Wilson’s self-infanti-
lization invokes the symbolic complementarity of white innocence (or vul-
nerability) and black blameworthiness (or danger). Writing about the trial 
that followed the police beating of Rodney King, Judith Butler explains: 
 
                                                   
Kanzler draws on an extended version of the video – showing the clerks reshelv-
ing the items after Brown has left – to forward his claim that the store workers 
declined Brown’s offer to barter and that the teenager left the bag in the store 
only after they had threatened to call the police (cf. McLaughlin, Shah, and Va-
lencia). Since St. Louis County investigation papers indicate that prosecutors 
and the Ferguson police viewed the video, Pollock’s film “raise[s] questions 
about how forthcoming police and prosecutors [are] about evidence” (“Prosecu-
tor Says”). Despite the fact that the details of Brown’s earlier visit to the store 
still remain unclear, the events surrounding the release of the two videos em-
blematize the struggle over the power of “performative magic” or, put different-
ly, the “power to impose a certain vision of the social world, i.e. of the divisions 
of the social world” (Bourdieu, Language 106). Brought back to the fore by the 
Trump administration’s emphasis on “alternative facts” (cf. Blake), this struggle 
over the power of legitimate definition, which constitutes one of the most fun-
damental “symbolic struggles of everyday life” (Language 106), signifies “a 
contest within the visual field, a crisis in the certainty of what is visible” and be-
lievable, as Judith Butler has argued (16). 
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[T]he infantilized white […] is positioned […] as one who is helpless in relation to 
that black body, as one definitionally in need of protection by his/her mother or, 
perhaps, the police. The fear is that some physical distance will be crossed, and the 
virgin sanctity of whiteness will be endangered by that proximity. The police are 
thus structurally placed to protect whiteness against violence, where violence is the 
imminent action of that black male body. And because within this imaginary sche-
ma, the police protect whiteness, their own violence cannot be read as violence […]. 
(18) 
 
Indeed, Wilson constructs his own violence as the imminent violence of 
Brown; for it is while recounting his first shots that his discursive demoniz-
ing of the teenager becomes explicit: “[H]e looked up at me and had the 
most intense aggressive face. The only way I can describe it, it looks like a 
demon, that’s how angry he looked” (“Case: Grand Jury” 224-25). Brown, 
hit by one of Wilson’s shots, flees; Wilson takes up chase until the teenager 
stops at a lamppost. The officer describes the ensuing events as follows: 
 
He turns, and when he looked at me, he made like a grunting, like aggravated sound 
and he starts, he turns and he’s coming back towards me. His first step is coming 
towards me, he kind of does like a stutter step to start running. When he does that, 
his left hand goes in a fist and goes to his side, his right one goes under his shirt in 
his waistband and he starts running at me. (227) 
 
Wilson shoots again. He can tell that Brown is hit at least once because the 
teenager flinches; according to the police officer, Brown does not stop, but 
continues to run mechanically toward him: “At this point it looked like he 
was almost bulking up to run through the shots, like it was making him mad 
that I’m shooting at him” (228). Wilson then invokes his social distance by 
articulating his effort to maintain physical distance: “I know if he reaches 
me, he’ll kill me. And he had started to lean forward as he got that close, 
like he was going to just tackle me, just go right through me” (229). The of-
ficer bespeaks in this description a threat that is intimately linked to the 
danger of social mixture, a repugnance toward close contact with members 
of the outsider group defined by Elias as fear of “anomic infection” (9). It is 
in this way that the officer’s narration subtly indicates his dread of losing 
social status and, ultimately, racialized honor. 
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Brown dies from a bullet that enters the top of his head. Describing this 
last moment of the teenager’s life, Wilson states: “And when [the bullet] 
went into him, the demeanor on his face went blank, the aggression was 
gone, it was gone, I mean, I knew he stopped, the threat was stopped” 
(“Case: Grand Jury” 229). Wilson’s animalization of Brown hyperbolizes 
the establishment fantasy of black anomy to the point of revealing its (su-
per-)naturalist essentialism: In the officer’s narration, Brown is turned into 
a devious black brute, filled with uncontrollable rage and devoid of the fear 
and pain that would make him human. The “performative magic” 
(Bourdieu, Language 106) of Wilson’s phantasmatic delineation is inti-
mately tied to the officer’s social position as a representative of the state. It 
is this proximity to the state as the center of power or, as Bourdieu puts it, 
“as the holder of a sort of metacapital” (Practical Reason 41) that vests 
Wilson with the authority “to impose a more or less authorized way of see-
ing the social world,” one that “helps to construct the reality of that world” 
(Language 106). In popular culture, the brute is usually construed as a 
menace that must be neutralized because it defies the established (white) 
authority, because it fails to ‘stay in its place.’ Similarly, when asked in a 
televised interview what should have happened to prevent Brown’s death, 
Wilson matter-of-factly replies: “Him complying” (“Exclusive” 23:05). 
Habitus, Bourdieu explains, “tend[s] to transform instituted difference 
into natural distinction, produc[ing] quite real effects, durably inscribed in 
the body and in belief” (Logic 58). Wilson’s ability to anticipate his chanc-
es in court on the basis of a “feel for the game” (66) constitutes one of the 
real effects of this bodily inscription. Ryan Devereaux invokes the bodily 
dimension of knowledge when he observes:  
 
The fact that Wilson testified was telling. He was not legally required to do so, and 
in most grand jury cases defendants do not testify because their attorney cannot be 
present. This move, some suggested, was an indication that Wilson and his legal 
counsel felt the proceedings would work to his favor. (my emphasis)  
 
Thus, the grand jury’s decision not to indict Wilson for the killing of Brown 
was not simply the ‘logical’ result of the officer’s adjustment to an 
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‘objective’ law, as some legal analysts contend12; it was the socio-logical 
outcome of the lawful “encounter between [the subjective structures of] the 
habitus and [the objective structures of] a field, between incorporated histo-
ry and an objectified history” (Bourdieu, Logic 66, original emphasis). Ra-
ther than merely freeing the officer from any wrongdoing, Wilson’s exone-
ration can be read as an official consecration of his (symbolic) power: of 
his authority, his representation, and, ultimately, of the murder itself. 13 
 
 
OBJECTIVE CRISIS AND SYMBOLIC BATTLE  
 
On July 21, 2014, exactly twenty-five years after the initial release of his 
critically acclaimed film Do the Right Thing (DTRT) and nineteen days be-
fore the shooting of Brown, director Spike Lee posted a short film on 
YouTube that interspersed two sets of footage by way of parallel editing. 
The first set of footage, taken from DTRT, depicts the dramatic death of one 
of the film’s main characters, Radio Raheem. The second set of footage, 
taken from a cell phone video, shows the killing of forty-three-year-old Eric 
Garner on July 17, 2014.14  
                                                   
12  Cf. Theodore Shaw’s “Introduction” to the Ferguson Report (U.S. Dept. of Jus-
tice xi-xii).  
13  “The form par excellence of the socially instituted and officially recognized 
symbolic power of construction is the legal authority, law being the objectifica-
tion of the dominant vision recognized as legitimate, or, to put it another way, of 
the legitimate vision of the world, the ortho-doxy, guaranteed by the State. An 
exemplary manifestation of this State power of consecration of the established 
order is the verdict, a legitimate exercise of the power to say what is and to 
make exist what it states, in a performative utterance that is universally recog-
nized (as opposed to an insult, for example) […]” (Bourdieu, Pascalian Medita-
tions 186, original emphasis). My argumentation is mainly one of structural po-
sitionality and therefore independent of the presence of ‘nonwhite’ agents. From 
a structural viewpoint, “whiteness as an episteme operates despite the existence 
of […] nonwhite jurors” (Butler 19). 
14  Lee released two films within a period of five days. The first video, posted on 
July 21, 2014, appeared on the director’s official YouTube channel 
(www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bnq4rrcIO1g). The second film, released four 
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What links Raheem’s filmic death to Garner’s real death is the fact that 
both men were killed by officers of the New York Police Department using 
an illegal chokehold. By intercutting the various pieces of footage and 
arranging them according to certain patterns of movement, speech, and ac-
tion, Lee sensitizes the viewer to the similarities of the two killings, and 
thereby also to the presence of the past of racialized (state) violence – a 
present-past that links the police terrorism of the late 20th and 21st century 
to the terrorism of lynching of the late 19th and early 20th century. The sty-
listic device of parallel editing is central to the video’s interleaving of pre-
sent and past (and, in the same vein, of fiction and reality). It explicates the 
filmic break with the established notion of chronological temporality – and 
thus also with the notion of progress – generating what Jelani Cobb, in his 
commentary of the video, has called a “cinematic sense of déjà vu.” “It’s 
entirely possible for an uninformed viewer,” Cobb further notes, “to believe 
that Lee’s scene was inspired by Garner’s death instead of preceding it by a 
quarter century.”  
There is another, less obvious, similarity between Garner and Raheem 
which Lee’s video subtly indicates, a similarity that links the two cases to 
the later one of Brown. Like Brown, the two men were killed while defying 
police authority or, put differently, while attempting to assert their humani-
ty against the oppressive forces of a state that consistently constructs the 
inhumanity (in the form of illegality) of the black (surplus) body. As we 
have seen, this consistent dehumanization (qua illegalization) characterizes 
the violence – symbolic as well as physical15 – of a state that embraces the 
                                                   
days later by Lee’s production company, 40 Acres and a Mule Filmworks, ap-
peared on Vimeo (vimeo.com/101731549). While both films, entitled “Radio 
Raheem and the Gentle Giant,” are fairly similar in terms of content and style, 
the Vimeo film is approximately 47 seconds longer. The reason for this is that, in 
depicting the death of Garner, the Vimeo film includes not only the famous cell 
phone video by Garner’s friend, Ramsey Orta, but also a lesser known video by 
another bystander, Taisha Allen. Though shorter in running time, the YouTube 
film represents Lee’s most immediate response to Garner’s death and thus con-
stitutes the focus of my inquiry. 
15  Highlighting the interrelation of symbolic and physical violence, Bourdieu 
maintains: “Domination, even when based on naked force, that of arms or mon-
ey, always has a symbolic dimension […]” (Pascalian Meditations 172; cf. also 
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hegemony of market ideology, practicing “‘[s]mall government’ in the eco-
nomic register” and “‘big government’ on the twofold frontage of workfare 
and criminal justice” (Wacquant, Punishing the Poor 308). 
The collage aesthetic of Lee’s video – the juxtaposition of DTRT and 
the Garner video, the “mixing and matching of fragments [of readymade 
found footage] to provide a new whole” (Lippard 136) – cues viewers to 
revisit the director’s 1989 film and to reassess it in terms of “the role of art 
[…] to ‘become’ reality, rather than merely recoding it” (Cran 7). It is by 
recognizing this interpenetration of fiction and reality in DTRT that we can 
appreciate the film’s prophetic vision and arrive at certain conclusions 
about its significance regarding current structures of racialized state vio-
lence.16  
A closer examination of the film’s climactic murder scene and its por-
trayal of the subsequent uprising of the predominantly black (and brown) 
residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, will serve to illustrate this 
point. Lee constructs the killing of Raheem as an act of lynching. A medi-
um close-up depicts the young man as he struggles against three police of-
ficers who restrain him after having pulled him away from a fight. In the 
course of the struggle, one of the officers puts his baton around Raheem’s 
neck and begins to pull. The following thirty seconds depict Raheem’s 
struggle for his life. Tension builds as Lee crosscuts between the choking 
and the residents of the neighborhood who are forced to witness the death 
of their friend. Raheem’s feet are filmed in a close-up, jerking above the 
ground until they finally stop moving. Depicting this police killing from an 
African American perspective – a kind of meta-perspective that mirrors the 
                                                   
Logic 126). Brown, Raheem, and Garner are further united in their respective 
defiance of the established economic power: Brown (more or less consciously) 
challenged Ferguson’s systemic for-profit policing whereas Garner was ap-
proached by two NYPD officers in plainclothes because they believed that the 
father of six was selling so-called “loosies,” i.e., untaxed loose cigarettes (cf. 
Hill 31-39). Radio Raheem died as a cause of fighting Sal, the owner of the local 
pizzeria, whom the film represents as the neighborhood’s main entrepreneur.  
16  DTRT includes various elements that establish it firmly in the social and politi-
cal reality of its time – from posters of Jesse Jackson’s 1988 presidential cam-
paign to a graffiti calling upon voters of New York City’s 1989 mayoral election 
to “dump Koch” (Do the Right Thing 1:23:01-1:24:36).  
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residents’ witnessing of the killing – Lee renders the death of Raheem as a 
“crucial moment of the process of gaining insight” (Buschendorf and 
Franke 87) into the neighborhood’s power relation.17 This moment is expe-
rienced by the residents of Bed-Stuy in the form of a symbolic “encounter 
with the collective past” (87) of racialized violence, prompting them to re-
alize that the police “did it again” (Do the Right Thing 1:33:51).18  
In a wider sense, Raheem’s killing also instantiates an encounter with 
the collective past of lynching itself: As Jonathan Markovitz points out, 
lynchings are “generally meant ‘never to be forgotten by anyone’” and 
function to “create collective memories of terror and white supremacy” 
(xxvi). Thus, in Lee’s film, the uprising against the local powers-that-be is 
catalyzed by a process of awareness wherein the unconscious, embodied 
knowledge of vulnerability to gratuitous violence – the residents’ realiza-
tion that they are not even “safe in [their] own […] neighborhood” (Do the 
Right Thing 1:33:55) – is finally raised to the level of consciousness. “The 
unconscious,” writes Bourdieu, “is history—the collective history that has 
produced our categories of thought, and the individual history through 
which they have been inculcated in us” (Pascalian Meditations 9).  
A similar process may have sparked the uprising in Ferguson. Reflect-
ing on the circumstances that contributed to the rebellion, Taylor assumes 
that “[t]he transformation of Mike Brown’s murder from a police killing 
into a lynching certainly tipped the scales” (154). Many observers have 
stressed the link between Brown’s murder and America’s history of lynch-
ing. Isabel Wilkerson, for instance, uses the negligent treatment of Brown’s 
                                                   
17  According to the storyboard of the scene, published in Lee’s production journal, 
the incident is depicted from the point of view of the black character Buggin’ 
Out who instigated the conflict that leads to the killing (cf. Lee and Jones 272).  
18  DTRT itself is dedicated to, and was inspired by the fate of, various black vic-
tims of racially motivated killings in the 1980s, including Michael Stewart, who 
was choked and killed by New York Transit Police in 1983 after he had been ar-
rested for spraying graffiti on a subway station; Eleanor Bumpurs, who was shot 
and killed in 1984 while being evicted from her apartment in the Bronx; Michael 
Griffith who was fatally hit by a car in 1986 after fleeing from a racist mob in 
the predominantly Italian-American neighborhood of Howard Beach, Queens; 
and Yusef Hawkins, killed by a racist mob in the predominantly Italian-
American neighborhood of Bensonhurst, Brooklyn, in 1989. 
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corpse by the Ferguson police as an example to argue that “Mike Brown’s 
shooting and Jim Crow lynchings have too much in common”:  
 
The demeaning objectification of the victim that was evident historically also per-
sists to current times. During formal Jim Crow, the lynched body was sometimes left 
hanging for days or weeks as a lesson to people not to step outside the caste into 
which they had been born. In a similar way, Michael Brown’s body was left in the 
street in Ferguson for four hours in the August sun after he had been killed. 
(Wilkerson) 
 
Besides serving as a symbolic manifestation of power – one that undergirds 
the (neoliberal) imperatives of police compliance and personal responsibil-
ity (cf. Wacquant Punishing the Poor 307) – the act of leaving Brown’s 
body on the street also entails what Buschendorf defines as “one of the 
most efficient means of symbolic violence”: the violence of ascribing lower 
human value to the members of the outsider group (Buschendorf and 
Franke 84). It would be erroneous to conceive of the symbolic violence of 
Ferguson’s penal system in rationalist terms; rather, this violence is best 
understood as a form of ritualistic imposition that shapes acts of seeing as 
much as it relies on them. As Wacquant puts it, 
 
the rampant gesticulation over law and order is conceived and carried out not so 
much for its own sake as for the express purpose of being exhibited and seen, scruti-
nized, ogled: the absolute priority is to put on a spectacle, in the literal sense of the 
term. For this, words and deeds proclaiming to fight crime and assorted urban disor-
ders must be methodically orchestrated, exaggerated, dramatized, even ritualized. 
(Punishing the Poor xi-xii, original emphasis) 
 
Halpern’s interview with Michael Brown, Sr. illustrates the symbolic effec-
tiveness of this official discourse: 
 
Brown, Sr., recalls worrying that his son’s physical stature might make him a target 
for the police. “We had a conversation about just following orders,” he said. “After 
you thought that you were being disrespected, get a name and a badge number, so 
your parent can reach out to the police department and file a complaint.” Most im-
portant was a simple directive: “Obey.”  
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The words of Brown, Sr. highlight the “subtle psychosocial mechanisms of 
symbolic violence” (West and Buschendorf 7), illustrating the extent to 
which the established power has been inculcated into the subjective struc-
tures of the father who experiences this power in the form of a deep-seated 
fear. Based on a knowledge derived from a Du Boisian “double-
consciousness” (364), Brown, Sr. can only prepare his son “for a fate from 
which” he knows he “cannot protect him” (Baldwin 302). Thus, he can only 
attempt to meet this horror by resorting to the established language which 
becomes the only legitimate language (“follow orders,” “obey”) and by 
passing this language on to his son.19 
Although symbolic violence binds its victims through a relation of co-
erced recognition, it does not render them altogether powerless. As 
Buschendorf explains,  
 
the emphasis on the connivance of the dominated does not at all exclude their poten-
tial power of resistance and subversion […]. As to symbolic violence, Bourdieu 
maintains that it is not restricted to the dominant, but that it could also emanate from 
the victims of domination, in which case it would take the form of a “symbolic bat-
tle” or even a “symbolic revolution.” (Buschendorf and Franke 79) 
 
Bourdieu insists that it is especially during periods of “objective crisis” that 
a “heretical break with the established order” can be precipitated (Language 
128). Such a period of objective crisis may, if met by critical (dis)positions, 
promote the creation of a new langue – a language capable of “exploit[ing] 
the possibility of changing the social world by changing the representation 
of this world which contributes to its reality or, more precisely, by counter-
posing a paradoxical pre-vision, a utopia, a project or programme, to the 
ordinary vision” (128, original emphasis). Brown’s death generated precise-
ly such a crisis in the Bourdieusian sense, exposing the arbitrary violence 
                                                   
19  For an insightful discussion of James Baldwin’s “Down at the Cross” in the con-
text of the concept of symbolic violence, see Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations 
170; also cf. West and Buschendorf 7-8. For a powerful illustration of the fear of 
black parents and their coerced complicity in instituting their children into the 
(symbolic) power of the police, for instance, by urging them to “[s]wallow your 
pride,” see Martinez, Elam, and Henry.  
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that characterized Ferguson’s racialized relation of power: the fact that its 
Police Department’s mistreatment of Blacks was systemic, essentially de-
humanizing, and due to the city’s material and symbolic necessities rather 
than the result of ‘bad behavior.’ It is through this recognition of vulnera-
bility to gratuitous violence that the members of Ferguson’s black outsider 
group became “rebel[s] who [fought] back in a ‘symbolic battle’” 
(Buschendorf and Franke 89). The establishment of a language of black af-
firmation, which forms the conceptual core of the Black Lives Matter 
movement, can be seen as one site of this symbolic battle. It is by expedit-
ing this new wave of symbolic struggle for love and power for the dispos-
sessed and dishonored that Brown’s death reveals the extent to which his 
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Transformations of Oppression 




Considering his numerous contributions to social justice in the United 
States, Bayard Rustin (1912–1987) deserves to be a household name. His 
tireless work for equality and peace before, during, and after the Civil 
Rights movement had a considerable impact on American society. Yet, 
compared to other prominent figures of the Movement, such as Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, or Rosa Parks, Rustin, the organizer of the 
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (1963) and a close political 
advisor and personal mentor to Dr. King, did not receive a fraction of their 
public recognition.1 Apart from very few incidents, the Civil, Labor and 
Human Rights activist and Quaker remained “the man-behind-the-scenes” 
throughout his lifetime (D’Emilio 1). Until the late 1990s, Rustin was 
largely ignored by historiography, resulting in a public silence about both 
the name and the story behind ‘Bayard Rustin’ (333). Only in recent years 
has his case enjoyed renewed interest, culminating so far in the posthumous 
award of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2013. 
                                                   
1  The employment of Rustin’s case for this analysis primarily serves the purpose 
of providing a concrete example for how oppression continually adopts to the 
circumstances in order to persist. These structural power dynamics tend to re-
main too abstract if they are not illustrated with (historical) examples, though. 
Rustin’s case study, rather than amplifying his unique accomplishments and ex-
periences, should then also be read as a paradigm for the neglect of many other 
merited Civil Rights activists advocating for equality. 
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Scholars frequently state that Rustin’s position at the margins of society 
derives from having been an openly gay African American and a former 
communist (D’Emilio; Levine; Miller; Podair;). The fact that he is still pri-
marily referred to as an outsider and that certain facets of his personality 
tend to be highlighted, while others continue to be downplayed, proves both 
startling and interesting at this point, especially since this phenomenon does 
not solely pertain to the present, but also ties in with the oppression Rustin 
experienced during his lifetime. To begin with, the issue of his omission in 
historiography, the continued absence of Rustin’s case in most college text-
books, for example, is mainly attributed to the lack of support from both the 
African American community and whites who dominate mass media, aca-
demia, and society. Since Rustin was not fully accepted by either of the two 
groups, he was left without advocates and thus fell into oblivion. 
Whereas it shall not be disputed that Rustin and his public reception 
suffered from stigmatizations due to his skin color, sexuality, and the alle-
gation of being a communist, it seems evident that a consideration of mere-
ly these factors falls short of providing a deeper understanding not only of 
his story, but also of the transformations of oppression on a larger, social 
scale. What is more, the aforementioned reasons for Rustin’s marginaliza-
tion fail to account for his – if intermittent – rise to power, bearing in mind 
that all of the aspects that allegedly marked him an absolute outsider were 
known to exist from the beginning of his career as an activist. 
The contemporary discussion of Rustin’s case reveals insights about to-
day’s society and the transformation of oppression. How and by whom is 
someone (to be) remembered in order to be recognized for his or her merits 
today? Are the categories through which (the legacy of) a person is both 
remembered and evaluated not a perpetuation of forms of discrimination, 
such as racism, homophobia, and the like, that continue to be widely spread 
in society? In the following, these questions will be addressed by examin-
ing aspects of Rustin’s life with an emphasis on ‘class’ and ‘race,’2 as these 
                                                   
2  I would like to point out that, in line with the figurational approach, the em-
ployment of the terms ‘class’ and ‘race’ in this article certainly does not imply 
an essentialist notion of them. Rather, both ‘class’ and ‘race’ are regarded as so-
cial constructs that merely tend to evoke an essentialist perception due to social 
power relations. It is the effects of this essentialist perception with which I am 
concerned. 
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two concepts are key to understanding (the misperception of) his case and 
its social implications. Moreover, the silencing and unsilencing of his story 
will also be touched upon before I conclude with some brief remarks on 
what the discourse about Rustin says about these issues in Civil Rights-
movement American society.3  
Norbert Elias’s framework of figurational sociology and some theoreti-
cal insights by Pierre Bourdieu will serve as analytical tools for this en-
deavor. Since Rustin marks the central figure of this analysis, the figura-
tional approach with its emphasis on group relations may appear counter-
intuitive at first. However, Rustin’s case will of course be regarded in rela-
tion to social dynamics (Elias, Civilizing Process 472) and may thus serve 
as a lens through which larger, social power dynamics can be made visible. 
To capture those larger power dynamics in relational terms, it is further-
more crucial to adopt a long-term historical perspective even when dealing 
with short-lived moments. When it comes to the constructs of ‘class’ and 
‘race’ in particular, it is long-term developments that need to be analyzed in 
order to understand the persistence of certain structures in people’s think-
ing, a persistence that frequently tends to be considered ‘common sense’ 
but is rarely scrutinized with regard to how the structures in question have 
developed and prevailed over time.  
Elias’s premise that power dynamics will never cease to exist (What Is 
Sociology? 74) marks the basis for analyzing various forms of oppression, 
such as racism or homophobia. Power struggles constitute a given in any 
society, and new alleged reasons for marginalization and domination can, 
or rather must, constantly be invented by those groups who possess more 
power than others. Rustin’s biography, I argue, perfectly illustrates how an 
individual is repeatedly turned into a threat so that current power relations 
may be sustained. At this point, a closer look at the analytical instruments is 
in order: According to figurational sociology, a synchronic perspective is 
insufficient when assessing what seems to be an entirely unique individual 
case (Elias and Scotson 30-31). To account for longstanding, embodied 
structures of thinking, feeling, and acting, figurational theory employs the 
concept of habitus. With its historical and sociological perspective on the 
                                                   
3  Some passages as well as parts of the main argument of this article are taken 
from my monograph Oppression as Process; see also my article “Homophobie 
und Rassismus.” 
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status quo, this concept delivers useful insights about how the collective 
past shapes what is frequently considered an individual’s “nature” (Bour-
dieu, Logic 56). Especially in a case like Rustin’s, whose rise to and fall 
from power is usually attributed to his personal qualities, the concept of 
habitus reveals its wide repercussions in social dynamics, holding up a mir-
ror to society that shows the ideological lenses through which people’s 
lives (still) tend to be viewed. Moreover, in refusing essentialism that 
commonly works toward the stigmatization of the individual, figurational 
theory also helps to shed light on positive, even empowering figurations in 
a person’s life. 
The term “empowerment” is often juxtaposed to the concept of “privi-
lege.” Whereas empowerment evokes the notion of liberation from oppres-
sion, privilege is commonly identified as one of the main sources and rea-
sons for oppression (Mullaly and Mullaly; Kimmel and Ferber). However, 
as my analysis of Rustin’s case will demonstrate, one and the same aspect 
of a particular life story can be regarded as empowerment or as privilege 
depending on which of two interdependent groups – labeled by Elias the 
outsiders and the established – interprets the case (Elias and Scotson 5-6). 
 
 
THE ESTABLISHED AND THE OUTSIDERS 
 
Before I briefly outline the main ideas in Elias’s The Established and the 
Outsiders, it is important to clarify that these terms refer to a power differ-
ential in the relation of two groups. While the terms ‘the established’ and 
‘the outsiders’ can evoke a simplistic, binary opposition, it is crucial to un-
derstand that both of these groups can be further subdivided along the same 
lines (e.g., established/outsiders within the overall outsider group). In 
Rustin’s case, this differentiation allows to reveal the complexity and inter-
play of oppression, empowerment, and privilege in his story. ‘Race’ and 
‘gender’ have become naturalized so much that it requires great analytical 
effort to lay open the fact that they actually constitute social constructs and 
reveal the force of stigmatization connected with them. As Rustin was si-
multaneously part of both the established and the outsiders, the oppression 
he was subjected to was neglected by some who only considered his privi-
lege. Due to the profundity with which the belief in essentialism has be-
come ingrained in society, race thus occupies a special position within 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF OPPRESSION: THE CASE OF BAYARD RUSTIN | 241 
Rustin’s and many other figurations. But what makes his case particularly 
interesting with regard to race is that discrimination due to his skin color 
ironically seems to have had less of a negative impact on Rustin’s life in the 
short run – i.e., at the very period when racial inequality seemed to be the 
most prevalent issue – than it did in the long run. Indeed, it was mainly af-
ter Rustin’s death that racist thought structures (in Blacks and whites alike) 
either neutralized or devalued certain empowering forces in his life, by re-
garding them as privilege or dismissing them altogether. While figurational 
sociology and the analytical concept of an established-outsider relation 
does not lead to a complete dissolution of this dichotomy, it helps to form a 
more complex image by placing an emphasis on the underlying power rela-
tions that produce, or rather surface as, racism.  
A closer look at Elias’s book will now elucidate the dynamics between 
the established and the outsiders. In their sociological field study, Elias and 
his colleague Scotson examine two groups of residents in a small communi-
ty in England they name “Winston Parva” (39), revealing a sharp division 
between them although there are no differences in terms of nationality, eth-
nicity, religion, or social class. Whereas the established stigmatize the out-
siders in ways reminiscent of mechanisms frequently employed to justify 
racist or homophobic discrimination, none of the commonly given reasons 
apply here because the groups only differ in the amount of time they have 
lived in the same area. The families of the first group, the established, have 
known each other for two or three generations. Thus, their social networks 
are very dense, and they also hold the monopoly on positions in local or-
ganizations, such as city council, church, etc. (cf. 4). The outsiders, on the 
other hand, do not form a coherent group because as newcomers who only 
recently moved into a new housing development they are strangers both to 
the old residents and to each other (4). This observation makes Elias con-
clude that aspects commonly associated with discrimination, such as skin 
color or the like, are a less significant reason for oppression. Instead, both 
the power differential between groups and the process of group formation 
itself deserve closer attention. 
According to Elias, the power of the established over the outsiders is 
then mainly due to the fact that their group is very tight-knit and integrated, 
which allows them to close ranks against the newcomers. Within their 
dense social networks, the established have developed distinct norms and 
modes of behavior to which they attribute a high value (8, 147-48). This 
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ascription of positive qualities results in a feeling of superiority shared by 
all members of the established group, which Elias refers to as “group 
charisma” (103). The practice of gossip constitutes the most important and 
effective instrument to maintain group charisma among the established and 
to simultaneously attribute “group disgrace,” i.e., to ascribe the worst quali-
ties of a minority to the whole group of outsiders (104). Group disgrace is 
accomplished through the practice of “blame gossip” (122) in which out-
siders are accused, for example, of smelling bad, being lazy, or being less 
intelligent than members of the established. The established, on the other 
hand, talk about themselves in exactly opposite terms: They constantly re-
affirm the best qualities and accomplishments of their group members 
through “praise gossip” (122). Indeed, the social control exerted through 
these two types of gossip plays a decisive role in the reproduction of the 
unequal power balance between both groups.  
Interestingly, today’s discourse about Rustin still appears to be orga-
nized along the same paradigm of praise-gossip and blame-gossip as out-
lined in Elias’s study: Rustin’s story is viewed in terms of how it might af-
fect the existing power dynamics; consequently, qualities or facets of his 
case that truly challenge or even undermine the current relations between 
groups are either ignored, distorted, or judged negatively. For example, 
while Rustin’s work has been honored by naming a high school after him in 
his native town of West Chester, Pennsylvania, the text about Rustin’s life 
on the school’s website says nothing about his homosexuality and his advo-
cacy for gay and labor rights, topics that continue to be considered contro-
versial by some in contemporary America (cf. “Rustin History”). The fact 
that certain pieces of information are deliberately left out when it comes to 
shaping his legacy shows the continuous control over the narrative of his 
persona. Thus, the reception of Rustin’s story can be said to reveal the per-
sistence of established-outsider figurations that equally affects all those 
who choose to talk about or ignore his case. 
Not belonging to the established obviously constitutes a disadvantage. 
In the case of Winston Parva, the outsiders are not even aware of the power 
dynamics that result in the formation of groups, since the ostensive preroga-
tive of defining and naming members of both groups is entirely left to the 
established. In fact, the newcomers at first do not even regard themselves as 
a group, let alone a group of outsiders that in the eyes of the established 
does not come up to their norms. If, in line with the long-term approach of 
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figurational sociology, we transfer this insight to the historical situation of 
Blacks in the U.S., it becomes clear how deep-seated and also how con-
structed the notion of race and the corresponding status of black and white 
individuals are in society: The black people who were abducted from their 
home countries and later sold as slaves, did not initially see themselves as a 
group either, for they often were divided by different languages and dia-
lects, cultures, and also the point of time they were enslaved and forced on 
ships to America (Beer and Jacob 26). Rustin, through his black ancestors, 
shared this past collective experience. However, he also possessed a habitus 
shaped by the behavioral religion of Quakers that seemed to work against 
some of the negative forces imposed on black bodies by whites through 
slavery. His belief not only provided Rustin with an empowering mind-set 
but also with embodied knowledge that stood in stark contrast to the stig-
matization connected with race.  
According to Elias, the established always attribute the worst qualities 
of an anomic minority of outsiders to the entire group. This explains why in 
a case of an exceptional outsider like Rustin even a single individual can 
constitute a threat to the social standing of an entire group of outsiders if 
that group is being subjected to discrimination by a group of established. In 
addition, aspects that are regarded as positive character traits or accom-
plishments in the group of the established take a negative turn when a 
member of the outsiders possesses them. These qualities are then either de-
valued or ignored (Elias and Scotson 120). Rustin’s case again illustrates 
this practice: Neither his adherence to Quakerism nor his clear statements 
against the Communist Party (Levine 20), gained him respect from the es-
tablished, in real life or in discourse. Instead, these aspects were either dis-
sociated from him as an individual or linked to other issues, such as his 
sexual orientation, resulting in a strong rejection of Rustin (Podair 20). 
Elias stresses that the power differential between established and out-
siders is primarily held up by the feeling of either superiority or inferiority 
on the part of the members of the respective group. Yet when the power 
differential changes and the outsiders gain more power, new norms and 
modes of behavior must be found by the established to ascertain that they 
may once again set themselves apart from the outsiders. This observation is 
also crucial to understanding some of the transformations that oppression 
has undergone in the 21st century: Especially a closer examination of ‘race’ 
and ‘class’ shows that while power differentials may have changed, the 
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practices of oppression have not disappeared but rather transformed accord-
ing to the social dynamics within figurations. A figurational perspective 
therefore also takes the underlying and slow-changing structures of think-
ing into account, and thus helps explain why the implementation of new 
laws or acts, for example, does not immediately lead to the intended results 
in society. Consequently, ‘transformation’ constitutes the more appropriate 
term in this context, for the connotation of ‘change’ suggests a much more 
drastic effect than can actually take place both within and between figura-
tions. Transformation instead captures the social processes initiated by 
change and conveys the aspect of persistence concerning certain stigmatiza-
tions and self-images. While it also emphasizes that human relations can by 
no means be characterized as stable, it acknowledges the continuity of 
power relations and alludes to the fact that the respective stigmatizations 
are revised according to the dynamics both within and between figurations. 
 
 
SILENCING AND UNSILENCING 
 
Against the background of figurational theory, the lack of Rustin’s public 
recognition, or his so-called silencing, can now be conceptualized as one of 
the examples of the transformations of oppression. As I would argue, the si-
lence about Rustin after his death is directly related to the very established-
outsider figuration that affected him throughout his life. Yet the thesis of a 
continuing power differential between the two groups contradicts the pro-
gressive narrative prevalent in the historiography of the Civil Rights 
movement that suggests a successful outcome of the struggle in the form of 
a constant development toward a more equal, better future (Alexander 101-
02). According to this narrative, power relations after Rustin’s death would 
have changed to his benefit, so that the ongoing lack of recognition was as-
cribed to his personality rather than to persistent oppressive structural 
forces. However, Rustin does not cater to that progressive narrative. In fact, 
his very existence could even be seen to subvert the predominantly optimis-
tic view of the Civil Rights movement. His subversive potential provides 
yet another explanation for why he was rarely (prominently) included in the 
literature about the Civil Rights era. Given the social significance of so-
called individual cases, we may assume then that Rustin’s story has never 
been irrelevant to larger debates. In fact, when at the height of the Civil 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF OPPRESSION: THE CASE OF BAYARD RUSTIN | 245 
Rights movement he had become a public persona, his example was repeat-
edly used in arguments about the moral or political future of the United 
States (D’Emilio 191-92). Yet laying claim to his case usually meant that 
certain aspects of his person were either played down (if not ignored) or 
exaggerated – depending on the respective agenda of the established.  
As the following example will illustrate, the Movement used Rustin’s 
‘personal image’ to counter outward attacks against him and – by proxy – 
defend the Movement as a whole. At first, white supremacists targeted 
Rustin, one of the key strategists of the Movement, on account of his for-
mer brief communist affiliation and his homosexuality. Since some black 
leaders also felt uneasy about supporting Rustin due to too many controver-
sial issues connected to his personality, it was not until later, shortly before 
the March on Washington, that he received strong public support from oth-
er prominent black leaders: In view of the underlying charges of immorali-
ty, Rustin was (and had to be) primarily defended as ‘a man of character.’ 
Yet, this strategy also (erroneously) affirmed the conceptualization of ‘mo-
rality’ as something universal that was not subject to power dynamics. In 
fact, however, ideas of morality were clearly shaped by the more powerful 
whites and their norms and could be used to easily discredit an entire group 
if only a single member was believed to stray from the path that they, the 
established, had identified as the acceptable one. Consequently, Rustin’s 
endorsement prior to the March on Washington did not include his sexuali-
ty, nor was it shared by all Civil Rights proponents. On the contrary, the 
fact that Rustin was gay required a supportive statement by fellow activists, 
lest the entire Movement suffer from Rustin’s bad reputation (Podair 59). 
As the main organizer and strategist of an event embedded in a mass 
movement that was about to profoundly impact social relations in America, 
Rustin was deemed significant enough by both his allies and his adversaries 
to manipulate information and create partial and thus distorted images of 
him. Thus, as independent as he strove to be, he was and continues to be 
subject to the bene- (and male-) violence of the established, in various kinds 
of figurations.  
Rustin’s example thus reveals how individual stories fall victim to larg-
er dynamics of power. This happens through the aforementioned silencing 
of certain aspects and thus the distortion of the person’s public image – if 
he/she is not erased altogether from public memory. Whoever does not 
neatly fit into the distinct categories that hold the power relations in place is 
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perceived as a threat by the established and will therefore be either misrep-





In Rustin’s case, ‘class’ constitutes one of these aspects that have not re-
ceived adequate consideration and thus caused a distortion of his story. For 
example, Rustin’s socialization in one of the most influential, predominant-
ly white religious groups in the United States, the Religious Society of 
Friends, is routinely mentioned, but rarely analyzed. This leaves room for 
uninformed, simplified ideas or even stereotypes about Quakerism, for in-
stance as regards whiteness or wealth.4  
                                                   
4  It is crucial to clarify that while Quakers, compared to many of their contempo-
raries, possessed the spiritual foundation to consider Blacks or women as 
equals, these beliefs did not immediately translate into social practices. In fact, 
the rather common narrative of Quakers as ultimate equalizers who were exempt 
from racism is not supported by historical evidence. Although Quakers were 
among the first in relation to their contemporaries to fight against injustice and 
include marginalized groups into their community, their practices, such as seg-
regated seating during meetings, were in fact not as detached from the secular 
world as one would be inclined to think. The complicated process of coming to 
terms with their history, including racism, is ongoing for Quakers and sheds a 
new light on the past (cf. McDaniel and Julye). Yet, from a figurational perspec-
tive, these comparatively new insights about Quaker history must still be con-
sidered against the strong background of the Quakers’ we-image and collective 
fantasies that inform the habitus of their community members. In other words, 
reality is not ‘void’ due to the revelation of new facts according to a figurational 
perspective. Reality is indeed never ‘fact-based,’ but rather always the result of 
beliefs, power dynamics, and social practices. This helps us understand why, in 
contrast to a non-figurational perspective, the lived experience of many margin-
alized groups does indeed not immediately change significantly, even though 
newfound evidence would suggest otherwise. Since incorporated ‘knowledge’ 
persists in people, buildings, and institutions even when new facts call into ques-
tion the very beliefs that informed and created them, change can never be as 
drastic as a substantialist approach would suggest. 
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According to this reasoning, Rustin, as a black Quaker, is either labeled 
an ‘Uncle Tom’ because he is said to betray his race, or he is declared an 
odd exception that can be dismissed. Without considering the theology of 
the Religious Society of Friends, however, these notions easily confirm the 
categories ‘black’ and ‘white,’ working toward perpetuating existing but 
rarely scrutinized structures that link skin color with economic and social 
standing. That being said, how can it be explained that Rustin’s Quaker 
faith received significantly less attention than his homosexuality, his skin 
color, or his interest in labor rights?  
Seen through the lens of an established-outsider figuration, it becomes 
clear that the tightly-knit pacifist community of Quakers with their great 
amount of social capital,5 their belief in the equality of all people, and their 
emphasis on education does not fit the negative image the established have 
of the outsiders. The very fact that Rustin mentored Dr. King in pacifist tac-
tics, for example, is closely related to his Quaker upbringing: The Quakers 
traditionally hold strong pacifist convictions and regard it as an integral part 
of their faith to act upon their spiritual beliefs and to become politically ac-
tive (Hamm 12). Moreover, the power differential between groups is inex-
tricably bound to differentials of cohesion and integration. Due to resources 
within the Quaker community, such as their group cohesion and trusted 
reputation, Rustin’s affiliation with the Religious Society of Friends afford-
ed him the social capital of a very influential and special kind of privileged 
group. Given the 370-year history of Quakers, a history that, particularly 
during its early years, was marked by marginality and rebellion, such a 
claim of ‘privilege’ may seem ironic if not paradoxical. Yet, the Quakers’ 
image gradually changed with their steady development from “a peculiar 
people” (Hamm 194) to a both economically and politically active and suc-
cessful group. 
Indeed, the example of the Quakers illustrates how a formerly op-
pressed group – in the course of centuries – has been able to redefine its 
role in society. Interestingly, the Quakers’ notorious skepticism, or even re-
jection, of authority can be regarded as one of the main reasons for this 
                                                   
5  “Social capital is the totality of resources (financial capital and also information 
etc.) activated through a more or less extended, more or less mobilizable net-
work of relations which procures a competitive advantage by providing higher 
return on investment.” (Bourdieu, Social Structures 194-95)  
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development. To speak with Elias, Quakers, according to their habitus, 
were prone to ignoring or even rejecting the group disgrace that had for-
merly been attributed to them by the established, i.e., the commonly recog-
nized religious denominations. Instead, they cultivated their own virtues, 
such as pacifism, integrity (e.g., in trade), and education and, over time, 
earned the public’s respect. The recognition by mainstream America was 
not even a goal of the Quakers; they simply rigorously abided by their own 
standards and thus resembled a common behavior put forth by the estab-
lished.  
Rustin’s religious belief gave him the feeling of belonging to a commu-
nity and the ability to “speak truth to power” (American Friends Service 
Committee 1967) – i.e., to question authority with “plain speech” (Hamm 
23). It also made him less susceptible to feelings of inferiority which the es-
tablished strive to instill in the outsiders. On the contrary, Rustin was part 
of one of the religious groups that in hindsight were considered the spiritual 
founding fathers and thus, quite literally, the establishment of America. 
Although Quakers had been regarded as outsiders in times gone by, their 
important role in U.S. history increasingly bestowed them with a very 






As has already been mentioned above with regard to slavery, which marks 
a collective experience for most African Americans, the behavioral creed of 
Quakerism likewise inscribed itself onto Friends’ bodies. Rustin, too, came 
to embody cognitive structures and modes of behavior based upon Quaker 
values, and it is this Quaker habitus that makes his development into one of 
the great Civil Rights leaders more plausible than mere contingence (cf. 
Bourdieu, Distinction 333). To quote William Deal and Timothy Beal’s 
summary of Bourdieu’s concept:  
 
a habitus is a set of dispositions that generate and structure human actions and be-
haviors. It shapes all practice, and yet it is not experienced as repressive or enforc-
ing. Its effects on us typically go unnoticed. […] How does one come to or learn a 
particular habitus? Bourdieu describes this process as one of informal, unconscious 
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learning rather than formal instruction. […] The habitus one occupies shapes the 
practices that one engages in. […] Once internalized, habitus dispositions are taken 
for granted. (50-51) 
 
Frequently accused of determinism (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 132-36), 
Bourdieu in fact always insisted that habitus was a product of history. Thus, 
while the habitus of an individual makes his/her practice, conduct, deci-
sions, etc. seem ‘natural,’ one should not conclude that a habitus constitutes 
essential or innate characteristics of that person. Yet, this reasoning is fre-
quently applied to the issues of ‘class’ and ‘race:’ A set of allegedly inher-
ent qualities is attributed to people based on their ancestry, upbringing, or 
skin color, which results in a certain evaluation of that group and its indi-
vidual members. While Bourdieu clearly distances himself from such es-
sentialist thinking, he stresses the (symbolic) power attached to both the 
perception and possession of a particular habitus: 
 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is not simply about a process of socialization or encul-
turation into a set of practices, but is also concerned with the power relations that ex-
ist between social classes, that is, with how social inequality is perpetrated and 
maintained. Habitus functions to distinguish social classes from each other. […] 
[T]his is so socially powerful, […] because class inequalities and the dominance of 
one class over another occur covertly. Rather than the application of overt force, 
symbolic power is harnessed to maintain class distinctions and the appearance of 
their naturalness. (Deal and Beal 51) 
 
Against this background, it is interesting to return to the correlation of habi-
tus and class in Rustin’s life: According to Bourdieu, ‘class’ comprises the 
amount of economic, social, and cultural capital. This results in a particular 
lifestyle that is bound to certain values as well as a corresponding degree of 
symbolic power (Swartz 333). As Rustin’s Quaker upbringing went along 
with a traditionally high regard of education, a great amount of social capi-
tal, and a long tradition of political activism based on one’s spiritual beliefs, 
‘class’ can be said to have played a crucial part in enabling his rise to pow-
er. But it was then either dismissed or even blotted out from current ac-
counts of his life – thus depriving Rustin (and perhaps people he could have 
been seen to represent, such as gays or African Americans) of that source of 
symbolic power. 
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Considering Rustin’s Quaker upbringing in the light of figurational the-
ory challenges commonly racist, divisive structures in dominant thinking, 
for this spiritual background introduces a new perspective on issues that 
usually tend to be solely regarded in terms of race – which means to run the 
risk of perpetuating racist thinking by means of a reasoning similar to that 
of the established. In order to truly challenge racism, however, the unscru-
tinized naturalization of this term, as it occurred in the course of a long and 
continuing process of social construction, must be pointed out and revealed 





While ‘class’ can be considered an empowering factor in Rustin’s life, 
‘race’ undoubtedly plays a decisive negative role. Rustin experienced bla-
tant racism throughout his lifetime. He was beaten and verbally abused as a 
Freedom Rider and activist as he put his body on the line to challenge rac-
ism. Compared to the time after his death and other aspects relevant to his 
story that were silenced, however, one could infer that ‘race’ did – at first 
glance – at least not completely hinder Rustin from exerting influence dur-
ing his lifetime. For a certain period of the Movement, particularly during 
the time following the March on Washington, Rustin was by some even 
considered part of the Civil Rights establishment. His was a well-known 
name among radical pacifists; he worked closely with A. Philip Randolph 
and Dr. King and was a coveted speaker and advisor in non-violent tactics 
(D’Emilio 358-61). At the time, other issues connected to Rustin, such as 
his short-lived Communist affiliation or his sexuality, caused greater stig-
matization than his skin color. After his death, however, race appears to 
outweigh any of the privileges Rustin’s class affiliation may have suggest-
ed. Taking into consideration the numerous figurations of which he was 
part, this suggests that the reception of his case is still dependent on the es-
tablished-outsider figuration that continues to operate along the lines of 
skin color. The stigmatizations, however, tend to be more complex and do 
not reveal their roots in racism immediately. Here, a figurational perspec-
tive helps lay open the dynamics leading to the silencing of Rustin. 
In the time after the Civil Rights movement, when power differentials 
were beginning to change in favor of the African American outsiders, the 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF OPPRESSION: THE CASE OF BAYARD RUSTIN | 251 
majority of whites did not show any interest in casting a positive light on 
the “troublemaker” Rustin (Levine 41) so that his negative image remained 
tied to his alleged communist beliefs. The majority of African Americans 
did not provide Rustin with much support either. Due to his cooperation 
with (primarily white) labor rights activists and his strong opposition to 
Black Power, Rustin was regarded as a “sell out” and further fell out of fa-
vor with many Blacks and whites when he and his white partner openly ad-
vocated for gay rights in the 1980s (Podair 33-34; Levine 191, 216-17, 242-
43). 
From a figurational perspective, one could explain this kind of detach-
ment with the fear of an increase of stigmatization should the openly gay 
Rustin be seen as standing for their entire group. This could have been used 
by the established against the slowly growing power of outsiders, because 
homosexuality was then closely linked to immorality. Moreover, Rustin, 
who was active in various fields, did not maintain the distance that was 
usually upheld between the outsiders and the established (that is both 
Blacks and whites, as well as other outsiders and established) but in fact 
reached out and sought to integrate (all of) these separate camps, asserting 
that “[w]e are all one” (Chang and Terry 253). Against Rustin’s intention, 
however, this tireless effort of coalition-building made him even more sus-
picious (for either side) of being a traitor. Elias explains this phenomenon 
as follows: 
 
The very existence of interdependent outsiders who share neither the fund of com-
mon memories nor, as it appears, the same norms of respectability as the established 
group, acts as an irritant; it is perceived by the members of the latter as an attack 
against their own we-image and we-ideal. The sharp rejection and stigmatisation of 
the outsiders are the counter-attack. (Established 30-31) 
 
Indeed, one could say that Rustin, by being the complex person he was, re-
vealed how Blacks and whites who had been systematically divided by skin 
color were associated with categories, preferences, or opinions that were by 
no means inherent to a certain ‘race.’ And yet this very mobility that al-
lowed him to move between various groups should neither be considered an 
entirely deliberate choice, nor a merit of Rustin’s. Rather, it was his habitus 
that enabled and at times may even have forced him to repeatedly under-
mine, expand, and overstep the boundaries erected between groups. Thus, 
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Rustin’s case demonstrates particularly well that any proclaimed essential-
ism is fictitious and that the naturalization of differences which people have 
come to accept is in fact a social practice of division in which they are 
complicit. Great efforts had to be continuously undertaken in order to up-
hold these apparently natural divides; gossip, written and unwritten laws, as 
well as segregation actually helped construct and perpetuate such differ-
ences. 
In Rustin’s eyes, these practices were oftentimes justified under the 
guise of protecting or restoring identity. Consequently, he initially spoke 
out against Black Power, an idea he thought wrongfully constricted the is-
sue of justice and – as did so many other ideas related to identity – rendered 
collective action impossible. Given the importance of a positive we-image 
for groups, Rustin’s opposition to Black Power caused significant irritation 
among its followers and attached the persistent label of a traitor to him once 
again (Levine 210). The former Freedom Rider and well-known Civil 
Rights activist James Farmer did not express a singular opinion when he 
said: “Bayard has no credibility in the Black community. Bayard’s com-
mitment is to labor, not to the Black man” (Levine 244). Rustin, however, 
whose intention it was to break the cycle of division between the races, 
classes, or nations, criticized Black Power not for the pride and dignity for 
which it stood but merely as a potential source of division. 
Referring to Elias’s theory, one could say that the group charisma pro-
moted by Black Power in Rustin’s eyes only entrenched positions instead 
of solving the larger, underlying problems. In his 1966 article, “‘Black 
Power’ and Coalition Politics,” Rustin claimed that Black Power not only 
worked toward segregation but also distracted people from the actual chal-
lenge in society: injustice. Hinting at what he perceived to be the lack of a 
clear strategy behind the slogan “Black Power,” one that would succeed at 
overcoming racism, he wrote: “The issue was injustice before ‘black pow-
er’ became popular, and the issue is still injustice” (39). With this state-
ment, Rustin pointed out the larger, social issues at the core of oppression. 
His habitus led him to perceive the political struggles around him from the 
perspective of the Quaker principles he was socialized to hold, which also 
meant to prioritize the greater goal over smaller victories. The alienation 
this caused among other black activists is certainly understandable. In their 
eyes, Rustin was self-righteously skipping crucial steps in the process of 
liberation that – to them – formed the only solid foundation for a better 
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future. However, as the figurational perspective helps us understand, 
Rustin’s take on Black Power should not be mistaken for a white perspec-
tive; rather, it was a spiritual perspective that became essentialized as 
white.  
While it is not surprising that the heteronormative, white establishment 
did not make an effort to promote him, the question remains why it took 
more than ten years for a handful of scholars, mainly from the queer and 
African American communities, to rediscover Rustin after his death. In this 
context, the aspects of evaluation and norms become relevant again. The 
power of definition the established exert over the outsiders creates a pro-
found and persistent feeling of inferiority amongst the latter. The estab-
lished not only determine the virtues and forms of capital that are deemed 
important in any given field, they also declare themselves the ‘yardstick’ by 
which all others are to be measured. Since the established always attribute 
the highest value to their group and all of its members, it is virtually impos-
sible for the outsiders to reach the standard defined by the established. This 
can result in feelings of inferiority that show in apathy or, as in Rustin’s 
case, the intermittent absence of work about him.  
Nevertheless, social dynamics at least seem to promise certain ‘ad-
vantages’ for those outsiders who learn to comply with the rules of the es-
tablished. Rustin’s case was (and may well be) misunderstood to constitute 
an example of that, as he was frequently accused of being ‘a traitor to his 
race,’ for instance. Rustin’s case still runs the risk of being misread by 
(white) established who might use his story to infer that it was indeed pos-
sible to ‘bypass’ racism if an individual was capable enough, thus blotting 
out social and structural forces. According to this reasoning and in line with 
the behavior of the established, Rustin’s story would then only serve the 
purpose of casting a negative light on all others who allegedly lacked that 
‘ability’ – which is obviously highly problematic. It is therefore important 
to acknowledge that hardly any group of outsiders possesses, like the 
Quakers, a spiritual foundation that provides them with the historical back-
ground of successfully resisting the dominant norms and rules of conduct. 
Consequently, it is crucial to be aware of Rustin’s unique socialization with 
Quaker values, for his case could otherwise easily be exploited for either 
colorblind, racist, or otherwise misinformed arguments that fail to take mul-
tiple facets of a person as well as social dynamics into consideration.  
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Seen from an established-outsider perspective, the fact that Rustin’s bi-
ography is barely discussed, or for that matter fully recognized, can be 
regarded as an attempt to inhibit the power potential inherent in his case. 
Rustin’s notorious crossing of the lines between various social groups car-
ries the danger of providing cohesion within these separated and marginal-
ized groups – and, consequently, unite and empower them (Elias and 
Scotson 5-6). Thus, it may not be altogether surprising that the discourse 
about the ultimate integrator Rustin still operates exclusively within the 
paradigm of the outsider, and thus fails to account for the content of his 
message. It is as if Rustin’s greatest asset during his life, the fact that he 
was never ‘either … or’ but always ‘both … and,’ continues to work 
against him to such an extent that it prevents the larger implications of his 
story from coming to the fore. Indeed, the main decision about Rustin’s 
legacy was made within an established-outsider figuration in which his per-
sona – if for different reasons – was and continues to be claimed by the es-
tablished in various figurations for their own respective purposes.  
Instead of repeating that Rustin was an outsider in the conventional 
sense, research should address the question why society still tends to take 
for granted the reasons for the silencing of his full and complex story. The 
fact that certain parts of that story now enjoy renewed interest is subject to 
the very same power dynamics. Thus, both the phenomenon of silencing – 
the lack of public recognition of Rustin’s whole story – and his unsilencing 
– the rediscovery of his case – constitute significant examples of the trans-
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Rancière’s Anti-Sociology and the Parallax of  
Political Subjectivity and Political Economy (of Racism) 
DENNIS BÜSCHER-ULBRICH 
 
The sociology of “misrecognition” [...] share[s] with Althusser-
ianism the idea that the dominated are dominated because they 
are ignorant of the laws of domination. This simplistic view at 
first assigns to those who adopt it the exalted task of bringing 
their science to the blind masses. Eventually, though, this exalt-
ed task dissolves into a pure thought of resentment which de-
clares the inability of the ignorant to be cured of their illusions, 
and hence the inability of the masses to take charge of their 
own destiny.  
RANCIÈRE, ALTHUSSER’S LESSON XVI 
 
 
In Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (1999) Jacques Rancière intro-
duced the polemical notion of “the police” [la police] to refer to “the set of 
procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is 
achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, 
and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (28). Curiously, for 
Rancière sociology as such – rather than dissecting “the police” and thus 
underwriting emancipation – is part and parcel of a non-egalitarian “distri-
bution of the sensible” [partage du sensible] secured by la police. In other 
words: Sociology is a disciplinary knowledge and practice that eventually 
amounts to the policing of subjectivities rather than emancipatory social 
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transformation. “Politics,” by contrast, is “an extremely determined activity 
antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration 
whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition 
that, by definition, has no place in that configuration” (29-30). Accordingly, 
“politics” is not a matter of negotiating conflicting interests, nor the exer-
cise of power or its institutionalization. Rather, it is a matter of what the ex-
cluded and disenfranchised [les sans-part] do that interrupts the hierar-
chical order of the social; in the process, they constitute a political subject 
(“the demos,” “the people,” “the proletariat,” but also “women,” “black 
people,” “the 99%,” “the sans-papiers,” etc.). Political subjects disrupt not 
only the power arrangements of the social order, but also its perceptual and 
epistemic underpinnings, the obviousness and naturalness that attaches to it. 
Rancière’s notion of “politics” is thus well suited to contest a post-political 
social formation, brought about by neoliberal capitalism and “end-of-
history” teleologies, that presents itself as non-ideological, non-
antagonistic, and permanent, where “consensus” has come to mean the 
eclipse of an identity constituted through polemicizing over the common. In 
other words: the disavowal of historical contingency and the “disagree-
ment” [la mésentente] constitutive of politics (cf. 43 ff.). 
But Rancière’s polemical critique of “the police” and his rethinking of 
politics as a performative contradiction has also led him to reject the con-
cept of power tout court: 
 
What makes an action political is not its object or the place where it is carried out, 
but solely its form, the form in which confirmation of equality is inscribed in the set-
ting up of a dispute, of a community existing solely through being divided. Politics 
runs up against the police everywhere. We need to think of this encounter as a meet-
ing of the heterogeneous. To be able to do this we have to let go of certain concepts 
that assert in advance a smooth connection between them. The concept of power is 
the main such concept. This concept once allowed a certain well-meaning militancy 
to contend that “everything is political” since power relationships are everywhere. 
[…] The concept of power allows one to retort with an “everything is policing” to an 
“everything is political,” but this is pretty poor as a logical conclusion. If everything 
is political, then nothing is. So while it is important to show, as Michel Foucault has 
done magnificently, that the police order extends well beyond its specialized institu-
tions and techniques, it is equally important to say that nothing is political in itself 
merely because power relationships are at work in it. For a thing to be political, it 
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must give rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in 
advance. (Disagreement 32, my emphasis) 
 
It is thus not difficult to see why Rancière’s thinking can largely be consid-
ered antithetical to that of Pierre Bourdieu, in particular. Rancière’s pro-
found anti-sociological bias, which can be shown to rest on a deliberate 
Foucauldian rejection of the Marxian and Freudian dialectics of essence 
and appearance, can indeed be illustrated by way of his fundamental rejec-
tion of Bourdieu’s relational sociology and habitus-field theory. But it also 
clearly invites a dialectical critique and raises numerous hard-edged ques-
tions about the nature of the relationship between “the police” and “poli-
tics,” structure and agency, a critical theory of society and the prospect of 
its radical transformation. Whereas Marx famously stated in Vol. 3 of Capi-
tal that “all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the 
essence of things directly coincided” (Marx 532), Rancière has radically 
distanced himself from both the critique of ideology (including commodity 
fetishism) and a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (cf. Ricoeur 30 ff.) toward an 
“approach that is more affirmative of the surface itself,” where “the surface 
no longer hides, but becomes a scene on which the symbolic efficacy of 
language and discourse are demonstrated” (Arsenjuk 7). What ultimately is 
at stake in Rancière’s anti-sociology, though, is the question of the relation-
ship between social science and emancipation – as rightfully highlighted in 
a 2013 n+1 editorial piece called “Too Much Sociology” (Saval et al.) and 
further discussed in Ruth Sonderegger and Jens Kastner’s Pierre Bourdieu 
und Jacques Rancière: Emanzipatorische Praxis denken (2014).  
Rather than reading Rancière in the light of contemporary theories of 
recognition, or situating his radically egalitarian philosophy – “more Jaco-
bin than Marxist” (Žižek, “Lesson” 75) – in the traditional chasm on the 
Left between Marxism and anarchism, the proper historical and intellectual 
context for understanding the development of his thought is to be found in 
the post-1968 New Left milieu and its post-Althusserian rejection of Marx-
ism as a science of revolution. Rather than being the necessary product of 
and strategic means for overcoming class antagonism, “politics” happens 
when the logic of “police” (and its agents) clashes with the logic of eman-
cipation (and its agents), which interrupts the former’s distribution of the 
sensible and “changes the very parameters of what is considered ‘possible’ 
in the existing constellation” (Žižek, Ticklish Subject 199). This theoretical 
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proposition, then, i.e., Rancière’s “ground-clearing distinction” (Davis 76) 
between “politics” and “police,” sits uneasily with Bourdieu’s insistence on 
the reflexive nature of symbolic power and the relationality of struc-
ture/agency sustained by a logic of praxis in the face of which the 
Rancièrean “disagreement” seems unlikely and “politics” itself becomes 
unthinkable. In other words: Rancière’s post-Althusserian notion of politics 
aims precisely at what is rendered impossible in the given post-political 
conjuncture and affirms the possibility of both intellectual and political 
emancipation conceived as a “dissensual” rupture of a non-egalitarian and 
thus always-already policed “distribution of the sensible.” Since the latter is 
a key concept in Rancière’s work that is also somewhat reminiscent of 
Bourdieu’s notion of “symbolic violence” and the “paradox of doxa” in 
Pascalian Meditations (164 ff.) and Masculine Domination (1-2), for in-
stance, it seems conducive to systematically highlight and explicate 
Rancière’s theoretical departure from and polemical dismissal of Bourdieu 
and related thinkers. 
 
 
DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE SENSIBLE 
 
Partage du sensible is a challenging concept which has variously been 
translated as “partition,” “division,” or “distribution” of the sensible, where 
“sensible” signifies both what is available to the “senses” and thus percep-
tible and what makes “sense” within a hegemonic regime of signification 
and meaning. The term refers at once to the conditions for sharing that are 
constitutive of a given sense and order of the community and to the sources 
of disruption, or “dissensus,” of that same order. As Rancière has acknowl-
edged, the concept is reminiscent of the Kantian transcendental argument or 
critique – “re-examined perhaps by Foucault” – of conditions of possibility 
or “a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience” 
(Politics 13). Most importantly, it does not rely on the concept of “mis-
recognition” [méconnaissance] on the part of the dominated, or the sans-
part. Key to understanding Rancière’s intellectual project, moreover, is his 
singular understanding of emancipation as a kind of ‘pulling oneself up by 
one’s bootstraps’ and the enactment of unconditional equality in the here 
and now, which from the perspective of the sociologist may well appear 
impossible. This holds true for the possibility of both politics and aesthetic 
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experience proper. It is thus no coincidence that Rancière also theorizes 
what ties aesthetics to politics and that he politicizes the terminological 
foundations of Kantian aesthetics in order to highlight the aesthetic dimen-
sion inherent to political subjectivization (cf. The Philosopher and His 
Poor, The Politics of Aesthetics, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, The Eman-
cipated Spectator). But why, again, is sociology to be rejected? 
As Caroline Pelletier puts it, Rancière “targets an often-noted tension in 
Bourdieu’s work between the denunciation of domination and the model-
ling of its ineluctable reproduction” (138). While the absence of an account 
of political agency is commonly described as a limitation of Bourdieu’s 
work, Rancière “sees in this the truth of Bourdieu’s entire discourse, […] 
which places the poor in one position in society, and the sociologist in an-
other; in which the poor are objects of study rather than intellectual and po-
litical subjects” (138). Rancière thus identifies a disavowed continuity be-
tween Althusser and Bourdieu, a continuity which Bourdieu himself firmly 
rejected in Pascalian Meditations. Rancière’s egalitarian rejection of any 
tendency toward (not just) sociological orthodoxy, on the other hand, al-
ready motivated his ferocious critical examination of its most dogmatic ex-
ample in the wake of Paris 1968: “Althusserian structuralist Marxism with 
its rigid distinction between scientific theory and ideology and its distrust 
towards any form of spontaneous popular movement which was immediate-
ly decried as a form of bourgeois humanism” (Žižek, “Lesson” 69). 
Rancière’s theoretical intervention into this schema, however, is not 
grounded in a rejection of Marxism tout court but in a rejection of a par-
ticular discursive employment of academic Marxism and especially struc-
tural Marxism as a kind of master knowledge which, according to Rancière, 
not only runs counter to the idea of workers’ intellectual emancipation but 
performatively reinscribes, or reinstalls, and thus helps to reproduce some 
of the very hierarchies it purports to abolish – the dividing lines between 
worker and bourgeois, manual and intellectual labor, unrefined and refined 
senses, incapacity for critical reflection and capacity for critical reflection.1 
                                                   
1 Cf. Althusser’s Lesson; The Philosopher and His Poor; The Ignorant School-
master. Rancière’s critique of sociological mastery and the question of ‘per-
formativity’ in relation to Judith Butler’s use of the term are cogently discussed 
in Pelletier. For a critical survey, see Davis 15-25. 
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This type of criticism of performative reinscription is characteristic of 
Rancière’s approach to a number of highly influential critical sociologies, 
chief among which is the work of Bourdieu. More recently, he has tackled 
Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s analysis of “network-based organiza-
tion, employee autonomy, and post-Fordist horizontal work structures” in 
The New Spirit of Capitalism (2006, back cover). As Rancière argues in 
The Emancipated Spectator, their work is perfectly in line with Bourdieu’s 
teaching in that it 
 
[makes] do with attributing the struggle against misery and for community bonds to 
workers and the individualist desire for autonomous creativity to the fleetingly rebel-
lious children of the big or petty bourgeoisie. But the collective struggle for work-
ing-class emancipation has never been separate from a new experience of individual 
existence and capacities, wrested from the constraint of old bonds of community. 
(35) 
 
Social emancipation, Rancière argues, is “simultaneously an aesthetic 
emancipation, […] a break with the ways of feeling, seeing and saying that 
characterized working-class identity” in a hierarchical order (35). In his es-
say on “The Misadventures of Critical Thought” Rancière thus locates the 
“solidarity of the social and the aesthetic, the discovery of individuality for 
all and the project of free collectivity [...] at the heart of working-class 
emancipation,” while insisting that “by the same token it signified the dis-
ordering of classes and identities that the sociological view of the world has 
always rejected, against which it was itself constructed in the nineteenth 
century” and which it naturally rediscovered “in the slogans of 1968” 
(Emancipated Spectator 35). It is therefore 
 
neither the novelty nor the strength of the thesis that has proved seductive, but the 
way in which it puts the ‘critical’ theme of the complicit illusion back to work. It 
thus provides fuel for the melancholic version of leftism, which feeds off the dual 
denunciation of the power of the beast and the illusions of those who serve it when 
they think they are fighting it. It is true that the thesis of the recuperation of ‘artistic’ 
revolts leads to several conclusions: on occasion, it underpins proposals for a radi-
calism that would at last be radical: the mass defection of the forces of the General 
Intellect, today absorbed by Capital and the State, advocated by Paolo Virno; or the 
virtual subversion counter-posed to virtual capitalism by Brian Holmes. It also fuels 
RANCIÈRE’S ANTI-SOCIOLOGY | 263 
proposals for an inverted activism, aimed no longer at destroying but at saving a 
capitalism that has lost its spirit. But its normal pitch is disenchanted registration of 
the impossibility of changing the ways of a world that lacks any solid point for op-
posing the reality of domination [...]. (36-37) 
 
Again, Rancière’s main opposition to Western Marxist sociology rests on 
his axiomatic notion of equality and the assumed effects of pseudo-radical 
academic discourse. Critical social science and its thesis of recuperation 
may well end up reinscribing – by way of ideologically functional discur-
sive emplotment – the (logic of the) social division of labor. In other words: 
The concept and analysis of recuperation can itself be recuperated into 
power.  
But Rancière, who is himself a critic of recuperation, goes further than 
this when he asserts that 
 
[t]he dominated do not remain in subordination because they misunderstand the ex-
isting state of affairs but because they lack confidence in their capacity to transform 
it. [… T]he feeling of such a capacity presupposes that the dominated are already 
committed to a political process in a bid to change the configuration of sensory giv-
ens and to construct forms of a world to come, from within the existent world. (Aes-
thetics 45) 
 
It is such undialectical humanist affirmation that ultimately risks trapping 
Rancière’s thinking in a kind of de facto standpoint theory, unless we also 
read his work as expressing a Kantian, or Lacanian, insistence on the re-
al/Real of appearances, disavowed by sociology at large. As he argues in 
The Emancipated Spectator, 
 
[t]he current disconnection between the critical procedures and any perspective of 
emancipation only reveals the disjunction at the heart of the critical paradigm. It may 
make fun of its illusions but it remains enclosed in its logic. This is why I think it is 
necessary to re-examine the genealogy of the concepts and procedures of that logic 
and the way in which it got intertwined with the logic of social emancipation. (42, 
my emphasis) 
 
A potential Lacanian point to be made against the sociology of “misrecog-
nition” and symbolic power would be that such “illusions” are, of course, 
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never mere illusions but necessary material-symbolic fictions that structure 
(or, with Kant, “schematize” the perception of) reality itself, which in turn 
– and against Rancière – may come to assert itself as part and parcel of the 
problem of social domination.  
What is of crucial importance according to Slavoj Žižek’s reading of 
Rancière, though, is the realization that “these poetic displacements and 
condensations are not just secondary illustrations of an underlying ideologi-
cal struggle, but the very terrain of this struggle” (“Lesson” 77). Thus, if 
Rancière’s “police” focuses on the policing of subjects and subjectivities, 
on “the clear categorization of every individual, of every ‘visible’ social 
unit,” Žižek argues, “then disturbing such orders of the visible, the sensible, 
the perceptible, and proposing different lateral links, unexpected short-
circuits, etc., is the elementary form of resistance” (77). Žižek thus aligns 
Rancière’s “police” with his Lacanian-Marxist notion of ideology. For him, 
ideology operates as a social fantasy which structures reality itself (cf. Sub-
lime Object 29 ff.), and the task of ideology critique is to read the social 
symptomatically in order to drag “the unconditional Real of global Capital” 
into the realm of the Symbolic (Ticklish Subject 4, cf. Fink 70-72).  
 
 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MISRECOGNITION AND THE SCIENCE 
OF REPRODUCTION: BOURDIEU AND ALTHUSSER 
 
Rancière’s critique of a Western Marxist sociology of neoliberal recupera-
tion (esp. of cherished New Left ideas and practices) seems all the more 
remarkable in light of the fact that he himself had contributed an important 
section to Reading Capital in 1965, in which he exercised his fidelity to 
Althusserian Marxism and political-economic “symptomatic reading” in the 
cause of the “epistemological break” (cf. Davis 8-15). But this was before 
he forcefully critiqued his former teacher and collaborator in La Leçon 
d’Althusser (1974) and entered on a series of archival projects, including 
The Nights of Labor (1981), The Philosopher and His Poor (1983), and The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster (1987), which basically reversed Althusserian 
Marxism and scientism, focusing on social history and workers’ struggles 
instead. Anthony Iles and Tom Roberts thus argue that his greatest contri-
bution is to social history. 
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Henceforth, Rancière follows, in the most minute detail, the mediations which sur-
round the subaltern subject, the proletarian or worker. The problem of theory, of 
Marxist science and the condescension of the intellectual to his subject, is raised to a 
general principle traceable back from the perspective of the present through the en-
tire history of the left.  
 
While Althusser strictly opposed any spontaneous understanding of the so-
cial as necessarily fetishistic, “Rancière has explored the consequences of 
the opposite presumption—that everyone is immediately and equally ca-
pable of thought. […] Everyone shares equal powers of speech and 
thought.” (Hallward 109) Rancière’s axiomatic account of equality thus 
strictly refuses to posit equality and emancipation as telos, in which case it 
could be endlessly deferred. Instead, for him, equality is a polemical a pri-
ori to be demonstrated both intellectually and practically qua politics: 
“[E]quality is not a goal to be attained but a point of departure, a supposi-
tion to be maintained in all circumstances” (Ignorant Schoolmaster 138).  
Nowhere is this idea articulated more forcefully than in Rancière’s 
scathing response to Bourdieu’s Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgement of Taste (1979). Rancière essentially argues that Bourdieu’s so-
ciology of art and aesthetic experience hinges on the systematic exclusion 
of the ‘gray area’ of aisthesis:  
 
The sociologist needs only to show each time the sufficient reason organizing the 
universe of judgements—simple distinction. He only needs to widen the distance. 
Questions about music without music, fictitious questions of aesthetics about photo-
graphs that are not perceived as aesthetic, all these produce inevitably what is re-
quired by the sociologist: the suppression of intermediaries, of points of meeting and 
exchange between the people of reproduction and the élite of distinction. Everything 
happens as if the science of the sociologist-king had the same requirement as the city 
of the philosopher-king. There must be no mixing, no imitation. The subjects of this 
science, like the warriors of The Republic, must be unable to “imitate” anything else 
than their own dye. (Philosopher 189) 
 
Contrary to Bourdieu’s wholesale rejection of Kantian aesthetics as “the 
site par excellence of the ‘denegation of the social’” (Aesthetics 1), 
Rancière seeks to lay bare again and reaffirm the emancipatory kernel of 
aesthetics. For instance, he reminds us that Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
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“profound motif” of denouncing the separation of labor and enjoyment goes 
further back than the Marxist critique of commodity fetishism and ‘bour-
geois’ Enlightenment thought: “Through the intermediary of Hölderlinian 
poetry, it harks to that which is without a doubt the veritable founding text 
of the modern thought of emancipation, Friedrich von Schiller’s Über die 
ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen [in einer Reihe von Briefen]” (Chroni-
cles 27). Rancière repeatedly refers to Schiller’s Letters as the founding text 
of aesthetic politics, precisely because Schiller counterposes “[t]o the estab-
lished social division between the barbarism of the civilization of the Great 
and popular savagery […] that chance at common humanity—at reconcilia-
tion in the sensory world—constituted by beauty” (27). However, in con-
trast to Schiller’s transcendental homo ludens, Rancière understands the 
Kantian “free play” (102 ff.) between the cognitive powers of imagination 
and understanding (i.e., the autonomy of aesthetic experience) to be “free” 
only insofar as it reveals the contingency of “the police” and its “distribu-
tion of the sensible” through the dissociation between what can be experi-
enced – perceived, felt, done – and its a priori (dominant social) signification. 
The “bold move” in The Philosopher and His Poor, as noted by Oliver 
Davis, is Rancière’s “insinuation, by suggestive juxtaposition, [...] that the 
scientific strand identified within the Marxist tradition [...] is rooted in a 
certain conception of the relationship between power and knowledge first 
elaborated in Plato’s autocratic model of the ideal city in Republic” (17-18). 
Davis further argues that “[t]he value to Rancière of Plato’s discussion in 
Republic lies in the way in which Plato, by introducing the myth of the 
three metals, admits to the arbitrariness [or rather contingency] of the dis-
tinction between those rulers capable of philosophy and the multitude of 
their ‘poor’ [...]” (20). In Rancière’s “argument by parataxis,” Marx, Sartre, 
and Bourdieu become “tainted by association” with Plato (20). All four 
have in common the construction of a group Rancière calls “the poor,” who 
are held to be constitutively incapable of thought, aesthetic experience, and 
historical agency. 
Following Charlotte Nordmann, Davis acknowledges that “Rancière 
somewhat overstates the case against Bourdieu” (23), not to mention Marx 
and Sartre. In any case, “Rancière’s reaction against the sociologist’s insti-
tutional self-interest is extreme and unforgiving” (102). Davis thus 
summarizes Rancière’s “composite objection to Bourdieu’s approach” (23) 
as follows:  
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[H]is sociology is unduly suspicious, scientistic, self-aggrandizing, reductive, de-
terministic and practically (politically) ineffectual. It is suspicious and scientistic be-
cause it assumes, as Althusser did, that social mechanisms are hidden and accessible 
only to scientific analysis by sociologists and that surface manifestations are unreli-
able; it is institutionally self-aggrandizing because only sociologists are thought ca-
pable of such analysis, as opposed, in particular, to philosophers; it is reductive be-
cause it suppresses mixity of, and exchange between, high and low cultures and be-
tween oppressed and oppressors [...]; it is deterministic because it assumes that so-
cial milieu determines taste, thought, feeling and potential and thus, surprisingly 
given its progressive reputation, it renews Plato’s autocratic and hereditary model of 
a society in which [...] individuals stay put in the places into which they have been 
born. Finally, it is practically (politically) ineffective because it is ‘depressing’, a di-
agnosis of social injustice which sees this as so powerful and all-encompassing as to 
be beyond the redress for which the analysis ostensibly calls. (23) 
 
Not accepting “Bourdieu’s display of self-awareness as mitigation for the 
untenable paradox of his institutional position” (24) and his critique of elit-
ism, Rancière considers Bourdieu’s work a “sophisticated scam which pre-
serves pedagogical privilege and inequality by purporting to analyse it” 
(24-25). In his own words (with reference to Bourdieu and Passeron’s 
Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture): “What can one do with a 
science of the school that says pedagogy is impossible? With a science of 
relations of power that says these are infrangible?” (Philosopher 180). 
What is at stake in this legitimate polemics, again, is the relationship be-
tween social science and emancipation. 
 
The symbolic struggles of the distinguished élite escape the non-sense of pure com-
petition because they define themselves as separate from the primary economy of a 
people affected solely by the movement upon itself of Parmenidian Marxism, by the 
eternal reproduction of the relations of production. An infra-world of the pure adhe-
sion of the popular body to itself, with no other possible judgment than a love of fate 
which resembles fate, and with no other thinkable symbolic than marks of virility—
that is to say, of reproduction. What distinguishes this generalized capitalism is 
therefore its Marxist unconscious: a “class struggle” functioning only at the price of 
not leaving to the classes a point where they could ever meet. (195) 
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While Rancière’s anti-sociological bias and extraordinary faith in the per-
formative side-effects of sociological discourse must be considered prob-
lematic, his polemics against the very lack of a political conception of 
emancipation not only in Bourdieu’s sociology but in what he terms 
“Parmenidian Marxism” is compelling, at least from the point of view of a 
theory of politics. 
Rather than relying, in Althusser’s terms, on the power of ideological 
state apparatuses (ISA) to interpellate individuals into subject positions and 
thus reproduce the relations of production, Rancière insists that “what 
guarantees that appearances remain as they are is the power of circulation 
itself; the ‘police’ want us to continue to see things as we are accustomed to 
seeing them,” to operate, in other words, with the same ideo-affective 
standards of perception and signification that are already in place (Panagia 
299; cf. Rancière, “Dissensus” 37-40). Following Davide Panagia, it can be 
argued that Rancière’s “disagreement” (mésentente) is nothing less than a 
performative “interruption of the indexical competence of human 
knowledge [and] disruption in the correspondences between perception and 
signification” that would amount to a social and aesthetic de-classification 
(300). A de-classification, that is, which would radically (self-)transform 
the habitus of the sans-part but without, as it were, a change of field. This 
is also why aesthetic appropriation is crucial to Rancière’s idea of (the logic 
of) revolt and emancipation. To put it crudely, Bourdieusian sociological 
analysis of symbolic violence and distinction is itself a mode/part of sym-
bolic violence and distinction, the science of social domination is itself a 
mode/part of social domination. For in its reliance on the epistemology of 
“misrecognition” (méconnaissance) it reinscribes discursively and thus 
helps reproduce the social division of labor. 
 
 
ANTI-BLACK “POLICE”:  
DEPOLITICIZATION AND STATE RACISM 
 
It is tempting to use Rancièrean key concepts to theorize race and racism in 
terms of an anti-black “distribution of the sensible” and anti-black “police,” 
which at least would have the benefit of avoiding the quasi-essentializing 
notions of (anti-)blackness and (critical) whiteness. But what exactly is at 
stake in this theoretical war of maneuver? For Rancière, the ‘dominant 
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ideology’ today (although he never uses the term explicitly) can be said to 
be one of depoliticization (or saturation). The suturing logic of “the police” 
aims at a de facto positivization of the entire social sphere. And we may 
add that this kind of consensual police “distribution” is fundamentally 
aligned with the needs of global capital, which can always return to or rein-
vent new forms of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 159-65), and 
with the power of race-making institutions from slavery and apartheid to 
the (hyper-)ghetto and the prison. In the United States, what Loïc 
Wacquant has called the “neoliberal government of social insecurity” has 
severely weakened the “Left hand” and greatly empowered the “Right 
hand” of the state in order to “regulate” the effects of economic deregula-
tion and welfare state retrenchment by way of “wedding restrictive ‘work-
fare’ and expansive ‘prisonfare’” (287).  
In the face of these developments, a sociological analysis of “symbolic 
power” is increasingly rendered obsolete by drastic austerity measures, 
state repression, and police violence. The neoliberal state’s increasingly au-
thoritarian response to poverty and economic crisis particularly affects ra-
cialized surplus populations and undocumented workers, and specifically 
Blacks and Latinos in the United States. Here, Joshua Clover’s historical 
materialist theory of the dialectical relation between labor strikes and riots 
and its significance for “the new era of uprisings” – from Watts, Newark, 
Detroit to Oakland, Ferguson, Baltimore and beyond – puts a spotlight on 
the interaction of class domination and racism by asking how we are to 
think the racialization of the riot (especially in the U.S.), thus focusing on 
what is, in fact, a global problem of racialized surplus populations – from 
laid-off workers and prison populations (not just) in the Global North to 
refugees and slum dwellers (not just) in the Global South (cf. Clover 153-
74). Judging from the perspective of the longue durée, it seems mistaken to 
even try to disentangle race and class relations, unless both race and class 
are understood merely in a vulgar sociological or culturalist sense. Rather, 
as Stuart Hall put it in 1980, “race” appears to be “the modality in which 
class is ‘lived’” (341). Mutatis mutandis, it should be considered reductive, 
if not outright racist, to identify the contemporary uprisings mentioned 
above as “race riots” rather than “circulation struggles” (Clover 175) of 
racialized surplus populations that are effectively disrupting the “police dis-
tribution” of (not just) the sensible. 
270 | DENNIS BÜSCHER-ULBRICH 
It has been argued by some that Rancière’s critical thinking is ignorant 
of race and racism, which indeed it rarely addresses due to its focus on the 
universality of dis-identification and disagreement. In a more recent essay, 
however, Rancière identifies racism as “a passion from above,” focusing on 
the logic of the neoliberal state.  
 
Today’s racism is [...] primarily a logic of the state and not a popular passion. And 
this state logic is primarily supported not by who knows what backward social 
groups but by a substantial part of the intellectual elite. [...] The invocation of uni-
versality in fact advances its opposite: the establishment of a discretionary state 
power that decides who belongs and who doesn’t belong to the class of those who 
have the right to be here; the power, in short, to confer and remove identities. That 
power has its correlate: the power to oblige individuals to be identifiable at all times, 
to keep themselves in a space of full visibility before the state. [… A] lot of energy 
has been spent against a certain figure of racism—embodied in the Front National—
and a certain idea that this racism is the expression of “white trash” [...] and repre-
sents the backward layers of society. A substantial part of that energy has been recu-
perated to build the legitimacy of a new form of racism: state racism and “Leftist” 
intellectual racism. It is perhaps time to reorient our thinking and struggle against a 
theory and practice of stigmatization, precarization, and exclusion which today con-
stitutes a racism from above: a logic of the state and a passion of the intelligentsia. 
(“Racism”) 
 
As Adolph Reed has stringently argued, it is “particularly important at this 
moment to recognize that the familiar taxonomy of racial difference is but 
one historically specific instance of a genus of ideologies of ascriptive hier-
archy that stabilize capitalist social reproduction” (53). Reed notes that “en-
tirely new race-like taxonomies could come to displace the familiar ones: 
For instance, the ‘underclass’ could become even more race-like as a dis-
tinctive, essentialized population” (53). After all, anti-racism and gender 
equality “are now also incorporated into the normative and programmatic 
structure” of a progressive neoliberalism, inasmuch as the “[r]igorous pur-
suit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of given pat-
terns of capitalist class relations [...] has been fully legitimized within the 
rubric of ‘diversity’” (53).  
In the face of the specifically U.S. American dilemma of anti-black 
racism and police, there may be more to be gained from Reed’s and 
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Wacquant’s analysis than from Rancière’s, which is closely bound to the 
French national situation. Leaving the detailed sociological analysis of “the 
police” behind and assuming its logic to be more or less universal, 
Rancière’s post-Althusserian theory polemically reclaims the notion of 
politics and inquires into the conditions of (im-)possibility of the emer-
gence of a political subject. By rethinking politics exclusively from the per-
spective of the sans-part, while sidelining both the critique of ideology and 
the sociological analysis of modes of recuperation into power (not to men-
tion the bracketing of Marxian critique of political economy) Rancière thus 
pits the sequence of desubjectification and political subjectivation constitu-
tive of emancipatory politics against the determinations of Bourdieu’s habi-
tus-field theory and analysis of symbolic power – as he did against 
Althusser’s account of ideological “hailing” and the material-symbolic 
force of ideological “interpellation.” It is crucial to note, however, that 
Rancière does not simply reject the latter but re-conceptualizes it as a kind 
of non-interpellation: “Move along, there is nothing to see here!” (Dissen-




THE PARALLAX OF POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
Thus rejecting social science, Rancière instead provides an anti-essentialist 
and economically non-deterministic theory of political subjectivity, begin-
ning with the paradoxical Marxian notion of the proletariat as a “class” that 
entails “the dissolution of all classes” that we find in the Young Marx’s 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, noting that the emergence of a po-
litical subject proper that addresses an inaugural “wrong” (Disagreement 
21 f.; Politics 84, 93) and engages in politics as “the polemical verification 
of equality” (Politics 86) is necessarily accompanied by the creation of 
symbolic “operators of declassification” (“Democracy” 287; also cf. Dis-
agreement 35 ff.). Given Rancière’s declared intention to theorize and “re-
interpret class struggle from a political point of view” (“Democracy” 289), 
it is obvious that he avoids “the metapolitical affirmation according to 
which the system is endowed with a truth that has its own effectivity” (Dis-
sensus 88).  
272 | DENNIS BÜSCHER-ULBRICH 
In contradistinction to (Platonic) “archi-politics,” (Aristotelian) “para-
politics,” and (Marxian) “meta-politics,” democratic politics proper 
 
always comes as a kind of exception to the way in which, generally, communities 
are gathered, it comes as an interruption. There are factual communities, grounded in 
the power of birth or money, and there is politics as the process of challenging the 
meaning of these factual communities through the operation of declassification. 
(“Democracy” 291)2  
                                                   
2 Rancière develops this idea at its most elaborate in Disagreement, arguing that 
political philosophy has conceived of these three scenarios to forestall the demo-
cratic event of politics proper (cf. 61-94). It is no coincidence that these scenari-
os align neatly with Rancière’s genealogy of historical regimes of the identifica-
tion of art, enabling a shuttling back and forth between political theory and aes-
thetic theory, labor/social history and art history. The following excerpt from his 
2005 interview with Historical Materialism clarifies Rancière’s use of Marx: 
“In the young Marx, there is a kind of debasement of politics, politics for him 
being only superstructural appearance, and the real thing being the subterranean 
process of class war. I tried to overturn the position by appropriating for myself 
the enigmatic sentence of the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right where he writes that the proletariat is a class of society that is not a 
class of society, and is actually a ‘class’ that entails the dissolution of all classes. 
The question is: what does this mean, how do you think of this class which is 
not a class? In the same text, Marx makes the proletariat akin to a kind of chemi-
cal or biological idea of dissolution. The proletariat is thought as the process of 
the decomposition of old classes. From this point on, Marxism oscillated be-
tween a negative idea of class as dissolution and a positive idea of class as iden-
tity. And, ultimately, this second sense, the proletariat as a positive class of la-
bour, obviously became the mainstream sense of class in Marxism. I tried to put 
differently this process of ‘dissolution’. It is not a matter of the historical and 
quasi-biological decomposition of old classes. I rather think this dissolution as a 
symbolic function of declassing. The class that is not a class thus becomes an 
operator of declassification. The proletariat is no longer a part of society but is, 
rather, the symbolic inscription of ‘the part of those who have no part’, a sup-
plement which separates the political community from any count of the parts of 
a society. The idea of the dissolving class can thus give the concept of what con-
stitutes a political subject” (“Democracy” 287, my emphasis). 
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Rancière thus reconceptualizes class struggle “as the power of de-
classification,” resisting simultaneously Marxist orthodoxies and the “re-
placement of the proletariat by a multiplicity of minorities” in favor of “the 
universality of disidentification” (289). Hence, 
 
[w]hat is important in politics as class struggle is political subjectification, that is, 
not only the fact of the action of minorities, the action of groups, but the creation of 
what I call empty names of subjects. What was the proletariat? The proletariat was 
an empty name for a subject – for anyone, for counting anyone. (289) 
 
Politics, for Rancière, creates “empty names of subjects” for counting any-
one, including the sans-part. The collective subject of politics, identifying 
with the point of exclusion in a hierarchical order, thus functions as a po-
lemical concrete universal.  
From the Greek demos to the East German crowd’s chanting “We are 
the people!” in 1989 and the protesters on the streets of Cairo or Tunis in 
the “Arab spring” of 2011, “the people” (as opposed to the ethnic-
nationalist Volk) has “stood for universality not because it covered the ma-
jority of the population, nor simply because it occupied the lowest place 
within the social hierarchy, but because it had no proper place within this 
hierarchy” (Ticklish Subject 224-25). It is “a site of conflicting, self-
canceling determinations […] of performative contradictions” (225) or 
what Rancière calls “a supernumerary subject in relation to the calculated 
number of groups, places, and functions in a society” (Politics 51). The Oc-
cupy movement’s “We are the 99 percent!” and the more recent “Black 
Lives Matter!” also essentially function in the same way. In both cases the 
solidary identification with the point of exclusion – or exploitation and op-
pression – in a hierarchical order, combined with the denunciation of a 
“wrong,” opens onto a radical universality.  
The problem with such a ground-clearing post-Marxist account of ‘pure 
politics,’ of course, is that it sits uneasily with the Marxian emphasis on 
both the internal contradictions of capital accumulation and the constitutive 
social antagonism also known as “class struggle.” What anti-economic po-
litical theory thus fails to address is the politico-economic form of the social. 
For Žižek, however, “[t]he relationship between economy and politics is ul-
timately that of the well-known visual paradox of ‘two faces or a vase’: one 
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sees either two faces or a vase, never both—one has to make a choice” 
(Parallax View 56).  
Following Žižek, Rancière’s political critique of Marxism and sociolo-
gy thus needs to be “supplemented by its obverse: the field of economy is 
in its very form irreducible to politics – this level of the form of economy 
(of economy as the determining form of the social) is what French ‘political 
post-Marxists’ miss when they reduce economy to one of the positive social 
spheres” (56). Intertwined with this onto-epistemological “parallax,” then, 
are the pressing questions of what material and symbolic constraints on 
subjectivity and agency exist today that help reproduce a consensual post-
political formation. If the “police” order’s most effective means of fore-
stalling “politics” in our time of post-political consensus is indeed, as 
Rancière claims, a non-interpellation of the subject – the inverted form of 
Althusser’s “hey, you there!” that takes the form of the “move along, there 
is nothing to see!”3 – then this also implies the rather successful reproduc-
tion of said order by way of consensual discourse and social practice. In 
other words: an ideo-affective formation ‘securing’ the depoliticization of 
appearances by positing “an identity between sense and sense” (Corcoran 
2). Rancière suggests to rethink this without relying on the notion of power 
(Bourdieu) and outside of the critique of political economy (Marx).  
As Marx knew very well, though, political-economic conditions are 
never absolutely determining. Rather they suggest both possibilities and 
limits. The field of social contest is held in tension, dialectically, by both 
the capacity of humans to “make their own history” and circumstances 
“given and transmitted from the past” (329). It is because of the tension be-
tween these forces, between agency and determination, that we find multi-
ple forms of collective action within a given conjuncture rather than mo-
ments of ‘pure’ politics. At the same time, as emphasized by Clover in his 
historical materialist theory of the riot, “because a given set of conditions 
tilts one way and not another, one among the forms of action will tend to 
become the leading tactic” (105).  
John Roberts has further pointed out that Rancière’s “quasi-
poststructuralist flight from externally ‘imposed’ notions of ‘collectivity’, 
                                                   
3 “The police say that there is nothing to see on the road, there is nothing to do but 
move along. It asserts that the space of circulation is nothing other than the 
space of circulation” (Chronicles 37).  
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‘unity’, ‘identity’ and ‘political action’ may take the fight to those self-
deluding forces on the left (and right) that assume such notions as unprob-
lematically good things” (78); while Hallward argues that Rancière’s 
“trenchant egalitarianism seems all too compatible with a certain degree of 
social resignation” (126). Rancière believes that politics “shatters any divi-
sion between those who are deemed able and those who are not” (Politics 
202). “But,” Hallward asks, “is the old relation of theory and praxis, intel-
lectual and worker, so easily resolved? Does political action no longer need 
to be informed by a detailed understanding of how the contemporary world 
works, how exploitation operates, how transnational corporations go about 
their business?” (127). Hallward’s criticism of Rancière’s indifference to-
ward a theory of revolutionary practice (strategies and tactics) ends on the 
following note, though: “In the field of recent critical theory, there are few 
better illustrations of [a decisive commitment necessary to art and politics 
that is itself organized, unequivocal, categorical, and combative] than the 
consistency and resolve that have over the last three decades characterized 
the development of Rancière’s own project” (129). 
However, we may also argue that at a time when anti-black policing 
and murder at the hand of the state is fundamentally disavowed and primar-
ily attributed (by a significant number of black conservatives and tea party 
republicans) to ‘black-on-black’ crime, a time when ‘sociological excuses’ 
are already under attack from the neoliberal and neoconservative Right, the 
belated Anglo-American academic reception and rise to fame of Rancière’s 
egalitarian critique seems rather untimely. Even more so as those engaged 
in the present wave of “circulation struggles” (Clover 129) and “commu-
nization” currents are not at all ‘enthralled’ by Marxist scientism or soci-
ology. As Nathan Brown writes in his critical reassessment of “the lesson” 
of both Althusser and Rancière:  
 
Real history returns, and with it a renewed intensity to debates over the relation be-
tween theory and politics. But the theoretical articulation of history’s real movement 
doesn’t pass through The Emancipated Spectator, darling of Artforum and the 
Venice Biennale. […] From the Red Years following May ‘68 to the reddening of the 
twenty-first century, the impasse that [Théorie Communiste] finds a way through, in 
my opinion, is precisely that which Rancière reproaches Althusser for walking into. 
[… Theory] cannot ‘guide’ a revolutionary movement by telling the proletariat what 
it should have done differently or what it should do now. Theory can, however, 
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compare, analyse, synthesize, periodize and arrive at a tendential and structural ac-
count of the concrete situations in which we are historically and geographically im-
mersed. It can do so in a way that emerges from particular struggles, and this can 
help us to situate those struggles in relation to a movement that traverses and ex-
ceeds them, a real movement that cannot be guided by ‘a general line’ or prescrip-
tions from party philosophers. Nor will any effort to situate our struggles be aided by 
what Rancière has to offer: an abdication of structural analysis and a theory of poli-
tics as the unaccountable interruption of ‘a freedom that crops up and makes real the 
ultimate equality on which any social order rests’ […]. This is a theory of the rela-
tion between politics and ‘the police’, as a game of whack-a-mole. (“Red Years” 23, 
original emphasis) 
 
Because the critique of political economy is fundamentally “bound up with 
the Marxist analytic of value and valorization” (namely “the production, 
self-presupposition, and expanded reproduction of capital that is called ‘ac-
cumulation’”), Brown concludes (in an article for Mute) that “Rancière is 
not a Marxist.” He is right to note that “Rancière’s approach to the figure of 
‘the worker,’ throughout his corpus, proceeds exclusively from the perspec-
tive of the labour process, ignoring the valorisation process.” Rancière is 
therefore ill-equipped to think the “distribution of the insensible,” the 
movement of valorization, and thus “misses entirely the dimension of polit-
ical economy in his thinking of politics.” This, of course, is precisely the 
point of Rancière’s strategic anti-sociology and anti-economic theory of 
politics. Its general objective, as rightfully noted by Jean-Philippe Deranty, 
is “to bring class struggle into logos” (17, original emphasis) – for the sake 
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